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PART VII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

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April to June 1921.

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PART VII.

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PART VII.

CHAPTER I—THE CAUCASUS.

No. 1.

[R 4376/23/58]

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 346.)

Constantinople, April 6, 1921.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter, dated the 27th March, 1921, which I have received from the Armenian diplomatic representative in Constantinople, enclosing a memorandum of information relative to the present situation in the Armenian Republic, which has been supplied by Armenian officials who have escaped from the Caucasus to Constantinople.

2. The delegate of the Armenian Patriarchate had already drawn the attention of this High Commission to the imminent danger of famine in the Erivan region and to the existence of abundant foodstuffs in the neighbouring district of North-Western Persia, and he has been advised to approach the American Committee for Relief in the Near East with a view to making the necessary arrangements for utilising this source of supply.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Armenian Representative to Sir H. Rumbold.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Constantinople, le 27 mars 1921.

FAISANT suite à mes deux précédentes communications, j'ai l'honneur de soumettre ci-après, en traduction, quelques notes qui m'ont été données par d'anciennes personnalités officielles, venant du Caucase et se trouvant actuellement en cette ville.

Ainsi que votre Excellence voudra bien le relever de la lecture de ces notes, la crise alimentaire sera bientôt suivie d'une famine épouvantable en Arménie, si l'on n'arrive pas à notre secours du dehors, en ravitaillant notre peuple dans la mesure du possible.

Notre pays est nettoyé des bolcheviks, mais on y est menacé des horreurs de la famine.

En soumettant cet envoi à la bienveillante attention de votre Excellence, j'ai, &c.

F. TALITADJIAN.

Memorandum on the present Situation in Armenia.

(Translation.)

ATTACHEMENT DE LA K... et ses... par les
f... et... la... et... et...
... et...
...
partagé entre les K... et... ayant occupé Kars et
A...

La domination des bolcheviks en Arménie n'a pas duré plus de trois mois, pendant lesquels il n'y eut que violences, pillages et toutes sortes d'exactions. Les bolcheviks commencèrent leurs déprédations par mater toutes les forces intellectuelles militaires et autres du pays, en opérant des arrestations et des déportations en masse. Plus de 1 000 officiers arméniens, y compris plusieurs généraux, furent arrêtés et déportés. En même temps, les bolcheviks désorganisèrent de fond en comble les conditions économiques du pays, déjà fort ébranlée, en enlevant tout ce qui leur est tombé sous la main, sans épargner les bêtes et le dernier blé du paysan arménien.

Ils vidèrent les dépôts du Gouvernement contenant de la farine du lait condensé, des manufactures, des étoffes, du coton, du cognac (fabriqué dans le pays), etc., pour expédier tout en Russie ou en Azerbeïdjan. Ils s'adonnaient à leurs pillages et dévastations avec tant de brutalité que le peuple arménien reconnaissait en les bolcheviks les pires des tyrans et ne pensait plus qu'aux moyens de s'en débarrasser, à quelque prix que cela fût.

Quoique très fatigué et épuisé par l'état de guerre durant depuis sept ans et par toutes les misères qui en découlèrent, le peuple arménien ne pouvait guère tolérer plus longtemps le régime destructeur des bolchevika.

Ainsi qu'on le sait déjà par les radios reçues d'Erivan, le 17 février dernier, le peuple s'est soulevé comme un seul homme, pour renverser la tyrannie bolcheviste.

Ne pouvant résister au torrent impétueux du peuple soulevé contre le joug

$$\frac{1}{\Gamma(\alpha)} \int_0^t (t-\tau)^{\alpha-1} f(\tau) d\tau = \mathcal{I}^\alpha f(t) \quad (t \geq 0) \quad (1)$$

Un Gouvernement légitime sous forme d'un Comité de Salut ayant à sa tête M. Vratzian, ancien Président du Conseil, s'y est de suite substitué.

L'ancien comité organisa immédiatement la lutte contre les bolchevika, lutte qui donna les meilleurs résultats. Les troupes soviétiques attaquèrent, à trois reprises différentes, Erivan, pour être chaque fois repoussées après des combats sanglants. Des combats acharnés eurent lieu du côté d'Etchmiadzin, de Dilijan et de Novo-Bayazet. La lutte fut particulièrement opiniâtre à proximité du couvent historique d'Etchmiadzin, résidence du chef suprême de l'Eglise arménienne. D'après un radio d'Erivan du 9 mars, les héros tombés dans la bataille en ces saints lieux furent solennellement enterrés dans l'enceinte même du couvent d'Etchmiadzin, en présence du Catholikos.

Nous espérons fermement que l'Arménie sera bientôt entièrement nettoyée des bolcheviks; d'autant plus que, d'après nos renseignements, des renforts venant du Karabagh et de Zangéhour et ayant à leur tête M. Terminassian, ancien Ministre de la Guerre, sont déjà en marche vers Erivan.

Il peut même se faire que ces renforts soient déjà à Envan.

Aussi l'objet principal de nos inquiétudes en ce moment, c'est la crise financière et alimentaire qui règne en Arménie. Les bolcheviks avant fait le vide autour d'eux, notre peuple se trouve sous le coup d'une famine imminente, et cette fois-ci la situation sera d'autant plus catastrophique, que le pays est coupé du dehors. Voilà pourquoi, nous sommes dans des trances chaque fois que nous pensons que, malgré les succès remportés sur les bolcheviks, la crise alimentaire et financière peut amener le naufrage de notre indépendance et de notre avenir.

Le nouveau Gouvernement est entré en lutte contre les bolcheviks sans la moindre réserve de blé et sans ressources pécuniaires, étant donné que les bolcheviks n'avaient rien laissé dans le pays.

La crise est tellement aiguë que si le paysan arménien qui se bat en ce moment pour sa liberté n'est pas ravitaillé du dehors jusqu'au 15-20 avril, et si le Gouvernement continue à être sans ressources, le premier mourra d'inanition, tandis que le second en sera réduit à lâcher la défense de sa juste cause.

Le blé existe en abondance dans le khanat de Makou, mais il faut qu'il y soit

acheté par l'entremise d'Européens et expédié en Arménie; quant à l'argent, il peut être envoyé via Téhéran, Tauris et Zanghezour.

On pourrait aussi agir par voie diplomatique à Angora et à M.-scou, en vue d'ouvrir pour ces transports la voie de Batoum-Tiflis-Alexandropol et Erivan. Nous nous dispensons de nous arrêter plus longtemps sur les voies et communications, étant donné que si, comme nous l'espérons, les grandes Puissances alliées sont animées du désir de venir à l'aide de l'Arménie affamée luttant contre les bolcheviks, il ne leur sera pas très difficile d'aviser aux moyens nécessaires pour atteindre le but.

En vous priant, M. le Représentant, de vouloir bien communiquer ces notes à leurs Excellences les Hauts-Commissaires des Puissances alliées à Constantinople, nous avons, &c

Constantinople, le 23 mars 1921

E 4625 56 58]

No. 2

Consul Stecens to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Barren, April 9, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that the following information has reached me by the Italian steamship "Georgio" in regard to events at Batumi since the withdrawal of Kennalist forces and the occupation of the town by Bolshevik troops. The particulars have been obtained from private, but thoroughly reliable, sources.

2. It would appear that after the events which took place at Batum on the night of the 17th-18th March, when quite a number of stores were entered into and the goods they contained were looted by armed bands of various nationalities, the Kemalists, who had been invited to enter the town by the Georgian Government, were compelled to withdraw in the face of military operations undertaken by superior Bolshevik and Georgian troops combined.

3. On the occupation of the town by the Bolsheviks, Soviet government was proclaimed and a Russian workman named Pertzoff, who since the outbreak of the revolution was always a leading spirit in all movements of a revolutionary character and caused some trouble to our Administration during the British occupation which led to his being deported from Batumi, was nominated President of the Revolutionary Committee that now administers all the affairs of the town. Apparently he is the only Russian commissar, all his subordinates being Georgians. Pertzoff, who is a fitter by profession, although uneducated, has shown common sense in most of his doings. He is reported to be level-headed, tolerant, moderate and fairly just in his decisions, which are invariably well considered before being taken.

4. Houses and apartments are being requisitioned for military purposes and all the best premises vacated by refugees have been occupied by the various commissars for their personal use and that of their offices. My residence has been taken by the commander of the Bolshevik troops.

5. The Soviet authorities at Tiflis and Batumi are stated to be inclined to enter into trade relations with the Turkish provinces of Trabzon, Van, Bitlis and Diyarbakir on conditions which are to form the subject of special discussion between them and would-be traders.

In connection with the foregoing, considerable activity on the part of the Italians, who have been well in the Caucasian field all along, is to be expected.

6. I have been unable to obtain figures as to the exact number of troops now at the disposal of the Bolsheviks at Batum. They are, however, reported to be considerable. The cavalry is stated to be well maintained, uniformed, otherwise equipped and horsed. Their artillery is said to be good, but their infantry regiments are much criticised and chiefly consist of undisciplined youths of bad moral who are stated to be mostly in rage.

There is some talk of an onward movement of Bolshevik forces across the river Tchorokh into Turkish territory being in contemplation. I have, however, no means of verifying this information, nor am I in a position to furnish particulars in regard to the units that are to be employed in the proposed expedition.

I have, &c

P. STEVENS

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 20)

My Lord,

London, April 20 1921

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report on events in Georgia which led to the withdrawal of my mission from that country.

On the 12th February the Bolsheviks suddenly attacked the Georgian troops which in scattered detachments were occupying the portion of the Borchalinsk district claimed by both Armenia and Georgia and known as the neutral zone. Simultaneously, anti-Georgian risings occurred in several places in this zone, and such Georgian detachments as were not cut off withdrew to the northern boundary of the zone. The attack was made by Armenian and Russian Bolshevik troops. The inhabitants of the zone who attacked the Georgians were Molokans and Armenians, amongst whom it was known that active Bolshevik propaganda had been conducted for some time.

On the 15th February the Georgian troops, having received reinforcements, made a counter-attack on the Bolsheviks in the neighbourhood of Sadakhlo and met with some success, but an attack by Bolsheviks at Poili and Red Bridge, which resulted in their crossing to the Georgian side of the river Kura, compelled the Georgian troops at Sadakhlo to fall back. The entire Georgian forces then took up a line running from Kosalo to Bolshoi Muganlo, thence west along the river Kham. This line was not intended to be held permanently, and during the night the Georgian troops fell back to the line of the foothills some 10 versts to the north. Here they were attacked on the morning of the 16th February, and repulsed the Bolsheviks. The attack was renewed on the night of the 16th-17th February, and the Georgian line penetrated. News of this event reached the Georgian Government at an early hour on the morning of the 17th February, and at 3.15 A.M. I was awakened by a representative of the Georgian Foreign Office, who informed me that the Government had decided to evacuate Tiflis, and that all foreign missions should also leave. He added that a train would leave at 7 A.M. Immediate steps were taken to warn all British subjects and others who had compromised themselves in Bolshevik eyes by working in our interests. As the representative of the Georgian Foreign Office had informed me that the Bolsheviks were only 12 versts from Tiflis, and that I was only some ten to twelve miles distant, I decided to burn practically all my archives, cyphers and a few important documents excepted. This was carried out in a short time. Thanks to the zeal and energy of my staff, about half the persons to be evacuated were sent off by a train which left at about 10.30 A.M., accompanied by half of my staff. The remainder of the mission and persons to be evacuated reached the railway station with me a few minutes later. The town was perfectly quiet, and complete order prevailed at the station despite the large number of people who wished to obtain places in any train leaving Tiflis.

The British colony received but short warning to prepare to leave Tiflis. I had carefully considered the question of warning them from the time the Bolshevik troops entered Georgian territory on 12th February. I decided not to issue any warning, as such warning would certainly become known in a short time and might easily start a panic. The short notice given is undoubtedly the cause of some members of the British colony having to leave behind much of their personal property. This I greatly regret, but I consider that in the circumstances it was unavoidable. News from the front was now received that the Georgians had re-established their line, and that there was no immediate danger. The Government decided to await further news and take a final decision in the afternoon as to their staying or leaving. Favourable reports continued to be received during the day, and at 7 P.M. I was officially informed that the Government had decided to stay. I was asked what I proposed to do. I decided to go to Batoum myself, leaving Mr. Rooker and Captain Court behind when volunteered to remain before I mentioned the matter to them. In taking this decision I was influenced by the following considerations:—

- (a) The necessity of keeping in communication with London. My cyphers had already gone in the last train to Batoum.
- (b) The disposal of the British colony, half of whom had already gone and the other half were about to go to Batoum, necessitated my presence in Batoum.

The French representative decided to go to Batoum, but the Italian and German representatives remained at Tiflis.

Our train left Tiflis at 1.30 A.M. on the 18th February, and owing to the inferior quality of the coal used in the engines, did not reach Batoum until the 20th February. I was then able to get into telegraphic communication with Mr. Rooker at Tiflis. The reported position of the Georgian troops on the 13th was 13 miles south-east of Tiflis and repulsed a cavalry attack on Boroblo. On the 18th February, at 2 A.M., the enemy delivered an attack in force on both sides of the Kura river. Their main attack, on the west bank, succeeded in penetrating to the outskirts of Tiflis itself, when it was stopped by the Georgian artillery. The Georgians then delivered a vigorous counter-attack and drove the enemy back. A flanking detachment of the enemy, consisting of two Armenian battalions and a cavalry brigade, however, had succeeded in occupying Kajuri. Fighting continued here on the 19th and 20th February, and on the latter day on the Telaf railway some 12 to 15 miles east of Tiflis. In the fighting described above the Georgians captured over 2,000 prisoners, their own casualties being reported as slight.

On 19th February a wireless message received at Tiflis from Erevan announced that the Bolshevik Government in Armenia had been overthrown and a Provisional Government formed under the Presidency of M. Vratsian.

On the 20th February, in the fighting near Tiflis, the Bolshevik troops penetrated the Georgian line, but a vigorous counter attack drove them back with the loss of four guns, eight machine-guns, numerous prisoners and horses. The Bolsheviks then withdrew several versts. The Georgian troops fought very well, and thousands of volunteers came forward, but the Government had no arms to give them. There was no serious fighting on the Tiflis front on the 21st, 22nd or 23rd February. Meanwhile, on the 22nd February the Georgian Government received from the Turkish Nationalists a demand to evacuate immediately the districts of Ardahan and Artvin. To this demand the Georgian Government was compelled to accede.

On the 22nd February the Georgians were attacked in two fresh directions, viz., on the Darial Pass and at Pelinkovo near Gagri. The Georgians succeeded in repulsing all attacks on the Darial Pass on the 22nd and again on the 23rd, but at Pelinkovo, despite the assistance of French warships which bombarded the Bolsheviks, the Georgians were driven back and, evacuating Gagri, retired to the river Bzib.

On the 24th February the Bolsheviks renewed their attack on the Tiflis front. I am sorry to say that the Bolsheviks were able to get round the Georgian line from a subordinate commander stating that a Bolshevik cavalry division had got round to the west of Tiflis and astride the railway line led to the Georgians deciding to withdraw from their positions and evacuate Tiflis. This was carried out during the night of the 24th-25th February unmolested by the Bolsheviks. Reliable information which has since come to hand shows that only 200 enemy cavalry had got round in rear of the Georgian line, and that the Georgian withdrawal came as a great surprise to the Bolsheviks, whose attacks had been repulsed after severe fighting.

Although Mr. Rooker had left Tiflis on the 18th I continued to have Tiflis in still in telegraphic communication with Tiflis during the 25th February, and received information that the Bolshevik troops had entered and occupied the town.

On the 26th February Mr. Rooker telegraphed to me from Kutais his arrival there with one of the Georgian Ministers. The remainder of the Government was with the general staff in rear of the army which was holding a position at Mahket.

On this day on the Gagri front the Bolshevik troops were reported to be at Novo Atios. As Sukhum was thus threatened, the British subjects there were withdrawn to Batoum.

During the 26th and 27th February the Georgian forces withdrew unmolested from Mahket to Gori, and on the 28th day continued their withdrawal to a strong position at Suram. The Bolsheviks made no immediate attempt to follow up the Georgians, but Bolshevik cavalry was reported at Gori on the 1st March. The Georgians were meanwhile consolidating their position at Suram.

At this time the Turks occupied the province of Ardahan and the town of Artvin, but there was as yet no sign of an advance towards Batoum. Although, with Georgian permission, their troops moved from Khora to Artvin via Borchka, the Bolsheviks now invaded Georgia at a fresh point, 300 of them crossing the Mamison Pass and advancing to Oni.

On the 28th February I took advantage of the departure of H.M.S. "Calypso" to send in her to Constantinople about half of the British colony.

On the 3rd March, at the request of the Georgian Minister of the Interior, I went to Kutais to discuss the situation. This appeared to be satisfactory on the main or Suram front, where the Georgians had made a short advance, encountered Bolshevik infantry and taken some prisoners. On the Sukhum front the situation was not satisfactory, as the Georgians had evacuated Sukhum and retired to the line of the river Mohva, while in the Oni sector it was dangerous, three Bolshevik regiments having been identified there. On the 4th March I found the Georgian Minister for Foreign Affairs confident, but events on the next day took an unfavourable turn, and the Government decided on the 6th March to move with the foreign missions to Batoum. On the Suram front a battalion of the National Guard had left its position without firing a shot and the Bolsheviks had captured Suram station. From Oni the Bolsheviks had advanced a considerable way along the road to Kutais and on the Black Sea coast the Georgians had retired to Ochencheri.

I returned to Batoum on the 7th March accompanied by Mr Rooker. I learnt that the Georgian Government had invited the Turkish Nationalists to occupy Batoum province with their troops on condition that the Georgian Government should continue to exist and its civil administration be carried on.

On the 8th March the Georgians held a line near Marilisi station on their main front. On this day H.M.S. "Caradoc" left for Constantinople with the remainder of the British colony and others to be evacuated. The uncertainty of the situation, the improbability of the Georgians being able to continue fighting for long, and the doubtful attitude of the Turkish Nationalists, made it desirable to embark and send them off and not to retain any of them there unnecessarily.

On the 10th March I received a letter from Colonel Kiazim Bey, representing the Turkish Nationalists, for a joint Georgian-Turkish military occupation of Batoum province and the districts of Akhalsik and Akhalkalaki, the Turkish Nationalist representative, Colonel Kiazim Bey, informed the Georgian Government that Turkish troops would immediately occupy the districts and province named. As the continuance of my mission depended upon the continued existence of the Georgian Government I called upon Colonel Kiazim Bey and enquired what would be the status of the Georgian Government if the Turkish Nationalists occupied Batoum province. He replied that the Nationalists would occupy the districts and the forts round the town, but not the town itself, that the Georgian flag would continue to fly and the civil administration would remain in the hands of the Georgian Government. He added that the Georgian Government should cease fighting and leave the Turks and Bolsheviks to settle the question of the further advance of the latter. He added that the question of Batoum province was one which concerned Georgia and Turkey alone, and that his Government would accept the decision of a plebiscite.

On the 11th March Nationalist troops passed through Batoum. Except for the appearance of a number of Turkish flags on the houses of Mohammedans, the aspect of the town was unchanged. The Georgian troops, who had retired to the neighbourhood of Samtredi, considerably reduced in numbers owing to men deserting, although not to the enemy. The Georgian Government was now at Batoum. On this day the Georgian troops evacuated Kutais, which was occupied by the Bolsheviks, who had advanced from Oni, and the Georgian troops on the Black Sea coast retired from the Ingur line through Zugdidi. The entire Georgian army, numbering some 10,000 (excluding 5,000 in reserve in Batoum), were holding a line running from Rion railway station along the river Rion to Samtredi, thence along the railway to Poti.

The Bolshevik Government at Tiflis had for some time been endeavouring to enter into negotiations with the Georgian Government with a view to ceasing hostilities and forming a Coalition Government. It was not until now that the Georgian Government decided to negotiate. At the same time, a verbal reply given to the Georgian representative at Angora by the Turkish Nationalist Government agreeing to the occupation of Batoum province and the districts of Akhalsik and Akhalkalaki was received by the Georgian Government.

On the 13th March the Georgian line ran from Poti along the left bank of the river Rion to a point 5 versts south-south-west of Samtredi, thence south-east to Tsagubanie. The Bolsheviks were reported to have crossed the Rion south of Samtredi and to be advancing also against Poti, which they took the same day. On the 14th March an armistice was arranged with the Bolsheviks for twenty-four hours. This was indefinitely prolonged next day, and Georgian representatives were sent to

Samtredi to communicate with Tiflis regarding negotiations. These negotiations resulted on the 17th March in the Georgian Government deciding to leave Georgia and inviting the Bolsheviks to occupy the province and town of Batoum. This result was in great measure due to the arrival at Batoum of three Georgian Nationalists, sent by the Tiflis Bolshevik Government. Their argument, which the Georgian Government finally accepted, was that as all Georgians, Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik, agreed that Batoum was Georgian, it was preferable for the Georgian Government to hand over Batoum to Georgian Bolsheviks than to Turks.

The Georgian Government embarked on an Italian steamer late on the evening of the 17th March. By this time all foreign missions were on board their respective ships, except the French, who had left Batoum for Constantinople on the 11th March. Before embarking the Georgian Government informed its troops that it was going, and that they were free to do as they chose. General Masnief assumed command of the troops, who decided to side with the Bolsheviks. At the same time, the leading members of the former Bolshevik mission in Tiflis, who had been brought to Batoum as prisoners, were released. Some of these, under the leadership of Kasteradze, formed a Revolutionary Committee, and published a proclamation taking over Batoum in the name of the Bolsheviks. Simultaneously was published a proclamation by Colonel Kiazim Bey taking over Batoum town and province and appointing himself Governor-General. Apart from some looting in one quarter of the town by local hooligans, which was forcibly suppressed by troops, the town at large remained quiet. Attacks were, however, made by the Turks on the telegraph office and the railway station. The former they secured, but from the latter they were beaten off. On the outskirts of the town, where the Turks held the forts, fighting took place between Georgians and Turks, and continued until the afternoon without any decisive result. About 1,000 to 1,500 Russian Bolshevik troops arrived by train, but remained outside the town until fighting had ceased. They then marched into the town, but announced that they had no intention of taking part in the Georgian and Turkish conflict.

The British and French missions, who had been in Batoum, landed from the Italian steamer on which their passages had been booked and, in company with M. Shainemann, former Bolshevik representative in Georgia, left for Tiflis by train in the evening.

On the 19th March I received a letter from Colonel Kiazim Bey, representing the Turkish Nationalists, for a joint Georgian-Turkish military occupation of Batoum province and the districts of Akhalsik and Akhalkalaki, the Turkish Nationalist representative, Colonel Kiazim Bey, informed the Georgian Government that Turkish troops would immediately occupy the districts and province named. As the continuance of my mission depended upon the continued existence of the Georgian Government I called upon Colonel Kiazim Bey and enquired what would be the status of the Georgian Government if the Turkish Nationalists occupied Batoum province. He replied that the Nationalists would occupy the districts and the forts round the town, but not the town itself, that the Georgian flag would continue to fly and the civil administration would remain in the hands of the Georgian Government. He added that the Georgian Government should cease fighting and leave the Turks and Bolsheviks to settle the question of the further advance of the latter. He added that the question of Batoum province was one which concerned Georgia and Turkey alone, and that his Government would accept the decision of a plebiscite.

On the 24th March I received a letter from Colonel Kiazim Bey, representing the Turkish Nationalists, for a joint Georgian-Turkish military occupation of Batoum province and the districts of Akhalsik and Akhalkalaki, the Turkish Nationalist representative, Colonel Kiazim Bey, informed the Georgian Government that Turkish troops would immediately occupy the districts and province named. As the continuance of my mission depended upon the continued existence of the Georgian Government I called upon Colonel Kiazim Bey and enquired what would be the status of the Georgian Government if the Turkish Nationalists occupied Batoum province. He replied that the Nationalists would occupy the districts and the forts round the town, but not the town itself, that the Georgian flag would continue to fly and the civil administration would remain in the hands of the Georgian Government. He added that the Georgian Government should cease fighting and leave the Turks and Bolsheviks to settle the question of the further advance of the latter. He added that the question of Batoum province was one which concerned Georgia and Turkey alone, and that his Government would accept the decision of a plebiscite.

In conclusion, I desire to express my thanks to the Royal Navy and in particular to the following officers, Captain C. Seymour, H.M.S. "Calypso," Captain Colvin, H.M.S. "Caradoc," and Lieutenant Commander Crabbe, H.M.S. "Meadow," for their invaluable assistance in evacuating the British mission and colony and other persons who had worked in British interests.

I further request permission to thank to your Lordship's staff the staff who worked so efficiently and efficiently throughout the time that I was in Georgia, and in particular during our enforced evacuation.

Mr J. V. Rooker performed his duties with zeal and judgment, and deserves special praise for his work at Tiflis after my departure when he kept me informed by excellent reports of the changes in the situation.

Captain Court, R.E., remained with Mr Rooker and deserves great credit for

his work, also Mr. J. Waite and Mr. T. Walton rendered most efficient service in looking after and securing the comfort of the British colony, which entailed a great deal of hard work.

To Major Pinder, my commercial adviser, is due the credit of securing the export from Batoum in an entirely friendly manner and without friction of all British-owned goods. I may mention here that at least one foreign representative found it necessary to land marines to seize forcibly the goods of his nationals.

Major Euler, R.E., of the staff of the army of the Black Sea, was present during the evacuation of Tiflis, and rendered most valuable assistance in every way.

I am glad to be able to record that, with the exception of one typewriter and one "Sunbeam" car, under repairs at the time and therefore immobile, no Government property was left in Georgia. The "Sunbeam" car is, I hope, in the hands of the American Near East Relief Workers at Tiflis.

I have, &c.

C. B. STOKES, *Lieut-Colonel,*
Chief British Commissioner in Transcaucasia

CHAPTER II.—TURKEY.

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No. 4

Department of Overseas Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received April 1, 1921)

THE Comptroller-General of the Department of Overseas Trade presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and transmits herewith a copy of a despatch from the Commercial Secretary at Constantinople respecting economic conditions in Smyrna.

Department of Overseas Trade,
April 1, 1921

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Mr. Monroe to Department of Overseas Trade

Sir,

Constantinople, March 21, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that I have recently returned from an official tour in Smyrna, and enclose a report on the prevailing economic conditions in that district on the 15th March, 1921.

I have, &c.

C. COURTHOPE MONROE,

Commercial Secretary,

Enclosure 2 in No. 4

Report on the Prevailing Economic Conditions in Smyrna on March 15, 1921

THE import and export trade of Smyrna at the present day is at a standstill, and there appears to be no business of any sort whatever except for Greek military requirements. When I visited the town in November, 1918, after five years of war, it looked far more flourishing than at the present time. There are only two or three vessels in the harbour, when in 1918, before the full effects of the Greek administration were felt, there used to be fifteen or twenty. The condition of the town and its inhabitants, both European and native, is very deplorable.

No law exists. The Turkish municipal council, headed by M. Sterghiadou, the Greek High Commissioner, has ceased to function, and owing to the action taken by the Greek authorities the Ottoman Gas Company is unable to light the public streets. The company is, in consequence, losing the greater part of its revenue and has had to increase considerably its prices to private consumers. These consumers are in most cases unable to afford such high prices, and either avoid the necessity of lighting at all or install private electric sets. After nightfall, with the exception of one or two hotels and the larger shops the town is in complete darkness.

The streets have large holes in them, and where they have fallen in communicate with underground cesspools, and the smell and filth is indescribable. The cafés and restaurants are filled with Greek officers, who appear to spend most of their day in drinking and discussing politics. The English club fills at noon with the majority of the European business men, who apparently do not leave it again until 6 o'clock, which fact alone proves the complete stagnation of business in this town. The only efficient undertaking that I noticed during my visit is the Ottoman-Aidin Railway. This railway is a most thriving concern, and throughout that portion of it which is running in excellent condition. It makes a certain revenue out of the transport of the Greek goods and stores, but owing to the interruption of traffic through a large part of its length there is not much hope of dividends for the shareholders at present.

The bazaars are exceptionally empty, and I understand that they are especially so at present, as there is a general feeling of pessimism among the people.

who are only able now to afford the bare necessities of life. European merchants shortly after the armistice, however, realised large profits in the same manner as they did in Constantinople. These consequently are able to hold out during the present crisis, and there have been few cases of failures. Furthermore, owing to the absence of legal procedure, firms are unable to be declared bankrupt.

The present position is such that local merchants refuse to take delivery of goods merely on the grounds of the rise in the exchange.

Owing to this stagnation in trade, caused partially by the war conditions in the hinterland, but also by the incompetency and maladministration of the Greek authorities, the greater part of the trade of the vilayet of Smyrna is gradually filtering to Scala Nova, and unless a radical change soon occurs Smyrna will become a second Salonika.

As an example of the way trade has dwindled a table follows showing the statistics of different articles arriving in Smyrna by the Aidin Railway during the years 1913 and 1920:—

STATEMENT of Goods Transported to Smyrna by the Aidin Railway Company.

Goods	1913	1920
Total	168,800	16,800
Wool	10,000	1,000
Woolen goods	10,000	1,000
Textiles	10,000	1,000
Foodstuffs	10,000	1,000
Grain	10,000	1,000
Oil	10,000	1,000
Iron	10,000	1,000
Coal	10,000	1,000
Timber	10,000	1,000
Other goods	10,000	1,000
Grain	10,000	1,000
Oil	10,000	1,000
Iron	10,000	1,000
Coal	10,000	1,000
Timber	10,000	1,000
Other goods	10,000	1,000
Grain	10,000	1,000
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Coal	10,000	1,000
Timber	10,000	1,000
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Timber	10,000	1,000
Other goods	10,000	1,000
Grain	10,000	1,000
Oil	10,000	

the Greek instructions in connection with this matter they contained a clause that this prohibition might be reimposed at any time. This, consequently, caused great hardship to merchants interested in this trade as they were unable to make forward contracts, which they might be unable to fulfil. They particularly requested that this clause should at least be removed on the present year's crop and only reimposed if next year's crop turned out to be insufficient for local consumption. Messrs. Whittall, on the other hand, said that, in their opinion, there was no great demand for olive oil in Europe which alone accounted for the slackness in this trade in Smyrna.

Machinery

Apart from the reasons already discussed the variation in the exchange has been a great stumbling block to trade of all kinds, and more especially to the importation of agricultural and other machinery, where a long delay occurs before delivery. I received one complaint from a firm who ordered a consignment of agricultural machinery from Messrs. Hetherington, of Manchester, who, in reply, stated that no delivery could be promised before the expiration of eighteen months. They were thus forced to send their orders to America. Furthermore, America has a complete monopoly of reaping machinery on account of the fact that they manufacture a cheaper and more suitable for the land.

Owing to the lack of lighting in the town there has been a big demand recently for electric lamps. These have already been supplied by the American firm "Delco." A local English firm, however, has recently obtained the agency for an English installation set, which is said to be both cheaper and to give a stronger voltage. It, however, has the failing of being non-automatic, and apparently, owing to the absence of skilled mechanics up to date, the American machine has been preferred. They, however, hope to place some British-made machines on this market, and in due course to prove their superiority.

Commercial Travellers

In spite of the considerable business done in Smyrna during 1919, before the evil effects of the Greek Administration were felt, I am informed that practically no commercial travellers from English firms have paid a visit to Smyrna during the last two years.

There is a strong demand for English goods in normal times and if these ever return, commercial travellers should make a point of visiting this district.

Incendary Fires

In a place like Smyrna, where both commerce and commercial morality are at a very low ebb, the natural result has been a number of incendary fires for the purpose of obtaining the insurance money. I have received a complaint from one member to a British insurance company that he had not received sufficient support from the British Consular authorities in connection with a claim for 300,000l. made against this company over a fire that occurred in some warehouse, of which there was proof that it had been caused intentionally. I do not think there is much truth in this statement, but the matter is being looked into.

Summer Time

Great confusion is caused in Smyrna by the introduction of summer-time, which was ordered from Constantinople by the Allied High Commissioners. This confusion arises from the fact that the Greek authorities refuse to abide by it, in consequence, no local inhabitants do, the only people who are actually compelled to being the railways. During the present week, however, the Allied High Commissioners have notified the consular authorities that "summer time" shall not apply to Smyrna.

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No. 5

Sir H. Dering to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 4)

(No. 1301)

My Lord

Bucharest, March 23, 1921

WITH reference to my letter of this day's date, I have the honour to report that I observed in last evening's "Progres" M. Marghiloman's organ, a statement to the following effect:—

"The Greek Legation communicates to us the following

Athens, March 19. The 'Daily Telegraph' announces that British circles expect a protest on the part of Roumania against certain proposals of the Conference of London.

The 'Daily Telegraph' states that Roumania in the matter of the Straits Commission is in a position of great importance.

The 'Daily Telegraph' states that Roumania, without the freedom of the Straits, is a country which cannot exist without the Treaty of Sévres.

"The 'Elefteros Typos' states that the Roumanian Government proposes to make strong objection to the modification of the Treaty of Sévres has been received in Greece with the greatest satisfaction, for Roumania has the right to intervene.

"The 'Politika' writes that the protest of Roumania, which rendered no great services to the Allied cause, will not be without effect.

I telephoned this morning to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to enquire whether he had seen the Greek Legation communiqué in the "Progres," which I had not found elsewhere, and whether I could come and ask him what truth there was in the statement of intervention by the Roumanian Government.

M. Take Jonescu, whose dislike of M. Marghiloman is well known, replied somewhat precariously that he was not to discuss anything to do with or published by the "Progres." I then enquired whether he would discuss the communiqué issued by the Greek Legation, and, on receiving an affirmative answer, waited him at the Foreign Office and explained that I was merely desirous of hearing the "Daily Telegraph" and Greek press statements had any foundation. M. Take Jonescu, who received me very cordially, said, in excuse of his crusty telephone language, that even if all other public men in Roumania were corrupt and unscrupulous he himself was honest—a pointed allusion to his *bel ami*, M. Marghiloman, who had permitted the publication of the Greek communiqué. The Minister said that he had read the communiqué and had immediately issued a categorical denial of the intention of Roumania to protest, to be published in the "Universul"—one of his own press—the "Adeverul" and other papers of yesterday evening and to-day. He added that sensible papers had refrained from publishing the Greek Legation communiqué. He gave me the details of his denials, which corresponded to the translation from the "Universul" of to-day's date, herewith enclosed.

He explained that M. Boerescu had, before the London Conference, been instructed to discuss with the Greeks the question of the Straits Commission. He had, in regard to the Commission of the Straits, and had received the reply that there was no intention to raise this point. It had, however, notwithstanding, been discussed, whereupon M. Boerescu, even before he received his further instructions, had expressed surprise, and had pointed out that Roumania considered that she had a right to the same number of any delegates on the commission as Turkey might be accorded under revision of the treaty. M. Take Jonescu said that he considered it quite natural that Turkey should take part in the Straits Commission, but that Roumania had an equal interest with Turkey in the regulations affecting the Straits. Roumania's interest in the Straits was certainly greater than that of Greece. He repeated that there was no question of the Roumanian Government making any protest. Protests were a sign of weakness.

I observed that the aim of the new Greek Minister seemed to be to endeavour to enlist Roumanian support, on the strength of the recent Royal marriages, for the Greek attitude towards the Treaty of Sévres. M. Take Jonescu intimated that it would not be successful, adding that M. Panas had announced to him a few days ago the intention of the Greek Government to mobilise three classes of reservists, obviously in order to

seek approval, whereas the Allies did not favour fresh Greek military enterprise in Asia Minor. He added that personally he had always deplored the alliances which had just been contracted by the Roumanian Royal family with the most reactionary and despotic dynasty in Europe, thereby introducing the "infernal blood of Wilhelm." He had not been previously consulted as to the marriages and had seriously thought of resigning at the time, which he was quite ready to do at any moment now if other reasons arose, for he had no desire to cling to office. His own personal feelings of friendship and past negotiations with M. Venizelos rendered it impossible, as he had said to Prince George of Greece soon after the latter's arrival here, for him to change his policy and inaugurate a period of cordiality with the Constantinian regime.

I remarked that Prince George was reported to be as bitter about M. Venizelos as the rest of his own family, and to have referred to him in conversation here as "cette canaille."

I have the honour to enclose translation of the démenti referred to above and published in the "Adevărul" by M. Take Jonescu in parallel column with the Greek communiqué.

I have, &c.

HERBERT G. DERING

Enclosure in No. 5.

Extract from "Adevărul," March 22, 1921.

ROUMANIA was informed that that part of the Treaty of Sèvres which relates to the regulation of the Straits, the only matter affecting her, would not be modified.

Now that Turkey has been admitted to the Straits Commission Roumania will not object to the admission of Turkey, but will ask for a number of votes equal to Turkey.

Up to the present the Roumanian Government has taken no action, as the whole matter is in a process of elaboration.

All the statements of the Athens papers are therefore incorrect.

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No. 6

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 1003.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the text of the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 11th March, 1921, as communicated by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, April 2, 1921

Enclosure in No. 6.

Accord franco-turc politique, militaire, économique sur les Frontières entre la Turquie et la Syrie.

ENTRE les hautes parties contractantes soussignées :

Son Excellence M. Briand, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, agissant au nom du Gouvernement français, d'une part, et M. Fethi Bey, délégué de la Grande Assemblée nationale d'Angora, agissant au nom du Gouvernement turc, d'autre part.

Il a été convenu ce qui suit :

(A) Cessation des hostilités et échange des prisonniers, dans les termes de l'annexe ci-jointe.

(B) Désarmement des populations et des bandes armées, d'accord entre les commandements français et turcs.

(C) Constitution de forces de police (en utilisant la gendarmerie déjà formée sous le commandement turc, assisté d'officiers français, mis à la disposition du Gouvernement turc).

(D) D'accord avec les commandements français et turcs : Evacuation dans un délai d'un mois (après la cessation des hostilités) des territoires occupés par les troupes combattantes, au nord des frontières du Traité de Sèvres. Les troupes turques se retireront les premières et occuperont, huit jours après l'évacuation, les localités évacuées par les troupes françaises.

Des dispositions transitoires seront prises en ce qui concerne l'évacuation des territoires attribués à la Syrie par le Traité de Sèvres et réincorporés à l'État turc par le présent accord, en raison de leur caractère ethnique.

En raison de l'état de guerre prolongé et des troubles profonds qui en sont résultés, les troupes françaises se retireront progressivement dans un délai maximum de deux mois dans des conditions déterminées par les autorités françaises et turques réunies en commission, sur les bases générales suivantes : pacification effective, garantie de la sécurité des communications, rétablissement des ouvrages d'art de l'Amasnie et du pont de Djéرابلس, droit de suite militaire éventuel en cas d'attentats par des bandes, punition des coupables du guet-apens d'Ourfa.

(E) Amnistie politique entière et maintien des fonctions du personnel administratif.

(F) Engagement de protéger les minorités ethniques, de leur garantir l'égalité absolue des droits, de veiller à la sécurité et à la tranquillité des populations, de maintenir la quotité des populations pour l'établissement dans les régions à population mixte d'un régime municipal mixte.

(G) Collaboration économique franco-turque avec droit de priorité pour les concessions à accorder par l'État, comprenant notamment les voies de communication, mines, carrières, travaux d'assainissement et d'irrigation, &c., en vue de la mise en valeur et du développement économique de la Cilicie, des régions évacuées par les troupes françaises, ainsi que des vilayets de Mamuret el-Aziz, Diarbékir et Sivas, dans la mesure où cela ne serait pas effectué directement par le Gouvernement ottoman ou les ressortissants ottomans à l'aide de capitaux nationaux.

Concession à un groupe français des mines d'Argan. Les concessions comportant monopole ou privilège seront accordées par l'État turc, conformément à la loi ottomane.

Association la plus large possible des capitaux ottomans et français (pouvant aller à 50 pour cent du capital ottoman).

(H) Institution d'un régime douanier approprié entre les régions turques et syriennes.

(I) Maintien des œuvres scolaires et hospitalières françaises et des institutions

(J) Le Gouvernement français instituera un régime administratif spécial pour la région d'Alexandrette, en vue de faciliter le développement de leur culture et l'emploi de la langue turque, qui y aura le caractère officiel au même titre que les langues arabe et française.

(K) Transfert à un groupe français, désigné par le Gouvernement français, de la concession de la ligne de chemin de fer de Hama à Latakia, avec tous les droits, privilèges et avantages attachés à la concession, en particulier en ce qui concerne l'exploitation et le trafic. La police de la voie et des gares sera faite par la société concessionnaire, qui aura le droit de faire ses transports militaires par le chemin de fer.

La ligne de chemin de fer partira de Hama, traversera le golfe d'Alexandrette, immédiatement au sud de la localité de Payas et se dirigera sensiblement en ligne droite vers Meidan Eklès (la station du chemin de fer et la localité restant à la Syrie).

De là, la frontière s'infléchira vers le sud-est, de manière à laisser à la Syrie la localité de Marsova et à la Turquie celle de Karnaba, ainsi que la ville de Kullis.

De là, la frontière rejoindra la voie ferrée à la station de Chobanbeg. Ensuite, la frontière suivra la voie ferrée de Bayraktar, dont la plate-forme restera sur le territoire ottoman jusqu'à Nim.

Puis la frontière rejoindra le coude du Tigre au nord d'Azek et suivra le Tigre jusqu'à Djéziré-ibn-Omar.

(M) La ligne des douanes turques sera installée au nord de la voie et la ligne des douanes syriennes au sud.

Fait à Londres, le 11 mars 1921

A. BRIAND.
S. BÉKIR.

Annexe.

Entre les hautes parties contractantes soussignées :

Son Excellence M. Briand, Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, agissant au nom du Gouvernement français, d'une part ; et son Excellence Békir Samy Bey, délégué de la Grande Assemblée nationale d'Angora agissant au nom du Gouvernement national turc, et muni à cet effet de pleins pouvoirs, qui ont été trouvés en règle, d'autre part,

Il a été convenu ce qui suit

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

En attendant la conclusion imminente entre les hautes parties contractantes d'un accord plus général, toutes opérations militaires actives seront entièrement arrêtées sur le front de Cilicie, et sur les confins de la Turquie et de la Syrie dès la réception des ordres donnés à cet effet à leurs troupes respectives, tant par les autorités françaises que par les autorités d'Angora et au plus tard dans un délai d'une semaine.

Pour hâter cette suspension d'hostilités, les chefs d'unités françaises ou turques feront connaître, dès qu'elles en seront avisées, aux forces adverses qui leur sont opposées, la signature des présentes et l'arrêt des opérations.

ARTICLE 2.

Dès réception des ordres urgents qui seront donnés par les deux hautes parties contractantes, les prisonniers respectifs, ainsi que toutes personnes françaises ou turques, détenues à la suite des hostilités, seront remises en liberté et reconduites aux frais de la partie qui les détient aux avant-postes ou dans telle ville la plus proche qui sera désignée à cet effet. Il ne sera fait exception que pour les criminels de droit commun, dont le cas sera réservé pour un examen en commun.

ARTICLE 3.

La présente convention est conclue sans limitation de durée, la reprise d'hostilités ne pouvant avoir lieu de part et d'autre qu'après dénonciation en règle un mois à l'avance. Pendant la suspension des hostilités, les parties s'engagent à s'abstenir de tout renforcement d'effectifs et de toutes mesures tendant à améliorer leur position respective, les seuls transports militaires autorisés seront ceux des relèves normales ainsi que ce qui concerne le ravitaillement et l'entretien des troupes.

Fait à Londres, en double original, le 11 mars 1921

A. BRIAND
S. BEKIR

(E 4063/1492/44)

No. 7.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 323.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 29, 1921

THE newly elected *locum tenens* of the Greek Patriarchate, who is Archbishop of Caesarea, called on me yesterday to ask me to convey to His Majesty's Government the deep gratitude of the Greek Patriarchate and of the Ottoman Greeks for the consideration and courtesy shown to the late *locum tenens* in London.

2. In reply to my congratulations on his election and to the wish which I expressed that under his tenure of office as *locum tenens* the unredeemed Greeks would flourish, his Eminence replied that the Patriarchate had always looked to Great Britain as their protector and traditional friend. He hoped that he might count on the support of Great Britain in the future. His Eminence went on to say that the situation was now very difficult and critical. I replied that, as he would no doubt admit, the Greek offensive had still further embittered the already strained relations between Moslems and Greeks. The *locum tenens* acknowledged this, and, referring particularly to the withdrawal of the Greek division at Ismid and the Greek battalion at Beiruts, General Harrington's command expressed the regret that the Greeks in the latter locality would not be left unprotected, as he feared that there might be

serious disorders, if not massacres, should no British troops replace the Greek forces. I have mentioned this to General Harrington, who will not allow the Greek force at Beiruts to withdraw until he has made provision for its replacement by a small detachment of British troops.

3. The *locum tenens* then alluded to one or two deplorable incidents which have occurred recently, such as the deportation of Greeks from Koundje and Kara Mureal and the events of Samsoun. I replied that these incidents were very regrettable, but that the Turks were bringing somewhat similar allegations against the Greek authorities. I mentioned the particular of the extra-judicial declarations from Ottoman subjects expressing satisfaction with the Greek rule over territories in the occupation of the Hellenic forces. I said that it was very necessary that both parties should avoid any action which might lead to trouble at this particular moment, and I had in mind the possibility of disturbances in Constantinople itself should the Patriarchate wish to organise a funeral procession through the town when the body of Mgr. Dorotheos is brought back. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has told my colleagues and myself that the Turkish Government have information to the effect that shots would be fired at such a procession by persons in Greek pay in order to cast discredit on the Turks. I am in consultation with General Harrington about this matter, and I think that the Patriarchate will accept a solution by which the body of the late *locum tenens* will be brought by water to a spot near the Phanar where it will lie in state and afterwards be conveyed by water to a landing stage near the cemetery, thus avoiding any procession either through Stamboul or Galata.

4. The new *locum tenens* has not the same personality as his predecessor.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

(E 4068 23 44)

No. 8.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

My Lord, His Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to send herewith copy of a despatch from the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Black Sea, dated the 29th March, 1921, respecting the command of Allied armies of occupation.

Constantinople, March 30, 1921

Enclosure in No. 8.

Lieutenant-General Sir C. H. Harrington to Sir H. Rumbold.

(Secret.)

Your Excellency,

Constantinople, March 29, 1921

AFTER careful consideration, I feel compelled to bring the following situation to your notice with reference to the command of the Allied troops of the armies of occupation, so that you may, if you think fit, discuss this subject with your colleagues with a view to representation to the various Governments concerned.

I have hesitated to bring this matter forward before, as I quite realise that I came here by agreement of the Allied nations to have the honour of assuming the Allied command for a period of two years from the date of ratification, during which period I was also appointed to be president of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control and Organisation. Recent events have shown the probability of still further delay in the ratification being effected.

I have also hesitated to raise this point on account of the extreme courtesy and cordiality shown to me by the Allied High Commissioners and the Allied services since my arrival.

I do so, however, now because I feel that the military situation in this theatre is sufficiently serious to warrant the limited forces of all the Allies being under one command. I do not raise it from a personal point of view, but solely because I honestly believe that we are taking a military risk which we are not justified in taking under present circumstances.

I am fully aware that if a serious situation developed the military commanders

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here would all help each other in that cordial way which all the Allied soldiers have learned during the past few years, but I feel that, unless a definite unity of command is established, a situation might arise with which it would be very difficult to cope.

For reasons of policy, the Greek division at Ismid has now passed from my command. The resources of the combined Allies have therefore been reduced, whereas the factors which make for possible disturbances have been increased. The factors to which I allude are the following:—

- (a.) The general unrest amongst the Turks and Greeks in Constantinople consequent on the operations which have now commenced, and the prospect of still further delay in settlement.
- (b.) The situation as regards the Russian ex-army and refugees.
- (c.) The Georgian situation.
- (d.) Bolshevik and other agencies plotting for general disturbance.

I do not anticipate trouble, but the above are factors which we cannot afford to ignore.

If we study the situation from a military point of view, we find that we are constrained to hold what is virtually a bridge-head, and if we examine the protection of this against a possible attack from the west, we find that it would be possible, with the Allied troops in France, to send reinforcements by rail to the coast, and then to move approximately from Therapia, via the north of the Golden Horn, to Makrikeui; but when we examine the defence of the Asiatic side, we find we should have to defend a position approximately from Anadolu Hisar, via Genukdagh-Ereukeni, which would require at least a French brigade in addition to the forces at my disposal.

I understand it is the order of the French Government that French troops are not to be sent to Asia, and possibly this proviso also applies to the Italian troops.

I have no doubt whatever that both the Allies would be only too anxious to help me if I was placed in a serious position on that shore; but the situation, as I said above, might develop so quickly that it would be unfair to any commander to place him in the position of having to make plans which were entirely dependent on reference to Allied Governments at a critical moment.

It has never been my intention, when honoured by the Allied command on ratification, to do anything without the full approval of the Allied military commanders, with whom I am in the most cordial agreement; but I do represent that the picture I have presented above is a situation which is militarily unsound and opposed to the teachings of the recent war and to the Allied command now existing on the Rhine, where the Allied forces are under the French command.

The matter is one for the Allied Governments to settle, but I should be failing in my duty if I did not represent strongly that the present situation here is one which grows daily more difficult and should most certainly be controlled by one command.

I can assure your Excellency that it is only my conception of duty to the troops themselves which prompts me to put forward this question entirely as a military problem.

I have, &c

C. H. HARRINGTON, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding-in-chief, British Army of the Black Sea.

(E 4067 800 44)

No. 0

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 5.)

(No. 330)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 30, 1921

THE Vekil or head of the Protestant community in Turkey, which as your Lordship is aware consists mainly of Armenians, a considerable number of whom are established in Cilicia, called at this High Commission on the 29th March to speak about the agreement concluded between the French Government and the Nationalist Government of Angora.

2. The Vekil said he understood it contained a clause relative to the privileges of schools and other institutions. He said he hoped that this did not mean that French institutions were to obtain a preferential position, and that others would be left at the mercy of any legislation which the Kemalist Government might think fit to enact. He said that his community either themselves ran or were counterinterested with the Americans

in higher educational institutions at places like Aintab, Urfa, Marash, Tarsus, Kharput, &c., besides numerous elementary institutions belonging to the community elsewhere. He dwelt on the importance of maintaining the privileges of such institutions at least on the pre-war scale, and urged that they should, if possible, be placed on the same footing legally and practically as that of foreign scholastic and charitable institutions.

3. It was pointed out to the Vekil that any separate agreement contracted by the French could not of itself affect the status of non-French institutions, whether native Christian or foreign, and that the question really turned not on the French agreement, but on the future of article 149 of the Treaty of Sèvres.

4. The Vekil went on to express grave misgivings as to the future of the Christians in Cilicia. He said that a gendarmerie with Allied officers would not suffice to assure their safety, and he expressed serious doubt as to the solid value of any assurances which the French might have obtained, especially in view of the exacerbation of feeling which the events of the last two years had produced among the Moslems. He evidently thought that nothing would really be done to secure the presence of Allied military forces. There is now no prospect of the maintenance of such forces, but there is much ground for the Vekil's anxiety, and it is to be hoped that everything will be done to make the Minorities clauses of the revised treaty as real a safeguard as possible.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner

E 4372 143 44)

No 10

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 339.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 5, 1921

AFTER very severe fighting in front of Eskişehir for several days, during which the Greek troops incurred heavy losses, the Greeks have been obliged to fall back. Both the northern and southern columns are retiring to their original lines. The effective strength of the Broussa forces seems to have been reduced from 13,000 to 8,000. Casualties are estimated at 2,700 in one division and 2,000 in another, and the moral of the troops is reported to be falling steadily.

2. The Greeks assert that reinforcements to the extent of 20,000 are en route from Thrace, and reinforcements are being hurriedly collected at Smyrna. The Greek authorities at Constantinople state that, after the arrival of these reinforcements, the Greeks will advance again.

3. I had occasion to see the Greek High Commissioner yesterday, who admitted that the Greek losses were very heavy. He stated that in all the officers of one regiment, from the colonel downwards, had been killed. He attributed the Greek failure partly to the fact that the Kemalist artillery had been able to register the ground over which the attack was to take place, whereas the Greeks had been unable to bring up their artillery for counter-battery work. M. Volais likewise stated that if it had not been for the help which the Kemalists had received from both the French and Italians the operations would have been over by now. He said that the Italians in particular had supplied the Nationalist forces with arms and ammunition, three Italian ships had recently sailed from Tarranto to Adalia with material of war for the Kemalists. He also asserted that there were two French and three Italian officers working with the Kemalist staff at Eskişehir, and that a French officer in uniform had been found amongst the Turkish dead. The French High Commissioner is issuing a denial of this story.

4. I understand that one of the main reasons for the losses and set-back which the Greeks have sustained is that the Kemalists brought up 6-inch Howitzers, the existence of which was quite unsuspected by the Greeks. Another reason which has undoubtedly contributed to the Greek failure has been the replacement of capable officers by incompetent adherents of the Constantinist régime.

5. So far the Kemalist troops do not seem to have been able to take advantage of their successful resistance in order to pursue the retreating Greeks. No doubt they have had severe losses themselves.

6. Thus it would seem that both sides have been somewhat exhausted by the first round of this conflict, and since the Greeks have elected to renew hostilities in order to settle the position of the Treaty of Sèvres by a sword, the best solution would seem

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to be that Turks and Greeks should fight one another to a standstill. Then, presumably, they would be more amenable to pressure or advice from the Allies. It is impossible to contemplate a complete Greek or Kemalist victory without dismay.

7. Military opinion inclines to the belief that the Greek commanders will not be able to get their troops to advance again, and General Papoulos may, indeed, find himself filling the rôle of a modern Xenophon.

8. An interesting indication of the state of mind of the Ankara Government is furnished by a telegram sent by that Government to the secretary of the Régie Company at Constantinople, pointing out that the Ankara Government will not necessarily recognise the arrangement recently concluded between the company and, what they contemptuously call, the Constantinople administration. The telegram reminds the Régie Company that the Ankara Government is the sole Government in Turkey.

The situation is curious and possibly without precedent. The Greek Government apparently considers itself at war with Turkey, but not, presumably, with the Constantinople Government, which remains an impotent but deeply interested spectator of the struggle. The Ankara Government, on the other hand, has sent their best wishes to the Greek army for its success in the present struggle, and has also expressed its sympathy for the success of the Kemalist arms. All the mosques were illuminated last night in honour of the Turkish victory.

10. The present situation has given rise to a variety of questions in the domain of international law, in view of the attitude of neutrality which the Powers have decided to observe in the present conflict. The situation is extraordinarily interesting, but, having regard to the rapid and often unexpected sequence of events, it would be rash to predict what is likely to take place even within the period of a week.

11. Hardly a day passes without the Allied High Commissions receiving notes of protest, either from the Turkish Government or from the Greek High Commissioner, about deeds of violence committed by one or other of the contending parties. In present circumstances it is perfectly futile passing these notes on.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

E 4601/143 44]

No. 11.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 160)

My Lord,

Athens, April 7, 1921.

TODAY being the hundredth anniversary of the outbreak of the struggle for Greek independence in 1821, the town is profusely beflagged, it is a public holiday in which crowds are wandering about, salutes are fired, and there was a Te Deum in the cathedral and a ceremonial lecture in the university, both attended by the King and the Royal Family.

It is, however, difficult for them to celebrate this centenary as joyously as they would have wished. After some days of concealment, the news has now been published that the troops which were attacking Eskishehr have been withdrawn to their original positions just east of Broussa, and though ridiculous official explanations have been issued that the attack on Eskishehr was never intended as a serious operation, but only as a feint to render easier the capture of Afium Karahissar, everybody realised that the Greeks had met with a serious rebuff which has cost a terrible lot of casualties. I think a good many people also realise the danger that Afium Karahissar may now be very seriously threatened by Turkish forces. The south-eastern position of the city rendered by the Greek retirement. There was a report yesterday that Afium Karahissar had already been retaken, but I gather that this is at any rate premature.

So far, public opinion appears to be taking this bad news better than I should have expected; possibly the man in the street swallows the optimistic declarations of the Government and the press and does not quite realise the situation. On the other hand, I suppose there is a possibility that the optimism is justified and that when the Greeks may be able to execute an enveloping operation and still take Eskishehr and inflict a real defeat on the Turks. M. Theotokis, who has been Acting Minister of War during

M. Goularis, told me two or three days ago that the mobilisation of three classes had already yielded 40,000 men, and that he felt confident of getting 45,000, which was the figure the Government had counted on. I am, however, sceptical of this statement, which does not tally with General Girumat's statement that I still hear constantly of great difficulties throughout the country in getting the men to present themselves. An Englishman travelled in a train full of newly mobilised men a day or two ago and heard the most violent abuse of the mobilisation, of the Government and even of the King himself. On the other hand, the men I have seen in the streets of Athens have been most cheerful.

A press telegram reached Athens from Smyrna the other day that the body of a French officer had been found in the Turkish trenches. The Government stopped this telegram, and they were more telling the same story with numerous other details. It was not allowed to be published. This produced a crop of Government papers attacking the French in unrestrained language. A few papers showed common sense in refusing to believe these attacks, and somehow deprecating these attacks on a Power whom it is in Greece's interest to conciliate. The abuse was such that my French colleague protested to the Minister for Foreign Affairs insisted on his issuing a *démenti*, and begged him to keep the press in order; the *démenti* was issued—rather a half-hearted one—and was followed with contempt and disbelief and fresh abuse of France by the Government. The Italian Minister also issues periodical *déments* of the accusations against France. I have protested to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but with no apparent result.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE

E 4608 143 44]

No. 12

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 362)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 12, 1921.

THE Greek High Commissioner called on me on the 9th instant to communicate three items of information which had been reported to him by his Intelligence Service:—

- (1.) That one of the Turkish torpedo-boats at present in the Golden Horn was getting ready to torpedo the "Kilkis," which is the Greek cruiser now lying in the Bosphorus.
- (2.) That the "Goeben" had taken in 1,500 tons of coal which had been supplied by the French.
- (3.) That war material for the Nationalists was being disembarked at Zunguldak under the supervision of the French detachment at that place, part of which was going up-country with the material in question.

2. M. Votis stated that the information as regards (1) came to him from a source which he could not disregard. He hinted that if anything of the kind was on foot the Greek troops might march on Constantinople from the frontier. The report under (2) did not cause him so much anxiety, because he understood that there was a British detachment on board the "Goeben." He considered that the information under (3) was of much less importance, and again asserted positively that the French and Italians were not to be alarmed.

3. I told M. Votis that I had not at the moment believed the alleged plot to torpedo the "Kilkis." As regards (2) I said that there was no British or Allied detachment on board the "Goeben," and that I had not seen any official communication with the captain of the ship. I promised to enquire into the reports which he had made to me, but I warned him that it was unwise at the present moment to reveal the matters which were going about Constantinople.

4. I have not yet brought the three reports to the attention of Admiral Tyrwhitt, who is the Turkish torpedo-boat expert. Admiral Tyrwhitt reported that none of them was in a position to perform a dangerous act, and that there was nothing to give credit to the report under (1) made by M. Votis. As regards the "Goeben," Admiral Tyrwhitt explained that the British naval forces had recently sent her into service, which probably accounted for the report received by M. Votis. Admiral Tyrwhitt added that the "Goeben" would be successful if he could go to

Commission to pay the balance of the January salaries, and probably a large part of the February salaries. The Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday evening to express the gratitude of the Turkish Government for the prompt manner in which the claim of that Government against the Eastern Telegraph Company had been settled.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

E 4615/1 44]

No. 15

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(N. 371)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 13, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in duplicate, a certain number of French bulletins issued by the "Agence d'Anatolie," which is the official mouthpiece of the Angora Government for January and February. They are extracted from a large number of these bulletins which recently reached me, and I venture to draw your Lordship's attention to the marked passages. They show that the hostility and mistrust of governing circles in Angora towards Great Britain remained as strong as ever, both before and after the departure of Bekir Sami Bey for the London Conference, though the expression given to these feelings is less violent in form than it used to be. They show also that, while there is a hope of playing France off against Great Britain, the feeling against the French is hardly less strong, especially so long as the French retain any hold on Cilicia. The article marked 5 is especially significant in this connection, when regard is had to the date, the 17th February.

2. There is reason to fear that the attitude of the leaders, who, so far as we know, are still dominant at Angora, is such that neither Great Britain nor France can have any strong hope of coming to terms with them on any basis which strikes us as reasonable. Apart from anything else, the extremist leaders have had to fortify their position for a long time past by stimulating passions which they themselves would probably have difficulty in controlling. As an example of the sort of propaganda which has been scattered broadcast in Anatolia, I may mention a pamphlet printed at Samsoun under the title, "Let those who sell their Religion for a shilling [sic] know that God is Most Great.—To Damad Ferid and his associates."

3. The one hope lies in the possibility of a more moderate party evolving from the Nationalists in Asia Minor and Constantinople, and acquiring sufficient influence to dominate the movement as a whole. This hope, not very strong at the best, is weakened by the recent Greek reverse. Nevertheless, if it is right to regard men like Izzet Pasha and Bekir Sami Bey as relatively moderate, it may be possible to promote their becoming, with others of the same way of thinking, the nucleus of a new movement which would stand for a united Turkey, loyalty to the Sultan or at least the throne, and a certain amount of give-and-take in the next stage of the negotiations with the Allies.

I have &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner

[E 4616 143 44]

No. 16

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 372)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 13, 1921.

IN my telegram No. 250 of the 7th instant, I had the honour to summarise the situation resulting from the severe reverse suffered by the Greek troops, as it presented itself to me, and I venture to supplement that telegram by the following brief remarks.

2. Although it is dangerous to prophesy the probable sequence of events in this part of the world, I anticipate that the Nationalist forces will devote all their energies to driving the Greeks down to the coast, or out of as many places in Asia Minor as possible, neglecting Constantinople for the moment. Even if and when they are at

* Not printed

liberty to move on Constantinople, I do not believe that they will commit any act of hostility against the Allied forces. In other words they will come to Constantinople peaceably. But it is certain that they will, in co-operation with their numerous sympathisers here, devote all their energies to bringing about the cessation of the military occupation of Constantinople by the Allies, neglecting no form of pressure short of force for this purpose. Their attitude towards the Sultan may also be expected to be the reverse of benevolent.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

E 4707/1/44]

No. 17.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris):

No. 1132.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, April 19, 1921

THE French Ambassador having asked to see me this afternoon, in order to discuss the subject which I had handed to the Prime Minister yesterday, regarding the question of German reparations and the views of the French Government thereon, I took advantage of the occasion to make a few observations to him about the agreement which his Government had recently concluded, without reference to us, with the Angora Government while Bekir Sami Bey and the delegates of the latter were in London.

I said that our first knowledge of this agreement, apart from the fact that we knew it was concluded, was derived from the text of the treaty which had been handed to the Prime Minister yesterday. We had thereupon expressed our great surprise to the French Government that they had come to this arrangement behind our backs and without any communication to us. Nor did the reply, which we had then received, that parliamentary reasons had prevented its disclosure to us before it was laid before the French Chamber, appear to me to be at all an adequate explanation.

Subsequently, the French Government had handed to us the text, and I had now had an opportunity of carefully perusing this. It seemed to me to raise two points of some importance.

In the first place, I found it difficult to reconcile the conclusion of any such agreement with one of our enemies in the recent war with the declaration which had been signed in London in November 1915 between Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and Russia, in which each of the signatory parties engaged not to conclude peace separately during the war, and, further, that when terms of peace came to be discussed no one of the Allies would demand conditions of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies. I thought it difficult to contend that this clause of the declaration had not been violated in letter as well as in spirit.

Further, I noticed that certain of the provisions of the agreement, notably those with regard to the frontier line between the Turkish territory and the French mandated territory in northern Syria, were in apparent disagreement with, or at any rate were in conflict with, the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. And this added to my surprise that the French Government had not thought it desirable to consult us upon a matter which equally affected all the Allies, and which could not become operative without their consent.

The case was not rendered better by the fact that Count Sforza had taken advantage of the conference in London to conclude an independent agreement on his own part with the same enemy. Indeed, the Italian agreement was in some respects a wider divergence from existing obligations than the French. In neither case did it seem to me possible to pass by the incident without indicating the anxiety which it had caused us.

The French Ambassador's explanation was a mixture of candour and ingenuity. He said, in the first place, that everyone knew that the French military position in Cilicia was so precarious that they were bound to conclude peace with Mustapha Kemal at once, without delay, and that they were forced to do so by the enormous expenditure of a prolonged campaign. This was as well known to us as to everybody else.

Further, as to our complaint being kept in the dark, M. Briand claimed that he had informed Mr. Lloyd George at every stage, if not of the actual details, at least of

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the lines upon which he was proceeding, and he conceived that he was acting in strict co-operation with his allies in what he had done.

I remarked that I had heard of no such revelations, and that I could not help thinking that there had been some exaggeration in the explanations of M. Briand. Several opportunities had occurred of acquainting the Foreign Office with what had passed, and certainly we had been kept entirely in the dark.

His Excellency then explained that, had the matter been left to him to conduct by the traditional diplomatic methods, he would have been only too glad to have kept us informed with what was passing and to show us the document before it was signed. He could see no reason why this should not have been done, but we were living in days now when the old conventions were not always strictly observed and when conversations took place, and arrangements were made between Prime Ministers which sometimes passed unrecorded. If, as Prime Minister, he would undoubtedly have behaved in the way I had suggested. On the other hand, as Prime Minister, he evidently thought he had discharged his duty by whatever communications he had made to the British Prime Minister.

I replied to this argument, which did not altogether convince me, by postulating a situation in which the British Government having done the same or a similar thing, and the Comte de Saint-Aulaire having come to me on instructions from his Government to make a protest, I had delivered the reply with which I had just been favoured by him. Would he have been altogether satisfied with such an explanation?

His Excellency endeavoured to dismiss the subject as one of no great importance, arising from the peculiar circumstances of the hour.

I said that I was not content to accept this plea and that I had discharged what I thought was a necessary duty in informing him of the point of view, from which we had no alternative but to regard it.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 4745 143 44)

No 18

Memorandum on the Supply of War Material to Greece

It was decided in December last, as one of the sanctions against King Constantine, to suspend the supply of war material to Greece, and it would not appear that during the recent conference in London any very specific agreement was reached as to an attitude to be adopted towards Greece. The principal Allies, however, that it is the policy of the Allies towards the Greeks they must remain neutral.

2. The legal aspect of this attitude of neutrality towards the present Turkish hostilities has since been carefully considered at the Foreign Office. It is not to be regarded as analogous to that of neutral States towards the belligerents generally, and in particular during the recent war, since the present belligerents were two parties with whom the principal Allies had recently been seated at conference here in London, and to both of whom identical proposals of peace had been submitted. It had also been made clear to both the Greeks and the Turks that, while the principal Allied Powers could undertake no responsibility for restraining either of the two parties from such movements as they might consider necessary to secure the safety of their own territory, they would not be prepared to assist either party in such movements. While the proposals of peace were still under discussion, one party had attacked the other.

3. Since, therefore, His Majesty's Government and the Allied authorities at Constantinople were preventing the despatch of munitions of war to the Kemalists, and since His Majesty's Government had protested strongly to the Italian Government in the matter of the alleged supply of war material to the Kemalists, whether by the Italian Government or by private individuals, it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to adopt a consistent attitude and intervene, so far as the powers of His Majesty's Government went, to prevent the export of munitions of war to the Greeks. The Greek Charge d'Affaires was therefore informed on the 14th April that "His Majesty's Government have agreed with their Allies to adopt an attitude of strict neutrality in regard to the present hostilities in Asia Minor, and they have therefore decided that no facilities can be accorded for the export of war material from this country to either

Greece or Turkey." A copy of this note and of other relevant correspondence was sent to the Board of Trade, who, together with the Department of Overseas Trade, had previously been informed verbally of the attitude which the Foreign Office had decided to adopt.

It is understood that the French Government are adopting precisely the same attitude. It is also understood that the Italian Government are acting similarly. They have certainly concurred in this line of policy being adopted by the principal Allies.

4. The power of His Majesty's Government to withhold such facilities is, in fact, conferred by the Orders in Council, issued on the 24th March last, published in the "Board of Trade Journal," which gives a list of various munitions of war which can only be exported under licence from this country. This list really comprises only arms and ammunition, &c., and would not extend to such supplies as boots, blankets, &c. The object of the above Orders was to prohibit the supply of arms and ammunition to certain specified areas. The Convention, as such, has not yet been ratified by the signatories.

prohibited areas mentioned in the convention are concerned, and one of these is pro war Asiatic Turkey.

5. It is not unprecedented for a State to prohibit the export of munitions to another State for special reasons which appear to justify that course. At present, all the States represented in China, with the exception of Holland, are restraining their nationals from exporting to, or importing into, China arms and munitions until the establishment of a Government whose authority is recognised throughout the whole country. The reason given to the Chinese Government for this action was that the Powers concerned "in considering the present state of disunion between north and south in China have been impressed by the fact that the continued possibility of exporting military arms and ammunition into the country from abroad could not but be a serious menace to the maintenance of peace and order in the country." It is not considered to be in accordance with the maintenance any condition or action which might favour the reversion to hostilities.

6. Again, a joint resolution of Congress on the 14th March, 1912, gave the President power to prohibit the export of arms to any American country in which it was engaged in a civil war. Acting under this power, President Wilson on the 12th July, 1912, prohibited the export of arms and munitions of war to Mexico.

7. Although the action now taken in regard to Greece and Turkey has not been promoted by considerations of neutrality as generally understood, it may be pointed out that, while "a neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit on behalf of one or other of the belligerents of arms or munitions of war" (5th Hague Convention), it is not prohibited from doing so, and this has sometimes been done, as, for instance, by Switzerland and Belgium during the Franco-German War.

E. G. F. ADAM
H. W. MALKIN

Foreign Office, April 22, 1921

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No 19

(No. 378.) Sir H. Humboldt to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 23.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to acknowledge herewith copy of a statement by Sir A. Block of Government expenditure and receipts for March and April 1921.

Constantinople, April 13, 1921

Enclosure in No. 19

Sir A. Block to Sir H. Rumbold

Sir,

Constantinople, April 5, 1921

I HAVE the honour to place before you a statement of the sums paid by the Government in salaries and expenses during the first fortnight in March 1921, a short survey of the receipts obtained in March 1921, and an estimate of the expenses for April 1921.

Salaries and Expenses (first Fortnight of March)

Salaries	£ 1,814,646
Payment on account of arrears for the financial year 1336 (1920-21)	578,503
Advances to various departments	984,450
Expenses in March	1,428,609
Total	£ 4,807,208

Receipts

Apart from its normal receipts, the Government has lately obtained an advance of £ T. 100,000 from the Agricultural Bank as well as £ T. 1,500,000 from the Tobacco Régie, representing its share in the surplus receipts during the six last years.

These two windfalls have enabled the Treasury to pay the balance of the December salaries, as well as 50 per cent. of those of January, and the second half of the February salaries of the police, public security, gendarmerie corps and tax collectors.

Estimate of Expenditure for April 1921

Salaries	£ 1,814,646
Expenses	578,503
Total	£ 2,393,149
To meet this the Treasury's estimate of receipts in April is	984,450
Total	£ 1,408,699

After deduction from the general receipts (£ T. 960,340) of the priority salaries and expenses, which amount to £ T. 1,408,699, there remains a balance of £ T. 400,500 to meet the expenditure, reduced, after payment of priority salaries and expenses, to £ T. 1,889,179. There therefore remains on expenses alone a deficit of £ T. 94,321, and another on salaries of £ T. 1,334,288.

I append herewith a table of the credits for April 1921.

I have &c.

ADAM BLOCK.

Annex.

Credits for April 1921

	Salaries	Expenses	Total
Salaries	£ 1,814,646	£ 578,503	£ 2,393,149
Expenses	578,503	984,450	1,562,953
Total	£ 2,393,149	£ 1,562,953	£ 3,956,102
Salaries	£ 1,814,646	£ 578,503	£ 2,393,149
Expenses	578,503	984,450	1,562,953
Total	£ 2,393,149	£ 1,562,953	£ 3,956,102

* This will form the subject of a separate report later.

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No. 20

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon. — (Received April 25.)

(No. 168.)

My Lord,

Athens, April 14, 1921

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch No. 130 of the 2nd inst. relative to alleged irregularities committed by the Greek authorities in Thrace and at Adrianople. I have unfortunately no means at my disposal, as there is no British consular officer in any of the districts in question, to check the truth of these allegations, but I am sure that the best way of obtaining reliable information on the matter, if, as I understand, you are not desirous of sending a consular officer at present to Adrianople, would be to send an Allied commission of enquiry, as requested by the Porte, or to entrust the task to a British officer or official. Such an officer who knew Turkish should have no great difficulty in checking the allegations made, as pretty complete details are given in the Turkish note. The proposal would no doubt not be agreeable to the Greek Government, but I have no doubt I could obtain their consent.

On the receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 117 of the 19th ultimo, I handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the list of Moslem notables alleged to have been arrested, and asked him to cause enquiries to be made and to inform me of the result. I propose to take a very early opportunity to revert to the subject, to tell M. Baltazzi that constant complaints reach His Majesty's Government of ill-treatment of Moslems in territories taken over by Greece, and to urge him to cause the strictest instructions to be sent to all Greek authorities concerned, pointing out how very desirable it is in Greek interests to avoid any possibility of Greece's critics being able to say that under her rule her Moslem subjects are little better off than the Greeks under Turkish rule.

I have, &c.

GRANVILLE.

* £ T. 480,858 for salaries and £ T. 23,612 for expenses.

* Not printed

remainder of his statement on this subject, as printed, was misleading, for he is represented as having said that twenty-four persons would be released to a port to be designated by Angora, without adding that this was conditional on the release of the British prisoners in Anatolia, and as having said, further, that four persons would be kept in custody in accordance with the agreement.

3. According to the same paper, Bekir Sami Bey expressed confidence in the early conclusion of a peace compatible with Turkey's national resolve. He bade the people of Constantinople to be of good heart, and claimed it as a success that the Allied Powers in whose hands the fate of the Empire lay were now directly at grips, and of whom she could make short work.

4. In its leading article on the Anatolian delegation, published the same day—the 20th April—the *İleri* still further emphasises the fact that Greece is no longer acting as mandatory of the Allies, with whom Turkey, which for the "*İleri*" means the Grand National Assembly of Angora, continues to be in peaceful negotiation. The writer congratulates Bekir Sami Bey's mission on having done away for good and all with the Treaty of Sèvres. The mission, he says, is returning to Angora with the new proposals of Europe, and he anticipates that these proposals will be accepted by the Grand National Assembly.

5. The last phrase would appear to suggest that a paper so radical as the "*İleri*" leans to what has now to be regarded as "moderate" Nationalism, i.e., a Nationalism desirous of good relations with all the Allied Great Powers and prepared to sacrifice something of the complete Nationalist programme. This impression is unfortunately counteracted by a perusal of the portions of the article deleted by the censors, in which Bekir Sami is represented as having obtained far more than is contained in the London proposals. These passages suggest, *inter alia*, that the Anatolian Government has been officially recognised; that there will be no Straits Commission; that financial questions will be left to the Turkish Parliament; that the Chataldja lines may be re fortified, and that Adrianople will return to Turkey.

6. It remains to be seen how far Bekir Sami Bey will remain a "moderate" Nationalist in the stimulating air of Angora, and how far, if he resists the fumes produced by the recent success against the Greeks, he will be able to carry other Nationalists. Meanwhile, it is clear that, while ready to make the most of any favourable turn of policy in Allied countries, the more ardent Constantinople Nationalists will give their full support to any policy which Angora may decide to follow.

7. While on the subject of the "*İleri*," I may mention that a translation of an article which appeared in the "*Hakimiet-i Milliye*" on the 21st March, which was published in the "*İleri*" on the 22nd March, shows that the xenophobia of that wing of the Nationalist movement, however dissembled in the case of Italy, really extends to that country also, so long as she maintains pretensions to enjoy special privileges in Turkey.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 4897/1 44]

No. 24

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 401)

My dear Sir,

Constantinople, April 20, 1921

For some time past reports have been reaching me of political intercourse between Angora and Afghanistan. Up to a short time ago the information was very vague and unauthenticated, of the movements of emissaries of a political or religious kind.

2. It has now become known that a definite agreement was concluded between the Angora Government and Afghanistan early in March. Somewhat different versions of

* Not printed.

this agreement have come to my notice, but the summary published on the 24th March in the "*Hakimiet-i Milliye*," the organ of the Angora Government, may presumably be regarded as authentic, if not very complete. I enclose a translation of the article containing this summary.

According to other accounts, for which, however, I cannot vouch, the agreement is for a period of twenty years, and it contemplates: (a) an exchange of military missions and the despatch of a Turkish military mission of instruction to Afghanistan and (b) the creation of a Pan-Islamic federation embracing Persia and Azerbaijan as well as the two principals, under the auspices of the Caliphate. The report that Turkey is to help Afghanistan with military instruction seems intrinsically probable, and may well be covered by articles 8 and 9, the summary of which in the "*Hakimiet-i Milliye*" article is extremely brief.

4. The report that the treaty expressly contemplates the inclusion of Persia and Azerbaijan in a federation seems more open to doubt, and may be founded on the fact, which appears from the enclosed version, that the agreement does refer to two States not parties to it, which are, however, not Persia and Azerbaijan, but Bokhara and Khiva.

5. The "*Hakimiet-i Milliye*" summary suggests several interesting subjects of discussion. It is, for instance, noteworthy, having regard to the practically certain fact of direct intercourse having existed between Angora and Afghanistan that the present treaty should have been concluded at Moscow. One wonders what rôle the Soviet Government have played in the matter, and what is the position of Jemal Pasha, whose mission to Kabul was undertaken under Bolshevik auspices, but who, according to secret reports, has aroused the worst suspicions of the Bolsheviks, owing to his supposed intention of running Pan-Islamism not as an instrument of the Soviet, but as an independent and self-sufficing movement.

6. It is also significant that the "*Hakimiet-i Milliye*" summary represents the Afghans as recognising a Turkish hegemony, but makes no mention of the Caliphate. Altogether, the treaty shows traces of Bolshevik inspiration, as would be expected from the fact of its having been negotiated at Moscow.

7. Incidentally, it will be observed that the "*Hakimiet-i Milliye*," in an article published as recently as the 24th March, describes the Angora delegation to the London Conference as being on its way back without having found any basis of agreement with the Allies.

8. My information as to the steps taken to establish mutual diplomatic representation in the capitals of Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan is very incomplete, but I may, perhaps, be able to report something on this subject later on. In the meanwhile I would draw your Lordship's attention to the issue of the "*İslamic News*" of the 17th February last, which contains a leading article on "Afghanistan and England," and what purports to be the gist of a letter addressed by the Ameer to Mr. Kemal Pasha.

I should be grateful if any fuller information on the subject of relations between Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan which may have reached your Lordship from India or other sources might be communicated to me. I should also be glad to learn whether Turkish activities in Kabul have had any effect on the position and progress of the British Special Mission, which is still, I understand, in that place.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 24.

Extract from the "*Hakimiet-i Milliye*" (Angora) of March 24, 1921.

(Translation.)

THE TURKISH-AFGHAN TREATY

(The Turkish-Afghan Treaty was concluded and signed at Moscow on March 1, 1921.)

WHAT remarkable new developments these days are producing! Just as the Turkish delegation sent to London are returning without having found it possible to arrive at an agreement with the Imperialist Powers of Europe, comes the good news that on the other side treaties of friendship have been concluded with two Great Powers in Asia. Our issue of yesterday gave the essential clauses of the treaty

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concluded at Moscow between Turkey and the Russian Soviet Government. To-day we publish the essential clauses of the treaty concluded between Turkey and that powerful Asiatic Moslem State, Afghanistan. This treaty means that Turkey begins to have a share in Asiatic policy, with which she had not hitherto been able to concern herself. There is no doubt that Turkey, like other Eastern States, must draw her force from the East, and that only by this force can she stand up against the colonising mentality of Europe.

A treaty of alliance in ten articles was concluded and signed at Moscow on the 1st March between the delegates of the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey in Moscow and Mehmed Veli Khan, Ambassador Extraordinary and delegate, with full powers, of Afghanistan. The preamble of the treaty speaks of the bonds which unite the two Moslem and brotherly States, of the historical duties which devolve on them in these days of incipient awakening of the East, and of their decision to transfer to the political plane the long existing spiritual and natural alliance between them and to convert it into an official and material alliance.

Article 1 deals with the position of Turkey and Afghanistan in regard to each other.

Article 2 lays down that the Eastern peoples are endowed with full liberty and rights of independence, and that each is free to adopt and apply the form of administration which it individually desires, and confirms the independence of the States of Bokhara and Khoran.

Article 3 states that Afghanistan recognises the hegemony of Turkey as a State which has for centuries rendered signal services to Islam.

Article 4 lays down that each of the contracting parties will regard any aggression against the other on the part of any Imperialist Power whatsoever pursuing a policy of exploitation [?] as directed against itself, and undertakes to resist it by all means in its power.

Article 5 lays down that neither Power will conclude any treaty or international instrument in compliance with the wishes of any third Power which is at variance with the other or injurious to the interests of the two contracting parties, and that each will inform the other on the occasion of the conclusion of a treaty with any Power whatsoever.

Article 6 provides for the conclusion of commercial and consular conventions.

Article 7 provides for the organisation of communications and the establishment of cordial relations between the two countries.

Articles 8 and 9 deal with Turkish assistance to Afghanistan, and provide for the ratification of the treaty as soon as possible.

Article 10 states that the treaty has been drawn up at Moscow in two copies.

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No. 25.

Sir H. Humboldt to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 403.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 20, 1921.

THE *locum tenens* of the Greek Patriarchate, accompanied by two lay members of the Greek Patriarchate, called on me on the 18th instant to thank me for having attended the funeral service for the late *locum tenens*, Mgr. Dorotheos.

2. After expressing once again the hope that Great Britain would continue to interest herself in the fortunes of the unredeemed Greeks, the *locum tenens* went on to say that he feared that the inter-Allied censorship was not holding an even balance between the Greek and Turkish press. Thus, for instance, the censorship in question apparently cut out of the Greek press reports of atrocities committed by the Nationalists on Greek subjects or Ottoman Greeks, whilst it had allowed one Turkish paper to attack the Patriarchate for holding a service in memory of the Greeks who have fallen in the recent fighting. The *locum tenens* said that if this procedure continued to be followed it might exacerbate the feelings of the unredeemed Greeks and have dangerous consequences.

I replied that I was glad to hear that the Allied censors [?] was concerned to cut out anything [?] the press which might [?] further to inflame feelings which were already [?] the removal of [?] lives in Anatolia. In point [?] the inter-Allied censors [?] principally at the instigation of this High Commission [?] has been [?] vigilance over the press, and has performed

its duties very satisfactorily. Any appearance of bias against the Greeks, however, may be ascribed to French or Italian influence; indeed, the British censor, in order to obviate this as far as possible, does more than his fair share of the work.

1. I then enquired of the *locum tenens* whether it was a fact, as reported in the press, that the Patriarchate had urged the Greek Government to reinstate in the commands the Veneselist officers now at Constantinople. The *locum tenens* admitted that he had taken the step in question in an unofficial manner. I suggested that the Patriarchate was indulging in political activities, which were bound to produce an unfortunate impression on Turkish opinion. He replied that he had acted in the interests of public order, because he thought it desirable to get the Veneselist officers away from this town. In reply to a further suggestion of mine, the gentleman who accompanied the *locum tenens* admitted, quite freely, that the motive in asking for the reinstatement of the Veneselist officers was in order that the Greek army should be better equipped to defeat the Nationalist forces. I then remarked that the Greek Patriarchate could hardly be surprised if its motives were misinterpreted and caused

Constantinople by the resumption of hostilities in Asia Minor. I venture to think, without precedent. On the one hand, arms have been disappearing from various dumps at Constantinople for some little time past. Machine-guns belonging to the armed Turkish force still in this town have also disappeared, and there is little doubt that these weapons have found their way to the Nationalist forces. I have made strong representations on this subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and have said that if any more leakage occurs the remaining machine-guns will be withdrawn from the Turkish force in question. It is likewise impossible to disregard the numerous reports to the effect that the Italians are supplying the Nationalists with a considerable quantity of arms and munitions. On the other hand, the Greeks are freely using the Sea of Marmora for belligerent operations. They have even used Constantinople as a naval base, from which to prevent Turkish subjects returning to Turkey, and three days ago a Greek destroyer took 157 Turkish subjects, who were returning to Constantinople, off a Bulgarian ship coming from Varna. The Greek destroyer subsequently returned to Constantinople.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

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N 26

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 29.)

No. 314.)

My Lord,

Rome, April 24, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Italian Colonial Institute and the Colonial Institute of Agriculture recently organised a congress for the discussion of subjects connected with the future development of the Italian zone in Anatolia. The Congress met last week in Rome and was largely attended, a great number of deputies and professors and a sprinkling of senators being present.

The programme of matters to be discussed was:—

1. Improvement of geographical information and statistics to assist the development of the Italian zone.

2. Questions of sea and land communication for facilitating Italian enterprise.

3. Effect of Mussulman law on property, especially as regards concessions and contracts.

4. Agricultural, zoological and forest resources of Anatolia and the existing land system there.

5. Cotton and hemp cultivation in the coast districts and afforestation in the interior; possible production of silk.

6. The population of the country and the traditions of Italian trade there.

The Congress held six sittings, during which a number of speeches were delivered, but the somewhat ambitious programme was only adhered to in a very sketchy manner, and no concrete scheme for the development of the Italian zone in Anatolia was forthcoming.

[6831]

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Both the President of the Congress, Senator Arton and Signor Vassello (a well-known parliamentary speaker on questions concerning the Orient), insisted on the necessity for some form of co-ordination in any enterprises undertaken in Anatolia and the desirability of first securing financial assistance for pushing Italian interests. It was generally agreed that the Italo-Turkish agreement signed recently at London ought to be of use in promoting the development of the Italian zone, but one speaker made the point that care must be taken not to offend Turkish susceptibilities by giving the impression that Italy intends to plant colonists in the zone and that it must be clearly laid down that Italians proceeding thither will be simply labourers, as in the case of Italian emigrants to South America.

In connection with the nature of the economic undertakings to be set on foot, it was decided that Italian activity should confine itself to agriculture, since means of communication in Anatolia are still so deficient that foreign industrial enterprise cannot yet hope to succeed there. In dealing with the general question of communications, allusion was made to the prejudice which the loss of Smyrna must entail for Italian enterprise, and it was suggested that trade should be encouraged to flow through all possible ports, with, for the present, Rhodes as a kind of "working station" linking up the Anatolian ports with the western Mediterranean; later on Rhodes might be replaced by a station at Mernuritz, a harbour on the mainland somewhat more to the north-east.

A speaker on the subject of the population of Anatolia called attention to the preponderance of the Greek element amongst the traders of the coast, and expressed the hope that some steps would be taken to prevent the "force of attraction of Hellenism" from prejudicing Italian immigration. It was urged that the Italian Government should expedite the appointment of consular officers or agencies throughout the Italian zone.

A question was asked as to the truth of a rumour that Arab Nationalist syndicates were acquiring land concessions in the zone reserved for Italy, but it was stated by a subsequent speaker that this report had not been confirmed.

The President of the Congress, dealing with the political aspects of Italian penetration into Anatolia, declared that Italy would never contest the national aspirations of any people, and that Italian operations would be entirely in the nature of collaboration with the local population, and of assistance to them in the work of developing the country. The employment of Turkish capital along with Italian was recommended, especially in the initiation of any large undertaking, such as the work of the Huraclea coal district, where there is need of road-making and of irrigation works.

The Congress finally approved a resolution to the effect that, in the interests of both Italy and Turkey, co-ordination was essential in any undertakings started for developing the Italian zone, that experts should be chosen outside the bureaucracy to collaborate with the Government functionaries; that to this end a central committee for Anatolia should be constituted as soon as the political situation admits, which will keep in close touch with the Government, and will assist in determining the general lines to be taken for ensuring the free development of private enterprises, co-ordinating such enterprises and carrying on a work of propaganda which will tend to confirm the "Italianism" of the zone; that this committee should also be an information bureau, operating to facilitate all proposed enterprises, that its members should be experts and representatives of the various interests which are likely to be affected by the development of Italian interests in Anatolia; that it should be nominated by the presidents of the Colonial Institute of Rome and the Colonial Agricultural Institute of Florence and that its headquarters should, for the present, be at the Rome Institute; and that it should take steps to constitute financial means for setting in operation works of public utility and for developing the public services in Anatolia, invoking the assistance both of the local population, who will derive the greatest benefits from its activities, and of private ventures whose development will be materially advanced by the improved means of communication by sea and by land, which it will be its object to promote.

Simultaneously with this Congress at Rome there has been a meeting at Milan, organized by the Italian Institute for Commercial and Colonial Expansion, at the Milan Chamber of Commerce, which was attended by representatives of the chief banks and delegates from the various Chambers of Commerce and from the Roman Colonial Institute. Signor Scarpini, the principal member of a recent commercial mission sent to Anatolia, made the chief speech of the day, in which—like at the proceedings in Rome—the importance of developing Rhodes as a centre for concentrating the exports of Anatolian ports was urged; he also recommended that one of the first undertakings to be put through in Anatolia should be the construction

of a railway from Adalia into the hinterland as far as Konia, and of lines from Denizli to ports of Giora and Macra. The Milan meeting approved a resolution to invite its president (Senator Pavia) to nominate a committee for co-ordinating and fostering the study and development at Milan of possible economic, industrial and commercial enterprises in Anatolia.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

[E 5220/50/44]

No. 27

Sir H. Rumbold to Lord Curzon — (Received May 4.)

(No. 408.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Sir H. Lamb's despatch No. 90, 10, dated the 15th April, 1921, respecting Christian and Moslem relations at Smyrna.

Constantinople, April 21, 1921

Enclosure in No. 27.

Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold

(No. 90, 10.)

Sir,

Smyrna, April 15, 1921.

I HAVE had the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice by telegram the regrettable and dangerous exacerbation of feeling between the Christian and Moslem populations of Smyrna, since the occupation of the Greek offensive in the latter part of last month.

2. This has been mainly due to the attitude and conduct of the troops called under arms as a consequence of their reverses following on the failure of their attack on Eskiashenir, but there is some ground for fearing that this was, at least in some measure, provoked by the action of the Greek authorities themselves in encouraging the population to attack the Moslem districts beyond the occupied zone—of massacres at Kaiserieli, Sokra and elsewhere.

3. As instances of the conduct referred to, I may mention the following.

4. The soldiers entraining at the Basma-Khane station, the terminus of the Cassaba Railway, amused themselves on several days in succession by firing at the minaret of the adjacent mosque of Tchouak Kapou, the upper portion of which was badly chipped, considerable fragments of masonry falling on the dome of the building and bringing down the plaster from the roof. Those bullets which missed their mark showered on a tekke situated behind it, and on the Mussulman quarter covering the slopes of the citadel hill. In other quarters shots were fired at the muezzim calling to prayer, at pedestrians traversing open spaces or exposed streets on the hill-side, or merely in the air. Several fatal accidents were the result. On the 6th April, for instance, a Turkish girl traversing the street called Yemuh Tchaharlu was struck by a falling bullet, which pierced her head. She died on reaching the Turkish hospital to which she was carried. On the 8th a Jewish glazier named Mosché Bahar was shot in the side and fell almost immediately, whilst a Turkish boy of 15 named Mosché Khalil was seriously wounded at Dolabli Kouyou. A volley fired from the troop train on the Cassaba line nearly wounded a Greek sealer who was on duty on the Aida Company's pier, and caused a considerable panic in the neighbourhood. A shot also was fired into the Samsun Oil Company's tanks, and set fire to the line passes, causing some loss of oil and raking a serious conflagration.

5. As the trains proceeded up the line the soldiers are reported to have fired indiscriminately at any Turk who was visible from their windows. At least twelve such are reported to have been killed. Thus between the villages of Balatchik and

Ghermenjik were found the corpses of Eymeh-oglu Mehmed, Moushadj Osman, Ali-Mehmed, and T. K. Saluk. Near Mersin a stepson of Mehmed was killed.

The events to which these events gave rise resulted in strict orders being issued by the authorities to prevent any further acts of violence. No person is allowed to carry a weapon, and no person is allowed to go out at night without a permit. The authorities are also taking steps to prevent any further acts of violence. The authorities are also taking steps to prevent any further acts of violence. The authorities are also taking steps to prevent any further acts of violence.

Incidents engendered, and which will most certainly have its repercussion elsewhere, and lead to reprisals and counter-reprisals of the customary nature. There is no doubt that the present situation is a purely political manoeuvre, degenerating into a religious war, with its dangers, but incapable of restraining the men.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB, Representative of the British High Commissioner, Smyrna.

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No. 28.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 11)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith copy of a statement showing the present financial situation of the Turkish Government.

This statement has been prepared by Sir Adam Block, British representative on the Provisional Financial Commission, and I would like to draw your Lordship's attention to the great services being rendered by that commission in the face of much difficulty.

HORACE RUMBOLD

Enclosure in No. 28.

Financial Situation of Turkish Government

The Turkish Government is in a position to make certain "priority" payments.

What the Government could not have been able to do in the last few weeks.

These are notably:—

1. Advance of the Debt Council ...
2. Payment of a sum due by the Bank of France ... 198,835
3. Payment by the Tobacco Regie Company, being Government share in profits of last six years ...
4. Payment by Eastern Telegraph Company ...

5,052,441

These extraordinary payments have amounted to £T 1,420,230 up to the end of April, as follows:—

Police and gendarmerie (March)	71,000
Special police (March)	1,000
Central office of gendarmerie (March)	1,000
Customs salaries (March)	11,300
Tax collectors of vilayet (March)	6,500
Prisons, hospitals, finance section of vilayet (March)	310,788
Salaries of various other departments	1,329,458
Leaving a balance	1,540,246

which I propose to apply to payment of one month's salary for the month of May. The payments in view up to the 30th April are estimated to be:—

Police and gendarmerie (balance for March)	71,000
Special police (March)	1,000
Central office of gendarmerie (March)	1,000
Customs salaries (March)	11,300
Tax collectors of vilayet (March)	6,500
Prisons, hospitals, finance section of vilayet (March)	310,788
Salaries of various other departments	1,329,458
Total	1,540,246

The Government is unable to reduce it or to find here and there some small sums to meet it.

The Government to widows and orphans will commence on the 25th April and the other payments will be as follows:—

Thus being so, the situation on the 1st May will be as follows:—

Balance of March salaries and other payments	1,540,246
Total April salaries	1,814,646
If I add current and urgent expenditure for May, say	575,000
And salaries for May	1,814,646
The Government will have to find at end of May	5,740,120

The daily receipts are dropping and will drop still further in the month of fasting, and the Government will be unable to meet its obligations.

1. Customs (21 at 25 a day)	525,000
2. From the vilayet	200,000
3. Various	50,000
Total	775,000

If the Greeks pay the 34,000l. odd sequestered at Smyrna with the Eastern Telegraph Company, and if, as I hope, the Eastern Telegraph Company pays the Government their share of receipts for the first quarter of the year, this would produce say	421,800
If, again, the Regie Company were to advance to the Government their share in the profits of the year 1936, that would give (I am not sanguine about this)	2,500,000
The Financial Commission could count on a total of receipts of ...	2,921,800
To meet a liability of ...	740,000
Being an insufficiency of ...	2,068,620

After that it would appear as if the Government would have only their ordinary receipts to fall back upon.

I venture to say that it is surprising that the Financial Commission has been able to carry on for so long, and it is only if Anatolia and Constantinople unite that there is any real hope of establishing an equilibrium.

In conclusion, I would add that the Sales Commission have realised £T. 580,026-91, which is not yet sufficient to reimburse the banks' advances of £T. 800,000, and it will be long before the advance of the Debt Council of £T. 1,200,000 will be reimbursed by the proceeds of the sale of stocks.

ADAM BLACK

Constantinople, April 23, 1921

E 5231/1, 44]

No 20

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 4)

(No. 426. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 27, 1921

WITH reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 20th instant, I have now obtained a certain amount of additional information regarding the relations between Nationalist Turkey and Afghanistan. As it is mainly based on reports from secret sources, I would beg that it be treated for the time being as confidential, though if the reports are correct, the facts will shortly be a matter of general knowledge.

2. In his speech in the Grand National Assembly on the 1st March Mustafa Kemal Pasha mentioned Afghanistan as one of the Asiatic countries with which the Angora Government had cordial relations, but there was nothing in his speech to suggest that formal diplomatic intercourse had been established. The balance of the evidence is that if there has been any such intercourse, it has been of a very informal character. The persons who may have visited Angora were at most unofficial agents, and in some cases, perhaps, irresponsible individuals. Towards the end of March, however, a regular Afghan diplomatic mission was stated to be on its way to Angora. This mission appears to have arrived there the second week of the current month. It is headed by a certain Sultan Ahmed Khan, with a staff of two Afghan secretaries and one Indian secretary named Hadji Mansour, who is known as an Indian seditionist.

3. There is nothing to show that a corresponding diplomatic mission has yet proceeded from Angora to Kabul. Such emissaries from the Turkish side as have been reported have been persons in the nature of propagandists. Among them is another well-known Indian seditionist, who has been reported to have visited Afghanistan recently. These emissaries have been Jamal Pasha and Bedri Bey, but they went rather as Bolshevik than as Turkish representatives. Jamal Pasha is known to have executed his mission in such a way as to excite grave suspicion among the Bolsheviks for the reason indicated in paragraph 5 of my despatch under reference. There is, however, no evidence that he can as yet be regarded as being an instrument of Angora policy. He stands for the pan-Islamism of the Union and Progress gang, and a distinction must still be drawn between these and the Angora leaders, although in so far as the extreme and at present dominant party in Angora is concerned, there is no real difference in the ultimate programme.

4. The "Hakimiet-i-Milîye," the organ of the Angora Government, announced on

10th March that it learned on good authority that an important and select military mission was ready to start for Kabul in response to an invitation from the Amir. The secret reports state that this military mission will be headed by Nureddin Pasha, and will be composed of some fifty officers and experts.

5. I have received from the same secret source the translation of a speech said to have been made by Ahmed Mouhtar Bey, Acting Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of the conclusion of the Turco-Afghan Treaty. I enclose a copy of this document which, if genuine, is not without significance. I have not yet been able to verify it by reference to the Angora press, in which it would presumably have been reported. It is not intrinsically improbable that Mouhtar Bey would have held the language ascribed to him, but pending verification the report concerning his speech must be accepted with reserve.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 29

The Turco-Afghan Treaty.

THE following is a translation of a speech said to have been made by Ahmed Mouhtar Bey, Acting Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, in connection with the Turco-Afghan Treaty.

"A treaty of alliance has just been concluded between our Government and that of Afghanistan, which is a Moslem State inhabited by a people of sturdy character, who have preserved their independence for centuries. The union of the Eastern world against the same danger is a very important event. The Imperialist Powers of the West are on the point of losing their authority and their prestige over the oppressed peoples of the East. They will succeed in their endeavours. They have realised the criminal and cowardly objects of the Western Powers, especially Great Britain, at the London Conference. I hope that the Conference, which was nothing more than a stratagem for the purpose of allowing the Hellenic army to prepare, has dissipated all doubts in the matter. In spite of the exceedingly conciliatory attitude of our delegates, the Western world still wishes to sap the strength of the East, particularly of Islam. The Entente Powers, especially Great Britain, will never acknowledge our rights and those of the Moslem. They will foment intrigues and have attained victory by our arms wielded in the name of right and justice. The treaty concluded at the Moscow Conference was an important step towards our triumph in the East. The Western world is in the throes of upheaval, becoming the ally of the oppressed who groan in slavery. The alliance concluded between Turkey and Afghanistan is thus a guarantee for the welfare of the Moslem world. The Government of Afghanistan is a strong Islamic Government, and Afghanistan is the Turkey of Central Asia. It possesses a regular army and perfect military resources. At all times it has rebelled against British domination, and only two years ago had recourse to war against the British. I am of opinion that we have in a manner taken a practical step for the achievement of the pan-Islamic project. I can conceive of nothing more likely to cause anxiety in Great Britain than this co-operation between Turkey and Afghanistan. Our Government is exercising every effort to reforming the army and finances of Afghanistan. I believe that this summer the Moslem world will recover its ancient grandeur and power. I may inform you in confidence that Bolshevik Russia has agreed that the Afghan army shall be reinforced not only from the independent Turkish klanata of the East, but also from the Moslem peoples of the West. We are hoping to-day that very shortly a Moslem federation of half a million people will exist ready at any moment to rise against the Imperialists of the West. In this manner we shall put an end to the Indian Empire, and we shall ensure the development of a strong Islam. The plans elaborated to this end by the Government of Afghanistan are known to the world. The Imperialist Powers are occupied with the matter. I can therefore give no further details.

Constantinople, April 16, 1921

[6831]

4.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 432.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, April 27, 1921.

With reference to recent correspondence relative to the attitude of the Turkish Nationalists since the London Conference, I have the honour to state that I have recently received copies of the two Angora daily papers, the "Hakimiet-i Milliye" and "Yeni Gyun," for the last days of March. As your Lordship is aware, the former paper is the semi-official organ of the Angora Government, while the "Yeni Gyun," which is much the more chauvinistic of the two, is the organ of Yunus Nadi Bey, one of the delegates to the London Conference.

The copies in question of the "Hakimiet-i Milliye" present few features of special interest, though even this paper manifests considerable hostility towards Great Britain. It is, however, not so hostile as the "Yeni Gyun," which is full of abuse for the prospects of any settlement on the basis of the London proposals, if, as I have heard, the nationalist counsels are still in the ascendant.

I have, however, been directly with the proposals and a number of the nationalist papers in London.

The "Yeni Gyun" presents as being a note of insulting disloyalty to the Sultan, whom, in at least one instance, it describes as a "Caliph who has played the traitor to his country and his people."

I do not wish to attach an exaggerated importance to such fulminations or to prejudge the issue when Bekir Sami Bey, who must by now have reached Angora, gives an account of his mission to the leaders there. There is, however, no evidence up to date that these leaders are prepared to compromise with the Allies, and it would be the greatest mistake to suppose that the nationalist papers in London being reflected in Angora, especially if, in the next phase of the conflict, the Angora Government should be forced to make concessions to the Greeks.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner,

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople)

(No. 436.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 9, 1921

RESHID PASHA, representing the Constantinople Government in London, asked to see me this afternoon.

I had no idea what he wanted, but welcomed the opportunity of saying something to him about the bad faith of the Angora Turks in respect of our British prisoners.

However, he opened at once on the question of the *ad valorem* basis of the customs duties at Constantinople.

When he began by referring to the Grand Vizier's conversation with me on the subject of the recent conference in London, and the sympathy which I was alleged to have professed for the Turkish views as regards a specific tariff, I had to tell Reshid Pasha quite plainly that the Grand Vizier had not only grossly exaggerated, but had entirely misrepresented what I had said on the subject; that he had reported both in Paris and at Constantinople that I had used language which I had never used, and that I expressed no sympathy at all with the Turkish proposals. What had happened was this:—

The Grand Vizier had expatiated upon the miserable position of the Turkish Government in regard to the impossibility of paying the customs duties on a specific basis, and had urged the desirability of a revision of the tariffs, to which I had replied that I understood the matter to have been under examination at Constantinople.

which would to some extent place the Turkish Government in possession of funds. I had never expressed any sympathy with the Turkish proposals, which, indeed, I had never examined. I was not prepared to express any sympathy now.

My recollection was that the three High Commissioners at Constantinople were acting in close co-operation, and I was not willing to go behind their backs. Had I known that Reshid Pasha was going to reopen the matter I would have refreshed my memory. As it was, I could only use the words "I am sorry for the papers" to examine the latest aspect of the case.

I then said to Reshid Pasha that I had a much more serious question to raise, and that was the apparent bad faith of the Angora Government with regard to the exchange of prisoners of war. The agreement had been concluded, not with the Grand Vizier himself, but with Bekir Sami Bey, for the reason that the whole of the British prisoners were in Asia Minor in the hands of the Angora Government. It was an agreement by which the Turks were to be largely the gainers, because, in return for twenty-nine British prisoners known to be in Turkish hands, we had been willing to surrender over 100 Turkish prisoners.

As I have said, the terms of the agreement, because the Malta prisoners had not actually arrived. In our anxiety to show our good faith, we had since landed them all in Italy and lost control over their movements. Nevertheless, although Bekir Sami Bey had been back at Angora for the best part of a fortnight, we had heard nothing about the release of the British prisoners. Not a single one of them had been produced, and news had reached us that Colonel Rawlinson, who had got as far as Trebizond on his return journey, had actually been sent back to Erzerum. The case appeared to be one of a gross breach of faith on the Turkish side, and, although I was ignorant of the degree to which the Constantinople Government held themselves responsible for the actions of their brethren at Angora, I could not fail to utter an opinion to that effect.

Reshid Pasha admitted that his relations with the Angora Turks were slight and his influence over them small. Indeed, he knew nothing about the matter, and seemed even to be unaware of the agreement which had been concluded. He undertook, however, to telegraph at once to Constantinople on the matter, and thought that the best way of coming into touch with Angora was to take advantage of the presence of Nihad Reshad, who was in touch with the Angora people, and get him to do so in the sense of my remarks.

As Reshid Pasha is suffering from acute inflammation of the jaw, which rendered our conversation a source of as much physical pain to himself as it was of irritation to me, we separated with mutual pleasure.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 439.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 2, 1921

ARMENIAN opinion continues to be much agitated by the fear of an early occupation of Cilicia by the French forces. In my despatch No. 330 to your Lordship of the 30th March, 1921 I reported the anxiety expressed by the head of the Armenian Protestant community in Turkey which was aroused by the news of the occupation of Cilicia by the French. The French authorities and the Turkish Nationalists, and it is clear that this anxiety is shared by Armenians of all denominations. The Armenian Patriarch called on me on the 26th ultimo, and left with me two memoranda, of which I have the honour to enclose copies.

2 The first memorandum deals with the apprehensions felt by the spiritual head of the Armenian community in Turkey as to the future of the co-religionists will be exposed when the French authorities evacuate Cilicia. The Armenian Patriarch urges that France should take a mandate over Cilicia. But should the French Government not be willing to assume such a mandate, the heads

of the Armenian religious bodies advocate the adoption of the following five measures —

- (1) ~~Formation of a gendarmerie and of a mixed police force under the control of French officers~~
- (2) Organisation of a gendarmerie and of a mixed police force under the control of French officers
- (3) The administration of justice under French supervision
- (4) General amnesty to be promulgated by the Turkish Government in order to forestall any acts of vengeance
- (5) The expatriation and the setting up in other localities of Armenians who would not feel safe after the departure of the French

3. Whilst expressing sympathy with the Armenian Patriarch in his apprehensions, I said that I assumed he had, in the first instance, been to see the French High Commissioner, who was more immediately concerned. The Patriarch replied in the affirmative. I did not gather that he had obtained any concrete assurances from General Paillé. I then drew the Patriarch's attention to a leading article which had appeared that morning in the "Bosphore," stating, in categorical terms, that the Armenian communities in Cilicia were not molested by the Turks. Finally, I informed the Armenian Patriarch that I would forward to your Lordship the memoranda which he had left with me.

4. The events of the last two and a half years, and the attitude of the French authorities in Cilicia, both civil and military, towards the Christian inhabitants of that province appear fully to justify the apprehension of the spiritual chiefs of the Armenian communities. The French administrators have repeatedly advised the Armenians to make the best terms they could with the Turks or else prepare to leave the country, offering them transport to Batoum *en route* for the Armenian Republic—now overrun by the Soviet forces—or to other destinations such as Cyprus, Egypt and Syria, where their presence is not wanted and where they would be at their own risk, and without any prospect of protection from the French forces which would shortly be withdrawn.

5. Since the French Government has bound itself in signing the Tripartite Agreement of the 10th August, 1920, and the five measures the adoption of which is advocated by the heads of the Armenian religious communities practically amount to no more than the fulfilment by France of her part of the provisions of article 6 of that agreement, namely, that the French and Italian Governments will withdraw their troops from the respective areas where their special interests are recognised, when the contracting parties are agreed in considering that the Treaty of Peace is being executed and that the measures accepted by Turkey for the protection of the Christian minorities have been put into force, and execution fully guaranteed.

6. Any comfort which the Armenians may have derived from the French Government's indignant denial of any intention to abandon Cilicia, which was communicated in your Lordship's telegram No. 990 of the 21st October, 1920, has been dissipated by the information which has reached them as to the nature and scope of the direct negotiations between the French Government and Bekir Sami Bey. It would, therefore, seem desirable that Armenian opinion should be reassured by some further declaration that their brethren in Cilicia will not be sacrificed to the exigencies of French policy in the convention to be concluded between the French Government and Ankara.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 32.

Memorandum No 1 from Armenian Patriarch

LA nouvelle de la conclusion d'un accord entre la France et les Kémalistes, en vue de l'évacuation de la Cilicie par les forces d'occupation françaises, a causé une vive inquiétude parmi les Arméniens de Turquie. Cette éventualité signifie à leurs yeux, inévitablement, qu'on est à la veille de nouveaux massacres aussi sanglants et

aussi terribles que les massacres qui ont eu lieu pendant la guerre et depuis l'armistice. Nul honnête homme quelque peu au courant de la situation politique en Asie Mineure et de l'état psychologique des éléments qui peuplent cette contrée, ne peut se permettre une illusion quelconque sur ce point.

Car les Arméniens, que les Puissances occidentales traitèrent pendant la guerre de "petits Alliés," parce qu'ils avaient embrassé spontanément avec elles la cause de la justice et de la liberté, avaient pris une part active aux hostilités aux côtés des grandes Puissances civilisatrices et risqué dans cette lutte leur existence nationale. Après la victoire commune, ils ont continué à apporter à leurs grands Alliés un concours précieusement et sans réserve pour l'application des dispositions de l'acte d'armistice. Ces circonstances devaient fatalement augmenter l'hostilité de leurs ennemis contre eux.

Et, effectivement, même à une époque où l'on pouvait supposer que les Turcs avaient tout intérêt à se tenir tranquilles, cette hostilité s'est manifestée par des explosions au cours desquelles des milliers d'Arméniens étaient massacrés en présence même des forces de l'Etat chargé de leur protection. A plus forte raison, si, après avoir traité sur un pied d'égalité avec les Kémalistes, la France évacue militairement la Cilicie, aucune disposition conventionnelle ne pourrait jamais empêcher que les Arméniens indigènes ou émigrés, concentrés dans cette région, ne soient inévitablement exterminés.

Mais même en incitant les choses au mieux, l'apaisement des esprits, la reprise des conditions normales, ne pourrait en aucun cas s'effectuer du jour au lendemain. Ce n'est que peu à peu, par le développement des relations constantes sous l'égide d'une administration puissante, consciente de ses devoirs et soucieuse du bien être moral et matériel de tous ses administrés sans distinction, qu'avec l'oubli du passé, la confiance mutuelle pourrait renaître.

Mais par l'unique souci de sauver l'existence physique des restes de leurs populations infortunées, les chefs spirituels de trois communautés arméniennes de Turquie, après avoir pris connaissance du vœu télégraphié à la Conférence de Londres par les communautés chrétiennes et les musulmans alaouites de la Cilicie, ont adressé le 9 avril courant, une note au Haut Commissariat de France à Constantinople pour demander, conformément au vœu susmentionné, le mandat français sur la Cilicie.

Toutefois, pour le cas où la France ne croirait pas devoir assumer le mandat, les trois chefs spirituels ont recommandé la prise en considération des suggestions suivantes, qu'ils croient être le plus appropriées pour assurer la sécurité des Arméniens :

1. L'évacuation progressive, échelonnée sur une période assez longue.
2. L'organisation d'une gendarmerie et d'une police mixtes, placées sous le contrôle d'officiers français.
3. La répartition de la justice sous la surveillance française.
4. Une amnistie générale promulguée par le Gouvernement turc pour parer à une action de vengeance.
5. Expatriation et installation en d'autres lieux des Arméniens qui ne se sentiraient pas en sécurité après le départ des Français.

Les renseignements reçus des différents centres de la Cilicie, après l'exécution de cette démarche, confirment à quel point les inquiétudes ressenties ici étaient fondées. Dès que la nouvelle de la signature de l'accord fut connue, notamment en ce qui concerne la clause de l'évacuation des territoires situés à l'est du Djihad, une vive panique s'est emparée des populations chrétiennes dont la première pensée fut d'émigrer vers d'autres lieux. Les Arméniens d'Aintab, qui avaient si efficacement aidé les Français dans leurs opérations militaires, ont été le plus affectés par les nouvelles relatives à la signature de l'accord. Ils ont écrit à leurs proches en exprimant leur inquiétude et leur espoir.

L'émigration apparaît bientôt comme une opération très malaisée et rencontre des difficultés matérielles quelquefois insurmontables. Force fut donc à la grande majorité des Arméniens d'en prendre son parti et de rester chez elle dans l'attente du retour prochain du régime kémaliste sur la Cilicie.

Devant cette situation épouvantable, les Arméniens tournent leurs yeux vers l'Angleterre, l'une des Puissances alliées qui ont confié à la France le soin de l'administration de la Cilicie. Ils ne peuvent pas oublier toutes les marques de la bienveillante sympathie qu'elle a bien voulu témoigner pour leur juste cause et espèrent fermement qu'elle avisera, d'accord avec le Gouvernement de la République

aux mesures efficaces nécessaires pour la sauvegarde de leur vie et de leurs biens et la garantie de leur libre développement

Les chefs spirituels des communautés arméniennes de Turquie prient instamment son Excellence M. le Haut-Commissaire britannique de vouloir bien porter d'urgence ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Roi, en l'appuyant de ses gracieuses recommandations

Constantinople le 26 avril 1921

Fuel sure 2 11 11

Memorandum No 2 from Armenian Patriarch

LA concentration des émigrés arméniens à Adana appelle quelques explications. Ces émigrés sont de deux catégories: les Arméniens originaires des provinces orientales qui avaient été déportés dans le désert et qui, après l'armistice, ont été concentrés en Cilicie par les soins des autorités françaises d'émigration, et les Arméniens originaires d'autres points de la Cilicie, tels que Sia, Hadjine, &c.

Il paraît indispensable de prendre en considération cette différence lors du règlement définitif de cette grave question, car il ne serait ni juste, ni équitable de traiter de la même façon ces deux catégories d'émigrés.

Constantinople le 26 avril 1921

E 5450 1 441

No. 33

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 10.)

(N. 11)

My Lord

Constantinople, May 11, 1921

SIR, In the date of my despatch No. 432 of the 27th April, I have had brought to my notice a further batch of Angora newspapers for the first half of April, including a complete set of the "Hakimiet-i-Millie," except for one missing copy, from the 3rd to 14th April inclusive.

The "Hakimiet-i-Millie" as compared with the extremist "Yeni Gyun" of the 1st of May. In the numbers now under review, however, the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" reproduces every feature which I had already noted in the "Yeni Gyun" of the 1st of May. The more significant, as the period covered is that during which the Kemalist successes against the Greeks became public property in Angora.

3. The "Hakimiet-i-Millie" of the 3rd April gives an account of the rejoicings in Angora over the news of the Turkish victory. The speaker, a lady, signed by a lady, acclaims the triumph of a handful of Turkish heroes over a Europe in arms, and expressly declares that the victory has been won not merely against Greece, but against "the English, fearing to advance from the sea-coast, but lending help thereto from with all their might; Lloyd George, thinking to have to do with a beaten Turk in a month's time, still further back all Europe, perceptible or imperceptible; then a whole world—the whole new-old Christian world—trembling to strangle Islam," all of whose hopes have been shattered by the Turkish victory and the defeat of Greece. Prominence is given in the same paper to various festive orations, in one of which the speaker declared that Turkey, by the Turkish victory, had torn up the bond of slavery proffered in the guise of a peace treaty.

4. Subsequent numbers of the same paper single out Great Britain for the bitterest hostility, and none too far from the truth. In the numbers of the 1st and 2nd of May, articles, which require no comment, except to state that it is entirely untrue that I had been present in Angora, and that the press of my country had been favourable regarding the neutrality of His Majesty's Government in the new war between Greece and the Kemalists. On the 14th April the "Hakimiet-i-Millie" accuses your Lordship of a change of front, on the strength of a report that you had stated that the Eastern question must be settled not by arms but by diplomacy, a statement which the journal attributes to disappointment over the Greek defeat.

* Not printed

5. There is little mention of France and Italy, except for a statement that French officers are making ready to leave Constantinople in view of the prospect of a declaration of war against France and a short article on the sorry plight of the Italians in Constantinople. The Constantinople Minister for Foreign Affairs is attacked for having stated in the Constantinople press that it was untrue that Tewfik Pasha in 1908 was "lying in the face of facts certified by Tewfik Pasha, Bekir Sami Bey, and the press."

The "Hakimiet-i-Millie" records "with regret" the confirmation of the news of Talaat Pasha's death. The "Yeni Gyun" is much more expressive on this subject. It is unnecessary to dwell on this paper's utterances in its numbers for the first half of April, as they are naturally not less flamboyant than those already reported. It is, however, worth noting that in its issue of the 12th April it contains an article on "Talaat Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress." The writer compares the work of Talaat with that of Reshid Pasha in the nineteenth century, and emphasises the far greater difficulties which the former had to contend with owing to foreign enemies. He says little either way of the Committee, but if he hints at a criticism it is that the Committee shrank from an immediate assumption of full power on the morrow of the 1908 revolution. The article concludes as follows:

"The termination in this manner of the general war has for us consigned those who would have taken part in the epoch now opening, it may not be difficult to form an estimate, but it is out of place; only, having regard to the large part of the past which they created, history, when sizing up Talaat Pasha and the Committee of Union and Progress, will not forget in what conditions of foreign pressure they began their task and by what foreign pressure they were again compelled to leave the task which they had begun."

7. If I venture to trouble your Lordship with these lucubrations of Angora journalists, it is because, however extravagant in expression, they reflect only too faithfully the deep-seated convictions and permanent orientation of those who have been the leaders of the movement. As the movement has been successful, and unless something occurs to weaken their position, they may be expected to be peculiarly zealous in going on with the Allies in the immediate future.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner

E 5452 1492 441

No. 34

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 450)

My Lord

Constantinople, May 4, 1921

WITH reference to the third paragraph of my despatch No. 207 of the 23rd February, I have the honour to state that after the death of the late *locum tenens*, Mgr. Dorothios, the Greek patriarchal authorities definitely decided to hold an election to the patriarchal see, which has been vacant since October 1918, and that the preliminary step of issuing an encyclical to the provincial dioceses has already been taken. The ecclesiastical authorities speak, though not with great confidence, of completing the election in the course of June.

2. This decision raises certain questions of political interest. The system of election is defined in a Turkish regulation, the text of which will be found in Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," Vol. II, p. 28. Briefly, the principle of it is that all metropolitans subject to the patriarchal authority are called upon to nominate candidates, thus providing a list of candidates which may, but need not necessarily, be added to by nominations made by the *clergy*. A committee of *clergy* and *laity* then meets in an assembly chooses three names from the list as prepared. The final choice among these three rests with the members of the Holy Synod and the other metropolitans actually present in Constantinople. The Sublime Porte has the right of eliminating any name displeasing to it from the preliminary list of candidates, and in due course the Patriarch-elect is officially admitted to his functions by the Porte.

3. In view of the rupture of relations between the Patriarchate and the Porte, it may be assumed that on this occasion the patriarchal authorities will disregard the Turkish Government entirely. There remains, however, the question of the constitution of the electoral assembly. The regulation contemplates the participation of a large number of metropolitans. The view which at present seems to prevail at the Patriarchate is that, while all the metropolitans whose sees have not been ecclesiastically detached from the Patriarchate must participate in the election, the laity of such dioceses as have become politically detached from Turkey are no longer concerned, as they have ceased to be Ottoman subjects. According to this theory, the metropolitans of Macedonia and Thrace would participate, but the laity of those countries would be excluded. This would apply even in the case of Eastern Thrace, which the Greeks regard as having definitely ceased to form part of the Ottoman Empire. I am not quite clear as to whether it is intended that the laity of the Smyrna district should be represented.

4. The Patriarchate does not appear to have any definite ideas as to how to overcome the obvious difficulty of assuring the participation of the numerous dioceses in Anatolia which are under the control of the Angora Government. Angora is, of course, hostile both to the Patriarchate and to the perpetuation of the privileges of the Ottoman Greek community in their old form. It is therefore unlikely to allow any participation in the election which it can prevent by local pressure. In this connection the enclosed cutting from to-day's "Journal d'Angora" is of interest.

High Commissioner

[E 5624 132 44]

No. 35

Sir G. Buchanan to Karl Curzon — (Received May 17)

(No. 353)

My Lord,

Rome, May 10, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of correspondence with Djamy Bey, the representative of Bekir Samy Bey at Rome, relative to the exchange of British and Turkish prisoners of war, which formed the subject of your Lordship's telegram No. 164 of the 28th ultimo and of previous telegraphic correspondence with the Foreign Office.

Malta was sixty-four, and Lord Plumer informed me that three of these proceeded, under special authority and at their own expense, to Italy.

Your Lordship will doubtless inform me in due course whether you wish me to return any other reply to Djamy Bey's present application than that which I have already sent.

I have, &c

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN

Enclosure 1 in No. 35

Djamy Bey to Sir G. Buchanan.

Excellence,

Rome, le 6 mai 1921

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que je viens de prendre livraison de trente-sept détenus turcs arrivés récemment à Taranto et que j'attends, selon la promesse de votre Excellence, la mise en liberté de vingt-quatre autres détenus de Malte.

Je me permets d'appeler particulièrement l'attention de votre Excellence sur la saisie par les Grecs de deux bateaux et sur l'arrestation des sujets turcs se trouvant à bord.

Pour éviter donc la probabilité d'une telle action de la part des Grecs à l'égard des détenus turcs de Malte, libérés dernièrement, je prie votre Excellence, de bien vouloir faire donner à ce sujet des instructions à l'Amiral Kelly.

* Not printed.

Le Gouvernement italien, auprès duquel j'ai fait les démarches nécessaires pour assurer le voyage des détenus turcs, m'a confirmé aussi nécessaire.

Comme il est connu de votre Excellence, l'application intégrale des stipulations de la convention signée le 16 mars entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et la délégation turque dépend de l'arrivée dans leur pays, sains et saufs, des détenus turcs en question.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

DJAMY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 35.

Sir G. Buchanan to Djamy Bey

HIS Britannic Majesty's Ambassador presents his compliments to Djamy Bey and is happy to acknowledge the receipt of his letter of the 5th instant of the 11th inst. of the liberation of Turkish prisoners of war. His Excellency desires to call the attention of Djamy Bey to the fact that the remaining twenty-four prisoners detained at Malta will be sent to any port desired by Bekir Samy Bey as soon as the British prisoners in Anatolia reach Constantinople. It appears from the first sentence of the note under reply that Djamy Bey has overlooked this understanding, which was communicated in the last sentence of Sir George Buchanan's note of the 13th April.

As regards the request contained in the third paragraph of Djamy Bey's note, his Excellency has the honour to point out that he is not in a position to cause instructions to be sent to Admiral Kelly on the subject. His Excellency is, however, forwarding a copy of Djamy Bey's note to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for his consideration.

Rome, May 7, 1921

E 5699 3654 44

No. 36

Sir H. Rumbold to Karl Curzon — (Received May 18)

(No. 458)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 7, 1921

THE Grand Vizier called on me on the 5th instant.

2. After discussing other matters, he spontaneously informed me that the Italian High Commissioner had asked him for a statement in writing to the effect that the Central Government would endorse the agreement recently concluded in London between the British and Turkish Governments. The Grand Vizier had pointed out to Marquis Garroni that it remained to be seen whether the Angora Government would endorse the agreement in question. If it did not do so, a written statement such as Marquis Garroni had asked for would be valueless. The Council of Ministers subsequently approved the Grand Vizier's reply, but Marquis Garroni, whilst admitting that the non-ratification of the agreement would render a written endorsement of it by the Constantinople Government valueless, said that this did not matter. I did not gather that the Constantinople Government have any intention of giving my Italian colleague any such paper.

3. The Grand Vizier added that on his way through Rome an official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had asked him for a letter to the effect that he would get the Constantinople Government to give favourable consideration to the agreement in question. Subsequently the Italian official had waived the demand for a letter, and he stated that the Grand Vizier's verbal promise to recommend the agreement to the favourable consideration of his colleagues would be quite sufficient.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[6431]

11

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 465.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 9, 1921

THE *locum tenens* of the Greek Patriarchate called on me to-day, accompanied by his political adviser and another lay member of the Patriarchate.

The *locum tenens* stated that the Greek Patriarchate had lately noticed a marked recrudescence of hostility on the part of the Turkish officials and of the Moslem population towards the Patriarchate and the unredeemed Greeks. This was causing the Patriarchate considerable concern. As a proof of this hostility the *locum tenens* mentioned the recent arrest by the Turkish police of certain Greeks who had come from the district of Yalova, and who, he stated, were to be tried by Turkish court-martial as being implicated in the outrages in that region. I enquired whether the persons arrested were Hellenic subjects or Ottoman Greeks. The *locum tenens* replied that they were Ottoman Greeks. The *locum tenens* said that these persons should, in any case, have only been arrested by the inter-Allied police.

3. I then enquired whether the Patriarchate wished to challenge the right of the Turkish police to arrest Turkish subjects, and I said that I did not think that the armistice had transferred this right from the Turkish police to the inter-Allied police. The *locum tenens* replied that he did not challenge the right of the Turkish police to arrest Ottoman Greeks at Constantinople for offences committed, or alleged to have been committed, in this town, but he could not admit their right to arrest Ottoman Greeks who had come from districts in the military occupation of the Hellenic forces, since the Turkish police could not know whether, in fact, such persons had been implicated in the outrages in question. The arrest of these Ottoman Greeks was causing the Patriarchate the greatest anxiety, and the *locum tenens* had, therefore, thought it well to come to me.

4. I informed the *locum tenens* that I had already taken such action as I could in the matter. I had seen some of the persons arrested, and had seen some Armenians, whom they accused of being implicated in the incidents at Yalova and Orkhan Ghazi. Amongst these Armenians were, no doubt, some Ottoman Greeks. I had immediately spoken to the Grand Vizier about this matter, and had written a semi-official letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs requesting the suspension of all proceedings against the persons arrested until the result of the enquiry which the inter-Allied Commission is about to make into the events at Orkhan Ghazi had been received. I may say here that the Grand Vizier received my remarks in a sympathetic manner. The *locum tenens* expressed himself as greatly relieved by what I told him.

5. I then went on to tell the *locum tenens* that the Mussulman refugees from the Yalova and Orkhan Ghazi districts had brought harrowing accounts of the outrages of which they and their co-religionists had been the victims at the hands of Greek bands in these districts. These stories have caused great bitterness at the Porte and at Constantinople generally, and I had been informed from various sources that the feeling against the Greeks was rising very fast in this town. I was therefore not surprised to hear that the Patriarchate had noticed a recrudescence of hostility on the part of the Mussulman population. I added that the High Commissioners, with the authorisation of their Governments, were about to despatch Commissions of Enquiry to the Iambli Peninsula and to the Orkhan Ghazi district to enquire into the real facts of the reported outrages. It was hoped that these Commissions of Enquiry would in themselves have a tranquillising effect on the populations of the districts concerned.

6. The *locum tenens* observed that, whatever might be the facts as regards events in the Yalova and Orkhan Ghazi districts, there was no doubt whatever that Turkish bands were being formed for operations on the Turco-Greek frontier in Thrace. Two such bands, in fact, had surrounded two villages inhabited by Greeks. I am bringing this statement to the notice of General Harington. To my mind there is little doubt that the troubles on the Greek-Albanian frontier and the formation of Turkish bands in Thrace are engineered by the Angora Government with a view to immobilising as large a portion as possible of the Greek forces.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 473.)

My Lord,

Constantinople May 11, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 338, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a letter which he has addressed to the Grand Vizier, drawing his serious attention to the present critical state of Turkish finances.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 38

Sir A. Black to Sir H. Rumbold

Sir,

Constantinople, May 6, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a letter I have addressed to His Highness the Grand Vizier, drawing his serious attention to the critical state of the Treasury at this moment. My French colleague and myself consider it most important that the Turkish Government should realise how precarious the situation is.

I have, &c.

ADAM BLACK

Enclosure 2 in No. 38

Sir A. Black to Tevfik Pasha

Altesse,

Constantinople, le 8 mai 1921

J'ai considéré comme de mon devoir de vous exposer succinctement la situation difficile et même critique dans laquelle se trouve actuellement le Trésor impérial.

Depuis que la Commission provisoire de Contrôle est entrée en fonctions, c'est-à-dire depuis le mois d'octobre de l'année dernière, elle s'est occupée sans relâche d'aider le Gouvernement à assurer le paiement des appointements des fonctionnaires ainsi que des dépenses urgentes de l'Etat. Elle a, de tous ses efforts, collaboré avec le Ministère des Finances pour la diminution des dépenses et l'augmentation des ressources du Trésor.

Votre Altesse ainsi que son Excellence le Ministre des Finances conviendront certainement que les résultats obtenus, pour inférieurs qu'ils soient à nos vœux, ne sont pas sans importance. Mais, pour parvenir à régler les appointements jusqu'à fin février, plus quelques paiements de dépenses urgentes, il n'aurait d'ailleurs pas été possible sans les encaissements extraordinaires dont le Trésor a bénéficié. Ces encaissements ont été réalisés par la vente de la Régie des Tabacs, de l'Eastern Telegraph Company, de la Banque française, de la Banque agricole, &c.

Le total de ces rentrées extraordinaires atteint £ T 6,000,000 environ.

Cette somme ajoutée aux recettes normales a permis au Trésor de régler en totalité les traitements jusqu'à fin février et ceux de priorité (sauf pensions aux veuves et orphelins) du mois de mars.

Pour ce mois de mai la situation du Trésor se présente comme suit :

À payer—	£ l
1. Traitements du mois de mars (sous déduction des traitements de priorité payés)	1 000 000
2. Traitements du mois d'avril (en totalité)	1 500 000
3. " " de mai (")	1 500 000
4. Frais du mois de mai...	632,680
Total environ ...	5 632,680

[6831]

H 2

Par suite du Ramazan et de la situation économique du pays de plus en plus mauvaise, les recettes prévues par la loi pour le mois de mai 1921 (en avril sur les prévisions établies par rapport aux encaissements des mois précédents). On ne doit donc raisonnablement tabler que sur les recettes suivantes :

1. Encaissements de la douane, chiffre rond (à raison de £ T. 16,000 par jour)	500,000
Revettes du vilayet de Constantinople (impôt foncier et ténietu) à raison de £ T. 10,000 par	310,000
.....	50,000
Total	860,000

Auxquelles il est toutefois possible d'ajouter la part de la ... Company, pour le ... et ... (janvier ... et mars), environ 40,000L. sterling représentant au cours de 540 piastres environ

Ce qui donnerait un total probable d'encaissements pour le mois de mai de ...

Le total à payer à la fin de mai étant comme ci-haut de ... Pour un total de recettes de ...

L'insuffisance fin mai serait de ...

Sur les recettes prévues pour le mois courant (£ T. ...), chaque mois, fait face tout d'abord aux traitements et frais de priorité (£ T. 480,000), et ensuite aux frais courants considérés comme irréductibles. Ces frais s'élèvent pour le mois de mai à £ T. 632,080, lesquelles ajoutées aux £ T. 480,000 précédentes font un total de £ T. 1,112,080, supérieur de £ T. 36,080 au total des recettes.

Dans ces conditions, il n'est pas possible d'envisager l'éventualité du paiement d'un acompte sur les traitements arriérés des fonctionnaires à l'occasion des fêtes du Baïram.

Il me semble que cette situation mérite l'attention sérieuse et immédiate du Gouvernement impérial; c'est pour cette raison que je crois pouvoir me permettre de la signaler à votre Altesse.

Veuillez agréer, &c
ADAM BLANK

[E 5711/132 44]

No. 39

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 474)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 11, 1921

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 252 of 23rd April and other previous correspondence relative to the execution of the agreement for the exchange of prisoners, signed by Bekir Sami Bey in London, I have the honour to state that, although Bekir Sami Bey reached Angora on 2nd April, the news has reached me as to the intentions of the Angora Government regarding the execution of their side of the agreement. I have therefore addressed to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea, a letter, a copy of which I have the honour to enclose.

2. I enclose also copies of a despatch and enclosure from my representative in Smyrna regarding the ... I have not thought it advisable to overload my personal message to Bekir Sami Bey with details of individual cases, as I wish in the first instance to elicit information as to the general intentions of the

authorities at Angora. In the meantime, however, I am officially requesting my Italian colleague to move the Italian authorities concerned to use their good offices to secure the release of the three British civilians detained at Soeha.

I have, &c

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 39.

High Commissioner to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Army of the Black Sea.

Sir,

Constantinople, May 11, 1921

WITH reference to recent correspondence relative to the execution of the agreement for the exchange of prisoners, signed by Bekir Sami Bey in London, I have the honour to state that, as Bekir Sami Bey arrived in Angora on 25th April, the time has not yet come for the execution of the agreement of the ... Government in regard to the execution of their side of the agreement. As Bekir Sami Bey stated in Rome that he would take the necessary steps to ensure this immediately on his arrival in Angora, I would propose to give the enquiry the form of a personal message from myself to him. I enclose a draft of the proposed message.

I understand that you have means of conveying such a message by wireless. If this is so, and if you concur in the proposed telegram, I should be glad if it could be despatched as soon as possible without any further reference to me.

2. Since Bekir Sami Bey passed through Constantinople, I have, as you are aware, received from the Foreign Office a further list of British officers believed to be in Kemalist hands. I passed this list to the Sublime Porte with the request that Angora should be informed that the terms of the agreement required that these officers should also be released. I understand that the Turkish Ministry of War has sent an unofficial letter to Angora regarding these officers. I have now received, moreover, a despatch from my representative in Smyrna giving the names of three British civilians, Messrs. Holder, Campling and de Swart, employees of the firm of McAndrews and Forbes, who are detained against their will at Soeha.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 2 in No. 39

Draft Note to Bekir Sami Bey.

SIR HORACE RUMBOLD avait l'honneur de vous adresser à Angora une lettre relative à l'exécution de l'accord de Londres pour l'échange des prisonniers. Cette lettre a été remise à Bekir Sami Bey par le ... et il a promis d'assurer l'exécution de cette partie de l'accord dès son arrivée à Angora, et que le Gouvernement britannique confiant dans les intentions des autorités d'Angora a déjà relâché quarante des détenus se trouvant à Malte. Depuis le départ de Bekir Sami Bey de Constantinople, Sir Horace Rumbold a appris les noms de plusieurs ressortissants anglais militaires et civils qui sont détenus en Anatolie outre ceux dont les noms sont portés dans la première annexe de l'accord. Ces personnes ont également le droit de bénéficier de l'accord.

Sir Horace Rumbold prie Bekir Sami Bey de lui accuser réception de ce télégramme.

Enclosure 3 in No. 39

Sir H. Lamb to Sir H. Rumbold.

(No. 110.)

Sir,

Smyrna, May 4, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. David Forbes, manager of the firm of McAndrews and Forbes, of this place.

2. This firm is, as your Excellency is doubtless aware, an American one, but

Messrs Hodder, Campling and de Swart, though employees of the company, are, like Mr David Forbes himself, British subjects, and it is significant that the change in the attitude of the Turks towards them roughly coincides with the recommencement of the Greek offensive.

3. I am doubtful whether, even now, there is any possibility of bringing pressure to bear on the authorities at Sochia through the Government of Constantinople, but I regard it as desirable that the position of these gentlemen should be known and perhaps considered in connection with the negotiations for mutual release of prisoners, in case those have not been concluded.

4. It has also been suggested that it might be possible to solicit the intervention of the Italian Government in their favour, but there again it is not clear to me in what way such intervention is likely to be efficacious.

5. I may mention that there are also a certain number of employees of the Andri Railway Company who are in the hands of the Kemalists, but, so far as I am aware, these do not comprise any British subjects.

I have, &c.
HARRY H LAMB

Enclosure 4 in No. 39

Mr. Forbes to Sir H. Lamb.

Smyrna, May 2, 1921

Sir,
I AM requested by Mr Hodder, who is resident of Sochia, to bring to your notice that for the last three months he and the other two Englishmen with him—Messrs. Campling and de Swart—have been, to all intents and purposes, prisoners of the Turks in Sochia, and not allowed to travel.

Mr Hodder has made all sorts of representations to the Turks and to the Italians to be given some facilities for moving about and visiting Smyrna, but has been informed by the local authorities that nobody, except Italians, is allowed to travel.

I should be much obliged if you could take this matter up with the High Commissioner in Constantinople and see if anything can be done to alleviate the position.

Anything you can do in this matter will be very much appreciated.

I might mention that Mr Hodder has been a resident in Sochia for 35 years, and has always been on very good terms with the Turks, and it is only during the last three or four months that they have changed their attitude towards him, and are practically holding him a hostage as a reprisal for events which are taking place in the Greek zone.

I have, &c.
DAVID FORBES

[E 5713, 43 93]

No. 40.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon—(Received May 18)

(No. 476. Secret)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 11, 1921

WITH reference to your Lordship's secret despatch No. 358 of the 21st April, I have the honour to inform you that the Greek authorities have been exploring the possibilities of encouraging the Kurds to give the Kemalists aid. The Greek authorities have included more or less vague plans for raising Kurdistan against them, and there have always been a certain number of Kurds imbued with Kurdish national ideas who have been anxious to see some such plan put into execution, as the Kemalists have been consistently opposed to giving the Kurds any real autonomy, much less independence.

2. I doubt, however, whether, even if united Kurdish action were possible, responsible Kurdish leaders would be very ready to enter into formal relations with the Greeks, as religious and racial sentiment would make it difficult to unite Kurds on such a basis. The two peoples are of some interest, but can hardly be regarded as leaders in any true sense.

3. Mustapha Pasha is a well-known Turkish officer belonging by origin to

He came into great prominence some time after the armistice as a supporter of Ferid Pasha's anti-Kemalist policy. His last part was that of president of the special court-martial for dealing with massacres and other war criminals. In this capacity he showed a praiseworthy zeal, and incurred much odium in Turkish nationalist circles. Soon after Ferid Pasha's fall last October, Mustapha Pasha was arrested on a trumped-up charge arising out of his activities on the court-martial, and it was only owing to the intervention of this High Commission that he escaped with a sentence of seven months' imprisonment, and was pardoned before he even completed that term. I have recently obtained from Mesopotamia permission for his return to that country, and I hope he may shortly go there, as his presence here is undesirable in his own interest.

4. Mustapha Pasha is honest, well-meaning and energetic, but he is too indiscreet to be of great value except as an instrument in careful hands. Properly handled he might be useful, e.g., to the British authorities in Mesopotamia, but he is not the man to induce Kurds generally to commit themselves to definite co-operation with the Greeks. The report that he and they may have some such plan in their minds gives nevertheless support from the fact that, when told he might go to Mesopotamia, he raised the question of his being allowed to take some other Kurdish officers with him. I have not encouraged him in this, on my grounds for wishing to facilitate his departure from here are personal to himself.

5. I know less about Kurd Hakkı Bey, but it is significant that he recently applied to me for facilities to proceed to Bagdad en route for his own country in the neighbourhood of Diarbekr, with a select company of other Kurdish notables. His account of himself is that he was in Paris, a fugitive from the Young Turks, when the

war broke out, and that he was taken to Malta, where he remained throughout the war and the first months of the armistice. He was eventually repatriated to Constantinople as a Turkish prisoner of war and has since been here. He seems to have been involved in some brawl in Malta in which certain Turks were killed, but he states that he was acquitted by the British Military Court which dealt with the matter. He claims to be head of the Melikan tribe. He is a well-set-up man, but appears to be of the adventurer or komitaji type.

6. I had Kurd Hakkı Bey's application under consideration when I received your Lordship's despatch under reference. In view of the information which has come to you, it seems preferable that I should leave it to your Lordship to decide what, if any, action should be taken regarding this.

7. In conclusion, I would refer your Lordship to my telegram to Bagdad of the 3rd May, which was repeated to the Foreign Office in my telegram No. 320 of the same date. I am still without any definite information regarding the anti-Kemalist movement, which broke out some time ago among the Kurds in the country east of Sivaa. It appears to have been of sufficient importance to cause apprehension in Angora and to necessitate strong military action. I have, however, no reason to suppose that it has had any extension beyond the Kizilbash or Alewi Kurds, who are numerous in the Persian and the country adjoining it, or that it amounts to more than a local insurrection, which the Kemalists authorities, with their superior military organisation and equipment, are capable of repressing.

I have, &c.
HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 5881/1826 44]

No. 41.

Consul Taylor to Earl Curzon—(Received May 23)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Rhodes, May 4, 1921.

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 1, Confidential, dated the 16th February, 1921, enclosing a report on the subject of Italian economic activity in Adalia, I have the honour to submit the following remarks:—

Thanks to the Italians, Adalia has undoubtedly become a port of great importance. If it were connected with the railway system it would soon become of great importance.

The Royal yacht "Trinacria" is expected at Rhodes early in June on a cruise in 11 parts carrying a cargo of samples of Italian manufactures of all sorts with a commercial commission to exploit them.

A. TREVELYAN TAYLOR

Extract from the "Sole" of April 21, 1921

(Translation.)

THE NATIONAL MEETING ON ANATOLIA

After an applauded speech, the president introduced the advocate, Dr. Scurpan, director of the mission to Anatolia.

the commencement of various enterprises, although it is still uncertain in what part our Government will start the putting in use of the money reserved for our commercial projects.

It should before all, according to Searpani, be the object of our attention, so that its important interior lands, which ascend to the fertile region of Konia, may be made productive by a railway.

After a brilliant discussion, the following order of the day was carried unanimously :—

"That this assembly, pleased at the opportune initiative of the Italian Institute for Colonial and Commercial Expansion, decides to invite the presidency to nominate an appropriate committee whose duty it will be to co-ordinate and study Italian economical, industrial and commercial action in Asia Minor, to sit in Milan near the above-mentioned institute."

The nomination of the committee national for Anatolia will take place as soon as possible.

[E 5862 2519 44]

No. 42

Consul Taylor to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 11 - Confidential.)

My Lord,

Rhodes, May 8, 1921

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch to me, No. 2, dated the 5th March last, enclosing a copy of a memorandum submitted by the Greek Rhodian delegation I have the honour to submit the following observations:—

This account of the sufferings of the Greek population under Italian rule is rather exaggerated; it appears to have been written hastily, during a time of some excitement.

In any case the state of affairs described, which may possibly have existed for a short time, is altered now

[6431]

There is considerable shipping activity. During the month of April sixteen steamers passed through Rhodes bound for Adalia, and twelve passed through from Adalia. The following lines call there more or less regularly: (Italian) Puglia, Servizi Marittimi, Lloyd Triestino, Navigazione Italiana; (British) Khedivial Mail Line, Rees Steamship Company, (French), Messageries maritimes, Affaires réunies, (Greek) - Psilos Company, Hadji Constandi; (Russian): Russian Navigation Company. Besides these there are frequent visits of steamers from Naples and Taranto chartered by the Italian Government.

The British, Greek and Russian steamers have superseded the motor-coasting service between Kuch Adasi (the native name for Scala Nuova), Rhodes and Adalia.

The land transport by lorry service, &c., had been organised before the war in A. I. The lorry service was at a standstill in 1911 and temporarily suspended, as also all other economic activities. All Italian efforts are now to secure and maintain the goodwill of the Turks for commercial purposes when the country shall have settled down again. Although there are no proofs of Italian assistance to the Komalists, there is no doubt about their sympathy with the Turks as against the Greeks or even the Allies. The Turks, for their part, seem ready to promise the Italians anything in return for assistance to get the Greeks out of Smyrna.

It is impossible for any European, except Italian, or even any Christian to land in Adalia without at once being seized by the Turkish Government. The Turks have become very threatening to strangers since their recent successes against the Greeks; the Italians look on and do not interfere with anything the Turks may do in Adalia or anywhere else along the coast of their sphere of influence.

I would mention the case of a British steamer, the "North Sands," which in March last delivered a load of firewood for the British Government at El Kantara, Egypt under charter of a Syrian firm of Adana. Whilst loading at Marmaris the agent went ashore, and was locked up by the Turkish authorities for six or eight hours and accused of being a spy for the British. Fortunately he was well known to the Governor and others, and so got released and back on board the ship. The Italian police looked on and did nothing. After the ship had been loading for about five days the Turks came and took away all labour, so the loading was finished by the officers and crew. The agent has since received a warning from his firm at Adana to be careful and not to attempt to land in Anatolia. This warning came in a letter which I have seen and was censured by the Italian authority at Adana. The censorship of letters seems to show that the Italians have something to conceal.

The Komalat deputation went to London through Rhodes, and will, I understand, return through Rhodes. It is possible that an Italian vessel will be put at their disposal.

Rhodes and other islands under Italian protectorate are full of refugees from Anatolia. These people are said to be landowners and other well-to-do classes who are escaping the demands of the Kemalists for contributions or military service. All this under the eyes of the Italians.

Of the various projects studied by the Italians, such as new railways, improvement of ports, roads, agriculture, &c., nothing is likely to materialise in the near future on account of the great expense and possible opposition of the Turks, but all would undoubtedly follow successful exploitation of the interior.

The translation of a cutting from the Italian paper the "Sole" on the subject of Anatolia and Rhodes is attached, dated the 20th April last.

It is not probable that Italian immigration would have any success until some of the above works were started, either by State or private enterprise. The Italian peasant could not live in Anatolia by working on the land alone.

At Rhodes nothing is being done. It is doubtful if the Italians would ever undertake the expense of building a safe port here in view of the uncertainty of the island's future fate. In the meantime it would seem that trade here is bound to diminish, a chief factor being that there is now a different customs tariff in Rhodes from that in Anatolia.

I cannot find that the Banca Commerciale Italiana is in any way taking the place of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, but news from Adalia is difficult to obtain.

It is hardly possible that a certain display of authority should not occur in any militarily occupied country, and I can quite believe that the Italians went a little further than was necessary even in dealing with the discontented Greeks.

The "large local autonomy" promised by the treaty and proclaimed by the Governor in October last is often sarcastically spoken of by the Greeks. As a matter of fact there is a municipal council for the city of Rhodes, consisting of one Greek, one European of any other race, and a mayor. Each of the villages

the people, powers are limited to control of expenditure for the current year only. No schemes of improvement can therefore be proposed or carried out until the council is properly elected. The Italian Government is accused of purposely retarding the elections, but I cannot vouch for the truth of this. I hear that the elections are to take place this summer and that they have already occurred in most of the villages.

An unarmed police force, called the "Municipal Guard," has been formed to patrol the city. The armed Carabinieri also patrol the city as well as every country district. They are well received and even welcomed. They have little to do, the people are quite orderly and crime non-existent. The Greeks of Rhodes used to be thoroughly Venetian, but it seems probable that they will follow any Government of which the Orthodox Church approves.

As for paragraph 5 of the treaty, which relates to postal censorship; the police espionage exists, as it does anywhere else. It is unreasonable to think the Italians would permit displays of Greek nationality. The rest of the paragraph is untrue.

Regarding paragraph 6, there are restrictions about leaving the island for more ceremonies and fêtes, but any restrictions there may be have probably been caused by the Greeks introducing a nationalist character into them. Italian has to be taught in the schools. As to restrictions on commerce, agriculture and industry, the excessive taxation has had a bad effect on commerce, but it seems hardly probable that the Italians would desire to cripple the industries.

The Italians, presumably for economical purposes in Anatolia, are certainly very strict. I have heard of no injustice being allowed as between Turkish, Greek or Jewish Rhodian subjects.

In conclusion I would remark that discontent is natural amongst the Greek inhabitants, who are in the great majority, at finding themselves under the rule of perhaps rather unsympathetic strangers, and who expected more autonomy than they have. I have heard of no injustice being allowed as between Turkish, Greek or Jewish Rhodian subjects. The Italians have improved the roads and rescued the ruins from the Turkish neglect, but that the Greeks will ever be happy under their rule or that they, the Italians, will ever do any good in Rhodes I do not believe, but the sufferings which are described in this memorandum are, as I have above submitted, exaggerated.

I have, &c.

A. TREVELLYAN TAYLOR.

E 5883/143 44]

No 43.

Consul Taylor to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 12. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Rhodes, May 8, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 2 of this date, on the subject of the boarding of the Khedivial steamer "Palitana" by Turkish soldiers or police at Adalia, I have the honour to report that the "Palitana" arrived at Rhodes yesterday morning from Adalia, and sailed again for Smyrna in about two hours. Her master did not come ashore, and it was not until she had left that I heard about the events at Adalia.

There are different versions of the story, which is now on everybody's lips, but the facts would seem to be approximately as follows:—

The "Palitana," which flies British colours, was boarded on arrival by Turkish armed police or soldiers, who forcibly arrested ten or twelve passengers, including two

Armenians, threatening the master and officers if they should dare to resist, and actually shooting one or more of the prisoners before dragging the others ashore.

I hear that these arrested men were the leaders of an anti-Kemalist revolution in Konia some time ago, the chief of them being a man called Hannid Omar; that they had escaped to Adana, but that when the French retired from that part these men embarked at Mersina, intending to escape to Smyrna.

I would observe that I had been informed some weeks ago that a British subject of some sort had been similarly taken on board a steamer by the Turks at Adalia last month.

I would refer to paragraphs 5 and 6 of my despatch No. 10, Confidential, of the 4th May, in which I referred to the apparent collusion of the Italians with the Turks in Anatolia.

In this case of the "Palitana," I cannot find that any action was taken by the Italians to hinder the outrage to the British flag.

I have, &c.

A. TREVELLYAN TAYLOR.

E 5924/1/44]

No 44

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 490.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 16, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 349 of the 16th instant, and previous correspondence concerning the relations between Afghanistan and the Angora Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of the official text of the agreement between the two Governments, as published in the "Hakimiet-i-Millî" of Angora on the 25th April.

2. As I have observed in my telegram under reference, the only significant passage in the agreement which was of any importance was that which expressly mentions the Caliphate as an appanage of Turkey.

3. The Afghan representative, according to reports in the Angora press, arrived at Constantinople on the 14th inst., and his presence has given great prominence to the event, as being a turning point in the history of Islam and the East.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 44.

Extract from the "Hakimiet-i-Millî" of April 25, 1921

TREATY CONCLUDED WITH AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

(Official text.)

(Translation.)

THE blessed clauses which bind together two brother Governments of the East, united in faith and interest.

—the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate—

The Turkish and Afghan Governments, convinced that they are bound together by sincere ties of sympathy, are imbued with one desire and one sacred purpose, and each possess the same high, moral and material interests, and that the happiness or misfortune of one State will redound to the happiness or misfortune of the other, and recognising that it is no longer possible that they should remain disconnected and isolated as in the past, and that certain historical duties necessarily devolve upon them at this moment, when is seen with infinite thankfulness that an era of awakening and deliverance of the Eastern world has begun; these two brother States and nations, therefore, observing that, as with the members of one body the troubles and afflictions of one part are the afflictions of the other, they have resolved to transfer their affection and mutual aid and assistance to the position of brotherhood, to bring about a state of mutual and general advance and on the basis of the friendship which will be

East, to conclude a Treaty of Alliance as a prelude to future welfare. For this purpose, delegates have been nominated: Youssef Kemal Bey, Commissioner (Minister) of Economic Affairs, and Dr. Riza Nour Bey, Commissioner of Public Instruction, members of the Government, on behalf of the Government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey, and his Highness General Mohammed Veli Khan, Ambassador Extraordinary, on behalf of Afghanistan.

Who, having communicated their full powers, found to be in due and proper order, have accepted the following articles:—

ARTICLE 1.

The Turkish nation, in possession of an independent existence for such time as God wills, considers it to be a sacred duty to recognise the independence, in the full significance of the term, of the Afghan nation to which she is bound with ties of the utmost sincerity and concord.

ARTICLE 2.

The two high contracting parties recognise that all Eastern nations possess complete liberty and right of independence, and that each of these nations is free to administer itself by such form of administration as it may particularly desire, and they recognise the independence of the States of Bokhara and Khiva.

ARTICLE 3.

Turkey having for centuries given guidance to and rendered distinguished services to Islam, and holding in her hand the standard of the Caliphate, Afghanistan in this connection recognises the leadership of Turkey.

ARTICLE 4.

Each of the high contracting parties will consider as directed against herself any action which would be directed against the other by any Imperialistic State in pursuance of the policy of invasion and exploitation of the East.

ARTICLE 5.

Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not to conclude any treaty or convention injurious to the interests of the other party, or which would be in the interests of a third State with which the other is not on friendly terms, and to give prior notice to the other of the forthcoming conclusion of an agreement with any nation whatsoever.

ARTICLE 6.

With a view to the regularisation of commercial and economic relations and consular affairs, the two contracting parties will conclude the necessary conventions separately, and Ambassadors will from henceforth be sent by each to the capital of the other.

ARTICLE 7.

The two contracting parties will establish regular and special postal services between the two countries, and will give to each other in the quickest possible manner all information regarding the situation in their respective countries, as regards public instruction and respecting their needs and desires in general.

ARTICLE 8.

Turkey undertakes to help Afghanistan militarily* and to send instructors and officers. These missions of teachers and officers will serve for a minimum period of five years, and on the expiration of that period, if Afghanistan so desires, a new mission of instructors will be sent.

ARTICLE 9.

This treaty will be ratified with the least possible delay, and its clauses will be in force as from that time.

* This appears to be the sense, though the word is apparently misprinted.—Translator's note.

ARTICLE 10.

This treaty has been drawn up at Moscow in duplicate, signed and exchanged by the delegates of the two parties.

This treaty has been signed on Tuesday, the 1st day of March, 1337 (1921), corresponding with the 21st day of Djumadi-ul-Akhir, in the 1339th year of the Hijra.

YOUSSEF KEMAL.

Dr. RIZA NOUR.

MOHAMMED VELI, Ambassador Extraordinary.

E 5926 143 44]

No. 45.

Sir H. Humboldt to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 24.

(No. 498.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 18, 1921.

THE situation here may be summed up as follows:—

1. The Greek Government, pending the resumption of active hostilities in Asia Minor, has repudiated the idea of intervention, and it is generally understood that they mean to see the Kemalists to the end. It is generally understood that the Kemalists intend to anticipate the Greek offensive, though I have noticed a statement in one Turkish paper that the Kemalists will start an offensive after Basmam. It would seem more likely, however, that, having worked hard to strengthen their positions, they will await the Greek attack.

2. In the meanwhile, the sufferers from the present state of things are the inhabitants of the regions in the zone of hostilities. Although the two commissions of enquiry have only been at work for three or four days, their reports point to the fact that irregular bands, organised by the Greeks for operations with the Greek regular troops, have committed and are committing serious excesses. No doubt some of the members of these bands are persons who have suffered at the hands of the Kemalists a year ago, and are actuated by feelings of revenge. A regrettable feature of these excesses is that in some cases Greek regular troops have been a party to them. The outcome is that the hatred as between Mussulmans and Christians in this part of the world is greater than ever.

3. Chauvinistic feelings seem to be getting the upper hand at Angora, and Bekir Sami Bey has been informed that General Fehmi Pasha, who temporarily succeeds Bekir Sami Bey, is a man of moderate views and not a firebrand. But the moderation with which Bekir Sami Bey has been credited has not prevented the Nationalist Government from giving the impression that they are hostile, in varying degrees, to the Allies.

4. On the issue of the hostilities in Anatolia. On a review of the situation I venture to think that a complete Greek victory would be less disastrous than a complete Nationalist victory. The best result to hope for is a stalemate, which will leave both sides exhausted.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

High Commissioner

[E 6157 1, 44]

No. 46.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 1573.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 28, 1921.

I HAVE been informed by a French official, giving the conditions imposed by the Angora Government before ratifying the Franco-Turkish Treaty concluded last March.

I enquired to-day of M. Berthelot whether the information was correct, and he stated that practically it was so. He added that the extremists at Angora appeared to

have gained the upper hand, and consequently the French Government intend to do nothing further for the time being.

It was interesting to note the change in the views of the French Government, since he expressed his ardent hope that the Greeks would obtain a great victory over the Turks in the Smyrna region.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST

Enclosure in No. 46

Extract from the "Echo de Paris," May 27, 1921

LES CONDITIONS DU GOUVERNEMENT D'ANGORA

Aucune Négociation ne peut être engagée sur de pareilles bases.

VOICI les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement d'Angora subordonne la ratification du Traité franco-turc conclu au mois de mars dernier :

1. Les hostilités pourront être reprises à tout moment : suppression du préavis d'un mois stipulé à Londres ;
2. L'échange des prisonniers ne sera pas immédiat ;
3. Pas de désarmement de la population ;
4. L'évacuation par les troupes françaises des territoires attribués à la Turquie s'accomplira, suivant les règlements, dans un délai de quinze jours et de huit jours, au lieu de deux mois et de six mois ;
5. Il n'y aura que dix-huit jours d'intervalle entre le départ des troupes françaises et l'arrivée des troupes turques ;
6. L'amnistie ne sera proclamée qu'à l'arrivée des troupes turques (c'est-à-dire que l'amnistie sera proclamée après l'arrivée des troupes turques) ;
7. Aucune communication n'est assurée entre Ourfa et Alexandrette ;
8. Aucune garantie de sécurité n'est accordée aux populations ;
9. Aucune garantie n'est accordée aux écoles françaises ;
10. La France n'aura pas à intervenir dans l'organisation de la police en Syrie ;
11. Suppression de la zone économique attribuée à la France. Les avantages accordés à la France seront énumérés dans une lettre ;
12. Aucune zone d'occupation intermédiaire n'existera entre la frontière turque et la Syrie ;
13. Modification de frontière faisant entrer toute la ligne de Bagdad en territoire turc et mettant la limite turque à une portée de canon d'Alexandrette.

Le Gouverneur français d'Angora, M. Munir Bey, qui est venu apporter à Adana les propositions du Gouvernement d'Angora, en sera pour son voyage.

E 8294 143, 44)

No. 47

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31)

(No. 506.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of an interim report furnished by the Commission of Enquiry, presided over by Colonel H. M. Farmer, on termination of its investigations on the Black Sea and Bosphorus coasts of the Ioud Peninsula.

Farmer informs me, in connection with the recommendations made by him, that the words "existing Turkish machinery" were adopted at the suggestion of his French colleague, who would not admit the use of the word "gendarmes."

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 47

Commission of Enquiry for the Ioud Peninsula to Sir H. Rumbold

WE have the honour to report that in accordance with your instructions and with the terms of reference for the above-named enquiry the commission left Constantinople on the 12th May in H.M.S. "Centaur" (Captain W. F. French, C.M.G.).

According to instructions, attention was first given to the northern portions of the peninsula. A warning was received from the British General Staff as to the uncertain conditions prevailing about Kandra owing to the withdrawal of Greek troops and to reported advances by Kemalists, and we were given instructions not to risk becoming involved in hostilities.

The necessity for this was borne out at Sile when the commission received a message from one Shevket to the effect that he was representing Mustapha Kemal at Kandra with orders to prevent anyone either coming in or going out.

On arrival at Sirek, witnesses stated that there were very few Nationalist soldiers with Shevket, and the commission proceeded to Kandra.

Shevket, with fifteen alleged Nationalist soldiers, retired and watched proceedings from a neighbouring hill, at which time this party was observed to be signalling.

The commission were of opinion that it would be unwise to take the risk of proceeding further east and south themselves, but had witnesses from the neighbourhood collected and took their depositions.

To report in general terms:—

Credible evidence has been produced as to crimes committed by both Greek officers and soldiers during the last year, and more especially lately, when the troops have been on the march. This is set out in the attached schedule; a few examples in *precis* only.

During the occupation by regular Greek troops there has been either entire or partial interruption of civilian police jurisdiction.

Civilian control has not been replaced by any capable military organisation. Full advantage has been taken of this by all bad characters, probably including deserters from the Greek army.

The commission is of opinion that the Greek military authorities did not take adequate steps to safeguard the civilian inhabitants from the depredations and acts of violence of outlaws, nor did they make adequate provision for the maintenance of discipline amongst their regular troops.

Turkish officials appear to have done their best to carry out their duties, but have been much handicapped, and charges preferred by them against the Greek soldiers do not appear to have been investigated.

There appear to be no complaints by Greek civilians of any trouble caused to them by Moslems during the last few months.

The commission recommend that full advantage should be taken at once of existing Turkish machinery for the maintenance of order and that this should be supplemented by the assistance of British troops as far as this may be practicable.

There is evidence that adjacent villages of different creeds exist side by side in the same districts without trouble when the Greeks are in a minority and the administration Turkish.

It is certain that many people have been prevented from settling on the land owing to the disturbed conditions. Some Greeks have already left and others will try to get away if the Kemalists troops come forward, as there is often only a shadowy distinction between brigand bands and groups calling themselves Nationalist soldiers. The Greek civilians are in dread of being made to suffer in their turn and the Moslems have a very genuine fear of the return of the Greek troops.

The countryside is sparsely populated and many villages are in a state of decay.

The members of the commission are of opinion that the displaced population will speedily return when they are assured of protection, and emphasise their opinion that the forces of law and order should be made under Moslem administration.

We beg to submit this half of our report before proceeding south in order to save time, being of opinion that it is necessary for action to be taken at once.

We have, &c.

LIEUT.-COLONEL H. M. FARMAR, *President*
LIEUT.-COLONEL S. VITELLI,
LIEUT.-COLONEL DE WITKOWSKI, } *Members.*
MAJOR O. H. VAN MILLINGEN.

Constantinople,
May 18, 1921

SCHEDULE.

Neighbourhood: Bozafat and Esser Keny, near Aghva.

During the last nine months parties of regular Greek soldiers with their officers have marched at intervals into these villages.

Katsaros has been a visitor and has behaved badly.

Both Greek regular officers and men have raped women, and robberies and acts of violence have been committed.

About March last the inhabitants lived in the hills for a month to escape further atrocities.

Witnesses, being also sufferers:—

Aiesha, wife of Jemal, raped five times.

Emme, wife of Alledjin, raped twice.

Uvze, wife of Tamarjahi Mustafa, raped five times.

Karagotch, an old man of 60, was beaten.

Haji Oglan Edhem, of Aghva, with two other Turks, were in a boat on the 26th/27th March, 1921. They were fired at by Greek regular soldiers, who were the worse for drink. The Turks came to shore and were ordered to take the soldiers to Shuleh, and were there beaten. A fresh bear was displayed on the head of Haji.

Haji Ibrahim, of Shonupli, was made to entertain Katsaros on his demand in March last. Katsaros subjected him to ill-treatment.

Evidence, and supporting evidence, was taken on oath.

Neighbourhood: Kandra. Witnesses: Salih Agha and Munir Beg.

No atrocities were committed in Kandra village. The Greek soldiers confined themselves to requisitioning cattle and carts without payment.

The different villages of this area were frequently occupied by Greek detachments under Greek officers or N.C.O.s.

First occupation was in November 1920, the others during February and March 1921.

The soldiers took everything possible, such as money, cattle and effects, having recourse to torture in all instances where pressure seemed necessary to them.

Acts of rape and murder were prevalent.

Some villages were either totally or in part destroyed.

Totally destroyed: Mehler Keni, Lazlar Keni, Arnak Keni, Omer Agha Keni and Sira Keni.

Witness: Ahmet. At Eregh 4 men and 2 women were killed, two Mustafas, Idria and Issa, and Fatma and Fetiyeh.

Thirteen persons were killed at Karalere. Witnesses: the surviving villagers.

Neighbourhood: Kandra. Witnesses:—

Aliamed of Erikli, one and a-half hour's distant from Kandra by march towards Adabazar, stated that in last November regular soldiers of the Greek army took all the money they could find in Erikli and drove away cattle. They killed people who they supposed to be hiding money, and the witness himself saw the murder of two men named Mustafa, one named Idria, and two women, Fatma and Fetih.

Fifteen houses out of twenty were burnt.

Esref of Sidiklar, one hour distant from Kandra by march towards Adabazar, stated that two weeks ago Greek soldiers entered the village and took away money, clothes and cattle. The witness was wounded, no one was killed.

Abdullah of Kavalir, half an hour's march from Kandra towards Ismid, stated Greek troops which came to this village two weeks ago pillaged it.

Jalus of Montardjilar, one hour's march from Kandra towards Ismid, stated Greek troops came for the first time in February, but did not do anything wrong. They came back two weeks ago and pillaged the village.

Hussie was badly treated and violated. Two other women on whom attempts were made escaped. Hussie, mother of twenty-four months' baby, corroborated this. This woman appeared to be modest and truthful.

Male witnesses, as well as seven women who came with them, stated that the villages to their own were pillaged and houses fired by regular Greek troops during the last five weeks.

Neighbourhood: Aghva. Whole village witness.

Large and small detachments of Greek troops occupied the villages in the district of Aghva twice, and passing through others, first in the autumn of 1920, and secondly in March 1921.

In all these villages money and valuables were extorted by menaces, threats and beatings, and other harsh methods.

In a few villages the cattle were removed, Katsaros appearing in several of these exploits. Everywhere the Greek soldiers behaved savagely. Haji Moustafa was the village that suffered most in proportion to size (twelve houses).

The seven men killed formed almost the entire male population. One woman was also killed.

Two Moustafas, two Hassans, Yousof, Hussein Ali, and one woman. Date 4th April, 1921.

Six women were raped.

Other villages that suffered from this invasion were:—

Kourfah-Aghva, where Salih was hanged by his feet twice, for one hour each time.

K. (witness), witness hanged by his feet.

(witness), Uzair (witness) and Djomal (witness), hanged by their feet.

K. (witness Sheman) and Kitchlar (witness Ibrahim).

stafa Kou; Nefsa, Emme and Fatma, whose relatives were killed.

Kowfah witness: Sindou Hanafe, Gulbin Hanoams, and Hussein Hadjo.

Neighbourhood: Shide. Witnesses: the kaimakam and chief gendarmerie officer.

Greek troops occupied the district of Shide. First in the summer of 1920, committing no atrocities, but robbing the countryside.

During the second occupation from November 1920 to March 1921, a band of 200 men on their way to Ismid, composed of soldiers and some civilians, officered by a captain and three lieutenants, terrorised the district.

Twenty of these men under Katsaros remained in the district destroying nearly all the villages and robbing the peasantry of their valuables and cattle.

Many of the inhabitants were beaten, some were hanged by their feet over straw fires, others were killed outright, and some women were raped.

At Shide the police agent, Ali, was killed under the pretext of having concealed arms.

At Darik a woman and a young girl were killed after having been raped.

Neighbourhood: Boicos.

The commission were given information as to widespread murder committed by Greek regular troops at Tchiboukli, and, following this up, the commission have had bodies examined; these had been buried fully clothed and shod, thrown together in all attitudes.

Evidence is being collected which is expected to lead to the discovery of other bodies.

The appearance of the bodies examined led the commission to suppose that they had been buried not later than last October, or perhaps as early as last July.

Evidence is also available as to the imprisonment of eighteen Turks by the orders of the Greek regular officers, in a dry underground cistern adjoining a Greek camp at Tchiboukli.

The prisoners were kept for ten days, being given food and water only when able to pay money to the Greek guards.

The majority of these prisoners were finally killed.

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No. 48

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31)

(No. 510.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 21, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter dated the 17th May 1921, which I have received from the Armenian Patriarch in Constantinople, stating that, according to a telegram which his Beatitude has received from an authentic source at Adana, Turkish Nationalist forces are marching on the Armenian town of Zeitoun, and begging for my intervention to save the inhabitants from the fate with which they are threatened by the impending attack.

2. The Armenians of Zeitoun are said to number about 1,500 souls, the survivors of some 25,000 Armenian inhabitants of the town and neighbouring villages who were deported in April 1915. From a previous report received by the Armenian Patriarch it appears that the Nationalists had recently sent a summons for the surrender of their arms and the enrolment of their men of military age in the Nationalist army; that, on their refusing to comply, it was decided to send a punitive expedition to Zeitoun.

I have, however, no authority to make any statement, and, even supposing it to be true, I am, as your Lordship is aware, quite powerless under existing circumstances to intervene with any effect in the manner desired by his Beatitude.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner

Enclosure in No. 48

Armenian Patriarch to Sir H. Rumbold

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Constantinople, le 17 mai 1921

NOUS avons l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que d'après un télégramme que nous venons de recevoir d'Adana, de source autorisée, les forces kémalistes marchent sur Zeitoun.

C'est un nouveau crime qui se prépare contre les milliers d'Arméniens, de tout âge et de tout sexe, occupés tranquillement à leurs travaux pacifiques, sans aucune crainte de la part des kémalistes, à leur destruction, et fatalement ils partageront le sort sanglant des habitants de Marache.

Sans autre ressource, pour parer efficacement à cette éventualité tragique, nous renons la liberté de prier instamment votre Excellence de vouloir bien user de sa haute et gracieuse influence pour empêcher que les événements redoutés et irréparables ne se produisent de nouveau dans cette région déjà si éprouvée.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Patriarche des Arméniens

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No. 49

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31)

(No. 511.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 24, 1921

IN the course of a visit which I paid to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday Sefa Bey urged on me the desirability of Great Britain showing, in an unmistakable manner, her sympathy for the Armenians. He said that the proceedings of the London Conference had produced a current of opinion favourable to Great Britain in this country. The renewal of hostilities by the Greeks had, to a certain extent, spoilt this good impression, because it was impossible to eradicate from the minds of many Turks that Great Britain was really behind Greece.

2. I asked Sefa Bey what he intended to convey by the expression "benevolent interest," and he replied that His Majesty's Government should openly accept the principle of a "viable" Turkey within her ethnic frontier. This meant that the Turks

should not be unnecessarily hampered in their administration of their own country. He was prepared to accept the Financial Commission, but with restricted powers of interference. He quite realised that certain Departments of State were in need of strengthening, and that the collaboration of Allied subjects might be necessary. He objected to what he called "the financial capitulations," although I pointed out to him that article 264 of the treaty expressly stipulated that foreigners should bear the burdens of taxation equally with Ottoman subjects.

3. Sefa Bey that in the present temper of the Angora Government no reasonable offer would content the Nationalists. He disputed this view, and maintained that, if the Greeks left Asia Minor altogether and Eastern Thrace were restored to Turkey, the other difficulties could be easily solved. He even said that the Turks would be satisfied with the Enos-Midha line.

4. Finally, Sefa Bey said that Turkey could not stand alone in the future. She must turn either to Russia or to England, and he thought it would be more in our interest that the Turks should lean on England. There was a risk of the Bolsheviks extending their influence over Anatolia. Sefa Bey again said that it was very desirable that Great Britain should come down definitely on the side of Turkey.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner

E 6212 201 44]

No. 50

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31)

(No. 517.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 24, 1921

I CALLED on the Grand Vizier yesterday before my departure on leave of absence. After his Highness had alluded to the various difficulties which were especially affecting the United Kingdom at this moment, such as the coal strike and the Irish situation, as also the Upper Silesian question, I led the conversation on to the financial embarrassments of the Constantinople Government. Sir Adam Block had previously informed me that he had written a memorandum for the Grand Vizier, pointing out the extreme gravity of the present situation, and urging his Highness to enforce all possible economies in the various Departments of the State. I had also learnt from Sir Adam Block that the Finance Minister, at the Council of Ministers, had stated that he could effect economies to the extent of £T 300,000 a month if his colleagues would assist him. None of them, however, had volunteered to do so.

2. I told the Grand Vizier that, so far as I could see, there were only two ways in which the Turkish Government could improve their financial situation. These were by doing away with superfluous offices and by a return to the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* system. The Turkish Government could not expect any more windfalls. I reminded his Highness that in two recent notes my Allied colleagues and I had again emphasised the necessity of a return to the *ad valorem* system, and that the American High Commissioner had brought in an additional £T 200,000 a month, without reckoning the proceeds of the consumption taxes. The Grand Vizier said that he understood that the American Government were opposed to a return to the *ad valorem* system, but I said that this was not the case. That Government were most anxious for a return to the *ad valorem* system, but the American High Commissioner objected to the maintenance of the *ad valorem* taxes side by side with the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff. The Grand Vizier repeated the argument that it was undesirable to have two customs regimes in Turkey.

3. I continued to urge the Grand Vizier to return to the *ad valorem* system. His Highness, whose attitude in this matter was evidently shaken in consequence of the firm stand taken by the three Allied Governments, then promised that he would take up the question again with his colleagues. I have little hope, however, that he will seriously try to overcome the opposition of his colleagues and, in particular, of Sefa Bey in this matter. We have thus reached a deadlock.

4. I then alluded to the Commission of Enquiry, which had just returned from the Ghazi and Yalova districts. This commission had verified the occurrence of murders, perpetrated by Greek irregular bands. But the commission had also ascertained that the Kemal troops had, less than a year ago, devastated and burnt Greek villages situated further inland. This had led to a displacement of the Greek population in those regions, and some of the Greeks who had suffered at the

hands of the Kemalists had undoubtedly taken part in the recent excesses against Moslems, under the stimulus of revenge.

5. The Grand Vizier then spoke about the situation at Angora. His impression was that the politicians in the Angora Parliament were likely to hamper the conduct of military operations. Situated as they were now, martial law was the only sensible regime for the Nationalists. He expressed the conviction that the Greeks would not be able to stand the strain for any length of time. The Nationalists were better off in that respect, because they were defending their own soil.

6. I then took leave of the Grand Vizier.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner

[E 6213 1 44]

No. 51

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31)

(No. 518.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 25, 1921

I HAVE the honour to state that I was received in private audience by the Sultan on the 23rd May, in order to take leave of His Majesty before my departure from Constantinople. No very settled practice exists as regards visits to His Majesty in armistice conditions, but I desired to seize the opportunity which presented itself of being received by His Majesty independently of my colleagues, and to mark the fact that His Majesty's Government regard the Sultan as a personage to be treated with consideration, and as still being the ultimate fount of authority in this country.

2. The Sultan, as on previous occasions, was unattended, and Mr Ryan, who accompanied me, acted as interpreter. His Majesty opened the conversation by referring to the occasion of my visit. He observed that my presence in Constantinople in the present serious situation was a source of comfort, but that it was also possible to derive some comfort from my departure on leave, as being perhaps an indication that the situation did not appear to me quite so black as it did to the people of the country. I replied that the situation might in the future enter on new and complicated phases, to which I would hope to return with renewed strength and energy.

3. The Sultan said that I would doubtless take the opportunity afforded by my visit to England to report verbally on the state of affairs in this country. He reminded me of what I had said at our first interview regarding the importance of moral and spiritual factors. He said that I was now in a position to appreciate the operation of such factors, and to present to His Majesty's Government the views which, as a conscientious observer, I had formed on the spot. He spoke of the atrocious conduct of the Greeks in places quite close to Constantinople. He accused the Greeks of pursuing a definite plan of extermination, and dwelt at some length on the horrors to which the Moslem population were exposed. Our own commissions of enquiry had, he said, seen what was happening. The suffering of the Moslems were such as could not be conceived possible by people living in Western conditions.

4. I said that His Majesty's Government had taken the lead in arranging for the despatch of commissions to enquire into the occurrences of which His Majesty spoke. I had on the previous day seen General Franks, the president of one of the commissions. What he told me confirmed the reports of atrocities. General Franks had indeed discovered cases in which the reports were exaggerated or unfounded, and I gave His Majesty one salient instance. I admitted that, notwithstanding this, the state of affairs in the Ispah and Yalova districts was very bad. I said, however, that the despatch of the missions had already impressed the Greeks, and was having a deterrent effect.

5. The Sultan said he realised how much His Majesty's Government had done, and thanked them for their efforts. He said, however, that peace was the only cure for the situation he had described. On the one hand, the Greeks were pursuing a policy of extermination. On the other hand, the Angora leaders, bent on personal aims, were creating disturbance. The innocent and suffering people were the victims of this. His own country abounded in people with mad ideas. They relied on Bolshevik assistance. His Majesty adverted to the recent change of Government at Angora, and said that the new Government were a "fellow" fresh from Moscow. The only cure, he repeated, was the re-establishment of peace by the Great Powers. It must be a peace founded on justice. The population

of the hinterland of Smyrna was overwhelmingly Turkish. Even in the town the Turks constituted 60-70 per cent. of the inhabitants. The Greeks might assert the contrary, but Greek, like Persian, exaggeration had passed into a proverb in this country.

As for Thrace, 90 per cent. of the population, both in Eastern and Western Thrace, were Turkish. The solution there was to form a kind of buffer State.

I said I was sure His Majesty's Government were alive to the considerations

and that Mr. Lloyd George was reported to have stated that His Majesty's Government were disposed to intervene in the conflict in Asia Minor when a favourable opportunity presented itself. His Majesty's Government were following the course of events very closely, and might be relied on to do everything possible to promote the re-establishment of peace. The British Empire was so widespread that its interests

interested than Turkey herself in the restoration of peace in Anatolia. For myself I said, I could not believe that the present conflict between Kemalists and Greeks would last, as neither side had the means of sustaining a prolonged struggle. I doubted whether the war would continue for more than a month or two longer.

7. The Sultan thanked me for what was reassuring in my remarks, but proceeded to develop his own views at some length, explaining more than once that they were personal expressions of opinion, which he offered with a view to assist me in forming my appreciation of the situation. The following is a summary of what he said, drawn up without any attempt to reproduce the precise order of his remarks.

Starting from my observation regarding the weakness of both sides in the Turco-Greek struggle, the Sultan said that the Kemalists drew strength from Bolshevism, and he insisted once more on the gravity of the Bolshevik menace. In his view the policy should be to throw the Bolsheviks back on to the Caucasus, in order to avert a danger which would otherwise threaten first Turkey and then the peace of the world. To do this it was necessary to arrive at a basis of settlement which would satisfy people sufficiently to enable peaceable men to settle down to the task of reconstructing their lives by individual endeavour. He compared the presence of the Greeks in predominantly Turkish areas to the artificial methods sometimes used in surgery of keeping a wound open. While the Greeks remained in Eastern and Western Thrace, he said, belonged properly to Turkey, but Turkey was incapable of holding them by her own resources against two rapacious neighbours.

Powers, and formed into a buffer between Europe and Asia. I understood His Majesty to say that controls need not be objected to, as they would be good for Turkey, but it was merely a passing remark, and I do not know how far it can be taken as a

As regards the prolongation of hostilities, he said that the leaders on both sides had an interest in the continuance of a disturbed state of affairs. Neither side would take the offensive, and it cost them nothing to remain facing each other as at present. What was wanted was not mediation, but the exercise by the Powers of a strong and just pressure from above. This alone could put an end to the present state of affairs, which, if allowed to drift on through the summer and autumn, might produce disastrous consequences. The Sultan, while admitting that the interests of minorities must be safeguarded, spoke with noticeable bitterness of the minorities in this country as belonging to some of the worst races of the East.

9. After asking that, in reporting personally to His Majesty's Government, I should combine what he had said with what I had myself witnessed, His Majesty said it only remained to wish me a pleasant journey. I thanked him for the great courtesy he had shown me on the three occasions on which he had been pleased to receive me.

Sultan reminded me of what he had told me more than once of his hereditary admiration for Great Britain, and his conviction that Turkey's best hope lay in the assimilation of British ideals. It was therefore natural, he said, that he should show particular consideration for one who came to him as British representative. He was good enough to give, as a further reason, the personal regard which he had conceived for me in the course of our conversations. After a few further courtesies of the same kind, I withdrew.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD
High Commissioner

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31)

(No. 521. Confidential.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch of the 25th instant, I have the honour to state that on the 25th instant I was called on by Mr. Ryan, accompanied by his son Jeladet Bey, who is one of the more active promoters of the Kurdish national movement. Emin Ali Bey said that, in view of the present situation, he and his friends had come into touch with the Greek representative here, who had listened favourably to the suggestion of a Kurdish movement, which, without any formal co-operation, would promote the interests of both Greeks and the Kurdish nationalists, but had said that he could not proceed in the matter unless the movement were sanctioned by His Majesty's Government. Emin Ali Bey asked whether, if he or other movers applied for permission to go to Mosul for instance, it would be granted, and whether, if an organisation were set on foot at some place in British occupied territory, it would be favourably regarded.

Mr. Ryan, following the line which has always been laid down in Foreign Office instructions since the armistice, at once replied that no encouragement could be

the submission of such proposals as that made by Emin Ali Bey. As regards the journey to Mosul, he said that if members of the Butrihan family applied as travellers for permission to go to Mosul, His High Commission would not oppose their going, but that the application would have to be made through the ordinary channels.

3. Your Lordship will doubtless agree that no other attitude could be taken up at present towards proposals of this kind from Kurdish notables in Constantinople. They have, however, been put forward by so many different persons at different times that they are worth bearing in mind. A Kurdish movement would be a very difficult instrument to handle, but if the extremist tendencies of Angora should end in forcing Great Britain and France into a definite conflict with the Kemalists, the anti-Kemalist sections of the Kurdish race might possibly be turned to account.

I enquired whether His Majesty's Government had any information as to the person, who used to reside at Ispah, and who, according to a report in the

Kurdistan. I have no knowledge of the long memorial which he submitted for the some considerable time ago. I have been unable to put my hand on this document, but it was drawn up at Tiflis and put forward the claim of Prince Kiamul, as he called himself, to be installed as ruler of Kurdistan.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD

High Commissioner

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31)

(No. 523.)

My Lord,

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 370 and 371 of the 23rd instant, relative to the change of Government at Angora, I have the honour to state that the newspapers of Nationalist sympathies in Constantinople have been at great pains to explain that recent events at Angora have nothing to do with foreign policy.

2. Much publicity has also been given within the last two or three days to the formation of a new party in the Grand National Assembly under the name of "Group for the Defence of the Rights of Anatolia and Roumelia." The title of the group recalls the autumn of 1919, when the programme of the Nationalist movement was

National Pact, which has recently been the subject of correspondence with the Foreign Office. Mustapha Kemal Pasha has himself accepted the presidency, and the group claims to have already secured the adhesion of 170 members of the Assembly.

3. This would appear to indicate that, as a result of recent tension in political circles at Angora, Mustapha Kemal is mobilising as many elements as possible round his own person, on the basis of the National Pact and nothing but the National Pact.

4. It is further reported from Angora that an important sitting of the Grand National Assembly is to be held on the 26th May in order to consider future policy. According to some accounts, the Cabinet recently appointed is merely transitional, and further changes may be expected after the sitting of the 26th May. However that may be, I see no reason at present to alter the opinion expressed in the last paragraph of my telegram No. 370 of the 23rd May.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 6.)

No. 212.)

My Lord,

Athens, May 23, 1921

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copies of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Volo, reporting on the failure of the mobilisation throughout Thessaly and the "pay-at-any-price" sentiment in all classes in his district.

Very similar reports reach me from more or less reliable sources from almost every part of Greece except from the Peloponnese, where the mobilisation appears to have gone pretty well, and I think now that the categorical statements made to me and to Mr. Benetuck by the Ministers of War and Finance respectively cannot possibly command credit in face of the general evidence that a very small percentage have actually joined the colours. When I said to my Serbian colleague that it was difficult to believe that such categorical statements by responsible Ministers could be deliberately untrue, he explained it by saying that many men had responded to the call, but had been seen again, the result of this was, he said, that recruits once collared were now never left free even for a day.

A official denials the other day of the report that the were refusing to answer the call, but I have been informed by a Deputy who has just returned from Crete that few have joined up.

Stories reach me that recruits left Piræus for the front the other day with shouts of "It is unjust—they have fooled us!"; that those of Eastern Macedonia cheered enthusiastically for Venizelos at the railway station of Drama; that those from Cavalla and Thessalonica sang the "Venizelist Hymn" during the whole of their voyage; and that they were shouting "He is coming!" (the cry we got so tired of between the elections and the King's arrival).

I have, &c.

AN

Closure in No. 54

Vice-Consul Knight to Earl Granville.

(No

My Lord,

Volo, May 17, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the various Greek mobilisation decrees issued since the London Conference have met with very little response throughout Thessaly and particularly in the populous Mount Pelion district. Shortly after the first of these decrees had been published I was told by a villager that in Makrymitra, one of the poorest and richest of the Pelion villages, out of a total of sixty men called up only four had presented themselves, which was perhaps but a slightly exaggerated statement of fact. About the same time I was informed, on excellent authority, that the managing director of the Thessalian railways at Volo had received orders to make arrangements for the conveyance on a certain date, from Larissa to Volo, of 3,000 recruits from the Larissa district, while only 400 were actually forthcoming. The percentage of recruits obtained in the latter case is double that in the former, but this is easily accountable for by the fact that the Larissa district, being a plain, offers fewer facilities for defaulters.

Makryntza is, in this respect, no exception among the numerous villages of Pelion, which, with one exception, voted at the last elections for supporters of the present Government, in the firm belief that they were thereby contributing towards the speedy termination of a war which the statesman until then in power was supposed to be protracting indefinitely for his own ends. Even last November, when the church bells in Volo were summoning the people to some demonstration in favour of the new régime, I overheard one villager remark to another: "We have turned out the lamb and brought in the bear," with an air of disillusionment and apprehension which made it clear that he took to himself a share of the blame. The same feeling has undoubtedly made very considerable headway since then.

The two following anecdotes, bearing on recent recruiting in this district, have been seriously related to me but I am unable to vouch for the absolute authenticity —

A brother of the recently-deceased Volo Deputy, D. Karakites, well known as a local Royalist firebrand, went up to Makryntza since the Greek Revolution from fifteen to twenty of the young men of the place to roast lamb and meat. He then had them conveyed to Volo and placed in the train, he himself accompanying them to Larissa and handing them over to the military authorities there. M. Karakites is understood to have gained much "kudos" as a result of this incident.

At the village of Mount Pelion having organized themselves into the "Pelion" for home defence, a small force of gendarmes was despatched to reason with them. In the village of Hagios Lavrentios, however, proved useless, and returned with a message to the effect that if the Government wanted to take it had to consider the numbers and determination.

As to the general local attitude towards the war, my impression is that, apart from a few zealous patriots, all classes and parties would welcome peace at almost any price, whether good or bad, since the imposition of the censorship has proved the worst. A near relation by marriage of a member of the present Government, the other day, with much satisfaction, in London, and her only anxiety was that the British Government of military age. Such an attitude is so general here that it provoked no surprise, save in the foreign mind.

L. C. KNIGHT

E 6440 201 44

No 55

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon — (Received June 8)

(No. 55)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 28, 1921

With reference to Sir H. Russell's despatch No. 473 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that Sir Adam Block, at his own request, attended the meeting of the Allied High Commissioners held yesterday, and communicated a detailed statement on the financial situation.

He pointed out that complete bankruptcy was now only a question of days. Every possible expedient had already been resorted to, and it was only due to a series of unexpected windfalls that the Turkish Treasury had been hitherto enabled to carry on. There was no reason to anticipate any further windfall of this kind, and in these circumstances the Ottoman Government would not even be in a position to pay the priority claims on the Treasury or the salaries of officials for the month of June. This would naturally create an outbreak of violent discontent, the end of which it was difficult to foresee.

3. Sir Adam Block pressed the French High Commissioner to exert his influence with a view to obtaining from the Ottoman Bank the statutory advance of £T. 1,500,000 which would enable the Turkish Treasury to carry on its present hand-to-mouth existence for a little longer. General Pellé promised to do his best to induce the bank to make the proposed advance without delay.

4. On being asked whether he could prescribe anything in the nature of a real remedy, Sir Adam Block replied that, as he had already pointed out, a saving of some £T. 300,000 a month could be effected by the diminution of the personnel in Government offices. Some 60 per cent. of these functionaries were superfluous and did practically

no work, and he had done all he could to induce the Government to pension them off. Further, he estimated a monthly gain of £T. 200,000 could be effected by the abolition of the Ministry of War, which, I am informed, was adopted. He had no further remedy to suggest until the Financial Commission, established under the Treaty of Sévres, came into being. He thought the Ottoman Government should be pressed to allow the provisions of the treaty to this effect to enter into force without waiting for the ratification of the treaty as a whole. He thought the Financial Commission might, with the powers conferred upon them, possibly save the situation, though it might already be too late. Anyhow, this was the only hope.

5. I suggested to the French and Italian High Commissioners that it could do no harm to bring into force a section of the Treaty of Sévres before its actual ratification. But they thought he might be right.

6. I suggested to the French and Italian High Commissioners that it could do no harm to take charge of the financial situation. At the same time I was bound to confess that, in the view of Mr. Ryan, the Constantinople Government was too frightened of Angora for there to be much chance of their accepting this solution. The same consideration applied to the question of reverting to the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* tariff.

6. It was finally agreed that the three dragomans should ask for an immediate advance of the Grand Vizier, and press upon him the adoption of the measure advocated by Sir A. Block, and especially of the *ad valorem* tariff. They could then in a friendly and unofficial manner, suggest to the Grand Vizier that the one real hope of saving the desperate financial situation appeared to be in the establishment of the Financial Commission, and sound him as to whether the Porte would be disposed to ask for the immediate entry into force of this commission.

7. Sir A. Block thought that there was some hope of the Porte accepting the advice.

8. The dragomans are to see the Grand Vizier on Monday. But neither Mr. Ryan nor myself are very sanguine as to the success of this *démarche*. I will report the result in a further despatch.

I have, &c

FRANK RATTIGAN,

Acting High Commissioner

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No 56

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon — (Received June 8)

(No. 56)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 1, 1921

With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 814 of the 16th May, relative to the despatch of Commissions of Enquiry to the Izmid and Yalova districts in order to investigate the atrocities alleged to have taken place there, I have the honour to transmit herewith for your Lordship's information the report of the Commission of the Allied Commission under Major General Franks, of the investigation.

The report is of a very voluminous character, it has not been found practicable to have them copied, owing to pressure of work, and they will not, therefore, be forwarded unless desired by your Lordship.

3. The report of the Izmid Commission has not yet been received.

I have, &c

FRANK RATTIGAN

Acting High Commissioner

Rapport de la Commission interalliée chargée d'enquêter sur les Exactions commises contre la Population turque dans les Régions de Yalova et de Guemlek

Les membres de la Commission d'Enquête quittant Constantinople le 12 mai, sont arrivés à Guemlek dans la soirée. Ils se sont mis immédiatement en rapport avec le Général Léonardopoulos, commandant la 10^e Division hellénique, en résidence à Guemlek.

Ils ont reçu de cet officier général tous les moyens matériels nécessaires à leur mission.

2. La région à visiter par la commission comprend la majeure partie des cazas de Yalova et de Guemlek. C'est une presque île montagneuse comptant une quarantaine de villages, dont trente-cinq exclusivement turcs. Dans la région voisine de Bazarkeui, sur les rives ouest et nord du lac d'Isnik, se trouvent une dizaine de villages arméniens, dont quelques-uns—exception faite pour le village de Tchenguiler, qui a été incendié par les Kémalistes en avril dernier—ont été détruits par les Turcs au cours de la guerre et après l'armistice.

Il y a eu environ 2.000 réfugiés grecs et environ 1.500 réfugiés musulmans provenant des villages voisins détruits et environ 3.500 réfugiés grecs des localités grecques d'Elmalik, Fouladjik, Ortakeui, Nicée, incendiées ou détruites par les Kémalistes au cours de l'année 1920.

La ville de Guemlek, la principale de la région, comptait avant les derniers événements environ 6.000 Grecs et un millier de musulmans.

3. La région est occupée depuis neuf mois par de faibles détachements de l'armée hellénique au total, huit compagnies environ. La première ligne Yalova-Bazarkeui est tenue par cinq compagnies et une compagnie de mitrailleuses. Deux compagnies environ occupent Guemlek. Un petit détachement de vingt-six hommes est à Armondli.

Le quartier général de la 10^e Division hellénique est à Guemlek. Les troupes de cette division assurent plus à l'est la couverture de l'armée hellénique dans la direction de Yéni Cheir.

4. Dans toute la région, l'administration civile ottomane est inexistante. Elle n'a été remplacée par aucune autre organisation.

5. La commission a opéré du 13 au 20 mai dans la région à l'est de Guemlek et sur la rive nord du golfe de Moudania. Elle s'est rendue le 20 mai dans la région de Yalova et est rentrée le 22 mai à Constantinople, sa mission terminée.

Elle a, durant cette période, procédé aux opérations suivantes :

(a) Pendant deux jours, audition soit chez le maire, soit au quartier général turc de Guemlek, de tous les habitants grecs, arméniens, musulmans, ayant des déclarations à faire sur les événements récents qui se sont passés dans la région.

Toutes les dispositions, même celles concernant des faits déjà anciens ou s'étant produits dans des localités éloignées, ont été recueillies.

(b) Visite des villages incendiés de la ligne des avant postes Tchenguiler (arménien) Bazarkeui (turc), puis des villages turcs situés en arrière de cette ligne et également incendiés Tchiteldji, Guemlek.

La commission ayant vu, le 15 mai, de son bateau, brûler des villages sur la rive nord du golfe de Moudania, a été rendue les 15, 16 et 17 mai dans les localités turques de Narli, Karadja Ali, Koumla, Kapakli, Fitikli, et dans la localité d'Armondli habitée par des Grecs et des musulmans.

Elle a constaté le passage récent de bandes grecques et arméniennes armées, et l'incendie, encore en cours, des localités de Kapakli, Narli, Karadja Ali. Elle a trouvé tant dans ces villages qu'aux environs de celui de Koumla vingt huit cadavres et un blessé. Un cadavre d'un jeune homme vivant a également été trouvé à Kapakli.

(c) Elle a recueilli toutes les déclarations concernant les événements qui se sont passés dans la région, et elle a fait un relevé de reconnaissance ayant opéré entre Guemlek et Armondli les 13, 14 et 15 mai, et celle de l'officier grec commandant le poste fixe d'Armondli.

(d) Elle a assuré l'embarquement pour Constantinople des habitants de Koumla et des réfugiés musulmans de Guemlek (environ 2.300).

(e) Dans la région de Yalova elle a visité Yalova, Tchinaradjik, Inguéré, Kodja Déré. Elle a reçu les dépositions des habitants grecs et turcs de Yalova et celle des habitants grecs de Tchinaradjik.

La commission a jugé inopportune la visite des villages turcs d'Ak Keui et de Samanli, où se trouvent encore environ 300 musulmans. N'ayant pas le temps de pouvoir leur porter immédiatement secours, elle a craint de se voir placée dans une situation aussi délicate que celle où elle s'est trouvée à Yalova, en allant à l'aide des Koumla, lorsque la population terrorisée s'est mise spontanément sous sa protection.

Le récit détaillé des opérations de chaque jour ainsi que les dépositions recueillies sont joints au présent rapport.

6. A la suite des dépositions qu'ils ont reçues, des constatations qu'ils ont faites de l'ensemble de leurs impressions, les membres de la commission croient pouvoir faire les déclarations suivantes :

(a) Tous les villages musulmans de la région visitée—à l'exception d'Onnoy, Yalova, Ak Keui, Samanli—sont abandonnés et pour la plupart ont été depués de deux mois, pillés et incendiés par des bandes chrétiennes.

(b) La population de ces villages est actuellement dispersée. Quelques habitants ont pu se mettre en sûreté en quittant le pays avant que leur village soit détruit. Les autres ou bien ont réussi à s'échapper par le lac d'Isnik, ou bien ont été tués.

(c) On ignore le sort réservé à la partie de la population la plus nombreuse, qui est réfugiée dans la montagne. Aucune précision de chiffre ne peut non plus être donnée.

(d) Aucune des atrocités proprement dites (hommes enfermés et brûlés, enfants jetés au feu, femmes violées et éventrées) signalées dans les rapports des autorités ottomanes n'a pu être matériellement vérifiée. Mais il est certain que des atrocités ont été commises.

(e) Des actes de violence et de barbarie, des massacres importants ont été commis. Des hommes ont été tués à coup de feu ou assassinés, parfois même dans leur propre maison.

(f) La population chrétienne ne paraît pas avoir été désarmée et il semble également que la population musulmane ait réussi à conserver encore des armes.

(g) Dans les localités occupées par les troupes grecques, la population musulmane se plaint des vexations commises par les soldats grecs.

(h) Les actes de violence et de barbarie, des massacres importants ont été commis. Des hommes ont été tués à coup de feu ou assassinés, parfois même dans leur propre maison.

(i) Les autorités helléniques qui pourvoient à Guemlek à la subsistance des réfugiés arméniens et grecs laissent sans nourriture et sans soins médicaux les réfugiés turcs.

(j) Des actes de violence et de barbarie, des massacres importants ont été commis. Des hommes ont été tués à coup de feu ou assassinés, parfois même dans leur propre maison.

(k) Les actes de violence et de barbarie, des massacres importants ont été commis. Des hommes ont été tués à coup de feu ou assassinés, parfois même dans leur propre maison.

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renilant à Koumla ont été trouvés tués sur la plage. Ce meurtre, que l'autorité hellénique n'a pas signalé est parvenu indirectement à la connaissance de la commission.

(j) L'incendie et le pillage des villages turcs de la région ont lieu depuis moins de deux mois. Cette destruction paraît méthodique. Elle est effectuée par des bandes grecques et arméniennes et il paraît certain que des détachements réguliers de l'armée hellénique y participent.

(k) Le commandement hellénique s'est dérobé à toute demande de la commission au sujet de son impression personnelle sur la situation actuelle dans le pays. Il affecte, en apparence, de n'attacher que peu d'importance à ces destructions, qu'il considère comme des représailles pour des attentats isolés ou pour des faits de violence commis antérieurement par des Turcs.

Ce n'est qu'après les événements du 15 mai, et seulement tard dans la soirée que des mesures ont été prises pour protéger la population musulmane de Koumla.

Un détachement de reconnaissance a bien été envoyé du 12 au 15 mai dans la région entre Guemlek et Armoudli, mais ce détachement, qui avait une mission de désarmement et d'épuration, n'a pas empêché les exactions ou incendies qui ont eu lieu à la date même de son passage dans les localités de Karadja Ali, Nari Kutchuk Koumla.

La commission a été chargée de recueillir les renseignements sur les événements de deux mois la destruction ou l'évacuation de la presque totalité des villages musulmans de la partie des cazas de Yalova et de Guemlek soumise à l'occupation hellénique.

Si les événements qui se sont produits à l'occasion des mouvements de l'armée hellénique à la fin du mois de mars peuvent expliquer les destructions ou l'abandon successifs de la suite d'attaques ou de représailles les villages voisins de la ligne grecque (Dijan Keui - Rechadié - Sogouldjak - Bazar-Keui) - Tchenguiler (arménien), il n'en est pas de même sur la rive nord du golfe de Mondania. Ces derniers ont été incendiés, le 15 mai, dans une période peu active d'opérations militaires, alors que la commission se trouvait en rade de Guemlek depuis le 12 mai, et sans que le commandant grec ait signalé des actes particuliers de provocation.

Sans doute, la haine séculaire entre les diverses races, haine encore alimentée, chez les soldats helléniques et chez la population grecque de Guemlek qui vivent en contact permanent, par la présence des 2.000 Arméniens réfugiés ayant particulièrement souffert des exactions turques pendant la guerre et par celle des 3.800 réfugiés grecs dont beaucoup ont été témoins des atrocités commises par les kémalistes à Filadjik, Elinalik, Nicée, est-elle une cause suffisante. Mais si cette haine peut expliquer la rigueur du traitement qu'ont subi les villages musulmans, elle ne paraît pas être la cause déterminante de leur destruction aussi générale et aussi rapide.

Il semble qu'il y ait une méthode apparente et suivie dans l'exécution de ces destructions qui depuis deux mois se produisent successivement par groupes de villages jusqu'à proximité même du quartier général hellénique.

Les membres de la commission concluent qu'ils se sont trouvés dans la partie de la région de Yalova et de Guemlek soumise à l'occupation hellénique, un plan systématique de destruction des villages turcs et d'extinction de la population musulmane. Ce plan est exécuté par les bandes grecques et arméniennes qui semblent opérer sous le contrôle hellénique et parfois même avec le concours de détachements de soldats réguliers.

Ces destructions de villages et la disparition de la population musulmane qui en est la suite ont sans doute, pour but d'assurer, contre tout mouvement possible de la population, les flancs et les derrières de l'armée hellénique en cas d'une offensive prochaine, et peut-être même aussi de créer dans la région une situation politique favorable au Gouvernement hellénique.

En tout cas, la commission est d'avis que les exactions signalées contre les chrétiens d'une part, contre les musulmans d'autre part, sont indignes d'un Gouvernement civilisé et qu'elles engagent également dans la région occupée par l'armée grecque—la responsabilité des autorités helléniques seules en fonctions, et—dans la région soumise au régime kémaliste—celle des autorités ottomanes.

8 En raison des conclusions de son enquête, la commission ne pense pas avoir qualité pour proposer les mesures propres à remédier à la situation dans la région de Guemlek. Aussi bien la dispersion de la presque totalité de la population musulmane des cazas de Yalova et de Guemlek est-elle déjà un fait accompli.

Mais pour éviter à l'avenir le retour de faits semblables dans les autres régions

occupées par l'armée hellénique la commission propose l'installation d'une commission interalliée dans ces régions ou tout au moins l'envoi auprès des autorités locales d'une commission interalliée.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne les musulmans se trouvant encore à Yalova, Ak Keui, et dans un nombre d'environ 600, soient autorisés à se réfugier à Constantinople ou environs et que des mesures soient prises dans ce but.

Les membres de la commission—

Grande-Bretagne.

Italie.

France.

G. M. FRANKS.

E. RULLOTTO.

G. VILCO.

Major-General.

Colonel.

Lieut.-Colonel.

Le 23 mai 1919.

enclosure 2 in No. 54

Journal de la Commission interalliée envoyée pour enquêter sur les incidents dans les Régions de Guemlek et de Yalova.

Le 12 mai 1919, la commission est arrivée à Guemlek. Elle a été accueillie par le commandant de la 10^e Division, à Guemlek. Il vint de suite à bord et paraissait, par son langage, satisfait de cette expédition, mais fut courtisé et offrit même de mettre à sa disposition deux automobiles pour le lendemain, afin qu'elle visite Bazar-Keui. A 8 heures la commission débarqua et rencontra le même sur la plage. Il la conduisit à Bazar-Keui. On y trouva des centaines de réfugiés venus des villages grecs et arméniens détruits par les kémalistes sont rencontrés, en particulier de Kex Derwent, Elinalik, de Vizar Han Houdié, Foulardjik, Levké et Kouplu. Les réfugiés grecs de Guemlek sont très mal logés, mais les kémalistes ont fait tout pour leur bien-être.

La commission a visité les villages de Bazar-Keui, Rechadié, Sogouldjak, Tchenguiler, Filadjik, Elinalik, Nicée, etc. Bazar-Keui fut trouvé complètement détruit, à l'exception de quelques maisons occupées par les troupes grecques.

La commission fut reçue par le commandant hellénique, chef du détachement à Bazar-Keui qui déclara ne pas avoir été à Bazar-Keui au commencement d'avril.

Après cette entrevue, la commission visita le village détruit de Chindjiller. Il fut entièrement rasé, mais quelques rares habitants vivaient encore dans ces ruines. La commission retourna à Bazar-Keui. Au même moment, quelques paysans turcs attaquèrent les lignes de communications grecques. A la suite de ce fait, le commandant reçut l'ordre d'évacuer la population turque de certains villages situés dans son secteur. Ceci fut commencé le 16 avril mais alors les réfugiés grecs et arméniens, quand les habitations turques furent évacuées, incendièrent ces dernières pour se venger.

Après cette entrevue, la commission visita le village détruit de Chindjiller. Il fut entièrement rasé, mais quelques rares habitants vivaient encore dans ces ruines. La commission retourna à Bazar-Keui.

La commission retourna à Bazar-Keui. Ville détruite systématiquement par les grecs, pas d'habitants y vivant encore, aucune preuve d'explosion, aucun cadavre n'y fut découvert.

La commission visita alors Cheltikdj. Le village brûlait quand elle entra. Quatre soldats grecs furent surpris comparant des planchers des maisons dans le village. Les kémalistes ont fait tout pour leur bien-être. Le lendemain il fut incendié. La commission n'a pu trouver de trace de cadavres.

La commission visita Gedelek, village entièrement détruit, mais il ne fut pas trouvé trace des vingt-sept personnes rapportées comme y ayant été massacrées. En effet, dans les confins de Gedelek, une foule de réfugiés et de soldats qui avaient

encé par faire une démonstration amicale, apercevant soudain Mujazim ah Effendi, guide de la commission, l'attaqua; il fut tiré de l'auto et ce ne fut qu'avec de grandes difficultés qu'il put être ramené à bord du "Bryony".

La commission regagne le bateau à 8 heures, le chef d'état-major grec vint à bord et s'excusa de l'incident de l'après-midi.

Le 14 mai, à 9 heures, la commission s'installe à la propre maison du maire pour entendre les plaintes des Grecs et Arméniens qui peuvent en avoir à formuler. La commission fut très amicalement invitée à déjeuner par le maire, invitation acceptée.

Le premier plaignant était le Dr Mezbourian, chef du Comité arménien dans la région de Guemlek. Le docteur donne à la commission un aperçu général des atrocités qui ont été perpétrées contre les Arméniens depuis le commencement de la guerre. Dans cette région dix huit villages ont été détruits et la population réduite de 70 000 à 25 000 habitants. Quand il lui fut demandé quelle solution pourrait être trouvée à ce mélange de races, le docteur dit que la chrétienté ne pouvait exister sous un Gouvernement turc, même s'il y avait une gendarmerie interraciale.

La commission commença il y a un an c'est-à-dire au début de l'occupation de l'Anatolie par les troupes alliées.

Des plaignants de Tehindjilar, Yem-Kem, Keramet, Mirdighenz furent entendus et tous racontent les massacres, les incendies d'août 1915 et du milieu de 1920. En particulier, les femmes de Filadjik, un village grec, furent alors entendues. Elles nous dirent de terribles atrocités et déclarèrent que l'officier turc qui servait de guide à la commission était un des chefs qui ont perpétré ces massacres.

La commission continue son enquête à 2 heures de l'après-midi dans la maison du maire. Hommes et femmes furent entendus, quelques-uns de Vazir Han, Kis Dervent, Fimalik, Soyoudjak, Tcherkesskeny, Deli Bazar et Orta Kem, tous nous donnèrent à peu près le même récit: des Kémalistes venaient de temps à autres dans leurs villages en premier lieu demandant de l'argent et de la nourriture, puis prenant des bestiaux et des chevaux et finalement, quand le village n'avait plus rien à donner, un massacre avait lieu et les habitations étaient incendiées.

En quittant la mairie, la commission rendit visite au général hellénique et prit le thé chez lui. Retour au "Bryony" à 6 heures 30, il demeure ancré à Guemlek pour la nuit.

Le 15 mai. La commission avait l'intention de se rendre à Koumla pour enquêter sur ce qui s'y était passé.

À 8 heures de la fumée fut observée s'élevant au-dessus du village de Nari. La commission embarqua dans le canot automobile, qui malheureusement eut une panne et force fut de revenir à bord. À 10 heures, au-dessus de Karadja Ali un nuage de fumée s'éleva. Comme le canot ne pouvait nous y porter, ordre fut donné de rester à bord, et le "Bryony" se dirigea vers les villages en flammes. À 2 heures, Nari fut atteint. Le village était encore une masse rougeie par le feu et il fut impossible d'y entrer.

Sur la plage duquel on distinguait aussi des cadavres. Douze vieillards, dont une femme âgée furent trouvés gisant sur la rive. Deux hommes étaient encore vivants et furent embarqués sur le "Bryony" par le docteur du bord. Il fut impossible de visiter la mosquée et l'école, malgré tout placées sur un petit tertre, étaient les deux seules maisons non incendiées.

À 4 heures 30 la commission débarque à Kutchuk Koumla. Le village est à moitié détruit, les maisons sont entièrement désertées, et l'une d'elles était en flammes. Des chevaux avaient été envoyés par le général hellène qui, le jour précédent avait été informé de notre intention de visiter le village.

La commission se dirigea vers Kutchuk Koumla. Plusieurs centaines d'habitants, la plupart des femmes, étaient frappées de terreur et attendaient la commission à son arrivée.

Il fut difficile d'obtenir des renseignements exacts, si terrible était la panique régnant parmi cette population, mais il fut compris qu'un détachement de soldats grecs et de brigands avaient traversé le village quelques jours auparavant et étaient revenus le matin même en passant par le débarcadère de Koumla.

Sous la protection des Alliés et refusa de quitter la plage tout en nous implorant de la transporter en un lieu sûr et tranquille. L'extrémité de la jetée, peu éloignée du "Bryony", était l'endroit le plus peuplé. Une lettre fut alors écrite au Général

pour lui demandant de prendre des moyens immédiats pour la protection de Koumla.

Cette lettre ne put lui être remise que le lendemain à 6 heures du matin. Le lendemain, à 8 heures, la commission se rendit à Koumla.

Le 16 mai. À 9 heures la commission descend à terre afin de recueillir toutes les informations possibles parmi les réfugiés qui se trouvaient sur le rivage. Un blessé grec et de brigands sous le commandement d'un officier grec. Les femmes furent renvoyées au village, les hommes durent suivre les bandits, sur la route quelques-uns d'entre eux reçurent l'ordre de retourner, les autres furent tués, le monklar étant parmi ces derniers.

À 10 heures la commission gagna le village. Il était complètement déserté. L'officier grec et dix hommes furent trouvés dans le village. Une lettre envoyée le matin et qu'il ne pouvait avoir encore reçue) était de garde.

Avant de retourner au débarcadère, un officier d'état-major grec, envoyé par le général, adressa aux réfugiés l'assurance qu'ils seraient protégés.

Alors la commission se dirigea sur Kapaki. Le village était entièrement déserté. Deux officiers grecs et dix hommes furent trouvés dans le village. La commission trouva que les indigènes étaient cachés dans la montagne, craignant les Grecs.

La commission fit le tour du village et trouva huit corps, dont quatre de femmes. Trois des hommes morts avaient été tués avec quinze blessés et dans un engagement précédent. Les cinq restants avaient été tués la veille au matin. La commission trouva un bébé abandonné, qui fut emmené à bord.

Les trois survivants demandèrent à la commission d'être évacués sur un endroit sûr. Ils furent emmenés à bord.

La commission se dirigea alors vers Nari. Le village fut trouvé entièrement déserté. Les habitants étaient cachés dans la montagne, craignant les Grecs.

Le "Bryony" resta ancré pour la nuit au large de Koutchouk Koumla, où nous étions retournés.

Le 17 mai. À 8 heures 30, les deux officiers hellènes Costas et Papanitopoulos, chefs de groupe grecs, se rendirent à bord. Ils nous racontèrent les événements du jour précédent.

La commission les interrogea. Le jour de leur passage dans les lieux incendiés, le Lieutenant Costas reconnaît avoir fait fusiller quatre Turcs. À part cela, il refuse tout meurtre et tout pillage.

À 9 heures 30, on quitte Koutchouk Koumla pour Fistieli. Remarque: deux officiers grecs et dix hommes furent trouvés dans le village. La commission trouva que les indigènes étaient cachés dans la montagne, craignant les Grecs.

À peu près 200 d'entre eux furent trouvés rassemblés sur la plage. Laissant les autres avec l'escorte nécessaire, le "Bryony" se dirigea vers Fistieli. Le village était entièrement déserté.

Un officier fut envoyé à terre pour prendre des renseignements. Les Grecs les prirent et se rendirent dans les autres villages. Ils étaient sans marchandise d'évacuer pour Armoudli (le prix offert par les Grecs était certainement au-dessous du cours normal).

Armoudli fut atteint à midi. Le village semblait tranquille. Un officier grec fut envoyé à terre pour prendre des renseignements. Les Grecs les prirent et se rendirent dans les autres villages. Ils étaient sans marchandise d'évacuer pour Armoudli (le prix offert par les Grecs était certainement au-dessous du cours normal).

Armoudli fut atteint à midi. Le village semblait tranquille. Un officier grec fut envoyé à terre pour prendre des renseignements. Les Grecs les prirent et se rendirent dans les autres villages. Ils étaient sans marchandise d'évacuer pour Armoudli (le prix offert par les Grecs était certainement au-dessous du cours normal).

et dire s'il était nécessaire que la commission visitât le village.

Il fut décidé que la commission interrogerait les notables grecs et turcs, au débarcadère, à 2 heures.

L'officier hellène déclara que tout était calme, et qu'il avait mission de surveiller le village seulement.

Il raconta plusieurs cas de brigandage dans les fermes environnantes.

Les représentants des comités grecs et turcs semblaient vivre en parfaite harmonie, mais interrogés séparément, ils se plaignaient néanmoins les uns des autres.

La commission se réembarqua à bord du "Bryony" et se dirigea vers Kapakli pour remorquer les deux caïques qui furent ramenés pleins de réfugiés à Kutchuk Koumoula.

En arrivant à Koumoula, le représentant de la Croix-Rouge raconta qu'il avait causé avec le chef de brigands venu au débarcadère pendant l'absence du "Bryony" pour terroriser les réfugiés et se vanter de ses actes. Un message fut envoyé au Général Léonardopoulos l'avisant de l'arrivée du chef des bandits.

Le "Bryony" resta ancré au large de Kutchuk Koumoula pour la nuit.

Le 18 mai. A 8 heures le "Bryony" retourne à Guemlek. A 9 heures, la commission descend à terre et visite le quartier turc et une mosquée pleine de réfugiés musulmans.

La commission interroge les plaignants du siège du Gouvernement turc. Tous sont frappés de terreur, ne reçoivent aucune nourriture, à part celle qu'ils peuvent se procurer et demandent d'être évacués puis dirigés sur un lieu tranquille.

En revenant à bord, la commission reçut à 1 heure un message sans fil disant que l'"Inéboli" venait de quitter Constantinople pour évacuer les réfugiés se trouvant à Kutchuk Koumoula.

La commission retourne à Guemlek, visite le maire et l'informe de son intention d'évacuer les réfugiés turcs.

A 6 heures 30, retour à Kutchuk Koumoula. A 9 heures, le bateau arriva et embarqua les réfugiés. Le bébé que nous avions à bord fut confié à une femme turque. L'embarquement se termine à 2 heures du matin et l'"Inéboli" se dirige sur Constantinople.

Le 19 mai. Le "Bryony" reste ancré au large de Kutchuk Koumoula. Les réfugiés pour qui il n'y avait pas eu de place sur l'"Inéboli" et qui avaient été laissés en arrière furent gagnés de confiance et beaucoup parmi eux retourneront au village chercher des provisions.

A 1 heure le chef de brigands Houtchi Yorghu, rencontré par le représentant de la Croix-Rouge, fut amené à bord par un officier d'état-major, ordre du général commandant les troupes helles. Il s'agit d'un homme de la veille, étant pris de boisson et que, réellement, il était le guide du détachement par le Lieutenant Cristas, envoyé pour désarmer les villageois.

Dans la soirée l'"Inéboli" et trois autres bateaux revinrent à Koumoula. Les réfugiés qui restaient encore furent évacués.

Le 20 mai. A 6 heures 30, le "Bryony" et les bateaux envoyés par la Croix-Rouge quittent Koumoula pour Guemlek.

Avis est notifié aux réfugiés de se rassembler sur la plage pour embarquer. A midi, la commission va à terre pour constater le progrès fait dans l'évacuation. Les officiers helles demandent à ce que les hommes valides fussent laissés en arrière, tout en garantissant qu'ils seraient traités convenablement. Cette proposition fut acceptée par la commission.

La commission retourne à terre à 3 heures 30. Elle voit les derniers réfugiés embarquer. Les bateaux levèrent l'ancre.

A 4 heures, le "Bryony" quitte Guemlek pour Touzla, où il doit attendre les autres bateaux pour la traversée de la mer de Marmara.

Le 21 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" jette l'ancre à Yalova. Un officier est envoyé à terre pour informer le chef du détachement grec que la Commission internationale venait d'arriver.

A 9 heures, l'officier grec commandant le détachement se presenta à bord et fut interrogé par la commission. Il déclara qu'il n'y avait eu aucune violence de la part des grecs environ un mois, il avait trouvé tous les villages des alentours brûlés. A sa connaissance, des brigands opéraient dans la région, mais les consignes étaient de tenir seulement Yalova, dont ses patrouilles ne s'éloignaient jamais de plus de 24 kilomètres.

A 10 heures, la commission vint à terre. Elle est rencontrée par une foule de réfugiés grecs, la plupart des femmes.

La commission siège au quartier général grec et prête attention aux plaintes formulées par les réfugiés hellènes, spécialement ceux de l'Inéboli.

Le 22 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" et les autres bateaux revinrent à Yalova. On apprend qu'avant la guerre la population du district de Yalova était de 100 000 habitants, dont 50 000 turcs. Yalova elle-même était une ville turque.

A l'époque actuelle, il n'y a que 3000 Turcs à Yalova. Les autres sont dans les camps de réfugiés.

Le caïman demanda à la commission d'évacuer la population turque restant en un lieu de sécurité. A la sortie du quartier général, on apprend que le chef de la commission et notable d'un village voisin, ayant débarqué le matin même avec la commission, avait été accusé par quelques femmes grecques comme ayant été impliqué dans plusieurs massacres perpétrés dans le voisinage.

Le 23 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 24 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 25 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 26 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 27 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 28 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 29 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 30 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 31 mai. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 1er juin. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 2 juin. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 3 juin. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 4 juin. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 5 juin. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 6 juin. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

Le 7 juin. A 8 heures, le "Bryony" se dirige vers le sud-est de la mer de Marmara pour aller chercher une barque pour revenir à bord. Il fut poursuivi par une foule hurlante, qui pénétra même dans l'eau tandis que le canot faisait force de rames.

A 2 heures 30, le "Bryony" ancre à Tehnedjik et la commission se retire à terre la suite. Le quartier turc était complètement vide.

E 6450 201 44

N. 57

Mr. Rattigan to Karl Curzon.—(Received June 6.

(No. 546)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 1, 1921.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the financial situation and the re-establishment of the 11 per cent. of the national debt.

At the meeting of the High Commissioners on the 27th May.

It is interesting to note, as a sidelight on the Italian attitude, the interval between the decision of the High Commissioners on the 27th May.

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At the meeting of the High Commissioners on the 27th May.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN

Enclosure in No. 57

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

M. QUINET, M. Galli and I called on the Grand Vizier on the 30th May to effect a *constructive demarche* regarding the financial situation decided on by the High Commissioners at their meeting on the 27th May. We stated that we had been sent to see his Highness in consequence of a statement made to the High Commissioners by Sir Adam Block, as president of the Provisional Commission of Control. Sir Adam Block had represented the situation of the Treasury in the gravest possible light. There was an enormous deficit. Salaries were in arrear, and the Treasury had come to the end of such expedients as had hitherto enabled it to tide over its difficulties. We said that immediate measures had been suggested in order to relieve to some extent the present financial situation. The first was the re-organisation of the personnel of departments which were at present overloaded with useless functions. The other measure was the re-establishment of the *ad valorem* customs duty which, according to experts, would produce the substantial increase in revenue, estimated at £1,200,000 a month.

2. After urging the immediate adoption of these measures, we went on to say that while they would afford relief, they would not effect a radical cure. We therefore submitted to the Grand Vizier's consideration the question of the immediate constitution of the Financial Commission or the temporary attribution of the Provisional Commission of Control of the powers which were to have been conferred on the Financial Commission by the Treaty of Sèvres. We recognised that the general situation had changed so considerably since his Highness took office that there could be no question of the Allies repeating the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres in its present form. We made it clear that what we were putting forward was a suggestion that the Turkish Government might find it in their own interest to ask for the Financial Commission which with its wider powers and greater elasticity of action would be able to render far more assistance to the Government than the Provisional Control Commission were able to do.

3. The Grand Vizier said that in the matter of reduction of staffs the Government had themselves taken the initiative and were considering very carefully what reductions could be made. He admitted that in certain departments, like the Admiralty (which M. Quinet had specifically mentioned) and the War Office, there was room for economy. He doubted whether much could be done in certain departments, e.g., the Ministry of Justice. He said that expenditure on officers' salaries had already decreased, and stated in reply to a question from me that no allowances were being paid to families of officers serving with the Kemalists.

4. Turning to the *ad valorem* question, the Grand Vizier repeated all the traditional arguments against a return to the *ad valorem* system. He, moreover, cast doubt on the estimates of increase of revenue from this source. He said that in any case the advantage would be illusory, as the Americans would not agree to the maintenance of the "droits de consommation" concurrently with the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* customs duty, and he seemed to think that if the "droits de consommation" were not maintained the loss to the Treasury would balance the gain from the restoration of the 11 per cent duty.

5. We returned the usual answers to the general arguments advanced by the Grand Vizier. We said that to ask the Allies to agree to the quintupling of the specific tariff, because otherwise there would be two tariffs in Turkey, was in fact to ask the Allies to waive their demand for a return to what they considered the only legal system because Angora had created something else. We said that our Governments were unmovable in their decision not to agree to the quintupling. We observed that the restoration of the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* was contemplated as a provisional measure, pending the general settlement of affairs of Turkey, and that during the transition period the existence of two customs tariffs could hardly be regarded as more serious than the existence of two Governments. As for the practical difficulties, we said our information was that they were by no means insuperable, and that it would be possible both to reconstitute a staff of valuers and to overcome the difficulties of fluctuation in the price of goods.

6. On the financial side, we said that the estimates of increased revenue had been made by experts who most certainly have taken into account the depression of trade. We added that while the Allied Powers were willing to see the "droits de consommation" maintained concurrently with the 11 per cent. duty, we understood it to be

the opinion of the experts that even if the "droits de consommation" were suppressed there would be on balance an increase of revenue as a result of the restoration of the 11 per cent. duty. M. Galli pointed out that if the Grand Vizier's argument were sound the American attitude would render the quintupling of the specific tariff no less useless than the restoration of the *ad valorem* duty, as the Americans, according to the Grand Vizier's showing would contest any increase in customs duty concurrently with the retention of the "droits de consommation." I myself, in order to test the strength of the Grand Vizier's opposition, asked his Highness whether, if the Americans abandoned their opposition to the retention of the "droits de consommation," we could say frankly that the Government would re-establish the *ad valorem* system. Tewfik Pasha did not seem personally adverse, but said he would submit the question to the Council.

7. The conversation ended at this point without the Grand Vizier having said a single word about the suggestion regarding the Financial Commission.

Constantinople, June 1, 1921

E 6461 531 44]

No. 58

Colonel Baldwin to Mr. Oliphant — (Received June 6.)

My dear Oliphant,

Paris, June 4, 1921

THE identical note of which you enclose a copy in your letter of the 2nd inst. draws attention to the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres, which authorises the Straits Commission to levy dues on shipping and declares that, in the light of modern practice the provisions of the relevant articles of the treaty are retrogressive.

It is impossible, as the note seeks to do, to compare the straits with waterways. The straits are a part of the sea and require no works of improvement, dredging or upkeep in the sense in which these terms are used in connection with a waterway, or even, for the matter of that with a river which has invariably been made navigable for vessels of deeper draught than it would carry in its natural state.

To my mind the strongest argument against the assertion made in the note is that it represents a survival of the recognition of the right of the possessor to close a passage should he so desire or, alternatively, to derive a revenue from the users should he so desire. The system would, as the note suggests, be reactionary. Taxes or navigation dues on the other hand, are universally recognised as being payments for services rendered and may not in any case provide a revenue for the owner.

The necessity for the imposition of navigation dues was specifically recognised in article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, when an international body, analogous to the Straits Commission, was constituted to open and keep open the mouths of the Danube. The principle of the imposition of dues of this description has not only never been questioned, but is being extended in respect of all international rivers, and its application, having regard to the guarantee of security which is offered by the Straits Commission, requires no justification in that case.

Yours sincerely,
JOHN BALDWIN

E 6204 143 44]

No. 59

Lord Curzon to Lord Granville (Athens)

(No. 254)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 6, 1921

WITH reference to previous telegraphic correspondence respecting representation of the Turkish Government's proposals regarding the Straits Commission, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th inst.

M

interim report of the Commission of Enquiry received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.*

"You should communicate this report without delay to the Greek Government and request them to furnish you without delay with their observations on these grave allegations."

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 6777, 143 44]

No. 60

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon — (Received June 13)

(No. 1)

My Lord,

Constantinople, June 4, 1921

WITH reference to my despatch No. 341 of the 1st June, transmitting to your Lordship the interim report of the Commission of Enquiry into the atrocities in the Yalova and Gueslek areas, I have the honour to enclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, a report, dated the 1st June, of the Commission of Enquiry despatched to the Ismid Peninsula.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 60.

Commission of Enquiry, Ismid Peninsula, to the British High Commissioner

(No. 1)

Your Excellency,

WE have the honour to submit the following report, in accordance with the instructions and with the terms of reference of the Commission of Enquiry:

The Commission of Enquiry, which was despatched to the Ismid Peninsula, found by both Greeks and Turks. There is no doubt that there has been a great deal of violence on the Ismid Peninsula, and it appears that those on the part of the Turks have been more considerable and ferocious than those on the part of the Greeks.

We attach a résumé of our investigations upon which our opinions are based, and will prepare a schedule giving full details.

The present state of affairs is largely due to racial feeling and age-long vendetta, now fanned to an intense pitch by exaggerated stories which promote fear and excitement.

3. Greek regular troops have been implicated in recent excesses—both officers and soldiers—more especially lately when the troops have been on the march.

In the zone which is effectively occupied by the Greek army there is order, but it appears to be maintained at the cost of oppressing the Turkish population. This evil is accentuated by the Turkish civil administration which, particularly in the neighbourhood of Ismid, is venal and corrupt, and allows itself to be used by the Greeks to carry out their policy.

The Greek military authority admits that nothing is done to maintain order in districts not actually occupied by Greek troops.

4.—(a) The commission recommend that full advantage should be taken of the existing Turkish organisation for the maintenance of order and that this should be expanded and made more powerful. European officers to be made available to give assistance to the Central Government and this especially in the way of control of officials charged with the administration of justice, such European officers also being made responsible for reporting to their Government any infringement of international law by either belligerent.

Also that pressure be brought to bear upon the Greek military authorities to maintain civil order and justice by means of this organisation in such portions of Asia Minor as they occupy or can control.

* See No. 47

5.)—(1.) Where either side is in the ascendancy the survivors of the other in many cases become fugitive; the men often become brigands. The estimate given by the Greek Colonel Commandant of the 11th Division at Ismid was of some 12,000 Christian refugees in Ismid itself, mostly women and children.

The Greek army have instituted conscription of those Ottoman subjects who are Christian refugees, who have to leave their families in great distress.

Moslems who are now in the power of the Greeks are in a state of great fear and wish to escape or to be given protection. Such Greeks who still remain in the north of the Ismid Peninsula, are in a state of great fear.

(2.) The commission recommend that the Christian refugees should be moved now to a region which is, and will remain, under Greek Government, or which will be under the protection of the Allies. The Moslems who have been taken from the Ismid Peninsula should be restored to the Ismid Peninsula, and the area under the protection of the Allies.

The members of the commission are under the impression that those Moslems who have become brigands will return to their homes and to peaceful pursuits when assured of settled conditions under Moslem administration, and that Greek brigands, if offered the opportunity of trusting the Allies in a scheme for compensation, will return to their homes or after desertion from the Greek army.

M. FARMAR, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Lt. Col. Temporary Colonel
WILKONSKY, Lieutenant-Colonel,
O. H. VAN MELLENGEN, Major

Enclosure 2 in No. 60

Memorandum respecting Crimes committed by the Greeks.

LES principaux excès reprochés aux Grecs se sont produits à partir de juillet 1920, époque à laquelle les forces militaires grecques ont occupé le pays.

Ces excès sont imputables soit aux troupes régulières, soit aux bandes.

1. Les troupes régulières au moment de leur arrivée dans le pays (juillet-août) exercèrent des violences contre plusieurs villages, mais surtout dans la région à l'est de Beğos. Des habitants furent tués, des troupes furent violées, des maisons furent brûlées. Il faut y joindre les méfaits individuels des soldats appartenant aux détachements grecs: extorsion d'argent, vols, brutalités et meurtres. Dans les régions occupées, l'autorité militaire grecque se livre d'abord à des exécutions sommaires (notamment à Beğos-Telboulou) et à des exécutions sommaires (notamment à Beğos-Telboulou).

2. Les bandes grecques sont opérées en vue de rechercher les armes; elles donnent lieu à des méfaits individuels, violences et vols. Les actes individuels favorisés par une discipline insuffisante, ne sont généralement pas réprimés.

Les violences contre les villages reprennent en mars-avril au moment où les troupes grecques abandonnent la partie orientale de la péninsule, se portent dans la région d'Ada-Hazar. Elles affectent surtout les villages turcs entre Koudra et Ada-Bazar, dont un assez grand nombre eurent des habitants brutalisés ou tués, des femmes violées, le bétail enlevé, et des maisons brûlées.

3. Les bandes grecques, formées de gens ayant eu en général à souffrir des violences turques et poussés autant par le désir de se venger que par l'appât du butin, ont opéré pendant l'occupation grecque avec une liberté d'action qui permet de conclure que l'autorité militaire grecque n'a pas fait le nécessaire pour s'opposer à leurs méfaits.

Dans la région de Chilo on peut même considérer comme très probable, sinon certain, que l'autorité militaire grecque a favorisé leur constitution et leur action.

4. Dans la région qu'ils occupent actuellement, les forces grecques ont armé et organisé comme auxiliaires des réfugiés d'anciens villages grecs pillés ou brûlés par les Turcs. Ces bandes, par leurs coups de main sur les villages turcs situés en dehors de la zone d'occupation effective des troupes grecques, et par les atrocités qu'elles y commettent, ont ravivé les haines et amené des représailles féroces dont les villages grecs ont fait les frais, notamment dans la région au sud d'Ismid.

Les Grecs ont également comme auxiliaires un grand nombre de bandes, musulmans du Caucase, réfugiés au nombre de plus de 30,000 dans la région d'Angora, et qui sont devenus ennemis des Nationalistes.

Les Grecs sont d'excellents éléments semi-réguliers mais forment également des bandes, dont l'action a été particulièrement dévastatrice dans la région d'Angora, perpétuant le régime des représailles continuelles qui ravage et dépeuple ce pays.

En résumé, dans les régions occupées effectivement par leurs troupes, les Grecs assurent l'ordre, mais au prix d'un régime d'oppression dont souffre la population.

Les régions qui ne sont occupées pas effectivement, ils favorisent l'action de leurs bandes et sont ainsi responsables, en partie, du régime de guérillas et d'atrocités qui y règne.

Enclosure 3 in N. 1

Memorandum respecting Turkish Atrocities

Depuis l'armistice, et surtout en mai, juillet 1920 (et surtout en septembre), les Grecs ont recommencé à l'égard des chrétiens qu'ils occupent, depuis l'armistice, reprennent de l'extension et un caractère de violence, surtout à l'égard des chrétiens.

Les Grecs, sous le commandement de Kiamil Bey, opèrent dans tout le sud-est de l'Anatolie (Pachakent, 20 kilom. est de Soutari).

Les Grecs, le plus souvent, agissent par les habitants turcs des villages voisins. Un grand nombre de villages sont ainsi pillés ou brûlés, et leur population, plus ou moins, est exterminée.

Les Grecs, à l'ouest de Soutari, ont brûlé ou pillé, dans la région d'Ada Bazar, dont la grande agglomération d'Ortakent, près de Gueve (16,000 habitants), et plusieurs villages au sud.

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Elles reprennent une activité particulière au printemps 1921 et se poursuivent jusqu'à nos jours, sous la direction de tous les villages chrétiens de cette région sans un (Bagebalkik).

Les autorités grecques ont fourni une liste de 32 villages pillés ou brûlés, avec plus de 12,000 personnes massacrées, 2,500 blessés, et le reste de leur population (plus de 15,000) réfugiés à l'étranger.

La commission, étant donnée les nombreux témoignages qu'elle a pu interroger, estime qu'il y a lieu d'indiquer ces faits comme tels, en tenant compte d'une certaine exagération dans les chiffres.

E 8786 1.44

No. 61

Mr. Rattigan to Earl Curzon. (Received June 13.)

(No. 570.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the following information has reached me from French sources regarding the situation at Angora:—

2. A conflict is said to be developing between the Kemalists and Unionist sections of the Nationalist groups. Both sections have certain points in common, e.g., the desire to see the Nationalist movement in control of the Nationalist movement.

3. The Kemalists are, however, believed to be ready to drop the Bolsheviks, if they can obtain satisfaction from the Allies. Whereas the Unionists, knowing themselves to be irretrievably compromised with the Allies owing to their war record, de-

permanent alliance with the Bolsheviks. Enver and Djemal are regarded as hand in glove with the latter, and are in fact, considered to be practically Bolshevik agents.

4. Enver is credited with the determination to supplant Mustapha Kemal as head of the Nationalist group. There are said to be at present at Angora a large and important band of his adherents, who are devoting their efforts to obtaining the direction of affairs on behalf of the Unionists.

In this connection there is a report that Bekir Sami's fall is really due to the fact that he was responsible for the arrangement with Great Britain for the exchange of prisoners, whereby an important group of Unionists were released and enabled to return to Angora, where they have reinforced the Unionist movement to supplant Mustapha Kemal. The latter could not openly oppose the release of Turkish prisoners, but was incensed by the folly of Bekir Sami in thus effecting a reinforcement of his opponents, and therefore withdrew from him the support of the Kemalists.

6. I have the honour to annex a memorandum by Mr. Ryan giving his views on these questions.

I have, &c.

FRANK RATTIGAN

Acting High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 61

Memorandum by Mr. Ryan.

WHEN the recent crisis in Angora became known here it was generally supposed that it was due to a conflict between moderates of the Bekir Sami type and extremists whose extreme consists in a determination to reject any settlement with the Allies except on the basis of the complete realisation of the National programme as laid down at Erzerum in September 1919 and in the National Pact subscribed by the Constantinople Deputies in January 1920.

2. For several days past reports have been current that the true inwardness of the crisis is that the Committee of Union and Progress to secure control of the National movement and to oust the present leaders, especially Mustapha Kemal. It is alleged that something in the nature of an unsuccessful coup d'état was organised by the adherents of Enver Pasha, including his uncle Halil Pasha and Kutchuk Talaat Bey. The same time that these reports reached Mr. Rattigan from French sources a version was published in the "Revel" of the 5th June, a weekly paper published by an Armenian, who probably got his information from a French source. A French colleague told me that he perceived the truth of the matter, and that the information came through from Trebizond.

We still have no definite information from the French sources as to the result of the crisis. It appears to be a matter of some importance, and it is up to certain of the released Malta prisoners to say that this is less certain, that Halil Pasha and Kutchuk Talaat Bey have been expelled from Angora.

It is perfectly certain that Enver has for a long time past been active on lines which are not those of Mustapha Kemal and the adherents most intimately associated with him have no desire to be superseded by Enver Pasha and his group. It is, moreover, probable that the Bolsheviks would prefer to see Enver in control of the Nationalist movement, firstly, because he has been much more in their pockets than Mustapha Kemal; secondly, because he is more compromised in the eyes of Europe; and, thirdly, because they probably suspect the Angora leaders of being at heart ready to come to some settlement with the Allies.

5. It would be a mistake, however, to attach undue importance, from our point of view, to the alleged struggle between the Unionists and the Kemalists. It is, as far as its effect on us is concerned, little more than personal rivalry between two groups, both of which are equally hostile to Great Britain, equally anxious to stir up trouble for us in Mesopotamia, Egypt and India, and equally xenophobic in their general attitude. If a struggle has really taken place, its result has been to leave in the ascendant, not Kemalists who are prepared to sacrifice anything of the National programme for the sake of a settlement with Europe, but Kemalists who stand for the whole of the National programme, and whose attitude towards the British Government

is one of unmitigated hostility. They have shown signs, it is true, of being alarmed by the open dissatisfaction of the French Government at their recent counter-proposals, but they have shown no signs of being willing to give the French real satisfaction. They dislike Bolshevism and mistrust Bolsheviks, but they stand by the Bolsheviks. Albany, and, unless I am mistaken, they mean to stand by it unless they can get from the Allies far more favourable terms than have so far been offered or even thought possible.

6. It is possible, though, I admit, not demonstrable, that the Kemalist leaders are exaggerating any recent trouble between them and the old gang of Unionists in order to frighten the Allies with the spectre of an extremism more extreme and, above all more Bolshevik than their own. The advantage of this would be to drive a wedge between us and the French and to counteract the tendency of recent events to throw the French completely into the arms of Great Britain.

7. The Italians, having served their purpose, count for less and less in Asia. They no longer exert any authority, even in the districts tenanted by them. On their own side, however, they are frightened of the situation. Their bottom should fall completely out of their policy of securing a strong position in Turkey and posing as the one European Power which in Islamic questions is disinterested. To this I attribute the publicity recently given, through the channels, to state that Angora is not really extreme, and that, while determined to eject the Greeks, the Kemalist leaders have no desire to prolong the war a moment longer than is necessary for the realisation of reasonable and legitimate aspirations.

8. Nothing should distract our attention from what are to us the main features of the situation, namely, that the Angora leaders are determined to play the French off against the British, that, while anxious to play the French off against the British, they are determined to give nothing away to the French, and that if they are defeated by the British and they defeat the Greeks, their subsequent attitude towards the Allies will be one of extreme intransigence over such questions as control of the Straits, zones of influence and disarmament. It appears to me, personally, that the Allies are prepared to yield to their present exigencies and to make the best of an intransigent, it is inevitable that we should join issue with them. If military considerations render this impossible, we must make up our minds to the fact that we have been defeated by Turkish Nationalists. If, on the other hand, we make up our minds to destroy Kemalism, we can only do so by coming to a close understanding with the French regarding common action. This should not be impossible if French and the Kemalists both maintain their present attitude as regards the Beirut-Bekir Sami Agreement. The Italians have committed themselves so much to the Kemalists as against the Allies that the sooner we can eliminate them the better. We should co-operate with the Greeks, but we should make it clear that we are doing so with a view not to consolidate the Greek position in Asia Minor, or even in Eastern Thrace, but to liquidate the Greek occupation of these countries with a minimum of reaction unfavourable to ourselves. We should aim at getting rid of the Turkish Nationalists, and without embroiling the Nationalists in the future Turkey. We should aim at destroying Kemalist chauvinism and creating, under the Sultan, a tractable, but not too reduced, Turkey.

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No. 62.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)

(No. 1623.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 13, 1921

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that the French Ambassador in the course of conversation with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the 1st instant, said that his Government were becoming anxious as to the general situation in Turkey. Their agreement with Angora was apparently not being confirmed, French prisoners remained. To his enquiry how His Majesty's Government regarded the situation, the British Government much anxiety; the position of the general in command of the small British force was a very delicate one, and was rendered all the more difficult by the persistent refusal of the French Government to consent to that unity of command

in this theatre which had been recognised as so essential in every part of the field during the war.

M. le Comte de Saint-Aulaire, bringing together the admitted want of co-operation between French and British agents in the East and the doubts continuing to spread in French public opinion as to British co-operation with France in the West, made an eloquent appeal for a general understanding between the two countries which would set the Entente on a proper business footing. He felt sure that at present they were drifting apart, and that, in the existing state of European politics, separation spelled disaster.

8. Sir Eyre Crowe informed his Excellency that he cordially agreed with the view that more genuine co-operation, covering the whole field of foreign policy, ought to be assured, and that he hoped an occasion might be found when next the heads of the two Governments met to probe this question a little more closely. M. le Comte de Saint-Aulaire, on the other hand, stated that the danger to France lay in the possibility of a powerful Germany starting a war of revenge, the British Empire was mainly vulnerable in the East, where France had special interests, namely, as regards the maintenance of her position in Syria and the recovery of her financial and political position in Turkey. He stated that the pursuit of these modest French aims in the East could in any way embarrass British policy, and he felt sure that all ideas of France pursuing a line that was in any way a hindrance to Great Britain was pure imagination. He, for his own part, would always advocate a close understanding with England, based on France giving every assistance she could to Great Britain in the East, whilst England stood firmly by France on the Rhine.

I am, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 6849 143 44]

No. 63

to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 14, 1921

THE War Office and Government have followed with increasing anxiety the recent developments in the general political situation in the Middle East, culminating in the rejection by the Angora Government of the agreement with France on the subject of Cilicia, the withdrawal of the Italians from Adalia, the open hostility to all British interests proclaimed by the Kemalist Government, its growing intimacy with Moscow, and finally, the imminent reopening of active military operations on the Greek-Turkish front.

2. The situation calls for a fresh review of the political and military problems facing the Allied Governments, which they can only hope to solve satisfactorily by close co-operation between themselves. From such information as has reached His Majesty's Government, they gain the impression that the French Government is equally alive to the dangers confronting the Allies. In these circumstances, they have carefully considered the most appropriate means of meeting the situation so as to form a

3. A full report based on personal inspection and as to the Greek Government has been asked to extend to a British general whom His Majesty's Government propose to despatch from Constantinople direct to the Greek front, charged to make similar investigations for the purpose of furnishing an authoritative report on all relevant factors of the military situation with the minimum of delay.

4. In the interval of time available before these reports are received, it is important to decide on some definite line of policy.

5. Hitherto the attitude of the Allied Governments has been one of professed neutrality between the Greeks and the Kemalists, although we have evidence that the Greeks have not been entirely unsuccessful in drawing arms, ammunition and supplies in certain quantities from Italian, and to some extent even from French, sources. As a result, it is probable that Angora, able freely to obtain arms, supplies and money from Russia, has been placed at a substantial advantage, which may have increased the confidence and truculent spirit of the Kemalist leaders.

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6. His Majesty's Government have no desire to prejudge the prospects of the Greek army, and they are by no means persuaded that it may not still be capable of achieving some decided success. It seems to them unlikely, however, that in its present situation, without moral or material support from the Allies, that army can achieve sufficiently decisive results to impose any lasting peace, and they therefore consider it imperative that the Allies should take into account the alternative situations which may arise and their probable consequences. The alternatives appear to them to be, broadly, two. On the one hand, the Greek army without achieving decisive results, may win some inconclusive, though considerable, success. If this should occur, an opportunity would present itself for negotiating satisfactory terms of peace; but the effect of such a success would not be lasting, the opportunity, if not immediately grasped, would probably pass; and the strain of protracted and inconclusive

the Greek army might be defeated in the near future and driven back. His Majesty's Government see no immediate reason to apprehend such an event; but they are convinced that the Allies should consider the consequences for themselves, should it unfortunately take place. The British military authorities at Constantinople are of opinion that, in the event of a Greek retirement, the Imd Peninsula could not be held without strong Allied reinforcements against any serious Kemalist advance, that if the Imd Peninsula were abandoned, Constantinople would be untenable; and that, if and when the Greeks fell back on Smyrna, the straits themselves could only be held temporarily pending a complete evacuation of the Allied troops. It is evident that so great a Turkish success as this would equally enhance Turkish prestige, would strengthen Turkish confidence in Russian support, and would render unobtainable any satisfactory settlement in Asia Minor. Such a situation would endanger Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, compelling France and Great Britain either to strengthen their garrisons in these provinces or to abandon them. Thrace would probably become untenable. In other words, a Turkish success would jeopardise every Allied gain in the war and remove all prospects of peaceful reconstruction in the Middle East.

7. His Majesty's Government have arrived at the conclusion that some steps are immediately necessary in order to shut out all possibility of such a catastrophe. The solution which they would most desire would be some definitive settlement between the Greeks and the Turks which the Allies could approve and both those parties accept, and they are prepared to make suggestions as to the form which such a settlement might take. Their first aim is naturally towards a solution of that kind, because, while bound by honour and friendship to the Greeks, they desire to maintain a friendly and helpful relation, if that be possible, with the Turks. They are convinced, however, that no negotiations with the Turks can have much chance of success unless both Constantinople and Angora are led to see that the failure of the negotiations will be followed by consequences more serious to themselves than a mere return to the *status quo* of the present moment. With that object, they would wish to discuss at once such measures as may be practicable and desirable in that contingency for strengthening the Greek army with moral and material support; and they would from the outset of the negotiations make it clear to the Turks that the application of such measures of assistance to the Greeks will follow promptly on the failure of the negotiations or a refusal on the Turkish side to negotiate. They consider, moreover, that agreement on such measures is necessary, not only to give the negotiations a reasonable prospect of success, but also as an insurance against their failure and the disastrous consequences which might overtake all Allied interests in the East in the event of a Greek retreat.

8. They suggest therefore that the Allies should at once approach the Greek Government in this sense. They believe it by no means improbable that the Greek Government, when informed of the assurances of help that the Allies would be prepared to give them in the event of the negotiations with the Turks being refused or breaking down, might be prepared to listen to a suggestion from the Allied Governments which would secure to Greece the maintenance of her rights under the Treaty of Sèvres in Europe and in other respects, in return for a solution of the Smyrna problem that would amount to a renewed approach to the Turks with the view of arriving at a pacific settlement of the existing impasse. Such a settlement might be on the lines of offering to Turkey the maximum modification, short of complete Turkish sovereignty, and consistent with the safety of the Greek population, of the arrangement respecting Smyrna proposed at the London Conference. This would allow for the creation of an autonomous Turkish province under the protection of the Powers, guarded by a locally recruited gendarmerie under a proportion of Allied officers. All Greek troops would

be withdrawn as soon as the Allied Powers were satisfied that the new force was in a position to carry out its responsibilities, which should include the duty of repelling

9. To this proposal, which should go a long way to satisfy the Turkish claims and aspirations, concerning which, if the principle of negotiation be admitted, we shall be prepared to enter into friendly discussions with the Turkish Government at a later date.

10. Further, we should be quite willing to accompany these concessions by a frank and sincere assurance to the Turkish Government that if they showed a reasonable spirit in meeting the Allied Powers the latter would make it a cardinal point of their future policy to assist Turkey in rebuilding the Ottoman State within its new frontiers on a surer foundation.

11. If to an arrangement on these general lines the assent of the Greek Government can be obtained, His Majesty's Government would propose that communications should be entered into with as little delay as possible, in a form to be arranged between the Allied Governments, with the Sultan's Government at Constantinople and with Angora, with a view to an agreement on the lines suggested. The communication would have to be coupled, as already explained, with a clear intimation of the course which the Allied Governments would be compelled to adopt should the extreme party in Turkey refuse to come to terms.

12. The assistance to be offered to the Greeks might, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be in the form of a participation as bedegent of finance, facilitate the supply to the Greek army of arms, ammunition and perhaps permit the enrolment of volunteers in the Allied countries. It would also include the cutting off of supplies reaching the Kemalist forces across the Black Sea or by other means.

13. At the same time it would be only just to declare that, should the Angorians decline the proposed settlement, and should the Greeks, with Allied assistance, be victorious, the terms in regard to the future of Smyrna which they are to accept as a feature of the proposed accommodation would no longer be binding upon the Allies.

14. It is assumed by His Majesty's Government that, while these negotiations are proceeding from the decisions arrived at in London with regard to a final withdrawal of Allied troops, the Turkish Government will regard it as essential to maintain their present military position there. A sudden precipitate the peril which it is desired to avoid and render the negotiations abortive from the start.

15. Such, in general outline, is the plan which suggests itself to His Majesty's Government. It is a plan which suggests itself to all the parties concerned.

16. His Majesty's Government are particularly desirous to act in these respects in accordance with the views of the Turkish Government, whose broad interests in the East they can only be identical with their own, and in close co-operation with whom lies, in their opinion, the best chance of success.

17. You should place yourself at once in communication with M. Brand, in order to acquaint him with the general purport of these proposals, in which you should be as explicit as possible either by telegram or despatch. I shall be happy to come to Paris myself, for the purpose of such a conversation, at the earliest date that may be found convenient.

I am &c
CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 237.)

My Lord,

Athens, June 3, 1921

WITH reference to my despatch No. 212 of the 23rd ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship, herewith, copy of a further despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Volo dealing with the resistance which the inhabitants of his district have been offering to the attempts of the authorities to enforce the mobilisation decrees.

As Mr Knight points out, the Government are now forced officially to admit the failure of the measures hitherto adopted. The call to arms of the Greeks of Crete has hitherto been held enough to make to the contrary. Contradictory reports continue to appear in the papers; for instance, the "Protevousa," M Gounaris's organ, declared a few days ago that only 25 per cent. of the recruits in Crete had joined the colours, but that the percentage in the rest of Greece was "astounding," while other papers stated that the Cretans had responded exceedingly well to the call. For an estimate of the total numbers enrolled please see the military attaché's report enclosed in my despatch No. 280 of the 1st instant.

I have, &c.
GRANVILLE

Enclosure in No. 64

Vice-Consul Knight to Earl Granville.

(No. 3.)

My Lord,

Volo, May 31, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to report that considerable interest was aroused by a telegram from Athens, published yesterday in the local press, to the effect that a new official method of dealing with the defaulters from military service was about to be put into operation. In this morning's papers it was announced that an official circular had been addressed to military and police authorities in which reference was made to a "new official method" forehadowed yesterday, it is safe to predict that its failure will be complete, as far as this district is concerned.

The existence of the "Pelon Division" referred to in my previous despatch on this subject has been confirmed by subsequent private reports. It is a band of several hundred men, although it is impossible to obtain accurate figures. They frequent chiefly the southern slope of the mountain range, and maintain themselves by burning charcoal which they supply to the villagers in return for food, except meat, which they occasionally requisition from the shepherds. This, save for the latter, satisfactory state of affairs is likely to come to an end if the authorities attempt to reduce the "legionaries" by interfering with their supplies, in which case brigandage, from which Mount Pelion has been quite free of late, would probably soon become rife. There have been recent instances of highway robbery in almost every other part of Thessaly, some even finding their way into the newspapers, and all attributable to the determination to evade military service at whatever risk. Large rewards have just been offered for the capture of the band.

There can be little doubt that the people's sympathies are almost entirely with the defaulters and the recent show of activity on the part of the authorities, while it has met with practically no result, has given rise to serious resentment in the villages. It seems that the soldiers or police beat themselves on the inhabitants, devastate their farmyards and gardens, and make themselves offensive generally. It is related that one such party entered a cottage in Kissos, made an inspection of the chimney, but did not detect through the smoke the son of the house who was in hiding within; and his mother afterwards complained bitterly that they had none the less insisted on her

killing and serving up her fattest pullets, of course without payment, before leaving the dwelling.

The reference, already quoted, to a "considerable number" of defaulters is interesting in that it is, as far as I am aware, the first official admission which has appeared here that all is not well. Hitherto, one has read of nothing but the innumerable throngs of reservists rushing to the colours, full of exuberant enthusiasm and irrepressible ardour.

I have &c.
W. L. C. KNIGHT

E 7021 143 44}

No. 65

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 515 Most Confidential)

Sir,

Foreign Office June 20 1921

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Sir E. Crowe, acting on my instructions, sent a message to the Italian Ambassador, the effect of which was to propose to him the purpose of making some communications of his own.

2 Sir E. Crowe opened the conversation with M. de Martino by taking up the subject of my projected visit to Paris, and began by saying that this was a subject which he had been discussing with the British Ambassador in Rome, Sir E. Crowe, and that he had been told that M. de Martino was also interested in the subject.

3 Sir E. Crowe then spoke to the Ambassador very frankly on the general subject of political co-operation between the British and Italian Governments. He went on to say that he had been told that M. de Martino was also interested in the subject, and that he had been told that M. de Martino was also interested in the subject.

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grave, if not a graver, view of the conclusion by Count Storza of an agreement with M. de ... behind the back of His Majesty's Government. Coming after this transaction, this repetition of the same objectionable procedure in an equity ... matter had come as a great shock, and I was frankly at a loss to understand how the Italian Government could go on protesting their close friendship and desire to act with us, and at the same time do things of this sort. I, on my part, did not feel particularly frank in the matter and earnestly hoped that M. de ... continued

8 Sir E. Crowe was entirely unable to admit that there was the remotest possibility that the British in those countries and Mr de Martino did not prove the point.

... to co-operate on all matters and, he added, with the intention of

10 M. de Martino assured Sir E. Crowe that he was deeply impressed with the necessity of putting an end to the feeling which he could quite understand had been created here by these and other incidents. He was quite determined to do all in his power to get the relations of the two countries back on a footing of harmony and hearty co-operation. He asked what as regards the Afghan Treaty had better be done. Sir E. Crowe replied that, while he had not seen the text of the treaty, he gathered that one of its main features was that it was a treaty of friendship and alliance. He did not know whether it was intended as to the effect of preventing the British Government from starting a mission. It ought not to be difficult, he thought, for them to find reasons, first for delay, and perhaps later for the total abandonment of the mission. He did not think that the British Government would be able to do this in any way.

12 Sir E. Crowe then took the occasion to refer also to the visit of the Italian man-of-war to Alexandria. On this subject M. de Martino was ready with an explanation and handed him a sheet of paper. He said that in the report now received from the latter he had not understood from Lord Allenby, when he saw him, that there was any objection to the visit of an Italian ship, and he had consequently not at the time made any report to Rome at all, so that the Italian naval authorities were in complete ignorance of the fact. He said that if our views, they will be quite prepared, if we desire it, to recall the ship. Sir E. Crowe said they had better recall it at once and M. de Martino agreed to do so immediately telegraph but he had no doubt it would be done.

I am &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 7168/143/441

No 66

Memorandum to Karl Pearson, (Received June 22)

Greek Legation, London, June 22, 1921.

A COVERED BY THE GREEK LEGATION, LONDON, JUNE 22, 1921.

M. Gounaris is convinced of the necessity of a settlement. M. Baltozzi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.
A. RIZO-RANGABE

E 7154 143 44]

No. 67

Conferences between M. Briand and Lord Curzon, June 18 and 19, 1921

18, 10.30 A.M.

At 10.30 Lord Curzon, accompanied by Sir Harace Rutland, Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Osborne, met M. Briand and M. Berthelot in the former's room at the Quai

Lord Curzon reviewed the whole situation since the London Conference, giving M. Briand the most recent information in the possession of His Majesty's Government relative to conditions in Greece and Turkey, and examined the possibilities in the event of a resumption of hostilities.

He pointed out that the moment was opportune for a renewal of Allied mediation, and then discussed the proposals of the Greeks. These were briefly an extension of the London proposals regarding Smyrna, demilitarisation of that part of Eastern Thrace beyond the Chatalja line, possible further modification of the general assurance of support to a reconstituted Turkey, a possible suggestion to the Turks that the Allies would see no objection to Turkish expansion in the Aegean, the question of modification of the tripartite agreement and the other concessions contained in the London proposals.

With regard to Smyrna, he would propose an autonomous province under Turkish administration by a Christian Governor with the assistance of a military council under European officers. Greek troops to be withdrawn as soon as the Turks could ensure security in the province.

With regard to Thrace he pointed out the obstacles to the Enos-Media line, and suggested, as alternative concessions to Turkish demands, the enforcement of the London proposals in the Aegean, and the maintenance of the tripartite agreement between Greece and Turkey.

His proposal would be to submit a solution on these lines to the Greeks. If they refused it, the matter would of course be at an end. The communication to the Turks would be accompanied by an intimation that a refusal would involve the withdrawal of all the concessions contained in the present offer and in the London proposals as well as possible assistance to the Greeks in the form of a relaxation of financial restrictions, a removal of the embargo on the export of munitions, and possibly a blockade of Black Sea and Mediterranean ports of Asia Minor.

He pointed out that unity of action among the Allies was an essential condition of success, but that, given loyal co-operation, the omens were favourable.

Finally, he asked that the French Government should agree to the assumption by General Harrington of supreme command at Constantinople, a stipulation which would have considerable effect on the Turks.

JUNE 18, 3 P.M.

Lord Hardinge joined the Conference.

M. Briand thanked Lord Curzon for his very complete review of the situation, and expressed his entire agreement in the proposal for mediation.

French information was to the effect that the Greek army was better organised, but that the Turkish army was in a state of disorganisation.

There was therefore a tendency for peace on both sides, but the situation was not yet settled. The Turkish position was not yet settled.

As to Smyrna, he thought it possible to satisfy the Turks on the lines proposed

The port of Smyrna was suffering from military occupation, and therefore commercially of no great value in present conditions. This was realised in Greece, but Greek amour-propre had to be safeguarded. Though the Greeks might not be able to leave Smyrna while the offensive was being made, they might be able to leave it if it was perhaps designed to meet this difficulty. There were also political difficulties in Athens, but acceptance by the Greeks would really depend on their confidence in the Allies.

As regards Thrace, M. Briand pointed out that it was the interest of the Allies to effect the transference of the Government from Vagora to Constantinople. In this place the Turkish Government could be more readily controlled. But the Nationalists would refuse to come to Constantinople as long as the Greeks threatened its security. The treaty solution of the question was both geographically and ethnically impossible. He would therefore suggest the creation of an international zone in Thrace under an international gendarmerie. He was in favour of the early evacuation of Constantinople.

With regard to finance, in which French interests were paramount, he would be willing to seek a method of securing essential control that would not offend Nationalist susceptibilities.

The Turks, he said, regarded the "zones of influence" of the tripartite agreement as the worst encroachment on Turkish sovereignty, but might be prepared to give freely all the concessions desired. M. Briand would be willing, on behalf of France, to renounce the tripartite agreement, and thought it might be possible to induce Italy to do the same once her economic interests were secured in some other manner.

He was opposed to accompanying the submission of the Allied proposals to the Turks by threats, as he feared this would endanger acceptance.

Finally, he said, the French Government were in entire agreement with the general proposals of His Majesty's Government, and had in fact been about to make a similar proposal for mediation.

Lord Curzon welcomed this evidence of Franco-British unanimity, and hoped that Italian adherence could be obtained.

With regard to Thrace, any proposal to modify the treaty had lapsed when the scheme for a commission of enquiry was abandoned in London. M. Briand had not referred to his own proposal, but had suggested instead an autonomous Thrace. The His Majesty's Government could not accept. Moreover, it would be useless to offer mediation at Athens on condition of the abandonment of Thrace as well as Smyrna.

With regard to threats, he pointed out that M. Briand was under a misapprehension if he thought it was proposed to threaten the Greeks in any way, so far from threatening them, it was intended to offer them help in the future should the Turks refuse our proposals. It would, however, be necessary, while offering such great assistance to Turkey, to have a threat in readiness in the event of refusal, and he knew, from his experience of the East, that a stick behind the back was very useful in dealing with Orientals.

With regard to procedure, M. Briand had suggested simultaneous action at Athens, Constantinople and Angora. He pointed out that it was essential to approach the Greeks first, for otherwise they would say that the Allies had tricked them.

With regard to finance, he welcomed M. Briand's offer of further modifications. He strongly welcomed the generosity and statesmanship displayed by M. Briand in sending to the abrogation of the tripartite agreement, and he counted on French co-operation at Rome. M. Briand had said nothing as to the plans for approaching the Turks, but he gratefully accepted his offer of united action in the proposed negotiations.

Further M. Briand had said nothing in regard to the command at Constantinople; must emphasise this point, as it was of the utmost importance as a demonstration of Allied unity.

M. Briand in reply said that he agreed to offering mediation first at Athens and subsequently approaching the Turks. He was ready to endeavour to secure Italian assent under the tripartite agreement by other methods, as, for example, a Turkish offer of free concessions.

He enquired whether His Majesty's Government could not, on their part, meet the Turkish demands in regard to Mesopotamia.

Lord Curzon said that he was ignorant of these demands, and that he considered it preferable not to raise the question of mandated territories. There was a further

difficulty, in that Mesopotamia was now dealt with by the Colonial Office and not by the Foreign Office. He said that he did not know what it was that the Turks had asked.

M. Briand replied that he could not enlighten him on this point, but to discuss the matter with Bekir Sami.

With regard to the tripartite agreement, it was necessary to find a way for the Italians would be ready to yield the latter but not the substance of the agreement.

With regard to the Constantinople command, he said that French opinion was insistent that the French position in Turkey should be safeguarded, but he had no doubt that the matter could be resolved.

M. Berthelot said that the Italians would resist unless some guarantees were given for the Italian zone.

Lord Curzon said he understood M. Berthelot to propose replacing the Allied agreement by an undertaking as between gentlemen, a suggestion in which he

Curzon pointed out that the obligations of the Allies to protect the Christian minorities would not be ignored and that the advantages conferred thereby were inseparable from the responsibilities it imposed.

M. Briand agreed, but pointed out that it was impossible to protect the Armenians everywhere.

Lord Curzon reiterated the views of His Majesty's Government relative to the

Curzon pointed out that should this prove to be the sole obstacle to peace Italy's refusal could not be maintained.

Lord Curzon thought that the situation was rendered easier by the fact that the agreement had never been ratified.

He then asked whether M. Briand would examine his proposal relative to Thrace, since His Majesty's Government could not go beyond it.

M. Briand thought that it would not satisfy the Turks, and suggested a return to the Commission of Enquiry originally suggested in London.

M. Briand thought the Greeks would accept if they really wanted peace, negotiations had begun.

Lord Curzon asked what the French Government would say if the Greeks demanded the recognition of King Constantine as the price of their acceptance.

M. Briand did not believe they would do so, but added that in no case could the French acknowledge King C.

The Italian Ambassador, Signor Galli and M. Kammerer were also present.

M. Briand explained the general proposals to the Italian Ambassador, but suggested a revival of the plan for Commission of Enquiry for Thrace should Lord Curzon's proposal be refused.

The Italian Ambassador agreed to the proposal as regards Smyrna and to a Commission for Thrace.

Lord Curzon supplemented M. Briand's explanation. He pointed out that if the Greeks insisted on the recognition of King Constantine as the price of their acceptance, the Allies would not be prepared to do so. He suggested that the proposed drafting a preliminary invitation; the actual proposals would only be submitted at a further stage.

The Italian Ambassador explained that he was not empowered to accept anything, but would immediately consult his Government. He must, however, make the fullest reservations as to the abrogation or modification of the tripartite agreement.

M. Briand explained to him at some length that it was intended to safeguard all Italian rights under the agreement.

Lord Curzon pointed out that His Majesty's Government must insist on the maintenance of responsibility for the Christian minorities.

Lord Curzon then raised the question of procedure at Athens and Constantinople, and discussed how far the Allies should recognise the duality between Constantinople and Angora. It might be found desirable for each of the Allies to send a representative to the latter place, but he emphasised the supreme importance of all three Governments acting together.

Curzon pointed out that the French and Italian separate agreements with the Nationalists, if such agreements were arrived at it might be by the three Powers acting together and signing a single document, not by each Power seeking to obtain a separate agreement and special advantages for itself. He also insisted that the offer to Turkey should be accompanied by an intimation of penalties for refusal.

M. Briand did not agree, as he considered that the Allied stick was not big enough to be effective and would only irritate the Turkish extremists. If any threats were to be made, he would prefer to threaten both sides, but, in the circumstances, he would abstain from threatening either party at the beginning.

Lord Curzon repeated that there was no case for threatening the Greeks, but that the British Government feared that concessions to the Turks would be fruitless unless accompanied by a threat.

M. Briand said that the French nation would not tolerate a conflict with the Turks by an anti-Turkish or pro-Greek gesture.

Lord Curzon said that British opinion was equally opposed to going to war. But if the Turks refused the concessions offered to them, there must automatically lapse.

M. Briand agreed. He added that the psychological moment had arrived for a decision, since both sides were in a difficult situation. It was the duty of the Allies to do what they could, and he personally believed they would succeed. He enquired whether His Majesty's Government could not approach the Soviet Government with a view to cutting off this source of supply to the Turks. The threat involved in this procedure would have a great effect on Turkish extremists.

Lord Curzon pointed out that the Nationalists had a treaty with Moscow and were in closest possible touch with them. The object of the Allies was to detach the Turks from Moscow. His Majesty's Government were prepared to promise all possible assistance to the Turkey of the future if mediation were accepted. He doubted, however, whether it would be of the slightest use to approach the Soviets.

The Italian Ambassador was of like opinion.

The meeting then broke up.

JUNE 10, 10:30 A.M.

Present

M. Briand
M. Berthelot.
M. Kammerer.

Lord Harding
Sir H. Rumbold
Mr. Vansittart
Mr. Osborn.

Italian Ambassador
Signor Galli.

Lord Curzon read the draft telegram to Athens which he had prepared, and gave a copy to M. Briand and the Italian Ambassador, both of whom expressed themselves as delighted with its terms. The latter undertook to submit it immediately to his Government.

M. Briand enquired whether the telegram should be despatched before the three Governments had received the draft telegram to the Greeks and Turks.

Lord Curzon thought the telegram should be sent at once, but stated his readiness to proceed to the immediate settlement of the proposed terms of settlement.

M. Briand said that he could not accept all Lord Curzon's proposed terms without consulting his Government, he agreed as to Smyrna, but not as to Thrace.

Lord Curzon said he could not go beyond what he had suggested yesterday, the arrangement in regard to Adrianople, guarantees for the Moslems in Thrace, and demilitarisation. But he was not prepared to accept either autonomy or a commission of enquiry; the latter had been refused by the Greeks, and we could not now impose it.

M. Briand said that the success of mediation depended on meeting the Turkish demands. The commission of enquiry had he added, been accepted in principle in London.

Lord Curzon replied that this was a question of procedure. The proposal for the commissions had been refused and had therefore been replaced by other proposals had been devised in its place. The Allies were in no way committed to a commission. At this stage it was necessary to settle not the ultimate basis of peace, but the basis on which Greece would commit her case to the Allies. She would refuse to give up Thrace. If, at a later stage, the Turks raised the question of Thrace it could then be considered, but meanwhile we could wait until they did so.

M. Briand assented, as it was only a question of procedure.

The Italian Ambassador said that it was very undesirable to give the Greeks the impression that they had Allied support on the question of Thrace.

M. Berthelot pointed out that a settlement of Thrace might ultimately be arranged between the Greeks and the Turks, and the presentation of our proposals to the Turks did not prevent us from modifying or adding to our conditions at a later date.

Lord Curzon agreed. If the Greeks asked about Thrace we should refer them to our proposal for demilitarisation. If the Turks refused to accept our terms without the inclusion of Thrace we could discuss the matter further. But let us open the first door before worrying about what might be behind the second.

M. Briand said that the question of Thrace was therefore reserved.

Lord Curzon asked the Italian Ambassador whether it was necessary to await a reply to his first telegram to Rome before sending off the telegram to Athens. His Excellency replied that it was necessary to await the Italian agreement on principle, but he expected a reply this evening.

Lord Curzon read to the meeting a telegram from the commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, saying that the Greek offensive was suspended.

M. Briand observed: "L'offensive est suspendue à nos lèçons."

Lord Curzon raised the question of Bekir Sami's visit to Rome and his allegations to the French and Italian Governments.

M. Briand said that the visit was entirely unofficial, and might be intended to delay final decision. But he looked to a union of the Constantinople Cabinet, under Izzet Pasha, with the Nationalist moderates, including Mustapha Kemal, a combination with which we could come to an agreement.

The question of the Constantinople command was then discussed, and M. Briand accepted the formula arrived at before the meeting.

The Italian Ambassador said he must obtain his Government's concurrence.

M. Berthelot said it would be easy to satisfy the Italians on the question of minor appointments.

M. Briand thought it would be desirable not to make a public advertisement of General Harrington's assumption of command lest it should be interpreted as a threat, and so endanger the negotiations.

Further discussion followed as to the best means of securing to Italy the substance of her advantages under the tripartite agreement. The Italian Ambassador said it was of vital importance to Italy, as it represented the sole Asiatic fruits of her victory.

M. Briand referred to the Turkish susceptibilities as to the encroachments on their sovereignty, and to their readiness to give the concessions involved. He added that the question was not an urgent one, and suggested that this concession be left until the Turks demand it.

The Italian Ambassador repeated his reserves.

M. Berthelot said that the assumption of command at Constantinople must not be too formal; the necessary orders would be sent to General Charpy.

Lord Curzon said that the important thing was that it should come into force at once.

Lord Curzon said that we were telegraphing to Athens. What was the next step? The Greek Government would have to make a decision. In any case we should have the conditions ready. He therefore offered to prepare a draft reply to the Greek enquiry for later discussion with the two Governments.

M. Briand gladly agreed to this proposal.

Lord Curzon said there was no advantage in discussing the terms further at present, since no reply to the first telegram had been received. It was necessary to wait for a week after its despatch, and the terms of the second telegram must necessarily depend upon the answer to the first.

The Italian Ambassador said it would be better to forward the second draft direct to Rome from London. Lord Curzon agreed.

Lord Curzon asked a further question as to the alleged missions of M. Franchini to the Italian Government. M. Briand replied that M. Franchini had been sent from the French Government, but had gone as a French journalist to report on the situation. Count Rumor informed Lord Curzon that Signor Tassinari had been sent by the Italian Government at Rhodes.

Appendix I.

Lord Hardinge to Sir E. Crowe — (Received June 20)

(Telegraphic)

Following from Lord Curzon —

Paris, June 20, 1921

"Please inform the Prime Minister that I have found M. Briand very well-disposed towards renewal of mediation. He has given me all the information in our possession and read to him Colonel Nairne's telegram. French information is to the effect that both Greeks and Nationalists will welcome a solution of their present difficulties which they can accept without loss of *amour-propre*.

"Following procedure has been adopted. A telegram drafted by me and accepted by M. Briand and by the Italian Ambassador, and by the Greek Ambassador, has been addressed a joint invitation to Greek Government to accept mediation and place themselves in our hands (see my telegram No. 380).

"If they agree, we shall submit to the Greeks, and, in the event of Greeks' acceptance, to the Turks, the terms of the proposed agreement, which will be a basis for a settlement of the present difficulties.

"I have also persuaded M. Briand to agree to suspend tripartite agreement in its present form, though on this point we shall have more difficulty with Italians.

"I have thought of sending a telegram to the Greek Government at Athens, Angora or Constantinople, and have deprecated recourse to independent or clandestine negotiations.

"Whether result be favourable or the reverse, at least the first step has thus been taken towards a possible reconciliation."

No. 4593.

(Telegraphic.) D

Following from Lord Curzon

Paris, June 11, 1921

"The Allied Governments, after consultation together, have decided to offer their good offices with a view to averting a renewal of hostilities in the Near East and to securing an honourable and lasting peace. They are profoundly convinced that, whatever be the immediate result of renewal of conflict between Greek and Turkish forces in Asia Minor, there are not to be found therein the prospects either of any enduring pacification of the East or of a solution compatible with the real interests and ultimate capacities of either party. The belligerents themselves will possibly not dissent from Allied Governments in this definition of the objects which they should hold in view, and any result which fails to attain them, even if it brings a temporary advantage to one or other party, will be stamped with ultimate failure. In the circumstances, Allied Governments feel that they are only discharging an international duty, as well as an obligation of friendship, if they inform Greek Government at this critical juncture, before hostilities are reopened, that, if Hellenic Government is disposed to place its interests in their hands, they are prepared to attempt task of conciliation. Should Greek Government decide that they are not prepared to accept outside intervention or advice the Allied Powers cannot persevere in an action which would obviously be fruitless. In such a case the responsibility for consequences of renewed struggle will rest exclusively on Greeks themselves.

"On the other hand should Hellenic Government decide, in its own interests, to accept intervention of the Powers, the latter will be prepared to state frankly to the Hellenic Government the terms upon which their assistance will be proffered, and, in the event of such assistance being accepted to approach Turkish Government with a view to im-

ly join with them in making this proposal to Greek Government and in inviting from them a prompt reply."

(Sent to Athens, No. 1, repeated to Foreign Office, Rome and Constantinople.)

Appendix 111

Lord Hardinge to Sir K. Craze — (Received June 10)

1784

(b) \rightarrow grating (c) H.

Following from Lord Curzon for Sir E. Crowe

Paris, June 19, 1921

" Agreement was reached this morning with French by which General Harington assumed immediate command of Allied troops in Constantinople, necessary actions being sent by French Government to General Charpy.

"It was further agreed that military commission should supervise three sub-

- * 1. Sub-commission of contrivd, presided over by an Italian officer.
- * 2. Sub-commission of gendarmierie, presided over by a French officer.
- * 3. Sub-commission of 'special elements,' presided over by a British officer.

"It also agreed that _____ should be attributed to a _____

do not apprehend any difficulty

* Please inform War Office

(Repeated to Rome and Constantinople)

No. 68

W. Rizo-Rangabe to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 24.)

My Lord,

Greek Legation, London, June 23, 1921.

REFERRING to my letter of yesterday's date, I now have the honour, in conformity with the instructions of my Government, to submit to your Lordship herewith a memorandum, despatched to me from Smyrna on the 20th instant. The memorandum, drawn up by the Prime Minister, M Gouvarnis, after a complete survey of the situation in the Near East, embodies, with the full concurrence of His Majesty the King, the definite conceptions arrived at by the Royal Government concerning the political and military aspects of this situation as it now presents itself.

I have, &c.

A RIZO HANGABE

Enclaves of

Memorandum

AT the moment of the resumption by Greece of military operations in Asia Minor, the fundamental causes of the struggle being undertaken by the Greek people, the British Government of their conciliatory spirit, which was prompted by their earnest desire to secure definite peace without further sacrifices. The Greek Government is convinced that the British Government was well aware that this attitude did not emanate from any doubt as to the ability of Greece to bring this conflict to a victorious issue. Unhappily, a similar spirit of conciliation did not prevail with England. Intoxicated as a result of the agreements entered into with France and Italy, the British representatives did not even consider worthy of answer the proposals made to them by the conference, notwithstanding that these proposals offered in their favour modifications of essential points in the Treaty of Sévres.

It is well known that the hostile concentrations observed and the fear of a possible Greek-Kemalist line opposed to the Greek army by troops drawn from the Turkish forces in Cilicia, made it incumbent upon the Greek Government, on the ground that the Greek army was menaced, to decide on the offensive.

It was, however, well founded were the apprehensions of the Greek command as to the enemy reinforcements, which made their appearance when an collision, it being moreover demonstrated that they were in even greater numbers than had been anticipated. Notwithstanding complete success on the southern front, which resulted in the seizure of the railway from Orhak to 50 kms. beyond K. H., on the northern front of Broussa the Greek army encountered near Peki-Sheir an unexpected enemy concentration which disposed not only of men greatly superior in number to those formerly present, but also of a far stronger artillery both in number of guns and heavier calibre, the latter, obviously, being available as the result of surreptitious raids on inter-Allied munition depots.

Fighting with incomparable gallantry, the Greek army occupied, one after the other, the very strongly fortified enemy defences; but, because of the losses sustained by the Greek forces, and the very heavy enemy artillery, the general in command was compelled to order a postponement of the operations in order to resume them after fuller preparations. In the face of reports spread abroad in the European press, the Greek Government deems it necessary to emphasize the fact that, confronted with these conditions, the Greek army halted the attack on its own initiative. The enemy did not even dare to leave his trenches, and made not the slightest attempt to interfere with the return of the Greek troops to their original positions. And when, after the suspension of our operations on the northern front, the enemy attempted a supreme effort to achieve some kind of success, concentrating nearly all his available forces for this last attack, he met with complete failure, being repulsed with heavy losses.

From the operations of March, however, one fact stood out clearly, and that was that the enemy had assumed a new character quite different from the one he had shown

up to that time. Instead of undisciplined hordes fighting with indifferent war material, the Greek army now found itself confronted with an organised military force possessed of efficient war material, including guns, even to weapons of heavy calibre.

This new phase of the war, revealed for the first time by the March operations, placed the Greek Government under the necessity of providing measures to reinforce and strengthen the Greek army in such a way as to allow no doubt as to its fighting superiority in every respect over the enemy as he now appeared.

The Greek Government did not hesitate for one moment to prosecute this course, in full accordance with the irrevocable determination of the Greek people that, with its own forces, its will should be imposed on the enemy in Asia Minor. This conception of the Government tallied absolutely with the facts; for the Greek people willingly and enthusiastically proffered themselves for the struggle.

The National Assembly unanimously voted a loan of 6,000,000 drachmas, the entire Greek people applauding this decision. The recruits of the seven classes called to the colours far exceeded in number those who had responded to any previous summons to the ranks. Of the three classes first called, it was forecast on the results of previous calls that the number who would present themselves would amount from 40,000 to 45,000, which estimate was communicated to the British Government last March. As a matter of fact, on this occasion 53,000 men came forward to join their units.

Of the four classes called up subsequently, two of which classes were of older men and consequently considerably reduced in number, 38,000 rallied to the colours instead of the 45,000 as had been estimated.

The above facts prove in a way beyond all doubt that the Greek Government has judged accurately when it based its action on the conviction that this its policy serving the paramount and vital interests of Greece, justifying every sacrifice,

consentaneousness which has manifested itself in the most eloquent way by the willingness with which the entire nation has offered its blood and treasure to carry out this struggle. It was impossible for the Greek people to conceive this policy in a different light from that in which the Government viewed it.

In the most deeply cherished and sacred memories of the Greek nation an historical past, extending over many centuries, replete with glory and an unapproached civilisation,

Greek race, which for thirty centuries and more has preserved, and still preserves, its superiority in every respect over every race which has migrated from Asia. It needs not a geographer at the map to convince anyone, and especially every Greek conscious of his destiny of his race, that Hellenism needs this naturally formed geographical unit of the shores, European and Asiatic, of the Aegean Sea, with the islands therein, in which to thrive and develop freely so as to fulfil its mission—a mission to stand as a bulwark affording security to Europe against dangers from Asia, which dangers, in its geographical position, Greece is the first to sustain, and to fortify the continents for the common benefit of a civilisation uniform on both shores.

Inspired by these convictions springing from the national soul, the Greek Government accepts with an unshakable determination the policy which is being pursued to-day by the Greek Government, a policy which it does not regard as a chance episode in Greek history, nor as an accidental occurrence into which it was thrust by the circumstances of the world war, but as the fulfilment of an historical necessity in the direction towards which the Greek people has always felt an irresistible propulsion, arising both from the impressive memories of the past and the unperious necessities of the present and future. In pursuit of such a policy, which so plainly and so unalienably corresponds with eternal

human affairs—the Greek Government is at the same time fully conscious that in presenting on this point also the conviction of the people, this policy does not constitute wider issues relevant to the new international status now being created. On the contrary, it contributes strongly to the realisation of aims which are of paramount importance to the said status, in which comes first and foremost the aim of establishing a real and lasting peace in the East, which is impossible without rescue of the territory concerned from the intolerable Turkish administration.

Moreover, the settlement of the regions in question does not escape the attention of either the Greek Government or people, and as these interests coincide as regards their general direction and their particular bearing in these regions with the interests of civilisation in general,

the Greek Government considers the policy it is pursuing with the assent of the Greek people is serving a purpose of general beneficent utility.

Since the establishment of the Greek Kingdom this concurrence of the will of British interests with their own has been recognised by the Greek people and their political leaders, and that is why Greece has always regarded England as the one Great Power which, not only for her sincere liberal spirit, but also because of this concentration of interests, was the one called upon to proffer her support for the liberation of Hellenism from foreign domination. In each of the many instances when this assistance has been forthcoming it has been recognised instinctively by the Greek national conscience as a fresh manifestation of the full and complete support of

Great Britain, encouraging the hope of co-operation with England. This is also one of the reasons why the principle of co-operation with England has been maintained by those Governments which were, nevertheless, represented by political opponents for reasons of internal politics, as being in opposition to the will of the Greek people. The present Government is also

Great Britain, being, as a matter of course, above all other great and small Powers in the Mediterranean basin, cannot but recognise as the faithful and sincere guardian of the freedom of Greece, who, also in her own interests, is determined to fulfil this mission, and is capable with her own resources to carry it out.

At this moment when Greece, with her whole heart and soul, enters the arena of this struggle, the Greek Government, in its own name and on behalf of the Greek people, and the hope which the Greek people nurture in its heart for England to support these views as set forth above—a hope that supports Greece in the struggle she is now undertaking.

At the last conference in London the Greek delegates made it clear to the British Government that they were anxious to co-operate with England, and sincerely expounding in confidence to the British Government their thoughts and opinions, and listening willingly to any suggestions put forward by the British Government. And now when the termination of the struggle in Asia Minor is imminent, and with forces considerably increased, the Greek Government again draws its attention to the British Government, reiterating its willingness to hear and consider with the warmest interest any suggestion made by the British Government tending to adapt the situation, which will shape itself out of the struggle into which Greece is entering, to the imperative dictates of the ultimate interests of the Greek people, as set forth in this memorandum. Such is the policy guiding the Greek Government as the agent of the will of the Greek people in this struggle.

Singra, June 20 1921

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No. 89

Lord Curzon to M. Rizo-Rangab

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1921

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 22nd June, in which you inform me that M. Gounaris is anxious to discuss the present situation with me and is prepared to start for London at once, accompanied by M. Baltazzi, should his proposal be considered opportune.

2. In reply I have the honour to inform you that, much as I appreciate M. Gounaris's offer, I am of opinion that it would be preferable that the Greek Government should formulate and forward their considered reply to the Allied proposals recently submitted to them rather than that individual Ministers should put themselves to the trouble of leaving Athens at the present moment in order to deliver the reply in person.

I have, &c

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 7222/143/44]

No. 70.

Earl Curzon to M. Riza-Pascha

Foreign Office, June 22.

Sir,
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 23rd J^y enclosing a memorandum prepared by M. Gounaris embodying the views of the Greek Government regarding the Near Eastern situation.

While I am glad to hear with all the expression of the Greek Government's willingness to hear and consider any suggestions put forward by His Majesty's Government, this offer is certainly opportune at a moment when the Allied representatives at Athens have invited the Greek Government to accept their mediation, and it encourages me to hope for an early and favourable reply.

His Majesty's Government are at one with the Greek Government in their desire to achieve a real and lasting peace in the East, and it is their sincere hope and belief that this object can be attained by mediation, and that further hostilities with all the consequent sacrifices can thereby be avoided.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 6934/531/44]

No. 71.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris)*

(No. 1750)

Sir,
I have received your note of the 20th May and your reply of the 27th. I am glad to hear that you have been able to secure the acceptance of the note from the Norwegian Ministry regarding the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres relating to the passage of vessels through the Dardanelles, the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, and the consequent arrangements for the control of the Straits.

I am glad to hear that you have been able to secure the acceptance of the note from the Norwegian Ministry regarding the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres relating to the passage of vessels through the Dardanelles, the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, and the consequent arrangements for the control of the Straits.

Your proposal that the French Government also should be invited to the conference may be regarded as a reasonable one, and it is possible that the four neutral Governments might be invited to the conference in May and circulated to the other Governments in June.

The Italian Government are at one with His Majesty's Government in their desire to achieve a real and lasting peace in the East, and it is their sincere hope and belief that this object can be attained by mediation, and that further hostilities with all the consequent sacrifices can thereby be avoided.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

Note from the Norwegian Legation.

Les articles 37 à 61 du Traité de Paix de Sèvres, signé le 10 août 1920, créent le Détroit de Bosphore et le Détroit de Dardanelles, le Détroit de Marmara et le Détroit de Samsun, et les dispositions relatives à la navigation.

Ces détroits sont déclarés libres de passage pour tous les navires, sans distinction de nationalité, et sont placés sous le contrôle d'une Commission internationale, qui a pour mission de maintenir la liberté de navigation, et de veiller à ce que les dispositions du Traité de Sèvres soient exactement observées, avec un cadre de fonctionnaires, un corps de police et des attributions étendues.

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome), 26 J^y, and to Sir G. Buchanan (Paris), 27 J^y.

Les articles 45, 53 et 54 du traité en question prescrivent que les frais occasionnés par la création de cette commission seront payés en dernier ressort par les navires utilisant les détroits, sur un pied de parfaite égalité, sans aucune distinction.

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Sans vouloir entraver la question de savoir si la perception de droits dans les détroits est justifiable ou non, il paraît toutefois au Gouvernement norvégien que cette perception de droits de passage, l'abolition des droits de péage du Sund, Convention de 1857; des droits du Stader, Convention de 1861, et des droits de l'Escaut, Convention de 1863.

Le Ministre de Norvège est instruit d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique sur la réaction que les dispositions de la Commission des Détroits créées par rapport aux conventions susmentionnées, qui justement avaient pour but d'abolir tout droit de péage, et d'ajouter que le Gouvernement norvégien, qui n'est pas représenté dans la Commission des Détroits, désire pour l'avenir ne réserver tous ses droits.

Légation de Norvège, Londres, le 2 mai 1921

Enclature 2 in No. 71

Draft of Note to the Scandinavian and Netherlands Ministers.

HIS Majesty's Government have given careful consideration to the identic note addressed to them by the Danish, Netherlands, Norwegian and Swedish Governments, regarding the provisions of Part III, Section II, of the Treaty of Sèvres, relating to the waterway of the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus.

2. Without raising the question of the imposition of dues on shipping using this waterway, the Scandinavian and Netherlands Governments point to the alleged trend towards the abolition of dues on shipping in the case of other international waterways during the last half century, as illustrated by certain conventions such as those reducing or abolishing the dues on the Sound, Elbe and Scheldt. Attention is also drawn to the absence of Netherlands and Scandinavian representation on the "Straits Commission," and the rights of the four Governments are reserved.

His Majesty's Government do not consider that there is sufficient similarity between conditions on the Straits and on the waterways cited by the Netherlands and Scandinavian Governments to warrant the application of the same principles, particularly in view of the fact that the necessity of devising an international control to keep them open and free to all nations in peace and war did not arise on the Sound, the Scheldt and the Elbe. In the case of the Straits the events of the last few years have shown that this necessity has arisen in the most acute form. Further, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to accept the general content on that the trend has been towards the abolition of dues on international waterways. Such contention ignores the essential distinction between navigation dues and tolls.

The former represent a survival of the recognition of the right of the riparian sovereign to close a passage, should he so desire, or, alternatively, to derive a revenue from the users, should he engage to keep it open. It is true that such tolls have been abolished, and that any tendency to revive the system would be retrograde. Taxes or navigation dues, on the other hand, are universally recognised as being payments for services rendered, and may not in any case provide a revenue for the riparian sovereign. The necessity for the imposition of navigation dues was, for instance, specifically recognised in article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. In virtue of that article and subsequent treaties, the European Commission of the Danube, which was established in 1858, has for its object the maintenance of the free navigation of the river at its mouth, levies dues to cover the expenses of the commission and the cost of maintaining and policing the channel. The commission has incidentally been forced since the war to increase the dues charged by them by 200 per cent. on account of the great rise of their expenses. In the case of the navigation on that part of the Danube which has been declared international between Ulm and the point at which the jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube begins, article 16 of the draft Act of Navigation for the Danube, as adopted at the first reading, provides for a moderate tariff of dues to be applied exclusively to the works for which they are levied.

"No dues of any kind may be levied anywhere on the course at the mouth of a navigable waterway of international concern, other than dues in the nature of payment for services rendered, and intended solely to cover in an equitable manner the expenses of maintaining and improving the navigability of the waterway and its approaches, or to meet expenditure incurred in the interest of the navigation of the waterway. The tariff of dues shall be posted in the ports. These dues shall be levied in such a manner as to render unnecessary a detailed examination of the cargo, except in cases of suspected fraud or infringement of regulations, and so as to facilitate international traffic as much as possible both as regards their rates and the method of their application.

5. His Majesty's Government are glad that the special provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, providing for absolute equality and impartiality in the imposition of the Straits dues, have been noted by the Netherlands Government. Apart from the administrative expenses of the commission, those dues are proposed to be devoted to necessary works and the provision of material facilities for all shipping, and partly for a small force of maritime police, which in view of the menace from local disturbances to the unobstructed passage of vessels through the Straits should generally be welcomed. This consideration, connected as it is with the local political conditions, is again evidence of the difference in treatment which the problem of the Straits calls for as compared with the Scheldt, the Sound and the Elbe.

8. In these circumstances the mere presence on the commission of the representatives of Great Britain, France and Italy, whose vessels together formed the bulk of the shipping using the Straits before the war, and who are deeply interested in the prosperity of Mediterranean commerce, should afford to those Governments who are not actually represented on the commission sufficient guarantees that the dues on vessels using the Straits will not be so raised as in any way to hamper the free movement of trade and shipping.

Foreign Office, July 1921.

No. 72

Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs summoned to meet in Cairo during March 1921 by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Telegraphic Correspondence regarding Policy in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Trans-Jordan and Arabia (Communicated to Foreign Office, April 1)

Mr Churchill to Colonial Office

COX and General Haldane arrived here on the 11th. Conference opened on morning of the 12th with short introductory meeting followed by formal political and military committee for discussion of reduction of expenditure in Mesopotamia. Political committee presided over by myself consists of Cox and staff with officials of Middle East Department, Arab Minister being called in as required. Military committee, presided by General Bagge consists of Haumea and staff. Ironside, Trenchard and his staff, Radcliff and Crosland. The two committees will hold combined meetings to co-ordinate recommendations. Sir Herbert Samuel will arrive on 16th by which date I hope to be free to discuss Palestine and Trans-Jordan leaving Mesopotamia committees to work out details. Opportunity is also being taken to consider Aden, Somaliland and Arab Littoral of Persian Gulf. High Commissioner for Cyprus will pay short visit on 16th.

Mr Churchill to the Prime Minister.

(Personal and Secret.)

First, I think we shall reach unanimous conclusion among all authorities that Faisal offers hope of best and cheapest solution.

If so, I can go ahead on this line! Formula would be "In response to enquiries from adherents of Emir Faisal the British Government have stated that they will place no obstacles in the way of his candidature as Ruler of Iraq, and that if he is chosen he will have their support." Do you think you and Lord Curzon have said enough to the French to justify my proceeding on this basis? If so, all the better because we do not want any premature disclosure and agitation to be made by the

If, however, you feel that further reference to the French is necessary, surely now while you are helping them in Germany would be the best moment for settling with them, and in this case they should be asked to treat this communication as confidential for the present. On the receipt of your assent to this formula I shall tell Lawrence he can communicate formula to Feisal. On this, Feisal will at once proceed to Mecca, passing through Egypt, India, &c. We do not want any announcement even in guarded terms, of formula if it can be possibly avoided until Feisal is at Mecca and Sir P. Cox is in Baghdad. About the middle of April, Mecca, I think we require to study the matter, and avoid confused or meaningless expression of Mesopotamian opinion. Time is short as Sir P. Cox must return, and all my plans depend on clear settlement with him before we separate. I have no doubt personally Feisal will be satisfied. Last letter of saying "it is not clear" and "it is not clear" is not up to you possibly, at least I am free to make plans on basis of formula.

Thirdly [Groups missing] Incredible waste now proceeding in Mesopotamia can only be cured by driving large numbers of troops and followers out of country and off our pay list. On this, I propose, provided my general plan is accepted, to take immediate and drastic action, thus securing large saving in 1921-22. I am met by assertion that many thousands of men and followers could not begin to leave country if shipping were available. Already it is declared that troops are being delayed at Basrah through lack of shipping, and certainly time table reduction of garrisons to pre-rebellion figures by the 31st March on which we were counting is already fortnight in arrears. We have to carry everybody back sooner or later, and keeping them waiting eating up our munition is pure waste. Will you, therefore, kindly tell Shipping Controller or send him personal message that he is to meet my requirements and carry troops and followers away from Basrah as fast as I can bring them to port. Exact figures will be furnished in a few days but considerable additional shipping will be required in the Persian Gulf as soon as demonstration

I am provisionally telling military that they may assume that we will carry away promptly whatever troops they bring to Basrah, and that they have done their part when they have brought them to port. Please confirm this. I should also be obliged if you would impress on India Office that we cannot agree to be charged for these men for several months after they return to India.

To sum up - If in three or four days you can give me favourable answers on these three points I shall let the Committee know and initiate programme of action.

(Secret and Personal)

March 18, 1929

IN reply to personal and secret telegram received Colonial Office 14th March
Reply to three points in your telegram is as follows:—

First We have repeatedly hinted to the French that if there is a strong demand for Feisal from Mesopotamia, and peace can be restored by establishing him as Ruler in Iraq, we should not feel justified in vetoing his candidature. Unless initiative comes from Mesopotamia, however, any demand with the French will be embarrassing, and we think it will be very difficult to reconcile procedure you propose with the attitude of the French Government in this matter. We think it essential therefore, that real initiative in any demand for Feisal should come from Mesopotamia. Sir Perry Cox and Miss Gertrude Bell will no doubt advise you as to whether this initiative will be forthcoming. You will doubtless recall however, that Feisal when sounded in London as to his personal attitude made it perfectly clear that he would not become a candidate for Iraq until Abdullah's claims had been disposed of.

Second point. We have entered into no stipulation with the Turks which excludes the possibility of a Turkish inroad or intrigue in Mosul this year. Turkish Delegation in London has recognized that we have offered very considerable concessions, but have protested against our proposals in regard to Smyrna, and against absence of any concession in Eastern Thrace. We have no certainty that settlement will be accepted by Turks. Turks are reported to be concentrating troops on Greek front, and Greeks may feel compelled to attack them. We are quite unable to control either side, and no truce has been arranged. Should fighting occur it is difficult to judge what its reaction will be on Mesopotamian front. We are, however, warning

Turks that if any hostile action is taken in Mesopotamia we shall consider ourselves at liberty to arm the Greeks.

Third point. I am in full sympathy with your desire to cure the waste and inefficiency in Munitions. I have asked the Secretary of State for War and Shipping Controller to take up the matter at once.

Mr Churchill to the Prime Minister

(Received Colonial Office 11.15 p.m., March 16, 1921.)

PROFESSIONAL. In reply to my telegram of the 14th March, I have taken a position for present definite proposals for action. I have decided to carry out the first stage of reduction in Mesopotamia. I have been able to select a small number of troops to be sent to act in the main body of troops, also 1st of the troops are retained.

All authorities, including Cox, Generals Haldane, Congreve, Ironside, Kidcliffe, Colonel Lawrence and Major Young have reached complete agreement on all points, both political and military. One-third approximately of troops, for which provision was made in estimates of 1921-22, will leave country as fast as shipping becomes available. Proportionate reductions will be enforced of staffs ~~and of other services if such forces in India~~. Mr. ~~Lawrence~~ representative of War Office, estimates resultant saving on estimate for Palestine and Mesopotamia in 1921-22 at 5,600,000L., provided prompt action is taken at all points. Further saving would result if India could be induced to shorten up time, during which troops remain on our charge after repatriation to India.

I propose that garrison as thus reduced to 23-battalion scale shall remain during dangerous hot-weather period intact; but that if, firstly, country remains quiet internally, and is not disturbed from outside; that, secondly, Arab Government proves a success; and, thirdly, good progress be made in training of the Arab army and development of Arab arms a further reduction to a 12-battalion scale will be possible. The necessary reduction of the garrison will be effected by the following steps:—

As concerned have also reached provisional conclusions upon normal or abnormal conditions. According to the statistics upon the same (1922-23) I have the following: In the case of the regular troops to be played in this scheme by Imperial military forces, by air forces and by local forces. When I return all this will be explained by the fact that it has been accepted by all that cost of garrison in Mesopotamia in 1922-23-24 shall not exceed an average of 5,000,000, 6,000,000, a year. Of course, fulfilment of this third stage depends upon successful political administration.

Adjustments have been made in spite of above reductions to hold whale

Samuel arrives to-morrow, and shall endeavour to secure further relations to a class of merchants who are beyond reach to us.

requirements are considered. It is suggested that a policy of "no net loss" of wetlands be adopted.

I append (1) proposed procedure in regard to Emir Feisal and policy in Iraq and Kurdistan; (2) proposed program prepared for my visit to Geneva, Radio 13, on military aspect; and (3) financial forecast by Mr. Crossland.

Policy with regard to Iraq

Consideration of reduction of Mesopotamian expenditure has been proceeded with a Conference commission in the Indo-European Division of the Ministry of Finance of the USSR. It has been decided at the first meeting by adopting the following procedure: Sir Percy Cox to visit Basra early April and

announce forthwith (2 remission of) sentences of military courts and the decision of His Majesty's Government to grant general amnesty, with one or two exceptions, for persons interned or exiled in connection with 1920 disturbances. Feisal, as soon as possible, to proceed to Mecca and thence to telegraph on about 23rd April to his friends in Mesopotamia saying that British Government had informed him, in response to their enquiries, that they would place no obstacle in the way of his candidature as ruler of Iraq, and that he would have their support if he were chosen; that he, after discussion with his father and brothers, had decided to offer services Iraq. We think that Feisal, in order to counter anti-mandate propaganda in Mesopotamia, should make it clear that he was prepared to accept terms of mandate as laid before the League of Nations, but we are not of opinion that he can do so unless I am authorised to guarantee that by so doing possibility of subsequent readjustment of relations between mandatory and properly constituted Government of Mesopotamia will not be precluded. Such readjustment to take form of modification of the mandate into a treaty providing for continuance of the support of the mandatory subject to adequate safeguarding and maintenance of latter's special interests and privileged position in Iraq. In addition, he would telegraph Naqib and Saiyid Talib, as representing Provisional Government, saying he hoped to have their support and personal co-operation in the future. At the same time Abdullah would communicate with those friends who supported his candidature, saying that he had withdrawn in favour of Feisal. Having seen from his friends primary effect of this, Feisal would either send representative or himself come to Mesopotamia during Ramadan. It is anticipated that Feisal's announcement, followed by arrival in country, would result in such a definite expression of public feeling on his behalf as would render unnecessary for us to ask the Congress to discuss question of ruler, and they would simply directly or indirectly confirm his nomination. This having been done, Feisal would dissolve present Provisional Government, namely, the Council of Ministers, and call Naqib or someone else to form Cabinet. The foregoing recommendations have unanimously been adopted, and I urgently request you to obtain Cabinet sanction for them in time to allow me to concert final details with Cox before he leaves Cairo.

Policy in Kurdistan

Having regard to article 62 of Treaty of Sevres, Southern Kurdistan has hitherto been brought under Provisional Government of Mesopotamia. The Commissioner had intimated that he proposed to deal direct with local officials in Kurdish areas until expiration of year allowed by article 6. Acting on assumption article 62 is no longer operative, and that accordingly there is no question of Southern Kurdistan at any future date opting for union with Northern Kurdistan, the Conference has considered what line of policy with

at this stage any attempt was made to force them under rule of the Arab Government they would undoubtedly resist, and a complication would thus be added to our withdrawal. We recommend, therefore, that they, together with the Iraq Government, should be informed that our intention under mandate is to maintain existing arrangement until such time as a representative body of Kurdish States may opt for inclusion in Iraq. The advantage of this solution will be to enable us to recruit Kurdish units under British officers, and thus to accelerate reduction of Imperial forces in certain areas. This policy will also tend to discount the endeavours of Turks to seduce Kurds in our territory.

Iraq. Military.

1. The Conference recommends, after full consideration by military and civil authorities, and agreement of all concerned, that the following further reductions in Mesopotamia garrison should be made as soon as reduction to a total of 88 battalions and 6 cavalry regiments, &c., already in progress, has been reached. 2 British battalions, 1 British cavalry regiment, 8 Indian battalions, 8 Indian cavalry regiments, 2 sappers and miners companies, 5 field batteries, 4 pack batteries.

2. It will be apparent from this that, of 14 that were due for relief by fresh units, 8 Indian battalions can be returned now to India without relief, and orders should be issued at once stopping the despatch to Mesopotamia of corresponding

relieving units from either India or Egypt, as may seem best. As the General Officer Commanding considers that there are only 3 battalions whose immediate relief is imperative, arrangements should be made, unless it is already too late, to stop despatch of further 3 relieving battalions. It is considered that, in view of further reductions contemplated in the autumn, remaining 3 battalions should stay for few months required, but should be made up to strength, and such of their personnel as can be demobilised should be repatriated.

3. I understand, in this connection, that we are threatened with charge of sum of 2,500,000. in 1921-22 for Indian units maintained in India to provide reliefs for units in Mesopotamia and elsewhere. The above-mentioned large reductions and further reductions which I contemplate later in year compel me to ask War Office to arrange with India to get rid of the whole, or almost the whole, of this charge without delay.

4. Reduction to 88-battalion level is not at the present moment proceeding as quickly as it might, the reason being the lack of sufficient shipping at Basrah, which at present is only sufficient to evacuate about 8,000 men per week—whereas, if sufficient shipping were provided, 5,000 per week could be evacuated; and it is hoped to be able to increase this rate to 6,000 per week. It is of the utmost urgency therefore, in order that maximum financial saving in 1921-22 may be effected immediately, to increase shipping at Basrah to capacity of 6,000 per week.

It is estimated that if additional shipping can be counted on at Basrah from 1st May, all combatants to be reduced on new decisions will have been evacuated by the end of June, by which date the garrison will be down to 28-battalion level, except as regards auxiliary services, which in turn will then be speedily reduced *pro rata*. In addition, General Haldane is confident that he can further reduce substantially the local transport, Indian labour and followers.

5. You will doubtless settle in consultation with India the order of priority which units are to be repatriated having regard to length of service ex India and other considerations.

6. Consequent upon the reduction of garrison, it is estimated that there will be some 25,000 surplus horses and mules in Mesopotamia. India declines to take any of these. It is proposed that as many as possible should be sold locally if the Remount Department does not need them elsewhere, and that the remainder should be destroyed immediately in order to avoid needless drain in new financial year. Please telegraph fully and very urgently on this point.

7. On all above measures, together, I am advised by Mr. Crossland we may expect following savings in 1921-22 provided immediate energetic action is taken: Reduction of troops after allowing for sea transport charges, 1,200,000.; relief units in India, 1,500,000.; local transport, Indian labour and followers, 2,000,000.; horses, forage, 800,000. Total 5,500,000., of which roughly 500,000. would be transferred to other votes from Mesopotamian vote.

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister

(Secret and Personal.)

March 18, 1921

I AM very anxious no misunderstanding should exist between us. Formula sent Feisal which was suggested in telegram of 14th March was not intended for publication, but as a definite indication of the limits within which our policy could be framed.

In my long telegram to you of the 16th March, present procedure for his appointment was discussed. It was devised by Cox, Miss Bell and Lawrence, carries with it unanimous opinion of all authorities here. We are quite as fully conscious as you are of desire for securing a spontaneous movement for Feisal in Mesopotamia as a prelude to his being countenanced by us. Unless we have a mind of our own on the subject it is by no means certain that this will occur. Situation is complicated by variety of claimants to Throne, several of whom are not persons of high ability, and it is difficult to see a prospect of a representative Arab Government capable of relieving our military commitments. As an instance, if

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Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister

(Received Colonial Office, 6.45 P.M., March 20 1921)

IN order that you may see the full plan which we are elaborating I indicate various readjustments of the subsidies to Arab chiefs which will be entailed.

Bin Saud has power to attack lower Euphrates which was raided by some of his followers a few weeks ago. By the reduction of our garrison disorderly elements will be encouraged and Faisal's arrival will displease Bin Saud. I propose therefore that his subsidy should be increased to 100,000/ a year paid monthly in arrears conditional upon his maintaining peace with Mesopotamia, Koweit and Hejaz. Sir P. Cox believes that a subsidy of this amount will ensure his goodwill over a difficult period, and it may under settled conditions be reduced. Hussein and Bin Saud must be treated on the same footing, and I propose that the former be paid a similar subsidy conditional upon improvement in the pilgrimage arrangements, and on his promise to recognise peace treaties and to use his influential help in instituting order and good government in Arab areas.

In Yemen conditions are difficult since we are not in touch with Imam. Agreement with him would permit outlying detachments of Aden garrison to be withdrawn, and in consequence effect a considerable saving of military expenditure. I consider that if we can get in touch with him we might offer him subsidy of 2,000/ a month as part of our accommodation. Our greatest means of influencing him is our control over Idrisi pressure on his western frontier. To keep this weapon in my hands I propose to offer Idrisi subsidy of 1,000/ a month on the condition that he excludes foreigners from his area.

(*)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister

(Secret)

March 21 1921

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister and circulation to the Cabinet —

I hope the decision which the Cabinet will take to-morrow will be in the sense of [one group undecipherable] reasonable latitude in handling of Mesopotamian candidature. I do not underrate in any way difficulties [one group undecipherable] delicacy of problem. There will certainly be local opposition to any Sherrefian candidate owing to vigorous pressing of personal claims by rivals on the spot. But we have no doubt whatever that best guarantee for stability of government and quick reduction of expense and responsibility would be adoption of Faisal by a substantial preponderance of public opinion. In all the Arab world there is no other competing principle capable of maintaining an Arab State on modern lines than the Sherrefian. On the other hand, I am deeply conscious of danger that by a too [one group undecipherable] open advocacy of Faisal we might defeat our own ends. This must be handled by Sir Percy Cox on the spot [two groups undecipherable] he gets back the better as much intrigue is rife in his absence, and we wish to have liberty to do our best in unostentatious ways, having regard to all foregoing conditions, to secure adoption of Faisal. Of course the more spontaneous demand for him the better [three groups undecipherable] there will be. Bear in mind also that Faisal must be given some assurance that we wish him well, and that he has a good chance before he will expose himself to the labours and [one group undecipherable] of candidature.

Now as to the French. If Faisal is chosen they will certainly believe, whatever we say, that we have so willed and they will be quite right. You alone can judge whether any further communication to them is necessary. There are many advantages in making none until Sir P. Cox is back in Mesopotamia.

Prime Minister to Mr. Churchill

(Very Urgent. Secret.)

Foreign Office, March 22, 1921, 10.30 P.M.

CABINET devoted exhaustive consideration to your proposals this morning. They were much impressed by collective force of your recommendations, and were in close agreement with concluding paragraphs of your telegram of the 21st March. It was thought that order of events should be as follows:—

Sir P. Cox should return with as little delay as possible to Mesopotamia, and should set going the machinery which may result in acceptance of Faisal's candidature and invitation to him to accept position of ruler of Irak. In the meantime, no announcement or communication to the French should be made. Faisal, however, will be told privately that there is no longer any need for him to remain in England, and that he should return without delay to Mecca to consult his father who appears from our latest reports to be in a more than usually amiable frame of mind. Faisal, with his father's and mother's consent, he becomes a candidate for Mesopotamia and is accepted by people of that country, we shall welcome their choice, subject, of course, to the double condition that he is not a member of the [one group undecipherable] and that he is not a member of the [one group undecipherable]. Your remark in an earlier telegram of series that acceptance of mandate by Faisal does not preclude subsequent readjustment of relations between mandatory and Mesopotamian Government is concurred in, although it does not appear to be necessary at this stage to talk about a treaty.

If above conditions are fulfilled, Faisal would then from Mecca make known at the right moment his desire to offer himself as candidate, and should make his appeal to the Mesopotamian people. At this stage we could, if necessary, communicate with the French, who, whatever their suspicions or annoyance would have no ground for protest against a course of action in strict accordance with our previous declarations. We trust that this procedure will commend itself to you and Sir P. Cox, and that you will act accordingly.

Cabinet then discussed your proposals for Trans-Jordan, as to which considerable misgivings were entertained. It was felt that almost simultaneous installation of the two brothers in regions contiguous to French sphere of influence would be regarded with great suspicion by them and would be interpreted as a menace to their position in Syria, deliberately plotted by ourselves. Further while reasons for your recommendation of British military occupation of Trans-Jordan as a guarantee against these perils were appreciated, it was urged by our military advisers that this occupation would involve a military commitment the extension and duration of which it was impossible to forecast. Nor was it clear that Abdullah would accept such a position as that suggested, in a territory too small for a Kingdom, and subject to conditions identical with those which it is proposed to exact from Faisal as regards the mandate and no intrigue against the French.

Presence of Abdullah in Trans-Jordan, from which he may be reluctant to go and general desire of His Majesty's Government to fulfil earlier promises to King Hussein about independence of Arab territories undoubtedly favour an Arab rather than a Palestinian solution. But the price to be paid for these advantages seems to be high and the results doubtful.

The Cabinet was of opinion that you ought to be acquainted with these misgivings before you see Abdullah, and that you should not exclude other plans from your mind. It might, for instance, be possible, while preserving Arab character of the area and administration, to treat it as an Arab province or adjunct of Palestine.

As regards Southern Kurdistan our proposals were approved. But you must expect attempts from Angora Government to seduce Southern Kurds into co-operation with their northerly brethren with a view to incorporation in Anatolian State.

Question of proposed subsidies to Arab chiefs did not appear to demand

immediate decision and calls for careful examination by more departments than one. It was therefore reserved for discussion with you after your return.

Proposals in regard to military reductions and shipping contained in Part V of your telegram of the 16th March were agreed to, and Secretary of State for War is authorised to arrange all details with you.

(10)

Mr. Churchill to the Prime Minister

(Received Colonial Office, 7.20 P.M., March 23, 1921)

AM much obliged both to you and to the Cabinet for approval to general principle of the plan. I am sure that the plan will be carried out with not the least difficulty in proceeding according to lines of Cabinet suggestion, but attaching great importance to the "to Feisal's" omitted arrival in Mesopotamia before election takes place. This can presumably be arranged as a result of appeals and invitations to him from his powerful and numerous religious and racial supporters in the Iraq. With other observations of the Cabinet in regard to this part of the subject I am in agreement, and we will bear them carefully in mind.

2. Am not quite clear whether it is contemplated that someone in London should at once approach Feisal. I think it would be better were Lawrence, who has his entire confidence, to send him the private telegram appended strictly within limits of which you have approved. This really is more non-committal than an official communication. I think Lawrence, at some point on the route, will have to talk with him quietly.

3. About Trans-Jordan. I do not seem to have made myself quite clear. We do not expect or particularly desire, indeed, Abdullah himself to undertake Governorship. He will as Cabinet rightly apprehend almost certainly think it too much. His influence should be upon our side and that a person elected for local Governorship shall be one in whose nomination he has cordially concurred is the vital point. Abdullah has power to do a great deal of harm, particularly against French in Trans-Jordan, and if he became actively hostile we should have no means of coping with him. The actual solution which we have always had in mind and for which I shall work is that which you described as follows, "while preserving Arab character of area and administration to treat it as Arab province or adjunct of Palestine."

Political affairs ought to be very favourable if this could be achieved under an Arab local Governor agreed upon between us and Abdullah and cordially backed by British troops. I am sure that without presence of a small British force no order or stability of government can be established in Trans-Jordan. In favourable conditions which we anticipate a single squadron might be sufficient for local purposes.

The reason why it is necessary to have larger numbers is solely because General Cox and his staff are not yet in the country.

With these officers are agreed that on lines proposed no risks would be run. With intention to reduce further our military commitments in Palestine as elsewhere in Middle East I am in hearty sympathy, and I think have given proof of this. But after hearing unanimous opinion of everyone concerned here, including most particularly Sir Herbert Samuel (as) actual political officers on the spot, I am convinced that restoration of stable conditions in Trans-Jordan is an indispensable preliminary to further reduction. I may add that a by no means inappreciable revenue can be raised in Trans-Jordan in such conditions. Civil Government will be no additional charge to Palestine or to His Majesty's Government. Lastly, we must remember that in Trans-Jordan we have accepted international responsibilities and ought to take reasonable steps to discharge our undertaking. Otherwise when French say "Will you allow us to come in and punish people who are preparing

to attack us in our own territory? Keep order yourselves or let us do it for you."

From our side of the line of partition Arabs have already (two groups) on the other hand, have dropped retaliatory bombs on flocks of Gilead. This is a serious situation.

4. General Gouraud, now on his way to Syria, has expressed a desire to see me at Jerusalem on 20th. I shall confine myself as regards Mesopotamia and Feisal to reiterating that choice of a ruler must rest with people of Iraq and that we cannot in advance undertake to rule out any candidate whom they desire and whom we do not consider undesirable. I shall at the same time say that nothing has been or can be settled at present until wishes of Mesopotamian people have been fully expressed, and on this I shall point out local candidates who are in the field and other candidates who are now pressing their claims.

About Trans-Jordan as result of my interview with Abdullah I hope to be able to report on French borders and to prevent French from being disturbed and annoyed from out of our territory. That they have themselves been tentatively in agreement with Abdullah is a matter of course.

After my interviews with Abdullah I will telegraph to you further and I hope to be able to say more about the situation.

5. Show the following message to the Prime Minister and, should he agree, have it delivered to Feisal preferably by Forbes Adam. Begin—

Following from Lawrence for Feisal. Things have gone exactly as hoped. I am sure that the situation in the Near East is now in a more favourable position. I will meet you on the way and explain details. Say only that you are going (to see) your father, and on no account put any (thing) in press. Ends.

(11)

Colonial Office to Mr. Churchill

March 24, 1921

CLEAR the line

From Shuckburgh Private

My telegram of 23rd March, No. 26, reference communication to Feisal enclosed. Part 2 of your telegram has now been approved by Prime Minister, and Lawrence's message conveyed in part 5 of your telegram has been communicated to Feisal this evening by Forbes Adam. Feisal, acting on Lawrence's advice, will start on his journey as possible. Date of his departure will be communicated to you later. I presume that you will inform Cox.

(12)

Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill

(Received Colonial Office, 2.5 A.M., March 29, 1921)

CLEAR the line

1. Issue of March 10th of "Near East" mentioned that draft mandate for Mesopotamia has been published in White Paper. The draft will have reached Baghdad. It is urgent that the final approval by the League of Nations or at least their general acceptance should be obtained as soon as possible, otherwise extremists in Iraq who are not for mandate will find it no use at all.

2. I note that in Foreign Office telegram to yourself No. 83, dated 1 March 22, it is stated that discussion of subsidies to Arab chiefs had been reserved for your return, as the question did not demand immediate decision.

As regards proposal made in the case of Bin Saud, it is most urgent that decision should be come to before I reach Baghdad [?]. I beg to observe that increase of his subsidy is an essential factor in the general scheme of policy presented to the Government. As you are aware it is contemplated immediately on my return to send an officer to Bin Saud to explain to him [?] decisions of conference as regards [?] assumption of title and his subsidy and conditions we require from him in connection with our Shereefian policy in Mesopotamia. If communication of our concessions is delayed until after Feisal has announced himself they will obviously lose much of their effect.

Addressed to Churchill repeated Colonial Office

E 4027 31 88]

No 73

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Sir E. Crowe, (Received April 5.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 2 avril 1921.

Cher Sir Eyre,

AU cours de notre dernière conversation au Foreign Office, nous nous sommes entretenus de l'Emir Abdallah et de ses proclamations aux populations de Syrie. Vous avez exprimé l'avis que ces documents étaient probablement antérieurs à l'action exercée sur ce fils du Roi du Hedjaz par le Gouvernement britannique.

M. Briand, à qui j'avais fait part de cette observation, vient de télégraphier que ces documents datent, en effet, des mois de novembre et de décembre derniers. Il n'en considère pas moins, toutefois, la pression exercée par les autorités britanniques comme demeurée sans effet.

Nos autorités en Syrie possèdent une lettre adressée le 17 février par Abdallah à l'Emir Faysal, dans laquelle il déclare que son but est de réunir les Arabes du Hedjaz et de leurs communs ennemis. D'autre part, notre Haut-Commissariat à Beyrouth a été informé par Ahmed Mehemmed, le Chérif Ali, cousin d'Abdallah, établissant que l'attaque du pont de Mekeriné, sur la ligne Damas-Caïffa, le 22 février, a été montée par les Chérifiens.

Je crois devoir attirer votre attention sur ces faits. Ils constituent, aux yeux du Gouvernement français, une preuve de l'esprit d'hostilité des Chérifiens à l'égard de la France en Syrie. Cette situation rend les rapports entre les autorités de Palestine et de Syrie très délicats, ainsi que vous pourrez vous en convaincre par les quelques extraits ci-joints d'un rapport que M. Briand vient de recevoir de Beyrouth.

Notre représentant en Syrie a certainement parlé de ces questions à Mr. Winston Churchill. Je crains, toutefois, que le séjour de ce dernier à Jérusalem ait été trop court pour lui permettre de se rendre un compte exact des difficultés et des malentendus que ces affaires arabes peuvent attacher dans les rapports franco-anglais. M. Briand redoute des incidents qui obligeraient nos autorités en Orient à réagir vigoureusement contre les organisations chérifiennes.

Je vous fais part de ces appréhensions, persuadé que le Foreign Office fera, en ce qui le concerne, tout ce qui dépend de lui pour l'établissement en Orient d'un état de choses favorable aux bons rapports franco-britanniques.

Veuillez croire, &c.
SAINT-AULAIRE

Enclosure in No. 7.

Extract of French Report from Beirut

VOUS savez que les éléments chérifiens ont abouti au coup de main dirigé contre la voie ferrée entre Damas et Caïffa et aux combats qui ont suivi cette opération. La bande qui a exécuté cette attaque a été dispersée et a été tuée. Le représentant anglais à Irbid écrivait au conseiller de Damas au lendemain du combat du pont de Mekeriné.

"Nous avons envoyé hier, 23 février, une patrouille de gendarmes aviser les riverains de la voie ferrée que toute agression contre cette voie serait sévèrement punie."

Le télégramme du consul de France à Djeddah, du 13 février, m'annonce que le prince Faysal du Hedjaz, Ali, accompagné de 250 hommes, est parti par mer pour El Quedj, d'où il doit rejoindre l'Emir Abdallah à Maan. Cette nouvelle fait suite à la lettre du 30 janvier, par laquelle notre agent à Djeddah vous a signalé que, par suite de la trêve conclue entre Ibn-el-Soud et le Roi Hussein, celui-ci, libre de porter ses efforts vers le nord, a envoyé récemment 30,000 livres turques or à son fils Abdallah à Maan et doit lui dépêcher son frère l'Emir Zeid, connu à Damas pour ses idées pro-français. Le Roi Hussein n'aurait à sa disposition que de très faibles ressources.

Si les autorités britanniques ne peuvent contrôler les mouvements qui s'effectuent à Maan et Akaba de servir au débarquement de matériel et de renforts qui sont acheminés vers le Transjordan.

Il résulte des renseignements envoyés du Caire que l'Emir Abdallah a installé un poste à Akaba. Akaba est le port de base pour tout son approvisionnement en armes, cartouches, uniformes et argent, le tout provenant d'Egypte ou du Hedjaz.

Or, dans les cartes récentes de Palestine, le port d'Akaba est englobé dans le mandat de Ber Sébaa. De sorte que la base et peut-être aussi le poste intermédiaire de l'Emir Abdallah dans ses opérations ouvertes contre nous sont en territoire de mandat anglais. S'il en est bien ainsi, il appartient à nos Alliés de remplacer les garnisons chérifiennes d'Akaba et El Guerra par des troupes britanniques, qui mettront fin à l'action chérifienne.

En outre, Akaba et El Guerra ne sont pas en zone de mandat anglais, ces points appartiennent au Hedjaz et rien ne nous empêcherait en théorie de procéder à une mesure de politique navale à Akaba pour couper l'Emir Abdallah de sa base et de ses relations avec l'extérieur.

Le prince Faysal, que Lord Hardinge a récemment représentée au Caire, français comme le résultat d'une pression exercée par le Gouvernement britannique sur Faysal pour nous rendre service, sert en réalité à intensifier le recrutement des bandes de l'Emir Abdallah. Toutes les informations venues du sud et reçues à Damas montrent que l'action de Souhbi el Khedra s'exerce dans un sens nettement contraire à celui qui vous a été indiqué.

Souhbi el Khedra est l'ancien chef de la Sécurité de Damas sous le régime de Faysal. Il est un des organisateurs des bandes armées de la Bekaa en 1919. Aventurier sans scrupules, partisan de "l'indépendance arabe", connu pour son fanatisme et ses sentiments extrémistes, il fut, avec Ali Ghofki et Ahmed Merowed, un des agents les plus actifs dans les troubles de la zone est; condamné à mort par contumace à notre entrée à Damas, il se réfugia en Egypte, où il sert depuis plusieurs mois la cause de l'Emir Abdallah.

Il est revenu en Transjordanie depuis le commencement de janvier, apportant, dit-on, des effets militaires pour l'armée du Chérif Abdallah. Puis il s'est rendu dans le Hauran, recrutant dans les villages du caza de Boer à Esjaj Chann des volontaires. Il a fait de la propagande anti-française dans la montagne et est reparti à Amman avec un groupe de volontaires, parmi lesquels Assad-el-Atrache.

Il semble donc difficile de pouvoir considérer Souhbi el Khedra comme un messager de paix en Transjordanie, où son action nous est aujourd'hui, comme antérieure dans la zone, ouvertement hostile.

Damas, le 7 mars 1921

E 4048 2430 88

No 74

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon, (Received April 5.)

LE Gouvernement de la République a eu maintes fois l'occasion d'intervenir auprès du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté au sujet de la Compagnie du Chemin de fer Jaffa Jérusalem.

A la suite de ces démarches, il avait été entendu qu'une discussion aurait lieu sur place avec les intéressés pour le règlement de cette affaire. Les représentants de la compagnie se sont donc rendus en Palestine, où ils ont exposé leur point de vue en janvier et février à Sir Herbert Samuel. Cette discussion est restée sans résultat.

[6891]

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I protested most vehemently against this unwarrantable inference, and pointed out to the Ambassador that we had entered into relations with Feisal long before the

French were aware of his existence; that we had made the treaty with King Hussein which brought the Arabs into the war; that we had made the march with Feisal that captured the Hedjaz Railway and ended in the conquest of Syria; that we, and not the French, had captured Damascus and placed Feisal in power there; that at no stage in our relations with Feisal had we ever been in a position to fall out with him, or to fight him at Damascus. I did not in the least see why we should reverse the whole of our policy of the last three years and treat as an outcast the man with whom they had failed to get on. In any case, to accuse us of favouring Feisal because he was an enemy of France was a really unwarrantable suggestion, inasmuch as, on almost every occasion—and there were many—when the British Government or Foreign Office had been brought into contact with Feisal during the last two years, we had insistently—in season and out of season—pressed upon him, at the cost sometimes almost of rupture, that we were bound by obligations to our French Allies which must be similarly accepted by them, and that, if they were not so accepted, it would be impossible for us to fulfil our own engagements.

When the Ambassador replied to this that the French would never forgive or form any other opinion about a man who had shed the blood of Frenchmen, and that they had even been unable to allow such a person to cross the soil of France on his return, I said that a similar consideration did not seem to have entered the mind of the French Government when Mustapha Kemal, who had probably slain a greater number of French than Feisal had ever done, or from establishing cordial relations with Mustapha Kemal, who had lately been expelled from the French Empire.

The Ambassador then said that he had discharged his duty by acquainting me with the views that were universally entertained in his country, and by my pointing out to him that I had been equally candid in my reply.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 4035 4035 91]

No 79

Foreign Office to Colonial Office

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 6, 1921

WITH reference to your letter of the 4th April, regarding the possibility of the Emir Feisal asking Colonel Lawrence to accompany him from Port Said to Jeddah, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that his Lordship sees grave objection to Colonel Lawrence being permitted to accept the invitation.

2. When it is known that the Emir is a candidate for the Throne of Mesopotamia it will be necessary for Lord Curzon to reiterate the assurances which have been given to the French Government to the effect that the Emir Feisal has not even referred to Mesopotamia in connection with his candidature, and that the support of His Majesty's Government to his candidature for the position of ruler of that country.

3. In view of the language held by the French Ambassador in his conversation with Lord Curzon on the 23rd March, a record of which is transmitted herewith for convenience of reference,* his Lordship anticipates considerable difficulty in convincing his Excellency of the good faith of His Majesty's Government in the matter.

4. The task would be doubly hard if after meeting the Emir at Port Said, Colonel Lawrence, known to be an official of the Colonial Office and to have been with Mr. Churchill during his tour in the Near East, were to accompany the Emir even as far as Jeddah on his return to Mecca, from which place he is presently to start with a view to setting himself up as candidate for the Throne of Iraq.

5. Lord Curzon therefore earnestly hopes that Mr. Churchill will not take a step which will not unreasonably confirm the French Government in the impression that His Majesty's Government have broken their faith with them and have not only deliberately planned the Emir's candidature but also done their utmost to further it at each stage.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

* See Part VI, Chapter VI, No. 160.

[E 4075-4 91]

No. 80.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office

Sir,

London, April 11, 1921

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to state that prior to his departure from the United Kingdom in the absence of the Secretary of State his Highness the Emir Feisal has expressed to Lord Curzon his deep gratitude for the assistance rendered by the British Government for the assistance rendered by the British Government.

Mr. Lindsay took this opportunity of impressing upon his Highness the necessity of avoiding any line of action which would be likely to create difficulties for His Majesty's Government, in their anxiety to serve the best interests of the Arab people, and pointed out to him that the Emir Feisal's Government had not been misplaced.

3. The Emir replied that he had, ever since his interview with Lord Curzon in 1919, fully appreciated the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the question of Syria, and that when he saw M. Clemenceau in Paris, he pledged himself to behave loyally towards the French Government, and he endeavoured to meet his wishes. He believed that M. Clemenceau would have succeeded him in office took a different view of the situation and appeared anxious to relegate his Highness to a position of well-paid inactivity.

4. The Emir protested that he had, in circumstances of the greatest difficulty, tried to do his duty, and that he would always impress upon his followers the great importance of avoiding any action that would embroil the British and the French authorities.

5. Mr. Lindsay then expressed the hope that the Emir's father, King Hussein, would eventually realise, if he had not already done so, that he would best serve his country by abandoning his claims to the Throne of Arabia and would be more likely to improve if he would abandon his continual complaints and assume an attitude of confident reliance upon the goodwill and assistance of His Majesty's Government.

6. The Emir then enlarged upon the peculiar difficulties of his position, and stated that he had staked his all on Great Britain, and that he was now in a position of extreme poverty and was conscious all the time of his entire dependence on the British Government when he received from them any mark of favour or assistance.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 4267/3816/65]

No. 81

Comte de Saint Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 11)

Cher Lord Curzon,

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 7 avril 1921.

J'ai été heureux de pouvoir causer un peu avec vous des affaires arabes avant mon départ pour Paris. Notre conversation a été très intéressante et la franchise avec laquelle nous discutons nos difficultés.

Telle est bien également je crois, la pensée du Gouvernement britannique. Je l'affirmerai à M. Briand lorsqu'il me parlera de Faysal et de sa famille.

Veillez agréer

No. 62

41

Chapman to Jerusalem, Chard and Hagdud

I have, &c
C. E. S. PALMER

No. 43

Sir,

6. With regard to the question of applying the French Convention I am enquire whether Lord Curzon considers it advisable to act as suggested in the last sentence of Sir H. Samuel's telegram.

London &c.
J. E. SHUCKBURGH

Sir H Samuel to Mr. Churchill

Jerusalem, April 6, 1921.

ENGLIB, situated on east bank of Sea of Galilee, in district now inhabited by us, but to be transferred to French under convention, has been visited by French troops. This has disturbed local population, who fear French may return and arrest Syrian refugees there. Desirable and uncertainties by effecting transfers of territory provided by convention as soon as possible. Is it necessary to await detailed settlement of frontier by commission, or could occupation be arranged now in accordance with general lines stated in convention, leaving any doubtful areas under present administration until decision reached by commission? Provisional arrangements on these lines could be made locally if as directed by Governments. If this not considered practicable, can French be asked not to disturb *status quo* by sending troops into our present area pending final settlement of boundaries?

No. 84

No. 35.

Damascus, March 25 1921

themselves at 30 000

In view of the above remarks, the political inclinations attributed to individuals by my Druse informant in the ensuing list of notables must not be taken to be in any way permanent, but merely to represent the latest opinion "at the moment of going to

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{x} + \frac{1}{x^2} \right) \quad \text{for } x \in (0, 1) \quad \text{and} \quad f(x) = 0 \quad \text{for } x \in [1, \infty).$$

sample size, n , is 100. The sample mean is 10.5 and the sample standard deviation is 2.5. The population mean is 10 and the population standard deviation is 2.5. The test statistic is $t = \frac{\bar{x} - \mu}{s/\sqrt{n}} = \frac{10.5 - 10}{2.5/\sqrt{100}} = 2.0$. The critical value is 1.645. Since $t > 1.645$, we reject the null hypothesis. The p-value is 0.0242.

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1. *Archei* *Archei* 67

(a.) *Utterance or Tonal Unit*. Attached. Divided

of Ura, The new Emir of Jebel Druze. Has some claims to the French délégué, to be recognised as the paramount chief. The most powerful and wealthy of the chiefs. Has a house in Damascus, where he spends most of his time. The French have just given him a motor-car. Also has houses and property at Ari and Sweida. Pro-French.

2. Nasib Pasha, of Salchad, son of Nassam, cousin of Selim, and next to him in importance. Probably pro-French at present, though my informant very correctly says of him "real opinions not known."

3. Abdul Ghafur, of Swerla, son of Ibrahim Pasha. Pro-French.

4. Farns Rev. brother of above. Pro-French.

5. Nejm of Urban, son of Nejm. Pro-French.

6. FARRIS BEY, of Debu, son of Said. Pro-French.

[6491]

Sultan Pasha, of Kurava, son of Zokan, who was hanged with other Druses before the war by Sami Pasha el-Faruk, chief of the pro-Shereefian section of the clan.

- * Hussein Pasha, of Aus, son of Nauf. Pro-Shereef.
- 1. Akbul Karim Bey, of Sweida, son of Ibrahim Pasha. Pro-Shereef.
- 1. Assad, of Sweida, son of Faris. Pro-Shereef.
- 1. Ferid el-Masri. Pro-Shereef.
- 2. Salman Bey, of Em Ruman. Pro-Shereef.
- 3. Metash, of Resas, son of Hilal. Pro-Shereef.
- 14. Ibrahim, of Sweida. A bad character, anti-foreigner and anti-Christian. Pro-Shereef.

(b.) *Awamreh* Clan. Amer. Pro-Shereef.

- 1. Talul Pasha Amer, of Sha'aba. Pro-Shereef and an enemy of Selim Attrash.
- 2. Zeid Bey Amer, of Sha'aba. Pro-French.
- 3. Turki Amer, of Hit. Pro-Shereef. The bodyguard of Abdullah. His father was hanged by Sami Pasha Farouki, the Turkish general, about 1912.

(c.) *Halabiat* Clan. Halabi. Pro-French.

- 1. Faris-el-Halabi, of Hit. Pro-French.
- 2. Selim-el-Halabi, of Sawara. Pro-French.

(d.) *Abou-el-Fahr* Clan. Pro-French.

- 1. Mahmoud Abu-el-Fahr, of Slem. An akl (religious sheikh). Pro-French.

(e.) *Salam* Clan. Pro-Shereef.

- 1. Hassan Salam, of Tarba. Pro-Shereef.
- 2. Selim Salam (brother), of Tarba. Pro-Shereef.

(f.) *Haneidat* Clan. Haneidi. Pro-French.

- 1. Hussein Haneidi, of Mejdal. Pro-French.
- 2. Fadlullah Haneidi (cousin), of Mejdal. Pro-French.

(g.) *Astam* Clan. Formerly pro-French, now becoming pro-Shereef.

- 1. Kofian-el-Azzam, of Dweir. Was pro-French, but changed, as dissatisfied with French subsidy.

(h.) *Mouqawish* Clan. Pro-Shereef.

- 1. Selim-el-Mouqawish, of Khalikhli. Pro-Shereef.
- 2. Mouaddah-el-Mouqawish, of Khalikhli. Pro-Shereef.

Latter acted as postman for the Shereef during war against Turkey.

(i.) *Zuhreddin* Clan, of Soura. Uncertain.

Hail Zuhreddin, of Soura. Uncertain.

(j.) *Sharaf* Clan. Pro-Shereef.

- 1. Ferhan Sharaf, Sheikh of Tenna. Pro-Shereef.
- 2. Mouyad Sharaf, Sheikh of Tenna. Pro-Shereef.

(k.) *Abdullah* Clan. Pro-Shereef.

- 1. Abou Hassan Abdullah-el-Abdallah, of Hout. Pro-Shereef.

(l.) *Barabra* Clan. Barabra. Pro-Shereef.

Related to the Attrash Clan, with whom they share the village of Kraye. Hameh-el-Barabra, of Kraye, and Em Ruman. Pro-Shereef.

The two akls referred to in paragraph 3 of this report are not supposed to have any pronounced political opinions.

2. *Lebanon Druses.*

My informant knows little about them, and they are outside the Damascus State. I add what I have learnt, however, as one or two are concerned in local politics.

(m.) *Jumblat* Clan. Pro-French.

(b.) *Tali* Clan. Mostly Pro-Shereef.

Rashid Bey Tali, of Mazrat-es-Shuf. Pro-Shereef. Now a vizir of Abdullah. The most intellectual and influential of the Lebanon Druses. Was Feisal's vali of Aleppo, and a former deputy under the Turks for the Lebanon.

(c.) *Hamade* Clan. Pro-French.

(d.) *Rezan*. Pro-French.

Moustafa Rezan. Pro-French.

[NOTE.—Hassib Dahin, now at Makran-es-Sharki, is a well-known pro-Shereefian agitator, but of subordinate rank, being a junior officer in Abdullah's army.]

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER

E 4409 117 89]

No 85.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

No. 37)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 26, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that Rashid Bey Tali has now gone with several followers to join Abdullah. Ten days ago Feisal telegraphed to the latter to remain quiet for ten days. These are now expired.

The Awamreh family is second in importance only to the Attrash family and, being pro-Shereefian, is at enmity with them.

Druses from the Awamreh village, supposed to have been instigated by their chief, the Pasha, to attack the French at the village of Deraa. The French are summoning a meeting of Druse sheikhs to obtain redress.

The French apparently do not intend to remain quite supine with regard to the Druses. They have imprisoned at Deraa the sheikh and notables of Dair Ahmar. Four Frenchmen were murdered some months ago. They have also started

at their own village, which is near Damascus, has been forced to flee—all antiquated or spoilt—and 50 rounds per rifle are now being demanded. The village (Jaramana) contains about 150 houses and 400 able-bodied men.

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER

E 4406 117 89

No. 86.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 38)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 29, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that two members of the French mission just left for Tadmor (Palmyra), accompanied by a son of Nuri Shalan. My Druse informant confirms the departure of the latter, and that he was despatched to Iraq.

Owing to the strict postal censorship it is impossible to obtain much news from outlying places like Tadmor, or even from Hama, Hama or Deraa, except by the accident of getting in touch with a recent arrival from one of those places who stops here for some time.

Permission to visit any place thus reported on and a motor-car at my disposal would be the only means of satisfactorily sifting these persistent rumours of gun-

running. Doubting whether the fact that Ossini accompanied the above French mission to Tadmor is due to more than that he asked for conveyance there and secured and, while imagining that Nuri Shalan's son was taken merely by way of escort, I am inclined to believe that gun-running may well be the object of Ossini's visit.

Any attempt by Lieutenant-Colonel Easton to carry out an investigation on the spot might quite possibly lead to a peremptory request for his withdrawal, despite his friendliness with the French. The latter's authorities certainly desire his removal, and

[6834]

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[illegible]

received will start sending the replies to it. When his election is a fact he will ask Sir P. Cox to arrange a friendly accord between himself and Bin Saud, and will do his best to bring in father as third party. Abdulla warns me this will be difficult, since Hussein dies into Hussein's hands. The question of accommodation is pressed upon him. I have been questioning him about it. He does not to urge upon his father to sign and ratify peace treaties and quarantine regulations. He observed this left matters still hanging. Lord Curzon in January last agreed to principle of a subsidy which has been interrupted since March 1920. This pledge of Lord Curzon has been communicated to his father, and I promised to bring it also to your notice. He thinks at present 2,000l. a month is minimum subsidy necessary to keep Hejaz on its feet.

"We then discussed Transjordan. He presumes that Abdulla will have sent to King Hussein the Arabic draft of our proposals which we gave to him in Jerusalem. He thought that relations of High Commissioner of Palestine and Arab Governor of Transjordan were not clearly enough defined, and suggested that latter position would be improved if he were given the right of appeal to Colonial Office in matters when divergence between him and High Commissioner had arisen. He is anxious for the necessity for political subordination to Jerusalem, but is anxious for relative independence. Feisal does not leave Suez till 21st April, so that if further points occur to you it will be possible for me to see him again up to 20th April.

(Addressed to Foreign Office for Secretary of State for the Colonies; repeated to Bagdad.)

E 4323 3777 88]

No. 89

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 15, 1921

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to refer to your letter of 11th April on the subject of the delimitation of the frontier between Syria and Palestine.

2. While appreciating the reasons which lead Mr. Secretary Churchill to the view that delimitation of the boundary should precede occupation of the territories to be transferred Lord Curzon is disposed to consider that the temporary occupation of these territories by agreement between the British and French High Commissioners, which is apparently the course advocated by Sir H. Samuel, might also recommend itself to the French Government, and he would prefer to approach them with this suggestion rather than with the alternative request referred to in the last paragraph of Sir H. Samuel's telegram.

His Lordship would propose therefore, subject to Mr. Churchill's concurrence, to instruct His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to approach the French Government, and to suggest that occupation of the areas in question might be arranged forthwith between the High Commissioners for Syria and Palestine, subject to the general lines of the Anglo-French Convention, leaving any doubtful areas under the Administration by whom they are at present controlled, and without prejudice to any rectifications which may be decided upon by the Boundary Commission when it undertakes its work.

I am, &c

LANCELOT OLIPHANT

E 4280 4 91]

No. 90.

Earl Curzon to Major Batten (Jeddah)

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 15, 1921

MY telegram No. 30 of 5th April. Hussein's fears of Wahabite attack.

Bagdad now report interview with Ibn Saud's envoy, in which latter stated he was unable to give assurance regarding Ibn Saud's attitude towards Hedjaz if Hussein

again refuses to permit Wahabites to take part in pilgrimage. He was, however, unable to give any definite assurance.

You should endeavour to persuade Hussein, if he shows signs of wishing to do so, to accept the terms of the Wahabite treaty.

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No 91

Major Batten to Earl Curzon. (Received April 18.)

(Secret.)

M

Jeddah, March 31, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 12th-31st March, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent

Enclosure 1 in No. 91

Jeddah Report for the Period March 12-31, 1921

(Secret.)

Reported Advance by Wahabites

KING HUSSEIN has promised in support of his statement that he has received no news of the Akhwan, beyond the report that K. H. has sent him 150 rifles from Nejd.

On the other hand, rumours such as preceded the raids in the Taif district in December are again current. Reports of the movement of the Akhwan towards the Hedjaz should they attack the Hedjaz in force. Further reinforcements of troops are being sent to Taif.

An agent has reported a lengthy conversation with one of the sheikhs of the Hedjaz, in the course of which he stated that the promises made by King Hussein and his sons to the continuance of tribal subsidies have been falsified, that the Bedouins are in great distress from the loss of the bulk of their camels, and that they are in want of money, and that they are everywhere ripe for revolt, and would be ready to attack the Hedjaz at any moment.

Lord Curzon has been informed that the Bedouins are in a state of great distress, and that they are everywhere ripe for revolt, and would be ready to attack the Hedjaz at any moment.

Distress among the Bedouins is increasingly apparent, Jeddah being full of starving Bedouins, and even their weapons, and the trend of information during the last few months shows that any further delay in the settlement of the Hedjaz will be most disastrous. The King's present position is most precarious.

The flying visit of Emir Ali to Rabegh had only a momentary effect, and the King's virtual blockade of that place has apparently only resulted in still further distress.

Ibn Saud and the Idri.

The report of the Idri having been provided with munitions on the evacuation of Hawdah has furnished King Hussein with further fuel for his resentment.

Extracts from communications received from him on the subject are attached.

The information was furnished to him by Abdulhadi Hadda, the Emir of K.

The latter report, however, is of a date which is not announced at present. The Wahhabies were reported to have been in the neighbourhood of the coast of the Hedjaz, and it was reported that they had been in the neighbourhood of the coast of the Hedjaz, and it was reported that they had been in the neighbourhood of the coast of the Hedjaz.

Other emissaries from Nejd were in Muhail, and with the Rijal-el Ma'. The Imam has been "successful," and Ali-ibn Abdu, of Birk, continued to hold up dhows bound for the Hedjaz, and had been to confer with the Idrii at Mid.

Kag Hussein's comment on the above was that Ibn Saud and the Idrii were clearly plotting to attack him, terminating with the characteristic taunt that apparently they were powerful enough for Great Britain to treat them as the equals of France in considering their interests, while neglecting his own.

Further reports of more recent date through Kuntidah were to the effect that Ibn Saud's deputation was still with the Idrii and had received presents from the latter. The Wahhabies were reported to have been entering houses and breaking-up "dhows," and were destroying the domes of tombs in Jizaa, Sabaa, Abu Arish and Mid.

Nasir-ibn-Ahmed-Rahman (cousin of Ibn Audh, of Khia), was reported to have been in the neighbourhood of the coast of the Hedjaz, and it was reported that they had been in the neighbourhood of the coast of the Hedjaz.

An attempt by the Wahhabies to capture Sulaiman-ibn Ali near Muhail, and to collect "zikat" had failed, the Al Musa apparently defeating a combination of Wahhabi elements and the Beni Thawwuh.

Said Muntafa had arrested certain notables of Hodeidah and sent them to Mid, for their alleged complicity in the plundering of a dhow by the Zaranik, laden with goods for the Idrii.

It had been reported that war material had been landed, either by the British or the Italians, for the Imam at Mokla, as had been done for the Idrii at Mid.

No mention was made of possible French activity in the former connection, and King Hussein, ignoring the reference to the Italians, seized on the above reports as evidence of the contradiction between the desire expressed by His Majesty's Government to promote peace in Arabia, and their apparent readiness nevertheless to supply rival chieftains, except himself, with munitions.

No reply has been received from Bagdad or Bahrain as yet which would give an indication of the grounds, if any, for Kag Hussein's accusation as to aeroplanes. It is, however, to be noted that, and for the reason given in my telegram No. 35 of the 21st March, no notice has been taken of his communication on this subject or his similar allegations in respect of the Idrii and the deliberate support of his enemies by Great Britain.

The consideration that many of Kag Hussein's actions and words may be treated as obstructions and pin-pricks until his claims are satisfied, does not, however, imply that he should be permitted entire licence to vilify His Majesty's Government on every pretext, as has become his habit of late.

Delay in opening of Kamaran.

Steamers have been now instructed to sail for Jeddah direct, and the Kamaran station will not apparently be in operation for some time yet.

The steamship "Lycan" sailed under official instructions that the opening of Kamaran had been postponed until the 15th March, but after delaying her voyage several days, in order to reach Kamaran on that date and entering the inner anchorage, the station was found to be closed. A protest for the loss incurred and the necessity of entering and leaving a dangerous port without cause has been lodged on behalf of the ship, the master maintaining that a wireless message from Aden, notifying him of the instructions already received.

Refund of Kamaran Dues.

In view of King Hussein's propaganda against shipping companies in the matter of Kamaran dues, instructions are refunding direct to pilgrims the 5 rupees Kamaran dues collected in anticipation of that station being in operation in February.

Letters received from Singapore conclusively prove that the allegations made by Kag Hussein as to the refunding of Kamaran dues are entirely unfounded.

The refund direct has been considered advisable, as adherence to the normal rule of this company against refunds elsewhere than at Singapore would result in a delay liable to furnish King Hussein with further material for his attempts to discredit, in the eyes of the pilgrims, the arrangements of the companies which carry them.

In the case of the Dutch steamers, a notice has been published that the consul for the Netherlands, through the action of the King, has forced the agent concerned to refund dues which the companies had fraudulently overcharged.

Local Quarantine Arrangements.

Pilgrims, since the final arrangement made as to the form of payment of dues, are being only detained for twenty-four hours in quarantine, the King being apparently endeavouring to save himself by himself collecting the excess P.T. is originally charged for the second and third days, his attempt to foist this upon the agents having failed.

The pilgrims undergo none of the prescribed measures, and in the case of the "Lycan" were sent to the further island, where no sanitary appliances exist. In view of the fact that the minimum period of voyage to Jeddah, under observation, amounts to twelve days, the detention of pilgrims for an additional period of observation, without any attempt at carrying out sanitary precautions, again sufficiently shows the extent to which financial and other considerations tend to confuse purely sanitary measures while quarantine control remains in the hands of the Hashimite Government.

The "Lycan" was further unnecessarily detained at Jeddah, firstly, owing to the quarantine authority failing to expedite the disembarkation of the pilgrims; and, secondly, by a medical inspection being delayed while, it is stated, the Director-General was negotiating the purchase of some canary birds. A protest and a request for the co-operation of the authorities in ensuring the minimum delay to steamers scheduled only to remain in Jeddah for a few hours, received the characteristic reply that the facilities offered at Jeddah were such as could not be found in any other port in the world.

German Enterprise.

A number of catalogues of agricultural machinery and other goods, in English and Arabic, have been received addressed to the agency, and in addition such catalogues have been sent direct to Araf Bey in Mecca offering the most favourable terms for payment and transport.

One such catalogue, forwarded here by Araf Bey for translation, draws attention to the ability, owing to current conditions, of German firms to offer better service and more advantageous terms than their British or American competitors.

Rupce currency.

A panic has been created locally and in Mecca by a private circular received from Bombay stating that a series of twenty-five issues of 100-rupce notes, dating from 1915, are fraudulent, and there is some danger of rupce notes generally not being accepted in consequence.

The Kamakani of Jeddah, speaking for the Government, emphasised the need of either enjoining local opinion by a prompt official denial, or making arrangements, firstly, to redeem such notes sent from the Hedjaz; and, secondly, to take steps to prevent their being imported by ignorant pilgrims, should the notice prove to be correct.

He has seen some of the notes in question and states they are not to be distinguished in any way as fraudulent, and have evidently been in constant circulation.

The possibility of the notice being circulated in order to discredit Indian paper, and the matter has been referred to Bombay by telegram for confirmation.

Egyptian Aukaf.

The King has expressed some anxiety as to the continued cessation of the supplies for the Egyptian Tekiya, and informed me he had instructed merchants to issue an equivalent on credit on his own responsibility.

It will be recollected that allegations have been previously made as to the disposal of former stocks by the Government, especially in Mecca.

Medina Pilgrimage.

The first caravan is announced as due to start in the middle of April.

The Yenbo-Medina road is still closed by the Hamada, and the Government has disclaimed responsibility for any losses by robbery.

Successive sheikhs appointed by the King to safeguard the route have failed to do so. The last is said to have been a man who was killed by the Wahabites. As the Juhaimah are virtually independent of the King the sheikhs concerned were probably implicated, and share the proceeds.

Red Sea Port.

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived at the 24th March and sailed for Port Sudan the next day.

Press ("Al Qibla").

No. 465. Emir Habib Lutfallah has been appointed a private adviser to King Hussein in foreign affairs, in addition to the official appointment of Rafiq-al-Rufqa.

No. 467. An official acknowledgment of two insulting anonymous letters addressed to the King.

A notice calling on every good Moslem to assist in the arrest of Hamza Gouth, and, if necessary to kill him, on the grounds that he was implicated in the theft of articles from the Medina Haram.

Note.—King Hussein requested the assistance of the French consul general in arresting Hamza Gouth in Syria, at the time the latter was in Cairo, as well as of this Agency in procuring his extradition from Egypt. The notice is obviously due to political motives, the King being nervous of his connection with Ibn Rashid, and of his known opposition to himself.

A letter from the Syrian Union in Cairo addressed to "His Hashimite Majesty Hussein I, King of the Arabs," with the telegram of protest sent to Geneva.

A similar communication from the Central Committee of Mesopotamian Societies.

No. 468. A schedule of charges to pilgrims for this year.

The announcement of the death of Ibn Sabah as a martyr and victim of political ends.

No. 469. An official notice drawing attention to the alleged counterfeit Indian notes, and repeating the notice as to the non-acceptance of rupee notes from pilgrims which appeared in No. 456.

"Al Falaḥ."

Since the departure of the editor for Egypt, no further issues have been published.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 91

King Hussein to British Agent, Jeddah.

(Extract from Translation.)

March 18, 1921

I HUMBLY beg Great Britain again, to carry out what is mentioned therein (letter of 21st Zil Ka'ada 1336), as I have no aim or object which necessitates affecting her interests in the least, not only with France, but with the Idri and Ibn Saud, . . .

I need not say after this that there is an end to patience, and that every question has some beginnings from which the result may be known. We have finished fighting the Turks, and now on the one hand I am fighting the great Ally France, and on the other hand I am fighting the great Ally Ibn Saud, and the Idri, as may be clearly known this time from the material help given them by her.

Enclosure 3 in No. 91

King Hussein to British Agent, Jeddah.

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

March 20, 1921

I HAVE private information that the Wahabites (both nomad and settled) are advancing to attack.

Everybody knows that Ibn Saud is hardly able to provide ten camels from one place to another, but I, knowing for certain that aeroplanes one after another are coming between Mesopotamia and Riyadh, have good reason to be sure of what is mentioned and rather than fight against Britain, I will go down to Jeddah in shame, and thus diminish my responsibility for bloodshed, avoid committing such an offence, and causing the annihilation of the Arabs.

Enclosure 4 in No. 91

Shipping Intelligence to March 26, 1921

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and the 26th March, 1921:—

Steamer	Flag	From	To	Arrived	Departed	Pilgrims transferred	Cargo discharged
British	British	Bombay	March 15				
British	British	Port Sudan	March 11	12			
British	British	Mamasa	March 12	12			
British	British	Suez	March 13	13			
British	British	Port Sudan	March 14	14			
British	British	Bombay	March 15	15			
British	British	Port Sudan	March 16	16			
British	British	Bombay	March 17	17			
British	British	Port Sudan	March 18	18			
British	British	Bombay	March 19	19			
British	British	Port Sudan	March 20	20			
British	British	Bombay	March 21	21			
British	British	Port Sudan	March 22	22			
British	British	Bombay	March 23	23			
British	British	Port Sudan	March 24	24			
British	British	Bombay	March 25	25			
British	British	Port Sudan	March 26	26			

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 24th and left on the 25th March, 1921

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No. 92

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received April 21)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, April 20, 1921

I AM directed by the Secretary of State to transmit herewith the accompanying copies of telegraphic correspondence on the subject of the interviews between Colonel Lawrence and the Emir Feisal in Egypt, and to request that, if Lord Curzon sees no objection, Field Marshal Lord Allenby may be instructed to move the Egyptian Government to the effect that the Government of the United Kingdom will be put at the disposal of His Majesty's High Commissioner for Mesopotamia at the first possible opportunity.

I am, &c.

E. SHUCKBURGH

Enclosure 1 in No. 92

Mr. Churchill to Colonel Lawrence (1 day)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, April 10, 1921

THIS telegram is being addressed to you and is intended to be used to make sure that you receive it before you see Feisal again, but you should in future keep me fully informed of your movements.

[6831]

T 2

I assume that Jerusalem telegram No. 87 was sent by you, and that you had not then received my telegram of the 16th.

Following is reply to your telegram No. 18 of the 15th April. Taking the points in order:—

1. Feisal may be assured by you that in his first public statement in Iraq he will be allowed to say that His Majesty's Government have agreed that after ratification of the Organic Law, modifications in the mandate may be made by negotiations between duly constituted Government of Mesopotamia and His Majesty's Government.

2. In same way that I explained to Abdullah you should explain to Feisal that while His Majesty's Government cannot absolutely guarantee that Ibn Saud will be able to restrain his followers from attacking the Hedjaz, by making him dependent upon their financial support they are taking the line which appears to them to be most likely to achieve this object.

3. To attach a British official to Feisal now would, I consider, compromise our assurances of neutrality. As an alternative, Sir P. Cox has proposed that Colonel Cornwallis should be sent at once to Mesopotamia as a member of his own staff to be used as liaison with Feisal when the latter arrives. Foreign Office are being asked to instruct Cairo accordingly. Colonel Cornwallis's services can of course be transferred to Feisal later only if latter makes good.

4. As regards future British staff, you may tell Feisal that we will certainly give sympathetic consideration to his wishes. We are confident that in the event of his being chosen there will be every desire on the part of the officials remaining in the country to help him to make his régime a success, and we hope very much that he will come to Mesopotamia with an open mind.

5. I presume that Feisal is nervous that he may be forced in Mesopotamia into the same position that led to his rupture with the French in Syria, but he must rely upon the good offices of the strong staff of British advisers of whom, as Sir P. Cox points out, he will have the benefit to restrain the Nationalist tendencies of his Ministry.

6. You may also tell him that though they cannot of course bind themselves in advance to accept whatever recommendations he may make, His Majesty's Government will always be prepared to consider his views on the question of the strength and composition of the British garrison in Mesopotamia.

7. I agree with Sir P. Cox that Feisal should be told that we are depending on what date he should sail for Basra. A message from us can always be sent him through the British agent in Jedda.

8. You may assure him that Sir P. Cox will do all he can to arrive at a satisfactory *modus vivendi* between himself and Ibn Saud, but that it is an essential preliminary as between his father and Ibn Saud that a conciliatory spirit should be displayed by King Hussein.

9. The monthly figure for Hedjaz subsidy appeared in your telegram No. 18 as 20,000*l.* instead of 20,000*l.* This explains my telegram of the 16th. In any case His Majesty's Government cannot consider making payments to King Hussein beyond the figure sanctioned by the Cabinet, namely, 5,000*l.* a month and a possible gift of 20,000*l.* on being satisfied with his undertakings as to his part. There is to be no advantage in holding out hopes that any larger sum will be sanctioned on receipt of budget statement from Mecca.

10. If he thinks that he is being unfairly treated by the local representative of His Majesty's Government the Arab Governor of Transjordan will of course have an ultimate appeal to the mandatory, but that this contingency will arise I see no reason whatever to anticipate.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 20, and Bagdad, No. 22.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 92.

Mr. Churchill to Sir P. Cox (Bagdad)

(No. 23)

(Telegraphic) P

Colonial Office, April 19, 1921

WITH reference to your telegram No. 28, time did not admit of further consultation with you before despatch of my telegram of to-day to Lawrence. I hope that you will agree with general lines of it.

Enclosure 3 in No. 92.

Sir P. Cox to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic) P

Bagdad, April 18, 1921

REFERENCE to Lawrence's telegram L8; repeated to me under Cairo, No. 240. My comments are as follows:—

1. My copy contains words 'he will accept mandate conditionally'. Is any other condition, beyond that contained in clause which follows above sentence.

2. His undertaking regarding Ibn Saud is a puzzle.

3. It must, I think, be clear to you that after what has passed here and elsewhere, I am not at all sure that I should be able to give him and my staff the benefit of an officer who knows him in order to give him and my staff the benefit of our mutual dealings. This solution will I trust be accepted, and I am confident that it will be a great help to Feisal in his new position. As regards future British staff, I think that we may agree to consider Feisal's wishes sympathetically in such matters. I hope very much that he will come with an open mind as I am confident that he will find that in the event of his being elected there will, on the part of officers remaining here, be every desire to help him to make his régime a success.

4. As regards future British staff, I think that we may agree to consider Feisal's wishes sympathetically in such matters. I hope very much that he will come with an open mind as I am confident that he will find that in the event of his being elected there will, on the part of officers remaining here, be every desire to help him to make his régime a success.

5. He must rely on good influence of British advisers as regards people of Iraq.

6. With reference to permanent garrison, His Majesty's Government are in best position to reply to him. I am not at all sure that I should be able to give him and my staff the benefit of an officer who knows him in order to give him and my staff the benefit of our mutual dealings. This solution will I trust be accepted, and I am confident that it will be a great help to Feisal in his new position.

7. Telegram, one worded slightly differently, has already been despatched. It is not at all sure that I should be able to give him and my staff the benefit of an officer who knows him in order to give him and my staff the benefit of our mutual dealings. This solution will I trust be accepted, and I am confident that it will be a great help to Feisal in his new position.

8. Judging from demeanour of Ibn Saud's delegates here I have every reason to hope that, should Feisal be elected, Ibn Saud would be quite ready to meet him half-way in effecting satisfactory *modus vivendi*, provided that King of Hedjaz displays same spirit of conciliation.

(Repeated Cairo for Lawrence, 591 S.)

Enclosure 4 in No. 92.

Sir H. Samuel to Mr. Churchill.

(No. 97)

(Telegraphic) P

London, April 17, 1921

YOUR telegram containing the revised text of the Cabinet decision on the Hedjaz subsidy reached me in Jerusalem at 10.15 on the morning of the 17th. When he mentioned need of 20,000*l.* a month I said that he was not to be taken knowing the real financial position in the Hedjaz. He then admitted that that figure was a guess, and he promised to send from Mecca a more definite figure for our guidance, and promised to urge his father to treat seriously with us. He is meeting Abdullah at 10.15 on 20th April. If this meeting is arranged I will make endeavours to be present, since the three brothers might be brought to a definite issue about Transjordan. Abdullah can for the present keep external peace there; his real power is in the Hedjaz and in the administration and in the only real scientific and engineering. He is not a man who is to be taken in by a clever scheme. His resignation in favour of a Governor General is a good thing, and I think the sooner the better. Abramson promises well. Proposition of going to Jedda although forced round was avoided.

(Telegraphic.) P.

Colonial Office, April 16, 1921

FROM my telegram of 15th April, which crossed your telegram No. 18, you will have learnt that Cabinet have agreed in principle to payment to King Hussein of a subsidy of 50,000*l* plus a lump sum of 20,000*l*. It has always been assumed here that it was absolutely necessary to maintain principle of equality as between Hussein and Ibn Saud, and it was on these grounds that I recommend Cabinet to grant same amounts to both chieftains, but we naturally do not want to pay Hussein more than is really necessary. Have you any reasons to suppose that Hussein would be willing to accept less than his rival? A sum of 5,000*l* paid to Feisal before his departure from England has, you will remember already been earmarked as charge against Hussein's subsidy. I had also contemplated treating in the same way 5,000*l* paid to Abdullah. This involves immediate reduction of 10,000*l* from first year's payment to Hussein. It strengthens the ground for not confining subsidy, at any rate in the first instance, to what you describe as minimum necessary to keep Hedjaz on its feet. On other points raised in your telegram I will telegraph as soon as possible. Meanwhile let me have your views on subsidy question with least possible delay. Message to Feisal authorised in my telegram of yesterday should, if not already delivered be withheld pending further instructions from me. Please repeat your reply to Bagdad.

(Repeated Bagdad No. 19 for favour of immediate views on points raised in Lawrence's telegram)

Purchase 6 in No.

(Telegraphic) P

Colonial Office, April 15, 1921

FFISAL may be informed that he may tell his father that subject to certain conditions to which I am sure he will agree as they are what the Middle East Department would envisage in the Arab interest. Cabinet have consented to the payment of a subsidy of 60,000/ a year. In addition they would agree to the payment some time or year of a lump sum of 20,000/. Unless you think the subsidy alone will cause great disappointment you need not tell Feisal about this. It is always better not to give away good things wholesale. King Hussein should also be told by Feisal that I hope you will be able to visit him at Jeddah a little later in the year and make a friendly messenger from me, enjoin the utmost that the reason why you are not accompanying him to

E 4708 482 89

Note on a Conversation with General Haddad.—(Received April 21)

GENE AL HADDOY gave me an account of the conversation
which took place on the 15th instant.
At the time he had two communications to make
to the Administration—that of Damascus and that of Aleppo.

As regards the Emir, the General had then reminded M. Berthelot of the way he and the Emir had worked together in Paris when M. Clemenceau was Prime Minister; and, while accepting what M. Berthelot might have to say officially, pressed him from M. Berthelot the admission that he himself believed personally in the loyalty of the Emir's character, and on this the General had not hesitated to make the personal admission that he considered the Emir to have fallen into the hands of very bad counsellors last year in Damascus.

M. Berthelot had listened courteously to General Huklud's language and allowed him to gather the impression that later on his views on Syrian affairs were

On the whole General Hualdada seemed well content with the result of his conversation. He thought that not only had he not made matters worse, but that he had perhaps made them a little better.

K. C. L.

April 19, 1921.

E 4928 117 891

No. 94

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon,—(Received April 26.)

No. 40.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 31, 1921

[illegible]

1 is reasons for this appear to be somewhat as follows:—

1. The extreme unpopularity of the Zionist policy in Palestine, which is distinct from the character of the Al-Husseini movement as seen by the press. All who have interests in Palestine appear to fear that these will eventually suffer at the hands of the Zionists and that they and all Arabs in general may be evicted from the permanent posts and even from their lands by the former. In my No. 39 I have ventured to suggest that some effort be made to correct this impression, and I enclose a cutting from the "Suria Jeddah" which I had inserted as a "trial run." It is taken directly from the "Daily Telegraph" of the 11th March.

2. The alleged "betrayal" of the Arabs by us. The rabid Sheremetsky considers it was a demand for the F. F. S. to demand that the Arabs be treated as a separate nation, and that they be given a separate state, which would be a violation of the principle of the unity of the Arab nation. The F. F. S. is accused of having failed to do this, and of having instead, in the name of the Arab nation, been engaged in a policy in Iraq which is an encouragement which, however, does not go to the benefit of the Arab nation, but to the benefit of the British Empire.

The Synods, in general, would probably prefer independent misgovernment to the established government of the Free Church, and certainly failed to give any aid or pecuniary support to the Anti-Slavery Society. The latter are therefore left to contend with the state, and present, though I fancy the situation they occupy with its failing regularity may end by rendering them less contented.

The only sections which I should consider at all genuine in their professions of pro-British feelings are the Orthodox Greeks and the Syrian Protestants, though

Premiary interests appear to me to play a higher rôle in Syria than in any other East with which I am acquainted, and, for the larger section of the upper classes is only "pre-anyone" so far and so long as it can see an immediate compensation.

An Arab Kingdom would mean lucrative posts for its henchmen, while Eng and

* Not printed.

The Kurds are ostensibly pro-French, though they too have not met with a treatment in accordance with that which they might feel entitled to expect. Some of their notables I believe to prefer the Turkish regime to any, and the attempted French rapprochement with the Kemalists and the avowed nomination of a Turkish Prince as Emir are probably welcomed by them.

Other local candidates for this dignity—should it ever be decided upon—are Nassif, Bey-el-Bakri, who pretends to be a descendant of Abu Bekr, and Ahmed Nany Bey, of the Koreich tribe—who married a daughter of Abdul-Hamid. The latter has much the more supporters. There is also the Emir Said-el-Jezarli—a grandson of Abdul Kador—who is chiefly notable for his incapacity, ignorance and conceit.

these persons could, however, hope to retain power indefinitely unless they received substantial financial aid. There is a deficit in the revenue this year of more than half a million, and the State is already heavily taxed. It is hard to say whether it is really seriously considering the advisability of raising prices, and paying him the large subsidy required as part price of peace with the Kinsalea.

It will be clear from the above that I believe that the occupying Power of this country could always receive a large majority at a referendum, unless the proceedings were conducted with absolute impartiality and by secret ballot.

Finally, I believe that Syria could if left to its own devices, be auctioned to the highest bidder, that no mandatory power would content the people for long or ever win their hearts, that they are now ready for a change, that if they cannot dispense with a mandatory power their experiences of the French have made many regret us in comparison largely because we spent more here--and that they would probably prefer America to either.

The Italian consul-general here—who is a "comédien de légation" and the hierarchic head of all posts in Syria, Cilicia, Palestine and the Hedjaz—has been trying in various odious ways to acquire a certain preponderance. He has not always been very scrupulous in his manoeuvres and is not on good terms with the French Mission. The latter openly accuses the Italians of providing the Kemalists with arms.

position. The local inhabitant can hardly fail to draw his own conclusions from the program of a notorious person like Mahatma Gandhi in a car belonging to the French Mission, and the country people of the interior numbers a good many Tadhurs.

In my No. 38 of the 29th I reported this, and the alleged object of Ozenmi's visit to them as

1 There are so many different interests and different parties here, that no single definite Arab policy of ours could possibly meet with unanimous approval.

2. We are unpopular with most subjects of this State, and the French are going the right way about to become disliked.

the only way to be "popular" here is to spend money freely on subsidies to the various parties, and in a lesser degree to construct communications and foster commerce.

4. There are not fifty men in the town who would fire a shot in support of the Sheriff, until they knew he was winning. There would be, however, numbers in at the death.

5. The French seem to have succeeded in sowing the seeds of the discord among the Druzes, and probably hope to keep them from exterior mischief in this way.

6. Zionism is certainly very unpopular.

into the bad books of the French. Very few of the real Shereefian supporters have ventured near me, and all believe that their actions and visits are reported to the French Mission.

I have, &c.
C. E. S. PALMER

My Love

1

The Director of Finance will act as Governor. An honorary delegation from Damascus will also leave shortly, but I have not yet obtained their names.

I append the list of persons who have been appointed members of the honorary Damascus delegation to the Beirut Fair, which will open on the 1st of July. The opportunity of giving notes about those who appear to call for a special mention will not be necessary to refer to them again in any further despatch. I append a list of "Damascus Personalities." I hope to complete this series shortly. —

1 *Fazi Bey-el-Bakri*.—Mahommedan notable; was in trouble with Jemal Pasha and joined Feisal. Later became pro-French through jealousy of Feisal and his brother Nemih-el-Bakri, of the latter, more later.

... Mohammed Said-el-Yusuf. Mahommedan notable, and owns enormous estates pro-European, and speaks English and French fluently; only 22, and a great friend of Hussein Idib, of whom more later. Said and his brothers were educated at the Agricultural College, Cirencester. He takes no part in politics; is very friendly with Colonel Easton and myself, but is also quite friendly with the French. Owns large lands in the Bekaa and also near Bisan. Has no grudge against the Turks. He is a Kurd. The late Abdurrahman Pasha-el-Yusuf, his father, was the recognised head of the local Kurds, also leader of the pilgrimage for some time, and a deputy in the Turkish Parliament, despite his lack of education. He was considered pro-French and was ~~to be~~ Emir of Syria. Was president of the Mejlis Shura. He was ~~one of the~~ ^{one of the} ~~main~~ ^{main} ~~leaders~~ ^{leaders}, during the attack on the train. A ~~very~~ ^{very} ~~reputed~~ ^{reputed} pro-French and pro-European leanings. At

The present Director of the Interior was maltreated and nearly killed at the same time.

3. *Kushdy et al.* (2000) - Mediterranean morchait

4. *Huron Singh*.—Mohammedan silk merchant and notable

3. *Emir Taher-el-Jezairi*. Algerian resident notable. Grandson of the famous *Abulul Kader*. Imprisoned for three years by Jemal Pasha. Very pro-French, but is not at all anti-British. Well off.

6. *Kahil Sara*.—Greek Catholic banker and merchant.

7. *Ameon Mellak*.—Greek Orthodox merchant and notary.

8 *Habib Kahlash*—Greek Orthodox editor of the "Suria-el-Jedida." I referred to him in a special despatch No. 34. Besides desiring a small subsidy for publicist articles, he has expressed his willingness to provide information. He is trusted by the French and his selection on this committee proves, and he will probably prove worth

9. *Isaac Stavar*.—Greek Catholic landowner and member of the municipal council.

10. *Yusuf Lingado*—Jew, banker and merchant

(Jerusalem, Cairo and Baghdad)

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER

My Lord,

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon. — (Received April 25.)

Dainava, April 6, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that while the budget for the year ending the 31st March, 1922, has not yet been completed, it is estimated at about 1½ million dinars. The gold dinar may be taken, roughly, as 11 paper. The modern calendar, not the Greek, is in use.

6881

The revenue is estimated at about 800,000 dinars; so that a considerable deficit appears certain, and that existing taxes must soon be raised or new ones imposed.

The chief sources of revenue are the following:—

Tithes, warko (the old vergin on land and property), temetta, cattle tax.

I take this opportunity of correcting previous statements re customs duties.

This State does not receive any share of duties in respect of goods landed at Beirut or Haifa and destined for here. In the time of Faisal such share was claimed, but without result.

Parcels from abroad, however, are taxed 11 per cent. on the invoices, or on the local estimate of the value of the goods.

Permission must be obtained to import alcohol even from the Grand Liban, and heavy fines are inflicted here for neglect of this formality.

In addition for every ton arriving by train a sum of 30 Syrian piastres is levied, while on loads arriving by animal transport 15 Syrian piastres is charged per animal, whether harnessed to a cart or used as pack-animal and irrespective of weight carried.

There is, further, a municipal octroi created by the French. For each donkey, horse or mule load, 3 Syrian piastres; for a camel load, 6 Syrian piastres; for a lorry or car, 12 Syrian piastres. There is a similar octroi at Hamah, Hama and Deran.

The Syrian piastre is rather less than 1 penny.

There is also a duty on tobacco and cigarettes. This duty is only paid once for all Syria. The director here is M. Gutowski, an Ottoman subject.

Ottoman Public Debt—This is still collected from the six taxes. The proceeds are sent to Paris. There are branches in each caza and a French inspector here, M. Wagner. But I learn that the debt will shortly sever any further connection with Constantinople and report direct to the French High Commissioner at Beirut. The employees will all be natives or French nominees, and Arabic its official language.

Municipal Taxation.—The new municipal taxes are innumerable, and all pre-war taxes have been vastly increased, but, while I enclose a list of them for reference, I have not translated them, as I have already notified the local authorities, after consulting His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Beirut that British subjects were only to pay those taxes agreed by the Beirut council of dragomans of 1909 and 1913, and that any up to the percentage in force before the 1st October 1914, seeing that should the authorities consider further taxation an absolute necessity, they must obtain the consent of His Majesty's Government before claiming anything additional from British subjects.

The local authorities have of course not accepted my point of view; and I have now taken the matter up with the French Mission, in the hope of getting a definite ruling as to what taxes are payable and what are not.

Copies to Jerusalem, Cairo, Bagdad and Department of Overseas Trade.)

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER.

E 4847, 117, 89)

No. 97

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 47)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 5, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that there have been frequent acts of pillage in the kazas of Zebdan, the A. T. Liban and the villages of Sargaya and Bludan. The latter village contains house property of the Edinburgh Mission Hospital at Damascus.

The chief persons responsible are:—

1. At or near Zebdan:

() For Liban. Chief: Kasim el Tal.

() For Bludan. Chiefs: Ahmed Asad Bey, Mohamad Said Bey, Mohamad Abu Fayad Bey, Kalil Kabalan Bey.

2. At or near Bludan—

Mohamad Ali Moussa.

3. At or near Sargaya—

The Shammatt family. Chiefs: Totik-el-Shammatt, Hussein Shammatt, Ferhan-el Shammatt, Yussuf Abdul Rahim Shammatt, Shehab-el-Shammatt.

These are all Mahomedans, and, besides pillaging persons and houses, Christians and Mahomedans alike, they have not stopped short of murder.

Just before the French occupation, Totik-el-Shammatt went to Zebdan and held up the kaimakam and robbed his safe. Faisal took punitive measures, killed and arrested some of the clan and burnt their houses.

The rest fled to the French, and were joined later by those imprisoned, who joined a revolt in the prison here during which 470 prisoners were killed, but many escaped.

The French have since arrested about thirty of this clan, but now there is talk of releasing them, which, if done, could only lead to a renewal of brigandage.

I have, &c

C. E. S. PALMER

E 4927 455 91)

No. 98.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 26) Secret

My Lord

Jeddah, April 10, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 10th April, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,

Acting British Agent

Enclosure 1 in No. 98.

Secret

Jeddah Report, April 10 1921

Quarantine

STUBSEQUENT to the call of the Steamship "Lycon" at Kamaran on the 13th March when that station was found closed, a Dutch pilgrim ship arrived at Jeddah direct, and the pilgrims were accordingly sent to the islands for observation.

Kamaran was then opened, but the agency was not made aware of the fact until after the arrival of the next two pilgrim ships (when this information was furnished by the Netherlands consul), and after the despatch of the last report stating that such ships had been instructed to sail to Jeddah direct.

Pilgrims on these two ships were disembarked at Kamaran and the measures appropriate to the quarantine were carried out on the ships and on the islands.

On arrival at Jeddah they were however detained in quarantine and the pilgrims were sent as before to the islands.

The attention of the Government was drawn to this action as being contrary to the previous assurances received, and a meeting was arranged with the kaimakam of Jeddah and the British and Dutch consuls to discuss the matter and to attempt if possible to arrive at an understanding for the future.

Previous to the arrival of these steamers—one British and one Dutch—Thabit Bey had threatened that unless the dues payable for the two last Dutch steamers, and for the British ship "Achilles" next due, were immediately forthcoming from the agent in gold, he would refuse pratique to the "Achilles."

Owing to the agent being temporarily short of enough gold to meet both these dues, and the heavy call made on him by refunding Kamaran dues to some 5000 pilgrims the cash for which had to be purchased by gold, and the insistence of the Government on immediate payment this was offered at once in rupees at the local equivalent, or in gold if time were given for obtaining the latter.

The rupees tendered in immediate payment were retained with the receipts, the official concerned refusing to take back the latter whereupon the agent was accused of having attempted to cheat the Government by fraudulently retaining both the receipts and the money, and a complaint was addressed to me on the subject. As this particular payment concerned Dutch ships alone I referred the Government to the consul for the Netherlands, while at the same time making the position quite clear as regards the "Achilles."

[6531]

U 2

The fact that payment in gold had been made before for British ships, and could be made from the separate account of the Holt Agency, for the Steamship "Achilles" added additional weight to the protest immediately made to the King against the threat of the director general to again refuse sanitary facilities to a British ship, in itself totally unjustifiable, and quite unwarrantable in the present circumstances.

After some difficulty, the matter was finally settled by my informing the King that, in order to avoid the consequences of the hasty and ill-advised action of the Director-general, I would personally guarantee that the dues for the "Achilles" would be paid in gold in the ordinary course, but that threats of the nature made not for the first time, by the quarantine authority could not be tolerated.

The matter was further made quite clear to Thabit Bey himself in the presence of the kaimakam. He of course denied having taken any such action, until confronted with his own letter, whereupon he apologised for what he attempted to treat as an unfortunate misunderstanding.

It may be pointed out incidentally that a telegram had been received from Mecca, the day before the director general proceeded to carry his threat into effect by forbidding lighters to proceed to the "Achilles" on her arrival, informing me that no difficulties were being made, and that instructions had been already issued that the payment for the "Achilles" would be accepted in the ordinary course.

The whole question of quarantine was again carefully discussed and explained. The assistance of the kaimakam was induced to admit that the detention of the pilgrims at Jeddah after the opening of Kamaran was not in accordance with the convention, that the Hashimite Government did not admit the provisions of the convention as sufficient in all cases but that whatever were the reservations concerning them they could not be expected to remain in quarantine and submit to delay on a purely local decision contrary to the provisions of the international convention, which alone they were entitled to consider as authoritative.

It was therefore agreed that after the inspection of the bill of health on arrival, the quarantine flag should be immediately lowered, and free access be allowed whether of the pilgrims or of their cargo. I pointed out to the kaimakam that this was ridiculous, if they had to be quarantined, in which I fully agreed with him, but that if the convention held good as regards the right of steamers to *libre pratique*, it should be equally applicable to the pilgrims on board. I informed him that his notification as regards the necessity of further detaining pilgrims, despite a clean bill of health from Kamaran and on arrival should a death from whatever cause have occurred at any time on the voyage, would be taken as official in further reference of this question to Mecca, in which he and the kaimakam concurred.

A brief résumé of the whole question was furnished to the King, together with a translation of the relevant portions of the 1912 convention, with a request for a definite answer in writing as to whether the Hashimite Government intends to adhere unconditionally to the convention as promised, or wishes to make any reservations, together with a formal protest in the interests of pilgrims themselves and British shipping against further unnecessary quarantine detention and delay after the provisions of the convention have been duly complied with.

The Holt pilgrim ship "Helenus" on arrival next day was given immediate *pratique*, on the grounds that no deaths had occurred. The papers showed that one death had actually taken place, but this was possibly held to be cancelled by a birth which left the number of pilgrims as before.

The formal reply of the Hashimite Government to my protest against the threats made by the director general of quarantine, before her arrival, to refuse facilities to the "Achilles," was that no reply was necessary, as the "Helenus" had not been detained and that hasty conclusions should not be arrived at before ascertaining the facts.

I considered it advisable to return this communication, confining myself to the remark that my representations had referred to the "Achilles," and to specific threats made before the arrival of either ship and not to any subsequent action of the above kind.

The above letter is typical of many similar communications, emanating ostensibly from the Hashimite Foreign Office, so-called, but in reality dictated on the spur of the moment by King Hussein.

Difficulties in dealing with the Hashimite Government

During the latter's last visit, I had an opportunity of witnessing how the business of state is conducted. The King receives a letter, calls his private secretary, or the official concerned, and gives an immediate outline, sometimes brief, more generally long and involved, of what he wishes to say in reply.

The scribe then leaves his presence to draw up the answer, which on submission is frequently added to by one or more postscripts in the King's own hand.

Replies to the plainest and most ordinary of communications, as well as to more complicated and important matters, are thus dictated entirely at the hazard of King Hussein's mood of the moment.

This may account for the fact that the majority of communications from or through this agency during the past year, and especially during the last few months, have received answers from the Government which are either completely irrelevant, deliberately obstructive, or in some cases little short of insulting, and so they may be expected to continue until King Hussein considers he has reasons for changing his attitude is taken to task and induced to treat His Majesty's Government with more outward respect, or ceases to reign.

Effects of Deceased Pilgrims

The Government shows no disposition to assist in the prompt and satisfactory settlement of the affairs of deceased pilgrims, particularly in respect of furnishing the necessary death certificate for comparison with the return ticket, in order for the latter to be authenticated by the agency.

A large number of claims for refund in the Straits Settlements are in particular held up in default of this authentication required by statute, and if King Hussein persists in refusing to assist the agency in this matter, he will be informed that the heirs concerned will be notified of the reason.

It is pointed out that such estates are arbitrarily assessed beforehand, and the dues payable demanded before sale from the consulate concerned, in gold. In view of the fact that the value of such estates is assessed by the Government, and not as realised on actual sale, less dues and expenses, and that it is significantly stated that all such have been handed over to the consulate for disposal, I am endeavouring to obtain King Hussein's agreement to—

- (1) The assessment of dues after sale on the actual amount realised, and not on the Government's prior estimate.
- (2) The payment of dues by the consulates after sale by deduction from the total realised, as a corollary to the above.
- (3) Their payment at the rate of exchange at which the value of the estate is arrived at instead of at a higher rate demanded in gold.

The excess of the amount estimated for last year's effects, over that realised, was 2,000,000 P.T. (P.T. = 1 rupee), while the rate demanded in payment of the dues in gold was at 6½ P.T. = 1 rupee.

Currency

The refusal of the Hashimite Government to accept any payments to its Departments except in gold is causing increasing difficulties to arise.

In January 1920 King Hussein agreed that rupees, whether silver or paper, would be accepted both by merchants and his Government. Subsequent notifications, however, only mentioned merchants, and the Government has since repeatedly refused to accept rupees, at any rate of exchange. Recent instances are the case of the shipping agent mentioned above and the return of the dues on pilgrims' effects tendered in rupees by this agency. No gold is available for the latter payment, and it cannot be expected that the agency should purchase it in the market at a premium in order to further fill King Hussein's coffers.

It is pointed out that such estates are arbitrarily assessed beforehand, and the dues payable demanded before sale from the consulate concerned, in gold. In view of the fact that the value of such estates is assessed by the Government, and not as realised on actual sale, less dues and expenses, and that it is significantly stated that all such have been handed over to the consulate for disposal, I am endeavouring to obtain King Hussein's agreement to—

should be the only country where payment in gold at a premium should be enforced, and the King has already had to accept subsidy payments in rupee paper.

Although the Government of India is not disposed to consider the supply of rupees with a view to their being made the normal currency of the Hedjaz, it would nevertheless seem desirable that rupees, which are legal tender for merchants under penalty, should be equally accepted by the Government.

The King's common plea, that the Bedouin will never accept rupees, has already been proven false in Jeddah and its neighbourhood, and it is only his obsession, that wealth is represented by a pile of gold sovereigns, and his own anxiety to collect as many of these as possible that stands in the way of the removal of present anomalies and difficulties.

Indians in Mecca.

Since the departure of Captain Nasiruddin and the closing of the Mecca office, Indians resident in Mecca have apparently become somewhat alarmed as to their future.

Certain of them complain further that they are being threatened by King Hussein's secret agents, the latter stating that the King has in his possession Captain Nasiruddin's diary and other papers, incriminating a number of Indians as being anti-Arab and agents of the British Government.

The assistant mudir of police and a shawish are stated to have been sent to prison for having failed to search the luggage of the Mecca representative and his clerk when this was sent down to Jeddah.

Rabegh

Reports were current recently that trouble had occurred in and around Rabegh with Mudayana and that a band of Wahhabies had attacked Asfaan (on the direct Mecca Rabegh route). Sherref Mohsen, the kaimakam of Mecca, was sent with some irregulars and guns to Rabegh, but this measure is probably intended to be rather a reminder of the King's authority than directed against the Mudayana. The latter abound in the Harb territory but are no more than small bands of brigands unconnected with the hinterland who make use of the fear inspired by the name to further their own ends.

Medina

Sherref Shuhant is reported to have left for Kharbar with a small force to put an end to tribal disturbances in that district.

Emir Ali is stated to have come to an agreement with the Humada and the direct Yenbo-Medina route is expected to be shortly re-opened.

Ahmed bin Mansur has returned to Mecca.

Jeddah Water Supply

The distribution of water has been reduced, and a strict ration-system introduced. The King was finally compelled to accept my offers to obtain coal for the condenser, and a small quantity was obtained for him from the Soudan. Experiments are now being made with patent fuel. The hopes entertained of utilising the wells and springs mentioned in a former report have as anticipated come to nothing but a certain quantity of very bad water has now been discovered in a disused cistern some 4 miles from the town.

Openings for Agricultural Machinery

King Hussein has considered the various suggestions and information placed at his disposal but in expressing his gratitude for the trouble taken, takes the opportunity of stating that nothing further can be considered for the present in view of the heavy expense he has to incur in guarding the Hedjaz from an attack by the Wahhabies.

Tarif

All is reported quiet and Emir Zeid returned to Mecca at the end of March.

Press ("Al Qibla").

No 470. Notifying the handing over of effects of deceased pilgrims to the consulates concerned, announcing the publication of all details.

The invitation of Emir Abdullah to Jerusalem where the opportunity would

be taken of visiting the Mosque of Aksa and a telegram to him to his good reception.

No 472. Announcing the return of Emir Abdullah to Amman.

No 473. The desertion of Emir Feisal from London.

All extract from A. Abram No 1693. The Arab question and the return of Emir Feisal.

1. The favourable progress of negotiations between Emir Feisal and the British Government.
2. Foundations laid for establishing an Arab Government in Transjordan and in Irak, and the anticipated settlement of political and administrative details after Mr Churchill's return to London.
3. The great importance of the interview between Mr Churchill and the Emir Abdullah as affecting the Arab question and especially Transjordan.
4. The adherence of Transjordan to the Emir and acceptance of his authority.

W BATTEN Major I.A.

Enclosure 2 in No. 98.

Shipping Intelligence to April 8, 1921

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 27th March and the 8th April, 1921.

Steamship	Flag	From—	To—	Arrived	Left	Pilgrims disembarked	Cargo Discharged
K. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	March 28	March 28	1,200	...
N. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 1	April 1	1,200	...
M. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 2	April 2	1,200	...
M. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 2	April 2	1,200	...
M. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 2	April 2	1,200	...
M. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 2	April 2	1,200	...
M. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 2	April 2	1,200	...
M. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 2	April 2	1,200	...
M. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 2	April 2	1,200	...
M. A. S. S. S. S.	British	Aden	London	April 2	April 2	1,200	...

E 4931, 117 89

No. 99

Consul-General Satow to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 50)

My Lord,

Beirut, April 13, 1921.

WITH reference to the third paragraph of my despatch No. 47 of the 9th April, in which I reported that the Greek Orthodox Bishop had been omitted from the list of those invited to the luncheon given in honour of the Maronite Patriarch at which other ecclesiastical chiefs were present and that this was construed locally as a mark of disfavour I have the honour to report that this omission was made up for by the giving of a luncheon by General Gouraud in honour of all the Greek Orthodox personalities, religious and civil, on Sunday, the 10th April.

(Copies to Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

[E 4474 1977/91]

No. 100

Earl Curzon to Major Marshall (Jeddah)

(No. 43.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 26, 1921

1 HAVE to refer to your telegram No. 374 of the 27th November relative to the régime of the Capitulations in the Hedjaz.

2. His Majesty's Government do not consider it necessary to make any protest to King Hussein with regard to the abolition of the Capitulations, but as soon as he has become a signatory of the Treaty of Sévres steps will be taken to secure from him an undertaking to recognise British subjects as such.

3. I should therefore be glad to learn your views as to the details of any such undertaking which may be rendered desirable by local conditions.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

E 4474 1977/91]

No. 101

Foreign Office to India Office.

Sir

1 AM sorry that I cannot refer to your letter of the 14th April on the subject of the proposed abolition of the Capitulations in the Hedjaz.

2. Pending the decision of His Majesty's Government, I do not propose to take any steps in the matter. It is, however, necessary that an understanding should be reached with King Hussein, but he proposes in due course to approach King Hussein with a view to arriving at some arrangement whereby His Majesty's Government will recognise British subjects as such, which he appears at present somewhat reluctant to do.

Mr. Secretary Montagu will be kept informed of any steps taken in this direction.

I am, &c.

LANCLOT OLIPHANT

E 4939 117 89]

No. 102

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 50.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 7, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that the following were the operations of the French column under Colonel Paulet, sent down to clear up the district on the Palestine and Transjordan frontier after the blowing up of the bridge reported in my No. 10 of the 23rd February.

The column consisted of all arms and reached Deraa on the 2nd March. The same day three persons were arrested at Shugara. The column reached Mezerib on the 14th. The same day villagers from Ghurbi, Saidie and Azb (unmarked villages near the Jordan, between Kuneitra and Fik) and tribesmen of Naim and Telwas tribes fired on and captured Captain Salece and a small French detachment, who were engaged on Boundary Commission work. They were afterwards released as reported in section I of my No. 41.

The French later exacted an indemnity for this and arrested five persons. The force next proceeded to Tail, Razania (unmarked), Khafin and Fik. The villagers at the last place evacuated the village, but returned within the delay of forty-eight hours given to do so.

The column remained at Fik from the 18th to the 24th, and was joined there by three British officers from Samakh (for Boundary Commission?). During their stay the chiefs of that district and of the neighbouring tribes of Telwas and Dabla made their

submission. The following persons accused of murder and brigandage were executed at Fik:—

Ah-el-Uwand of Fik

Bid Bin-el Kassim, of El Al, and

Abdullah el Hassan el Khatab, of Talawan

An indemnity was also fixed as follows:—

Shugara	250
Janila	50
Khafin	80
El Al	300

It was in this district that French aeroplanes bombed Hedonin encampment. The Sheikh of El Al has been arrested; possibly he is the same as the Kassim above who was executed.

The column next proceeded by Old (lesser) Kuneitra, Huehniye and Hachmou (unmarked) to Kuneitra in two sections.

General Goybet visited Kuneitra earlier, and armoured cars have also been utilized in conjunction with the column.

(Copy to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

E. S. PALMER

[E 4938 117 89]

No. 103

Consul-General Salow to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 47.)

My Lord,

Beirut, April 9, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that General Gouraud, French High Commissioner in Syria, reached Beirut on the 4th instant on the "Ernest Renan" and landed in the afternoon. As imposing a reception as possible had been arranged in the town and the town was beflagged. Besides the local civil and military authorities, there were present from Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Hama. From Damascus came a Deputation, under Selim Attarash, and some Roalla Arabs, while there was a deputation from the Aleppo tribesmen, the Milli of Viranabek and the Shammar of Deraa.

Through indisposition I was unable to be present at the reception with the rest of the Consular Corps, but Mr. Mackereith attended, and the general received me on the 5th. He was, as is his custom, he laid great stress on the importance of co-operation between France and Great Britain in these regions. He was much pleased with his recent visit to London.

Since his return he has been much occupied with receptions and entertainments. Among the latter has been a luncheon to the Maronite Patriarch, who had come down from Beirut.

The exception of the Greek Orthodox Bishop, who was not invited. This mark of disfavour is attributed to the fact that the Greek Orthodox Patriarch at Damascus is considered to have been, if not anti-French, at any rate too pro-British in his sympathies.

The populations at the return of the High Commissioner and the hope that the situation will now become clearer by the settlement of various questions which have been long pending, if not exactly public opinion, at any rate those who profess to represent it. Among these is the taking of a census in the Lebanon, to be followed by the election of an administrative commission to take the place of the present commission which was nominated. It is hoped that the elected commission will become a sort of Lebanon Parliament. It is stated that Census Commissions will shortly be formed to carry out the census. This they will do by visiting each house in the various quarters of the towns and in the villages and gathering the necessary particulars—a somewhat slow and cumbersome method. The future form which the government of Syria will

take is naturally a fruitful source of discussion. Of late rumour has said that a Turkish prince—possibly Prince Burhaneddin—will be the Emir of a United Syria. It has been suggested that this rumour emanated from the Haut Commissariat, which desired to learn how the idea would be received. It has provoked no enthusiasm. It seems doubtful whether people here have any clear idea as to what they really want. They wish to enjoy French military and financial support (Copies to Bagdad, Cairo and Jerusalem.)

H. E. SATOW

E 4978 31 881

No 104.

Comte de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received April 1921)

A DIFFERENTES reprises, et notamment par une lettre particulière en date du 7 avril 1921, l'Ambassadeur de France a l'honneur de signaler à son Excellence le Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères l'esprit d'hostilité des Chérifiens à l'égard de la France en Syrie.

La lettre ci-jointe en copie, dont l'original se trouve entre les mains du Haut Commissaire de Syrie, a été adressée par le Roi Hussein dans certains coups de mains tentés en sous française. Ce document établit nettement que le coup de main dirigé le 22 février dernier contre la voie ferrée à Mokerin entre Deraa et Chiffa, a été prescrit par le Chérif Ali, frère d'Abdallah, et exécuté par Ahmed Meroud et Ali Khouli—bandits notoires—dont la livraison a été plusieurs fois demandée aux autorités anglaises.

Dans ces conditions, le Comte de Saint-Aulaire a l'honneur d'appeler à nouveau l'attention de sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon et de l'indiquer sur les graves raisons qui amènent le Gouvernement français à considérer que la remise de l'administration de la Transjordanie aux mains du fils du Roi Hussein a de très sérieuses répercussions sur la tranquillité des territoires sous mandat français.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire rest. &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 24 avril 1921

Enclosure in No. 104.

Ahmed Meroud to Chérif Ali.

(Traduction.)

JE présente mes hommages et mes devoirs à votre illustre personne.

Je vous écris ces lignes, Monsieur, pour obéir à vos ordres.

Nous avons reçu avec respect votre lettre qui nous a été remise par l'Emir Hassan.

Nous avons compris la teneur.

Nous avons agi conformément à l'ordre qui nous a été transmis.

Votre humble serviteur est allé à Wadi Khaled avec les Arabes, en compagnie de l'Emir Hassan et de Mahmoud Abu Ras et leurs hommes. C'est fait, grâce à la collaboration du vaillant et zélé Ali Khouli. L'arche du milieu du pont a été démolie. Il en est de même des Metwali intrépides (?). Nous sommes prêts à répondre à un signe de vous quand il le faudra.

Votre humble serviteur,
AHMED MEROUD

15 Jemada-el-Thani, 1339 (25 février 1921).

E 5067 100 93

N 105

Papers communicated by Colonial Office.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 29.)

(1)

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to Mr. Churchill

(Telegraphic) P.

Bagdad, April 23, 1921

IN Reuter's news of the 17th April, which has reached me the 23rd April, following paragraph is contained:—

"In course of interview" ("Morning Post" learns from Cairo) "Emir Feisal said that he was proceeding to Mecca for family congress. He stated he has received unofficial offer of Throne of Mesopotamia, and whether or not he accepts depends on the decision of his family and their wishes."

Paragraph has been excised from Reuter's as issued, but it must have appeared already in India and will eventually be here. It will certainly be understood, as stated in the paragraph, that offer has been made by His Majesty's Government, and the removal of this impression is urgent, otherwise statement will constitute a serious impression on good faith of myself and His Majesty's Government. I strongly deprecated, as you will remember, any sojourn in Egypt of Feisal or Lawrence and I suggested that they should proceed to Jeddah, accompanied or unaccompanied by Lawrence. I suggest in the circumstances, in issuing correction, opportunity be taken to make a clear statement of our attitude on following lines: That the reference to Feisal to having been offered Throne of Mesopotamia doubtless refers to some invitation which he has received from Mesopotamia; that to offer throne to anyone is inconsistent with declared policy of His Majesty's Government. Feisal and Lawrence have not departed, and they desire to be guided by wishes expressed by people of Mesopotamia, of course subject to their own concurrence as to suitability of person on whom choice may fall. Their attitude in regard to family of Sherif is that both the cause of Arab nationalism and the Allies alike owe him a lasting debt of obligation. Consequently, in answer to his candidature, which has been received by His Majesty's Government will not object to his candidature should a majority of the people of Iraq express a wish for one of this nature would also clear air here.

(2)

Mr. Churchill to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

(Telegraphic) P.

Colonial Office, April 27, 1921

YOUR telegram of the 23rd April "Morning Post" interview

There was also a sentence in the interview referred to to the effect that Feisal had implied that the cession of authority to France in Syria and the Zionist policy in Palestine were inevitable mistakes. In a subsequent issue a categorical denial of this was published by Haddad based on a telegram which he had received from Feisal himself. Thus the report has already been badly discredited and has created no stir here.

You stated in your telegram No. 28 that message No. 1 has already been despatched to King Hussein from Mesopotamia. Feisal has now been in Jeddah for some days and a reply cannot be long delayed. Until Hussein's reply has been received I continued to think that it would be premature to make any announcement on the subject suggested by you. It might then suitably contain a reference to the exchange of views. If, when you have received Hussein's reply, you still consider that an announcement is desirable, the question will be reconsidered here. We decided at Cairo, you will remember, to use the phrase "in response to enquiries from adherents of Emir Feisal." I still prefer this to the wording now proposed by you. Also we substituted the word "chosen" for "elected."

E 5151 117 891

No 106

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2)

Damascus, April 16, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that the secret police have made the following arrests recently, on accusations of espionage for Abdullah. Huber, the chief of the secret police, and his sub-chief, Yussuf Trak, have their agents on all the trains —

Abdullah, referred to in my No. 45 of the 4th April, has proved himself to be a tax-collector in the Ajloun; but is apparently a French agent (Ali Khalk).

The French do not appear to have obtained any evidence against him, but desire to keep him in custody. He is now in the Ajloun round Kerak and the French are trying to get him out of the country. He is now in the Ajloun round Kerak and the French are trying to get him out of the country. He is now in the Ajloun round Kerak and the French are trying to get him out of the country.

Mohamed Jamil gave good references, and was made a policeman in the Kerak district of this town. He has now been found to be the son of Ali Shureiki — a Karamanli K. — under Feisal — who was condemned to death by the French and joined Mahmoud Faur. Mohamed Jamil is now under surveillance.

Two M. J. ... Abdullah, and accused of being spies.

The French Legal Counsellor and several French officers are expected to visit next week.

The latter and his cousin Neshb called on me, and I have received a similar but rather vaguer invitation, of which, I hope to avail myself later.

M. Soulier, the deputy for Paris, has been here and visited Palmyra.

(Copy to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, Sir,
Yours faithfully,
C. S. PALMER.

E 5163 31 88

No 107

Ambassador to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 2)

LE Gouvernement français vient de faire savoir au Comte de Saint-Aulaire que les lettres de l'Emir Abdullah sont envoyées par le drapeau de Djebel Druze.

Une communication du Clerif Al ... par le service français des renseignements.

Ne soyez pas découragé par le retard des Français en très peu de temps.

...

L'Ambassadeur de France à Londres a l'honneur d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement sur la note de cette Ambassade en date du 24 de ce mois.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire salut, &c

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 28 avril 1921.

E 5124 100/931

No 108

Colonel Lawrence to Mr. Churchill.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 2)

I RECEIVED your telegram of 19th April and High Commissioner's, Bagdad, telegram No. 591 S. on 20th April in Jerusalem, when I returned with High Commissioner from Amman. I communicated substance to Feisal in Suez yesterday before his boat sailed. For your points (there was no other mandate condition) 2, 3, 5, 6 he was grateful. On 7 he asks further information and for an idea when he will be wanted, as his visit to Idriis might be affected thereby. On 8 he will do his best to see Hussein. He was disappointed with figure of subsidy, but any further will come from Hussein.

According to Feisal, Abdulla is disappointed with arrangements proposed by us for Transjordan. This impression he gained from Auni Abdelhadi, who has done his best to influence Feisal in the same way. Desirability of sending Zaid up to see Abdulla Abdelhadi was suggested by Feisal.

I leave to-morrow by air for Jerusalem, and I think that I might, unless you have other wishes, return thence to England.

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

E 5065 4/911

No 109

Earl Curzon to Major Marshall (Jeddah)

(No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 4, 1921

MY telegram No. 36 of 16th April: Hussein's fears of Wahabite attack.

Ibn Saud, who has during last years forbidden his people to do Haj, has intimated his inability to prevent their participation this year.

Wahabites will necessarily be armed to some extent for self-defence, but Ibn Saud is prepared to give fullest assurances that pilgrims will not be aggressive in any way, provided corresponding assurances are given by Hussein that they will receive the same considerate treatment as other pilgrims.

You should endeavour to persuade Hussein to give the desired undertaking, assuring him that adequate corresponding guarantees will be given by Ibn Saud.

Feisal's good offices might prove useful in the matter.

E 5362 465 911

No 110

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 11)

(No. 29.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 21, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th-20th April, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and ALEX.

W. BATTEN Major Marshall
Acting Jeddah Agent

Enclosure 1 in No. 110.

Jeddah Report, April 11-20, 1921

Secret

Quarantine

The final report of the Hashimite Government to the representations mentioned in the last report was to the effect that further discussion on the question was unnecessary, that they were already fully aware of and in possession of the situation, and that the question of their approval was on the same footing as the approval of the British Government on the issues now under consideration.

and further distributed along the route, and arrangements have been made by Sheriff Mohsen for escorts from Qadhumah onwards, 1,200 soldiers having been detailed for the purpose.

Reported Mudayana Activity

Unconfirmed reports have been received of the recent presence north of Mecca of a large force, said to number 20,000. This number is certainly grossly exaggerated, and from the report that Sheriff Mohsen's nephew Ali prevented a party from interrupting the Rabegh route, the reports are probably due, as before, to the activities of bands intent on taking toll from the Medina caravans.

King Hussein has, however, profited from former experience to the extent of subduing the Musaida, Belediyah and Hudheila (Hudayem), it is said, to the extent of 55,000l.

The recent despatch to Mecca of 40,000l., requisitioned through the Customs from Jeddah merchants, lends colour to this statement.

Letter

It is pointed out that the action complained of by the King, of Ali-bin-Abdu, of Birk, having held up dhows bound for the Hedjaz, was taken at the instance of Hodeidah merchants themselves as a precaution against acts of piracy further north, the King, however, has apparently been misled. As Ali-bin-Abdu was apparently considered by the British as more capable than himself, he might with advantage be requested to take the country in the name of his master, the Idri.

His communication went on to abuse the latter, to deny his right to be referred to in matters connected with Hodeidah, and in a similar strain.

A lieutenant was said to be sending supplies and arms to the Wahabites in Turaba, from Birk and Muli, through the Ghannid and Zahran.

Customs

A British subject recently imported a tobacco-cutting machine from Egypt, worth 500l. The Customs refused delivery until 500l. had been paid, carefully evading, however, the mention of this sum as customs duty. After further evasions, both locally and from Mecca, the Government admitted this sum to be leviable as customs dues, and insisted on payment before the machine would be delivered.

As the owner had sunk all his capital in wheat tobacco, now on his hands at Jeddah, after having obtained permission to import a machine with which to treat it, and as the Agency was unable to do more for him than attempt to obtain a revision of this unjustifiable charge, and again protest at the imposition of duty without regard to the established scale and without notice, the importer is left with no option but to pay the 500l. or remove the machine and his tobacco, involving further heavy loss.

He had offered to hand over the whole at cost price to the Government and give instruction free in addition with the staff imported by him, but with no success.

The agent of Messrs. Holt has had sent him by the Blue Funnel Line a pair of masts for his pilot-boat, costing 4l. These have been assessed for duty at 15l., and delivery has been refused until duty at this estimate is paid.

The same gentleman imported a dog-cart costing 60l. On customs duty being demanded at 200l., and delivery refused unless it were forthcoming, the vehicle was returned.

Attention has been drawn before to the malpractice of the Hashemite Government in arbitrarily assessing all goods at twice to three-times their real value, and in many cases at a ridiculous figure, in order to levy a high duty.

It is submitted that this method of evading an open increase of import duty, resulting, in such cases as the above, in great injustice to importers, should not be permitted to continue unchecked.

The Government have on three occasions in the last year been called upon to abide by the tariff. On each occasion they gave an assurance that this would be done. But in each case the assurance was given by the King, who has no authority of any kind, and who is not bound by any law. The King has no authority of any kind, and who is not bound by any law. The King has no authority of any kind, and who is not bound by any law.

Press. "Al Qibla."

No. 475. The interesting announcement is made of the Haram having been provided with electric light.

The plant for the above is American, and was obtained through a local Dutch firm.

No. 476. An article on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the revolt, emphasizing that the latter was intended to liberate all Arabia, and not instituted for more particular ends, and enjoining patience until all aspirations are realised and all Arab States are fused into one.

The revolt was undertaken on terms, the treatment meted out to the Arabs since was well known, and had been borne only in the hope of improvement.

The basis of the revolt had not been to establish a kingdom or to escape ill treatment, but to raise the status of the Arab inhabitants themselves.

W. BATTEN, Major, I. C.,
Acting British Agent

Enclosure 2 in No. 110

Shipping Intelligence to April 20, 1921.

The following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 20th and the 20th April 1921.

Steamship.	Flag	From	To	Arrived	Left	Tugs used	Cargo discharged
Aman	Italian	Suez	Massara	April 9	April 9		
Hunt	Dutch	Jeddah	Suez	10	12	700	
Laurel	"	Jeddah	Suez	11	12		100
P. M.	"	Jeddah	Suez	11	14		100
M. M.	"	Jeddah	Suez	11	15		100
M. M.	"	Jeddah	Suez	11	19	140	

E 5385 40 88

No. 110

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, May 7, 1921

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Curzon's letter of the 4th inst. in respect of the termination of their concession in Palestine.

2. Mr. Churchill presumes that Earl Curzon of Kedleston is satisfied that the majority of the capital of the concern is held by French nationals, and on this basis he proposes to refer to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of article 311 of the Treaty of Sèvres, and that the actual coming into force of the treaty need not be awaited.

3. I am, however, to observe that a proposal to refer to arbitration a French claim connected with the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway is already under consideration, that it would appear possible that there may be other French claims against the Palestine Administration, and that in any case it may be anticipated that the Régie will put forward a similar claim in respect of the termination of their concession in Mesopotamia.

4. It would appear to be an uneconomical and inconvenient arrangement for a number of separate tribunals to be constituted to adjudicate upon these various claims, and Mr. Churchill would be glad if Earl Curzon would consider the possibility of their being considered by a single Tribunal.

5. Mr. Churchill is awaiting a reply from the High Commissioner of Palestine to a telegram addressed to him on the subject of the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway, and on receipt of Earl Curzon's observations on the suggestion made above he will be prepared to communicate further with the High Commissioner for Palestine, and, if necessary, with the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia, with regard to the claim of the Turkish Régie.

[6831]

Y

6. I am to enquire what arrangement Earl Curzon would propose with regard to the cost of the arbitration and the presentation of the case on behalf of the Administrations affected.

A copy of this letter is being communicated to the Treasury

I am, &c
G. GRINDLE

E 5513,4 '91]

No. 112

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 313.)

(Telegraphic) It.

Cairo, May 10, 1921.

Mr. Lloyd George, which has been handed to me by Hedjaz agent —

[illegible]

(Repeated to Jedriah)

E 5583 104 931

No. 113

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

84.

Deaning Street, May 13, 1921.

I AM directed by Mr Secretary Churchill to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 6th May on the subject of the proposed amnesty for political offenders in Mesopotamia, and to transmit herewith, for the information of Earl Curzon of Kedleston, copy of a telegram which has been despatched to the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia on the subject, and of telegrams from Mesopotamia and Palestine referred to therein.

I am to suggest that, if Lord Curzon sees no objection, an immediate communication should be made to the French Government to the effect that His Majesty's Government are contemplating the proclamation of an amnesty on the lines proposed by Sir Percy Cox and in pursuance of the same His Majesty's Government are at the same time making a simultaneous proclamation of a similar amnesty in Syria would tend to emphasise Allied solidarity in the Middle East; and that a further communication will be addressed to them specifying the exact date on which the Bagdad proclamation will be made, in time for them to ensure simultaneous action on the part of the French authorities in Syria, should they so desire.

J am, Sec.
G GRINDLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 113.

Mr. Churchill to High Commissioner for Mesopotamia

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic) P.

Colonial Office, May 11, 1921

Nos. 81, 92 and 93

If the proposals and the terms of the suggested proclamations are approved, though the persons concerned in the rising of 1920 were treated in the same manner as individuals not concerned in the rising of 1920. That is to say, that subject to consideration of each case on its merits, you should be authorised to extend amnesty to them. I am content to leave this point to your discretion.

1. The Office have replied that from Egyptian point of view there is no objection.
2. I have telegraphed to Viceroy and requested him to repeat his reply to you.
We cannot finally fix date of proclamation until this has been received. Foreign Office consider that French Government should be informed of proposed action, and I am suggesting to them that an interim communication should now be made to the effect that it is anticipated that the proclamation will be issued within the next ten days, and that as soon as possible actual date will be communicated. You should telegraph to me at once, when you receive the Viceroy's reply to India Office telegram, the actual date on which the proclamation will be made, leaving us sufficient time to inform the French Government.

His Majesty's Government will in no circumstances make any payment with regard to repatriation expenses of exiles and fugitives who return in consequence of the amnesty.

(Reprinted Jerusalem, No. 1)

(Reference No. 134.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 113

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to Mr. Churchill

No. 813

(Telegrams) 12.

(Received Colonial Office, May 6, 1921.)

AMNESTY. I have not yet replied to Lawrence re individuals as, until my final proposals for an amnesty which are now under active preparation here have been completed, I am unable to say authoritatively which of persons, if any, on Lawrence's list will be excluded from its provisions. It is not feasible, pending official announcement of amnesty, date for which is not finally fixed, for a large party to travel together, and I did not, in point of fact, propose to ask Government to bear cost of journey. Hitherto, with the exception of Arab officers who fought for Allies and returned by "Mihlades," individuals have borne their own expenses. Would it not be cheaper for them to come overland by caravan.

(Addressed Allenby, Cairo; repeated Beirut for consul at Damascus. No. 672 S.,
and Secretary of State for Colonies.)

Enclosure 3 in No 113

Mr H Samuel to Mr Church

(No. 134)

(Telegraphic.) P

Jerusalem, May 6, 1921

FOLLOWING telegram has been sent to Bagdad

"The following Mesopotamians are at Amman with Abdullah: Ali-el-Bazarkas, Thabet Bilbey Abid Nour, Maky Bey-el-Sharabty, Ruouf-il-Shahwany, Said-el Kalaak, Daoud Sabry. Abdullah is very anxious to get rid of them. As they are influential men he suggests that their presence in Mesopotamia would help forward Feisal's candidature. Do you approve their return?"

The Government of the United States of America, by the President, do hereby certify that the following is a true and correct copy of the original document on file in the Department of State:

Enclosure 4 in No. 113

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to Mr. Churchill

(No. 92)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Received Colonial Office, May 8, 1921

YOUR telegram No. 66 of 3rd May

I am communicating to you in my telegram next following draft amnesty proclamation, which will be published immediately on the receipt of your reply, and be dated accordingly.

I would explain that wording of last paragraph is intended to apply to such individuals as Ajamias Sadoon and Surchi, Kurdish chiefs, who are still actively hostile, and who, except after formal submission on appropriate guarantees, could not be allowed back.

Enclosure 5 in No. 113

High Commissioner for Mesopotamia to Mr. Churchill

(No. 93)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Bagdad, May 8, 1921.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding telegram:—

His Excellency High Commissioner is pleased to announce with the authority of His Majesty's Government, with effect from May, a general amnesty to political offenders on following basis. To all those who were concerned in rising of 1920 pardon is extended in respect of offences committed in furtherance thereof. Those who are detained or imprisoned will be set free. With following exceptions, those who are fugitives are permitted to return without fear of prosecution:—

"1. Individuals who were paid servants of Administration of occupied territories at time when they took part in rising.

"2. Individuals listed below who are believed to be responsible for commitment or abetment of certain heinous crimes and are at present time fugitive from justice.

(a) Saqr ibn Ibrahim al-Nasiri, son of Saqr ibn al-Nasiri, all of Zoba tribe and all charged with murder or abetment of murder of late Colonel Leachman. (b) Jamil Nannawi Ali Jamil Madfal, charged with being immediate instigator of murder at Tel Afar of late Captain Barlow, Lieutenant Stuart and other British officers. (c) Ibrahim Ilo, charged with murder of late Captain Salmond. (d) Jasim-al-Mualia, charged with murder of late Captain Wrigley. (e) Nasr-ibn-Araodhir, Alawi-al-Jasim, Ibn Duraimidi, all of Bani Hasan, charged with murder of British prisoners. (f) Ibn Mahawwis, Ibrahim [?] Binairi Ahwaz, Abbas-al-Sachit, Falih Ibrahim [?] Haji, Saqr al-Ajarib, all of Jawabir tribe, charged with murder of Royal Air Force officers.

"As regards individuals not concerned with rising of 1920 but interned, exiled or fugitive in connection with political offences committed prior to said rising, His Excellency High Commissioner is authorised on the receipt of formal application addressed by individual to nearest British representative in principle to extend amnesty to them, subject to consideration of each case on its merits.

E 5583 104 93]

No 114.

Earl Curzon to Sir M. Cheetham (Paris)

(No. 251)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 10, 1921

DURING his recent visit to Jerusalem, Mr. Churchill learnt from M. de Courcy General Gouraud was thinking of announcing an amnesty shortly in Syria. Mr. Churchill said that His Majesty's Government were about to take similar action in Mesopotamia.

It is now proposed to proclaim an amnesty for political offenders in Mesopotamia during the course of the next ten days, and you should bring this to the notice of the French Government in case they desire to synchronise the issue of a similar proclamation in Syria as tending to emphasise Allied solidarity in the Middle East.

Exact date of Bagdad proclamation will be communicated to you in time to permit of simultaneous action on the part of French authorities in Syria should they so desire.

[E 5513, 4 91]

No. 115.

Earl Curzon to Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby (Cairo).

(No. 289)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 17, 1921

YOUR telegram No. 313 of 19th May: Message from King Hussein to Prime Minister

Following for King Hussein from the Prime Minister:—

I thank your Majesty for your message conveyed to me through Lord Allenby.

Your assurances of loyal and sincere friendship afford a guarantee that a satisfactory solution will be found for all questions of mutual interest.

His Majesty's Government are confident that you will succeed in maintaining with Ibn Saud those peaceful relations which are so essential for the prosperity of Arabia.

Please repeat to Jeddah.

E 5774, 117/89]

No. 116

Consul Morgan to Earl Curzon — (Received May 19)

(No. 20)

My Lord,

Aleppo, April 23, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows on the situation in this district since my previous despatch No. 15 of the 12th April, 1921:—

Franco-Turkish Peace.—Despite the conclusion of peace, the French are still on the qui vive. Reconnaissances by aeroplanes and motor cars are daily made in the direction of Mebib and the Euphrates. The French say that at Diarbekir the local Moslems have set up an authority independent of Mustapha Kemal under one Nimet Bey, formerly a Turkish officer in Aleppo, and that he has a force under his orders to be used for attacking the French. In the Kilis and Aintab regions French troops are being maintained and even reinforced.

Military Operations.—Matters are brighter for the French in the Djebel Zawiyeh, south of Idlib, and latest newspaper reports announce that operations in that region are being crowned with success.

Marash.—An American who arrived on the 20th April from Marash after five days' journey, informs me that there are pro- and anti-Kemalist Moslems in Marash. There are about 10,000 armed Moslems in the town, some of whom are having firing practice. They are under Turkish officers, who are under Mustapha Kemal, but they have struck out an independent line. They are French-Turkish peace, and are prepared for attack or defence against the French. They are deficient in artillery. These independent Marash Turks took a leading part in the recent Armenian massacres. They have been the cause of threats to massacre the Armenian population, of whom 10,000 remain out of 50,000, the remainder having been massacred.

The American Relief Mission in Marash is not molested. A special permit from Mustapha Kemal was necessary before my informant could leave.

There are ten French prisoners in the town, nearly all disabled men. These are looked after by the Americans.

While anti-French feeling among the Moslems near the French zone is responsible for their ignoring orders from Angora, there are not wanting signs that Turkish officers and villagers are getting tired of protracted military operations and want things to end. My informant passed through a Moslem village just outside the French lines, where the Moslems were very friendly to the French, having favourable recollections of good treatment at the hands of a French detachment which had passed through the village.

In the French zone the Arab gendarmes, now under French control, were content with their lot, being well paid and well treated.

Local Situation.—Locally the French find it necessary to have frequent military parades in the town and firing practice with heavy guns and machine-guns very close to the town to impress the population, and a close watch is kept on the Moslem quarters of Aleppo.

Suspicion of Great Britain is still the dominant thought in the minds of the local

French officials. Most local troubles are attributed to British intrigue and annoyance at seeing the French in Syria. A strong leading article attacking England for her alleged attitude towards Syria appeared in the Arab paper *Al-Umm* on the 11th April, 1921. I brought the matter to the notice of the French High Commissioner Michel de la Roche. He replied that England after 100 years of France in Egyptian papers. I did not push the matter any further.

Commerce.—Commerce is stagnant. Aleppo which before the war traded with the greater part of Asia Minor lying to the north and north-east is now limited to the district lying within a radius of some 20 miles from the town.

(Copies sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Constantinople, Egypt and consular general in Beirut.)

I have, &c

JAMES MORGAN

[E 5779 117/89]

No. 117

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon —(Received May 19)

(No. 64. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, April 27, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a few notes upon the remaining chief political personalities of this State. The former handbook on local personalities is quite out of date, and, while excellent in its way, appeared to me to be too concise to give a real idea of the person described.

I have therefore ventured to give a few more details where such seemed likely to be of use. I have had personal experience with most of the people mentioned, and I have based my general summing up upon more than one opinion.

I have adhered to the order of the 1919 "Who's who in Damascus," though many changes have taken place since then. I have not included persons who are not in Damascus, but who are in the neighbourhood, as they are not of local importance.

I have deleted from the list of persons who are not in Damascus, but who are in the neighbourhood, as they are not of local importance. I have also deleted from the list of persons who are not in Damascus, but who are in the neighbourhood, as they are not of local importance.

Note.—The persons marked with an asterisk were willing to become honorary dragomans of this consulate, but have abandoned the idea on receiving posts under the French or the present Administration.

(A) Government Officials

1. Ali Riza Pasha Rickabi. Deleted from "Strong." Now considered in favour of a British mandate. Viewed with great suspicion by the French, and in trouble with the Jezairli family. But to-day reported to have made his peace with General Gouraud, to be receiving 500 monthly subsidy, and a likely candidate for a Ministerial post. At present not in any official position. He was Prime Minister when Feisal quarrelled with the French, but resigned, as realised it was suicide to provoke the latter. Strong and able, but probably quite unreliable.

2. Yaseen Pasha-el Hashimi. Additional. No office at present. Accused of malversation while on War Council. Hates all foreigners. Appears quiet at present, but I fancy he is an irreconcilable.

3. Ala-ed-Din Bey Dronbi. Additional. Had also been Vali of Sivas. Was first a member of the "Shura," then, after fall of Feisal, succeeded Elchi as Prime Minister. His hatred of Feisal made him pro-French, and for this he and Abdulrahman Pasha, the Kurd, were assassinated on the 20th August, 1920, at Kharbet-el-Gazala by the Hauranese sheikhs. Considered of a vacillating character, but met his death bravely.

4. Nuri Pasha-el-Said. Additional. Joined Feisal on his fall, and has continually tried to reconcile him and the French. Went with Feisal on most of his European trips. Believes Feisal should throw in his lot with the French.

5. Haddad Pasha. Additional. Considered pro-British, but of no strength of purpose, and devoid of administrative capacity.

6. Mussalli Pasha. Additional. Out of a job at present. Not a politician.

7. Mohamed Ali-el-Tamimi. Additional. A Palestinian extremist. Able administrator. Anti-French. Considered honest. Not employed at present.

7a. Rafik-el-Tamimi. Additional. The strongest of the three brothers, but an intriguer. Was one of the staff of the Arab liaison officer at Beirut (the latter being Jamil-el Elehi) at head of the Independent Arab Party.

7b. Amin-el-Tamimi. Additional. Able administrator. Was secretary of the Prime Minister till French occupation.

8. Ahmed-el Hassabi. Additional. Has some influence. Considered pro-British and anti-French. Not employed.

9. Yusuf H. Pasha. Additional. A former Minister of War under Rickabi, by whom he was dismissed.

10. Shukri Pasha Ayoubi. Additional. Favours complete independence, and next to that is pro-British. While at Aleppo got on well with the late Sir Mark Sykes. No administrative capacity.

11. Ahmed Hilmi Effendi. Deleted. Palestinian. Hates French and favours independence or British mandate. Able financier. Considered honest and a partisan of Rickabi.

12. Sulaiman Jokhadar. Additional. Now President of Court of Cassation. Not a politician, and disguises his sentiments.

13. Emur Adel Arslan. Additional. A Lebanon Druze intriguer. Great friend of Feisal. Favours complete independence. Backed the secret Druze party societies.

14. Tewfik Effendi Shamia. Additional. Landowner. Linguist. At Political Bureau under Rickabi, and under latter's influence. Favours independence or British mandate. Influential among the Greek Orthodox. Now director of the Arab orphanage.

15. Shakir Bey-el-Hambali. Additional. Mutesarrif of Damascus Marka. Ex-chief of correspondence under Rickabi. Favours independence, but not anti-British. Not popular with the French. Considered able.

16. Mohamed Kurd Ali. Additional. Still Director of Education. President of the Arab Academy and a literary dilettante. Has another brother who is a lunatic. Nearly executed by Jamal, and then turned pro-Turk. Anti-British. The French, from political motives, support his literary aspirations for the intellectual advancement of the Arabs.

(B.) Religious Sheikhs.

1. Mohamed Effendi-el-Mohamm. Still Cadi. Pro-Arab, but prefers British to French. Not political.

2. Ata-el-Qasbi. Additional. Intelligent. Pro-Arab, but not pro-Shar'efian.

3. Mohamed Aheh Hamsi. Additional. Still Makib of the Jaharat. Related to Rickabi, whose partisan he is. Honest. Brother of Ahmed Effendi-el-Hassabi (Q.c. under Supplementary (A)).

4. Abdul Khair Effendi Abdin. Additional. Hates Feisal and pro-French. Able and sides with winning party.

5. Ali. Taqi-el-Din. Additional. Anti-Feisal, sides with winning party, and now pretends to be pro-French. Ignorant.

6. Sheikh Bedr-el-Din-el-Hashimi. Additional. During the war exerted his local influence to prevent the Turks succeeding in making the war a Jihad, and probably thus prevented a massacre of the Christians. I could get no political views out of him.

6a. Taj-el-Din al-Hashimi. Additional. Was chief of the Ulama, Reza-ul-Ulama, over whom he has a big influence, favours Feisal and is pro-British. Very anti-French, as the latter dismissed him recently from his post.

7. Sheikh Abdel Mohsen Effendi-el-Ustuwani. Additional. Keeps aloof from politics. Pro-Arab and prefers us to French. Now President of the "Shura." Another report says, "Very pro-French." Under these circumstances I expect he is only a time-server.

8. Ata-el-Ajami. Additional. Religious. Keeps aloof from politics. Pro-Arab, and prefers us to French.

9. Sheikh Selim el-Bokhari. Additional. Now Reza-ul-Ulama, which corresponds to the Constantinople Sheikh-ul-Islam. I fancy he prefers the French to us. Of Turkish extraction but family has been here a century. Father of Supplementary (A) 1.

10. Sheikh Mahmoud Abu Shamal. Not a politician.

11. Nothing to report.

(13) *Monism Notable*

22. Mohamed Bassam. Additional. Considered very pro-British, and helped our prisoners of war and interned persons—even to escape. Reputed not to care about politics, but only about commerce. I fancy that while not implicated in gun-running he could help me to inquire into it, if I can persuade him.

23. Dr. Abdul Rahman Shahbandar. Additional. Flew to Egypt during the war to escape execution by Jemal Pasha. Member of the Syrian Union Party founded in Egypt under Habib Lutfallah Bey. Was Minister for Foreign Affairs up till French occupation, when he retired to Egypt, where he now is. Considered rather pro-British, but is a zealous Independence partisan.

24. Ferid Pasha el-Yafi. Additional. Ex-Inspector of the Administrative Council in Cilicia, to which post the French appointed him. Jemal Pasha exiled him to Anatolia.

25. Refik Bey-el-Azem. Additional. Not now considered important.

26. Ghalib Bey Zelik. Delete "honest." Ex-President of Municipality. Intelligent, keeps aloof from politics, anti-French. Untruthful, and used to Turkish methods.

27. Nassib Effendi Hamzeh. Additional. "Son of the famous Musti of Damascus." Mahmoud Effendi Hamzeh. Employed by Faisal to form bands against the French, near Hama and Baalback. Ignorant. Very anti-French, and one of the heads of Abdullah's party here. Probably actively responsible for propaganda here in latter's favour. Rather pro-British, but very suspicious. He and his party took steps to ensure safety of Christians during the troubles preceding the French occupation.

28. Nothing to add.

29. Talib Effendi Halouni. Additional. Now lives at Cairo.

30. Hassan Halbouni. Additional. Probably the richest man of Damascus next to Mohamed Said Bey-el-Youssif. Silk merchant. Honest. Pro-British, but not anti-French.

31. Hassan-el-Siouffi. Additional. President of local Chamber of Commerce. Merchant in manufactured silks.

(D.) Christians.

1. Gregorius IV. Additional. Generally popular. Pro-British, but has to beg money from French to pay his debts, and therefore afraid to show his sentiments openly. Took his office before Greek Cretans. Was a favored friend of Abdul Aziz, and the British mandate, and sent to the American Mandate Delegation. He at first refused French bribes to vote for them. Is very friendly with (A) 14, very friendly with (A) 15, Turk, and pro-Irredentist.

2. Dometios. Additional. Very pro-French. Has much influence on his flock and in the Hauran. I fancied he is pro-Irredentist, except in so far as his pro-French sympathies and the latter's present anti-Greek attitude clash with this.

3. Aniz Salloum. Additional. Pro-British; but has just accepted post in the Ministry of Finance under the French. A great admirer of Rickaba.

4. Yusuf Bey Salaa. Delete from "Intelligent" to end. Not considered very intelligent. Vacillating. Has been in turn pro-Turk, pro-Arab, pro-British, and pro-French. Ex-Commissaire of the Regie, which post has just been abolished. Now Commissaire of the Government at the electrical company, and just appointed Chef du Protocole and Dragoman of the Government.

5. Fares el Khouri. Additional. Ex-dragoman of the Turkish Legation. Was chief for Damascus under the Turks. Minister of Finance for Faisal. Was imprisoned by Jemal Pasha. Has great influence here, and Selim and Nassib Pashas Attrash consulted him re the proposed Jebel Druze constitution. Pro-British, and voted against the French mandate. Now very pro-Arab, and probably intriguing with Abdullah's chief supporters here. His friends equally among Christians, Moslems, and Druze. He employed has reverted to his old profession of barrister. A good and convincing speaker.

6. Fays el-Khouri. Additional. Is now studying law in Paris. Intelligent and to death by Jemal, but pardoned.

7. Boushara Asfar. Additional. Ex-dragoman of German consulate. Non-political. Very pro-British, and was great friends with our officers during our

7. Ghaleb Shaoul. Pensioned and living in Beirut.

7. Ghaleb Shaoul. Pensioned and living in Beirut.

8. *Chlorophyll*. *Chlorophyll* is the green pigment found in plants.

u Khalil Ahsi. Additional. Greek Catholic. Very pro-French, and his sons

9. Khalil Asst. Additional. Green Sash. Very prominent, and the
 of a bitumen mine in Hasbaya.

10. Ahmed Effendi Taram. Nothing to add. But see Supplement ry (A) 19.

(E) Jewish Notables.

1. Nassim Bey Addes. Additional. Now living at Cairo. Pro-British, but non-political.

2. Nothing to report.

Yusuf Abadi. Additional. Ex-member of the Mixed Commercial Court. Was once president of the municipality under the Turks. Untrustworthy and a time-server.

4. Yusuf Lanyudo. Additional. Under Turks a member of the Mixed Commercial Court. Non-political, but rather pro-British

(P.) Druze Chiefs.

See my despatch No. 35.

(G.) Arab Chiefs.

1. Nur-el-Shalan, Additional. Ignorant and a time-server, and has always been in a subordinate position. He has been in France and has received large sums from French to keep the peace.

14 Nuwaf-el-Shalan. Son of No. 1. Pretended to be pro-British and quarrelled with his father. This was probably only a manoeuvre to get money from us too. Anyhow, they are now reconciled.

Supplementary (A).

1. Nushhi-el-Bokhari. Son of (B) 9, director of military department. Pro-French. During the war was an inspector of prisoners of war under the Turks, and did nothing to alleviate their lot.

... 10 3

under Federal Ka taken in Zolot... Araba Harat...
Izzot Pashia. Now supported by M. Carrutte, the French...
known to have forged a signature, ...
Department.

Told

Annot.

1. Jamil Elein. 2. War Minister. 3. Foreign Minister. 4. Minister of the Interior. 5. Minister of the Treasury. 6. Minister of the Education. 7. Minister of the Agriculture. 8. Minister of the Commerce. 9. Minister of the Industry. 10. Minister of the Public Works. 11. Minister of the Health. 12. Minister of the Social Affairs. 13. Minister of the Religious Affairs. 14. Minister of the Justice. 15. Minister of the Defense. 16. Minister of the Navy. 17. Minister of the Air Force. 18. Minister of the Army. 19. Minister of the Intelligence. 20. Minister of the Information. 21. Minister of the Culture. 22. Minister of the Sports. 23. Minister of the Tourism. 24. Minister of the Environment. 25. Minister of the Urban Planning. 26. Minister of the Transportation. 27. Minister of the Communications. 28. Minister of the Media. 29. Minister of the Arts. 30. Minister of the Sciences. 31. Minister of the Technology. 32. Minister of the Innovation. 33. Minister of the Entrepreneurship. 34. Minister of the Social Security. 35. Minister of the Pensions. 36. Minister of the Unemployment. 37. Minister of the Labor. 38. Minister of the Trade Unions. 39. Minister of the Workers' Rights. 40. Minister of the Consumer Protection. 41. Minister of the Competition. 42. Minister of the Antitrust. 43. Minister of the Intellectual Property. 44. Minister of the Copyright. 45. Minister of the Patents. 46. Minister of the Trademarks. 47. Minister of the Geographical Indications. 48. Minister of the Industrial Designs. 49. Minister of the Utility Models. 50. Minister of the Inventions. 51. Minister of the Discoveries. 52. Minister of the Innovations. 53. Minister of the Creations. 54. Minister of the Productions. 55. Minister of the Performances. 56. Minister of the Exhibitions. 57. Minister of the Festivals. 58. Minister of the Conferences. 59. Minister of the Seminars. 60. Minister of the Workshops. 61. Minister of the Courses. 62. Minister of the Lectures. 63. Minister of the Debates. 64. Minister of the Discussions. 65. Minister of the Arguments. 66. Minister of the Opinions. 67. Minister of the Views. 68. Minister of the Beliefs. 69. Minister of the Faiths. 70. Minister of the Religions. 71. Minister of the Philosophies. 72. Minister of the Ideologies. 73. Minister of the Theories. 74. Minister of the Hypotheses. 75. Minister of the Conjectures. 76. Minister of the Speculations. 77. Minister of the Fantasies. 78. Minister of the Dreams. 79. Minister of the Visions. 80. Minister of the Imagination. 81. Minister of the Creativity. 82. Minister of the Inspiration. 83. Minister of the Motivation. 84. Minister of the Determination. 85. Minister of the Persistence. 86. Minister of the Perseverance. 87. Minister of the Endurance. 88. Minister of the Tolerance. 89. Minister of the Patience. 90. Minister of the Calmness. 91. Minister of the Composure. 92. Minister of the Poise. 93. Minister of the Balance. 94. Minister of the Stability. 95. Minister of the Firmness. 96. Minister of the Resilience. 97. Minister of the Flexibility. 98. Minister of the Adaptability. 99. Minister of the Versatility. 100. Minister of the Multifunctionality. 101. Minister of the Multipurpose. 102. Minister of the Polyvalent. 103. Minister of the Universal. 104. Minister of the Comprehensive. 105. Minister of the Exhaustive. 106. Minister of the Thorough. 107. Minister of the Detailed. 108. Minister of the Meticulous. 109. Minister of the Diligent. 110. Minister of the Industrious. 111. Minister of the Hardworking. 112. Minister of the Diligence. 113. Minister of the Industry. 114. Minister of the Industry. 115. Minister of the Industry. 116. Minister of the Industry. 117. Minister of the Industry. 118. Minister of the Industry. 119. Minister of the Industry. 120. Minister of the Industry. 121. Minister of the Industry. 122. Minister of the Industry. 123. Minister of the Industry. 124. Minister of the Industry. 125. 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Minister

...the "Beirut." Probably not very pro-French. Ignorant and

Director of Gendarmerie and Public Security.

7 Sunum Moaved. Director of Public Debt. Feeble character, and obeys all

8. Sheikh Ibrahim Hameish. Inspector of the Secret Police, and a French tool of

the Lebanon. Very anti British.
5. Hamdi Bey Ibn-el-Nassr. Director of Finance. obeys orders of French

10. Dr. Shakir Kham. Ex-drugman of this consulate and a doctor. Now

Director of Commerce, Agriculture and Public Works. Exiled to Anatolia by the
Turks. Says in his report, "I do not agree with the report I have received of
him, and do not think he is very trustworthy; but he may prefer us to the French."

11 Nauman Abu Shmar. Ex-Ottoman consul in Belgium under Abdul Hamid and agent of Ahmed Izzet Pasha. Apparently pro-French, but believed to be pro British. Now a member of the "Shura".

12. Selim Bey Anhouiri. Lawyer, poet and Arabic writer. Intelligent, but intriguer and untrustworthy. Exiled to Angora by Jamal Pasha. A member of the

the late (A) S. Exiled to Anatolia by Jemal Pasha. Pro-
Arab, but probably pro-Arab.

Intelligent and very pro-British. One brother, Ibrahim, lives in the Lebanon, and is unpopular with the French. Another brother, Akhu, is in our service at Nazareth.

15. Ahmed Bey-el-Hassbi. No longer president of the municipality. Brother of No. (B) 3.

16. Hakkı Bey-el-Azem, Governor of Damascus State. Commander of the Legion of Honour. Held small financial posts in Egypt, where he fled after ousting Abdul Hamid. His elevation to post of Governor was not merited by any previous display of administrative capacity, but he is a French puppet. A former journalist and pamphleteer, and belonged to several anti-Turk Arab independence societies. Was always pro-French and anti-Faisal. I do not consider him anti-British except from
 _____ Was friendly with my present dragoman in Egypt (C. _____)

[illegible]

18. Yahu-el-Sawaf. Simple, non-political. A rich merchant. More honest than

19. Ahmed Effendi Turan. A former spy of Jemal Pasha, and much hated here. Of weak character. Pro-French and anti-Franz.

Supplementary (B).

1. **Assad Haidar**, of Baidbeck. Chief of the Muteweh sect. Very influential there. Was pro-Arab under Faisal, but his son Ibrahim is now a member of the Administrative Council at Beirut. This has influenced him father, who is now considered pro-French.

He has visited London and Paris. Declares he
is a French feeling, and pretends to have great influence over Mesopotamian exiles.
Says he is anti-Turk, but proposes as a solution of present
situation the recall of Abbas Hilmi to Egypt. He says he has received a letter saying
the Sultan would like him to go to Egypt and propose to the British Government
he considering this solution.

Supplementary (C).

1. Saul-el-Jezairi. Son of Ali Pasha and cousin of (C) 8. Has pretensions to be of Syria. Rash and ignorant. Has committed three acts of homicide through carelessness with firearms. Was very anti-French before the war, also anti-European and anti Turk. Jemal Pasha exiled him. Joined Feisal, but probably as Pasha's spy. He soon left Feisal and stayed here. He took temporary charge of affairs upon the Turkish evacuation, and soon fell foul of Rickabi. See my despatch N 11. Now pretends to be pro-French, but some day he is intriguing with Abdullah. Members of Feisal's staff were Ihsan-el-Jabri, Auni Abdul Hadi, Enzar Adel Arslan, Sheskh Kamel-el-Kassab, Dr. Abdurrahman Shahbandar, Jamil Mordem Bey, Yassan Pasha-el-Hashimi and Murid Pasha-el-Sud.

Supplementary (D)

Nedra Meshaka. Dragonman of this consulate. Protestant. Was dragonman before the war, during which he served in our Intelligence Department in Egypt. Held similar post here till my arrival and was also "chef du protocole." Popular with all sects and political opinions, and known all the influential personages and Government officials, and most of the French employees and officers. A great friend of (A) 14 and (B) 5. A friend of the present Governor in Egypt during the war.

Supplementary (E).

Jacob Danon. The Grand Rabbi. A strong Zionist. No other political views but is not noticeably anti British.

Supplementary (F).

Lebanon Druze families in order of importance:

1. Raslan
2. Jemiat.
- Telhok.
4. Abu Nakad
5. Hamad.
- Atfal Salamad
7. Abdul Malik

Supplementary (G).

Mohamed Pasha Usami. Chief of the Ugeil Beilouin. Receives large subsidy from French, and allowed to control ingress and egress of firearms. Probably at the bottom of all gun running from this State.

Supplementary (H).

Le Marchese Gaetano Paterno. Italian consul-general. Has rank of "conseiller de Legation" and came here with credentials as Minister to Faisal, but never presented them owing to latter's fall. Is reporting centre for all Syria, Palestine and Hedjaz. Very unpopular with the French, and outwardly friendly to myself and Colonel Easton. Has an English wife, who was born in Italy. I agree with the French that he has been trying to acquire some influence with the Arabs here, but think he has completely failed. He gave Faisal good advice at the crisis, which the latter disregarded. A typical Italian diplomat, who would like to bring about amity between the French and us in any way.

Supplementary (I).

Dr. dat-el-Afrat. Editor and director "Kamel-el-Masri," an Egyptian of Zagazig. He had been in the Sudan for some time, but was expelled by the British. He was condemned for this to five years, but pardoned after six months.

Now condemned to a week for an article in the same paper against the local Arab Public Prosecutor.

I have, &c.

G. L. S. PALMER

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No. 118.

Major Marshall to Karl Curzon.—(Received May 19)

(No. 35. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, April 30, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period 1st-30th April, 1921.

The report is in two parts, one for the Jeddah and the other for the Aden and to the Foreign and Political Department, Simla.

I have, &c.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major,

British Agent and Consul.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

Jeddah Report for Period April 21-30, 1921

Arrival of Emir Faisal.

EMIR FAISAL arrived on the Khedivial mail-boat "Tantah" on the 25th April. He was accompanied by Emir Zaid and Emir Ali, the latter having joined the boat at Yenbo. His Majesty King Hussein arrived in Jeddah on the evening of the 24th. The town was decorated in honour of Faisal's arrival. Various complimentary calls were made and returned.

His Majesty King Hussein, accompanied by Emir Ali and Emir Faisal, called here on the morning of the 27th. A summary of his statement is attached.

Faisal, whose intention was obviously to settle differences between his father and foreign Powers, asked me to call on him and state our difficulties. Accompanied by Major Batten and Ismail Effendi I called on him on the afternoon of the 27th and, in a meeting which lasted for more than two hours, we discussed (1) quarantine, (2) public health, (3) supplies; (4) capitulations; and (5) local currency and payment in gold.

With regard to (1) quarantine, Faisal agreed that His Majesty treated the question purely from a political point of view. Kamaran, in the opinion of His Majesty the King, should belong to the Hedjaz, and, as we had taken it, he asserted his right to quarantine control by employing Jeddah. Faisal said that if King Hussein had a representative at Kamaran who would countersign the bills of health he thought the King would carry out the International Convention to the letter. In the meantime, Faisal promised to try to persuade the King to abolish the practice of twenty-four hours unnecessary quarantine at Jeddah.

With regard to (2) public health, we pointed out the lack of proper hospital accommodation, the complete absence of trained nursing orderlies, and the inferior type of medical officer attached to the Hedjaz service.

With regard to (3), (4) and (5) we pointed out the high price of rice, wheat and flour, and the hardships thereby imposed on the pilgrims, our powerlessness to interfere in the affairs of registered British subjects, and the injustice of the Government demanding payment in gold while allowing no gold to be exported from the country. All these points will receive Faisal's attention, and will be treated by him in a report.

Faisal also sent for the consul for the Netherlands and asked him to state all his grievances and difficulties.

Faisal during his short stay in Jeddah made a very good impression by his frankness, his statesmanship-like qualities and his broad-mindedness.

The King gave a luncheon party in honour of Faisal, and the Royal party left for Mecca on the afternoon of the 28th.

French and Faisal.

The French consul-general called on the King as usual, but not on the arrival of Faisal, thinking that a call on that occasion might be misunderstood. The King was angry, but we explained matters to both. On calling to say good-bye to King Hussein the French consul-general asked to be excused from attending the luncheon party from any personal reason, but in view of his Government's attitude to Faisal.

Water Supply.

Baron Pfyffer, from Cairo, presumably sent by Habib Lotfelleh, arrived here on the "Tantah" to report on the possibility of a water supply for Jeddah being obtained in the hills. The King is delighted with, and optimistic about, the two wells he has opened near Jeddah, but Baron Pfyffer, who called here, says the supply there is only temporary and is inadequate. Baron Pfyffer left for the interior on the 28th.

Quarantine.

A ship, the "Batavia," arrived at Jeddah on the 27th April, without having called at Kamaran. The explanation given was that the ship's agent at Batavia said Kamaran would not be open until 27th April, obviously a mistake for 27th March.

The pilgrims were sent to the Island of Wasta for twenty-four hours, where there are no appliances for disinfecting pilgrims.

[illegible]

Wadono

Under the circumstances, it was hardly surprising that he had little difficulty finding his way to the city where he was feelingly of the strain of his work at Medina.

Swedish soldiers is reported to have been captured by the rebels at Kumbhat, a force of 500 soldiers with seven guns is said to have been despatched to his rescue.

The majority of the Japanese have reached Medina without molestation. Sheriff M. S. was ~~informed~~ by Sheriff A. J. that M. S. for a Medina and various other points at holding up the caravans were frustrated.

Emir Ali is to supervise the survey of a railway between Medina and Yenbo. It was ~~in a letter~~ stated that one of the reasons given by him for choosing the Wejh route on first proceeding to Medina was in order to consider the old Turkish project of a line from Wejh to El Ula.

Emir Abdullah is being provided with munitions secretly by the British for use against the French.

Opinion is divided as to whether Emir Faisal will join his brother, or, after a short stay in Mecca, proceed to Iraq.

"Al Ubban," No. 477.

A petition submitted to King Hussein by certain Japanese residing in Java, requesting aid and assistance against a party recently formed in Java inimical to his interests, and a petition from the same party to the King asking for the appointment of a Japanese representative to safeguard Arab and pilgrim interests and to examine the passports of all leaving for the Hedjaz.

To avoid propaganda among pilgrims, members of the above party should be forbidden to enter the Hedjaz, even to perform the Haj.

I, , have filed their entry in Brit's
BOOKS.

No. 478 and 479 contain reports of the Emir Feisal's arrival in Jeddah.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major
British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 118

Summary of a Statement made by King Hussein on April 27, 1921

I HAVE come down to Jeddah especially to see you and to bring you and Fetai
going to say.

Here is Feisal, who has come from London to convey to me a message from His Majesty. My first impression of him is that the agreement between Great Britain and myself will be carried out. The British agent has previously communicated to me a similar message.

His Majesty's Government say that, with the exception of Syria and Palestine, everything will be carried out as originally agreed upon, and according to my wishes and desires. As regards Syria and Palestine, I am urged to exercise patience. But as with everything else, there is a limit to patience, and although my patience is almost exhausted I will try to keep quiet till I see what is going to happen. I can only say at present that what His Majesty's Government have suggested, and I earnestly hope that with their kind help all agreements will be carried out in due course.

If they are not carried out I shall have to carry out the intention expressed in my letter of the 21st Zil Kaidah 1336, of which I now hand you a copy, in which I explained all my views which still hold good.

In speaking to you as the representative of the British Government, I am speaking to the whole of Great Britain.

The British Government invited us to join them in the war for the sake of our mutual interests, and we appreciate the confidence reposed in us. We have nothing to do with France, nor have we any connections with her. It is the British Government only to whom we refer in all matters.

The British Government should understand that in the Arabian Peninsula lies the centre of British interests, and I am quite willing to employ British subjects as doctors, engineers, &c., in course of time.

I am a true and sincere friend of Great Britain. My feelings and attachments to Great Britain have never changed, and never will.

proves to me that His Majesty's Government think that my feelings have changed. But, I swear on my honour and that of my family (father and grandfather), that, even if I were placed in a most critical position, I could never change my feelings and respect towards Great Britain, and I can never forget her favours.

All that I have to do, in the event of my agreement with Great Britain regarding the independence of the whole of the Arabs not being carried out, is to abdicate.

If His Majesty's Government mean to refer to the pilgrim and quarantine questions of last year, I say that they were the result of differences of opinion between the local officials and Colonel Vickery, and are of no great importance, and had nothing to do with politics.

I know that we are not perfect and lack knowledge in many things, and, in cases
of emergency on our part I should like to see a ...

I know that I cannot do without the British, and I must have the British forces in Mesopotamia, at least for security, and I should like to have a British ship in the harbour of Basra as well.

In short, I say that it should be clearly understood that I never rose for the sake of wealth, property or sovereignty, or for my sons to be kings, but in the interest of the Arabs and Arab independence. I do not mind if you have Ibn Saud, Idriis or any capable person to take over the work from me. But it is most essential that the Majesty's Government should carry out the agreements, because they are not only in the interest of the Arabs and the Moslems generally, but of the British themselves.

I have been told by His Majesty's Government, through the Agency and otherwise, that they had to note with regret that I had opposed them in certain matters.

I again affirm I have never, and never will, oppose anything which is in the interests of Britain, and not only will I agree to everything she asks, if it is in the mutual interest, but I am always occupied in finding means to serve her myself, and to point out to her where her best interests lie.

The letter, of which I have again given you a copy in order to remove all doubt, states my first and last will, and I am about to see to the fulfillment of its provisions in their entirety.

Enclosure 3 in No. 118

Shipping Intelligence to April 30, 1921

The following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 21st and 30th April, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From.	To.	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged
Masrur	British	P. Soudan	Suez	April 21	April 22	308	2,753
"	British	Suez	P. Soudan	" 25	" 25	"	595
"	British	Rangoon	"	"	" 26	"	"
Keen	"	"	"	"	"	"	"
Cerberus	Italian	P. Soudan	"	"	"	"	"
S. S. S. S.	British	Bombay and Kutchi	"	"	"	"	"
Phoenician	British	Java	Liverpool	26	Apr 27	"	"
Krakatau	"	Java	"	"	"	"	"
Deubur	"	Dutch Java	"	"	"	"	"
Janet	British	Singapore	"	"	"	"	"
Akbar	British	Bombay	"	"	"	"	"

E 5872 100 93]

No 119

Major Marshall to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 21)

(No. 52)
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 21, 1921.

KING HUSSEIN asks me to communicate message, of which following is a paraphrase, to His Majesty's Government:—

"As already stated, I am prepared to carry out the wishes of His Majesty's Government, especially in the matter of which I have received from the people of Mesopotamia telegraphs asking for one of my sons to be appointed Governor of Mesopotamia."

I have delayed making any definite open announcement to avoid rumours. When date of his departure is fixed I will inform them of his appointment."

E 5888 4 91]

No. 120

General Haddad to Foreign Office.—(Received May 23)

Sir,

Empire Hotel, Bath, May 20, 1921

I HAVE the honour to enclose translations of telegrams just received from His Majesty's Government. Their urgency is indicated by their contents.

I have, &c.

E. HADDAD

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

The Emir Feisal to General Haddad

(Translation.)
(Telegraphic.)

Mecca, May 17, 1921.

WHILE I am doing my best to arrange with Ibn Saud, his troops repeatedly encroached on the districts of Taif on 1st May, and a force has also encroached on the tribe of Metair, north of Taif. On the 15th instant another force attacked the villages to the east of Taif and encamped there. May it be known.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120

King Hussein to General Haddad

(Translation.)

(Telegraphic.)

Mecca, May 17, 1921

REPORT to the British Government that it is only as the result of executing their wishes, prompted by my confidence in them, that I am found as I am. I have done all in my power to carry out their wishes. My least expectation is, therefore, that they will support me in this my critical position. I would have avoided calling on them, but our common interests being endangered there is no more room for hesitation. Ibn Saud yesterday encroached on the neighbourhood of Taif and murdered and pillaged. I do not want Hedjaz to be a burden on the British Government, but these are exceptional emergencies, and no reasonable time has yet been given for it to provide for its own requirements. Expecting urgent action.

E 5583 104 93]

No 121

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 275.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, May 25, 1921.

MY telegram No. 251 of 14th May: Amnesty for political offenders in Mesopotamia. Date of proclamation of amnesty has been fixed for 30th May

E 6002 4 91]

No 122

Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner of Mesopotamia.—
(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 26)

(No. 105.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

May 23, 1921

FELHAL and King Hussein have both telegraphed to Haddad that Ibn Saud's forces are encroaching in the neighbourhood of Taif, and that on the 15th they attacked villages east of that town and encamped there. Please see your telegram No. 25 of 18th April. I presume that Ibn Saud's envoys were clearly informed that as agreed at Cairo, continuance of Ibn Saud's subsidy was conditional upon his maintaining peace with Hedjaz, and that you put this condition into formal letter which you addressed subsequently to Ibn Saud himself. You should now communicate to him the report which we have received through Haddad, and inform him that, until we are satisfied that he is loyally fulfilling the conditions laid down by us, no further payment will be made.

E 6049 117/89]

No. 123

Consul Morgan to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 27)

Aleppo, May 14, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 30 of the 23rd April last, I have the honour to report that the general situation in Aleppo and district is not satisfactory.

In the past fortnight three attacks on trains or on the line between Boirout and Aleppo have taken place. In one of these some military and civilian passengers on the train were killed or wounded. In the most recent attack part of the railway line was torn up and communication stopped for two days. The area of the attacks is between the stations of Ummerdjum and Hamdanish, a district inhabited by the Mewali and Hadidi tribes. Strong French forces have now been despatched to the district in question and communications have been restored.

It is reported that the Mewalis, who are mainly responsible for these attacks, have been severely punished by the French.

Cases of holding up of vehicular traffic on the Alexandretta Aleppo road and on the Aleppo-Bab road have also occurred during the past fortnight. In the case of traffic on the Alexandretta road the assailants on one occasion carried off the French mail.

6831]

These attacks have caused much alarm among the population, who see in them an attempt at isolating Aleppo, and rumours of an Arab attack on Aleppo are rife. Rumour fixes the attack on the town for to-day or to-morrow. The French authorities are seriously concerned and look on an attack and a native revolt as probable, as is proved by their redoubling their military precautions within the last few days. The menace to Aleppo would appear real. Some days ago I was approached indirectly to know whether Great Britain would sympathise with a revolt of the tribes in Deir-az-Zor district and of the Mewali tribes. I replied that Great Britain was France's ally and would stand by her, and that she strongly disapproved any rising against the French and any propagation of a belief that Great Britain would sympathise with or help any such movement.

The population of Aleppo, both Christian and Moslem, is discontented with the present regime. This is due, in my opinion, more to the stagnation of commerce, due to Aleppo's isolation and to the high cost of flour, than to anything else. Unemployment and famine—especially in Ramadan—do not make for tranquillity.

I have, &c

JAMES MORGAN

E 6155 455 91]

No. 124

Major Marshall to Karl Curzon, (Received May 30)

N 44 Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, May 10, 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah Report for the period the 1st to 10th May, 1921

Copies of this report and despatch are being sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem, Aden and Sunka.

I have, &c

W E MARSHALL,

British Agent and Consul

Enclosure 1 in No. 124

Jeddah Report for the period May 1-10, 1921

Political.

Letters from the King and Feisal

THE following letters have been received from the King and Feisal. I give them in full.—

Your honour,

I beg to present you my best longings. Mr Lloyd George's telegram regarding the pilgrim question, which I received on the 1st March, has allowed me to discuss that question, which I have done in the Jeddah Report last week after my son Feisal had explained to me what arrangements were made, and what decisions were arrived at, regarding the question with Great Britain.

Therefore, being willing to express my best thanks and gratitude to Great Britain, I hereby hasten to write this letter, begging your Excellency, firstly, to convey my greatest thanks and gratitude for the glad tidings brought to me by Feisal to the effect that the hopes and reliance were renewed, and became as they had been before.

But, in spite of what we are up till now suffering, owing to the change which happened to the Government of the Kingdom of Syria, I am sure that I can see or any cause that I can understand, my dutiful loyalty and original sincerity make me bear as well the postponing of the return of Syria to a better period, as the British honour not to take the trouble to do anything which would cause difficulty or hardship to its dyalomatic representation, and I am sure that I am not liable to be again misjudged.

I stated to you in my last conversation that I am preserving the right of the contents of my letter of 21st Zil Ka'ada 1336.

I only beg Great Britain to be at least aware of what has nothing to do with international politics, such as stopping the attacks of Ibn Saud and Idri.

and compelling them not to advance against any places that were not under them before the war, or during it, in order, at least, to avoid bloodshed, and obliging them to return to the same position as they were in in the time of the Turkish Government.

If you consider the period that elapsed between the date of my asking for the withdrawal and your aforesaid communication till now, it is not necessary to mention how dangers are increasing and becoming more acute, and particularly in the pilgrim season when it is necessary to take precautions for its security before it is too late.

I am awaiting the result, and God is the best help my dear friend

HUSSEIN

My dear Major Marshall,

May 3, 1921

I have received your letter relating to the quarantine question. I appreciate the importance of a definite settlement of this matter, so that the troubles which the pilgrims suffer every now and then may be avoided. I am trying to attain that end and will inform you of the result.

His Majesty, my father, sent you a letter yesterday stating that he is pleased with the new manner of policy and the principal terms which were previously agreed to.

In the meantime, however, he finds it unavoidable to draw the notice of the British Government to Syria. Though His Majesty does not want to bring up a matter which puts Great Britain in a critical position with respect to the present circumstances, yet he sees it necessary to remind you of the rights of the Arabs in that region and asks your support, of which we have always seen the useful results, on behalf of the question, so that it may not be neglected later on.

There is still the question of the Wahhabies and their expected invasion, it stands in priority and His Majesty, my father, cannot look indifferently on it as the pilgrim season is now at hand.

Certainly your Excellency must appreciate the seriousness of the question and the necessity of taking effective steps so that nothing affecting the public security will occur thus leading to internal disorder of the country.

When I was in London His Britannic Majesty's Government gave me the required assurances about that subject, but, in spite of those assurances which I conveyed to His Majesty, my father, he has seen it convenient to allude to the subject in his letter, thus anticipating the prevention of any mishap in the future and hoping that your Excellency will refer to the subject with the British Government to be dangerous to the country. With best respects

Yours faithfully,

FEISAL.

I acknowledged these letters and sent your Lordship a telegram (No. 46 of the 5th May) on the Wahhabie question. Since then I have written both to the King and Feisal regarding the Wahhabie pilgrimage (your telegram No. 44 of the 4th May), but have not yet received a reply.

Two chiefs of the Muddayana (Wahhabies) named Sultan Din and Jamhoro, with 1000 followers and important sheikhs are in camp at Khalid Nauman (near Arfat). They are being hospitably entertained by the King.

A Mesopotamian deputation has arrived at Mecca, having come overland via Medina.

King Hussein continues to be very friendly with Ahmed Nadim Bey, late Vali of the Hedjaz, and frequently visits him in his house, remaining many hours. Nadim Bey's son is becoming a great favourite with the King, and is being entrusted with responsible duties.

Water.

Baron Pfyffer returned from the interior on the 30th April.

He went as far as Shamesi, on the Mecca road, and surveyed the ground in that neighbourhood. He says there is a plentiful supply of good water, and that a very good water supply could be brought to Jeddah by a system of pipes. There is no doubt that this money would be forthcoming. I understand that Khandwani, the Indian merchant, has offered to instal the water supply, but I doubt if the King will accept.

Baron Pfyffer examined the water from the two wells opened by King Hussein near Jeddah. He reports the water to be of bad quality.

[6831]

2 A 2

E 6197/4-811

General Haddad to Earl Curzon.—(Received May 31.)

SIR,

38, Sloane Street, May 28, 1921.

- IN acknowledging receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, I have to express my gratitude for the prompt steps His Britannic Majesty's Government have taken, following on my application to the subject. I have also the honor to inform you that I am at the disposal of His Majesty's Government for the purpose of contributing to the establishment of peace.

I have, &c

HADDAD.

Brigadier-General, representing Hedjaz.

E 6277 117 891

No. 128

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 1)

(No. 73.)

My Lord,

Damascus, May 13, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French have apparently decided to try to keep the different tribes to more or less definite zones.

The "Mukhtabas" of the [redacted] at the Rowellah have been asked to keep

Sheikh Ibrahim Habsib, the head of the local secret police, is to be transferred to the Grand Khan. His successor (M. J. ...), has arrived ... to take over his duties as Inspector of the Department of Public Security.

The "Fetted Arab," which the Liberator suppressed last year in 1857, is allowed to appear again.

(Under flying seal to Beirut; copies to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, etc.

C. F. S. PALMER

[6280 117 89]

No. 127

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon—(Received June 1)

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

Darmstadt, May 18, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Mukhtabas" of the 17th May states that the French High Commission in Iraq has informed the local authorities here that Mahjoud-el Faour has been pardoned upon his own request and that his property in the French zone is to be restored to him.

The High Commissioner has refused the request of the Damascus Moslems to be allowed to collect funds for the Turkish Red Crescent since the government of Turkey had not yet signed the Peace Treaty.

The railway and telegraph wires between Aleppo and here have again been cut by the Raddehym, Muwalli and Alaouites near Hamah.

A French officer from Hamah declares the bands active there are headed by Turkish officers and that they have machine guns. The train was fired on.

(Under flying seal to Beirut, copies to Jerusalem, Cairo and Bagdad.)

I have, &c.

C. E. & PALMER

E 6423/104 937

No. 128

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 1658)

His Majesty's Ambassador at Large presents his compliments to the High Marshal of the Empire and Secretary of State and begs to inform him that he has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs dated the 1st June 1911 respecting the proclamation of an amnesty in Mesopotamia.

Paris, June 4, 1921.

Enclosure in N. 118

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

L'AMBASSADE de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu faire savoir par une note que le Gouvernement britannique n'a pas l'intention de fixer la date de la proclamation de l'amnistie politique en Mesopotamie.

Le fait que le Gouvernement britannique n'a pas l'intention de fixer la date de la proclamation de l'amnistie politique en Mesopotamie, coïncidence des décisions des Gouvernements britannique et français sera donc, quelques jours après, la même.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, a l'honneur de remercier le Gouvernement britannique pour les assurances qu'il a bien voulu lui adresser à ce sujet.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 3 juin 1921.

E 6511 465 '91]

No. 120

Major Marshall to Earl Curzon — (Received June 7)

(No. 49. Secret)

My Lord,

Jeddah, May 20 1921

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period the 11th 20th May, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Aden, Jerusalem and Simla.

I have, &c.

W. K. MARSHALL, Major,
British Agent and Consul

Enclosure I in No. 121

Jeddah Report for the Period May 11 20, 1921.

(Secret)

Nejd Pilgrimage.

On receipt of your Lordship's telegram N. 41 of the 4th instant I wrote to King Hussein informing him that Ibn Saud was in a position to give the necessary assurances that they would receive the same considerate treatment as the Wahhabis. I said that I was quite aware that His Majesty made no distinction between the Wahhabis and treated them all with the same kindness and consideration, but pointed out that if he would give this guarantee it would be greatly appreciated by His Majesty's Government, who were well informed on His Majesty's views on the Wahhabis, as a step in the direction of peace, and that it might open the way for future negotiations on political matters.

At the same time I wrote to Emir Feisal on the same subject.

The King's reply was very satisfactory. He said that he was quite aware of the fact that the Wahhabis were in a position to give the necessary assurances that they would receive the same considerate treatment as the Wahhabis, but that he was not in a position to give the necessary assurances that they would receive the same considerate treatment as the Wahhabis, otherwise he takes up the same uncompromising attitude as he took last year. The letter contains many other irrelevant references.

On receipt of the King's reply I wrote to the Emir Feisal on the same subject. He said that he was quite aware of the fact that the Wahhabis were in a position to give the necessary assurances that they would receive the same considerate treatment as the Wahhabis, but that he was not in a position to give the necessary assurances that they would receive the same considerate treatment as the Wahhabis, otherwise he takes up the same uncompromising attitude as he took last year. The letter contains many other irrelevant references.

1. The Wahhabis should come in small parties, and should leave the Hedjaz directly after performing the Haj.

2. They should be unarmed.

3. That they should be met on the road by a committee who would give them the necessary passes for their visit to the Hedjaz.

In my reply to Feisal I quoted your telegram No. 47, and pointed out that His Majesty's Government were satisfied with the assurances of the King and I thought that King Hussein might trust His Majesty's Government in this matter. I pointed out that Ibn Saud was unlikely to run the risk of incurring the displeasure of His Majesty's Government by any act of treachery. I suggested that the King might insist on the following conditions when giving his assurances:

1. That Ibn Saud sends a highly responsible and powerful official with the Wahhabi pilgrims; and
2. That they only come with sufficient arms to protect themselves on the journey.

I pointed out that if the conditions were made too strict, Ibn Saud would suspect a lack of trust and we would be no nearer a solution of the question.

I have also sent a telegram to the King in which I said that I was forwarding to you under my No. 49 of the 17th instant, Feisal points out the danger of a dispute between even two persons, which might lead to a big riot, so long as Ibn Saud and King Hussein are at war. He is going to discuss the question again with his father and let me know the result.

There is a report that King Hussein is very angry at the Wahhabis. I think he has the weakness of his father, that way, as a pilgrim, he might be very angry at the Wahhabis. There is a report that they were they marched the King would raise objections to their coming, and it would be a sad result if Ibn Saud were to be required to make concessions to the Wahhabis. I have given the necessary assurances.

In my opinion two things are essential before we can safely encourage the Nejd pilgrimage:—

1. That King Hussein himself, either by letter, wire or verbally, gives the necessary assurances to a representative of His Majesty's Government; and
2. That Ibn Saud sends, as Emir of the Nejd Haj, a responsible and powerful official who could control the Wahhabies.

Since I have been in the Hedjaz I have received from Mecca copies of the telegrams King Hussein and Feisal have sent to Haddad Pasha. The former makes no reference to the Wahhabi pilgrimage, but asked for four aeroplanes, five armoured cars, and five machine guns. He probably fears that should the Wahhabies come to the pilgrimage they will find out his military weakness.

Aeroplanes and armoured cars are out of the question, as the persons who have to be of the Moslem faith. Some parts of the country also, especially in the neighbourhood of Taif, are probably quite unsuited for the military use of armoured cars.

The only way, in my opinion, to increase the Mahmal escort or to secure the safety of the pilgrims is to have an officer, such as Sadik Pasha, to accompany the King when he goes to the Hedjaz.

Reports have been received from Mecca that the King has sent a telegram to the Emir Feisal, asking him to send a representative to the Hedjaz. The Emir has replied that he is not in a position to do so, but that he is willing to send a representative to the Hedjaz, who, as formerly is probably the case, will be both King Hussein and Feisal think that this is a good idea.

Indian Pilgrimage Hospital.

On the 12th May I wrote to the King informing him that it was again proposed to send the Indian hospital to Jeddah, and asking for his formal approval and consent, and asking if the same could be given to the Emir Feisal, who is in a position to dispose of the hospital.

In his reply, full of irrelevant references to higher politics and cases of plague on the Khushial steamers, His Majesty submitted his objection to the proposed hospital of ten or, at the outside, fifteen beds.

On receipt of this letter I at once telegraphed to you (my No. 50 of the 17th May, 1921), and repeated same to Simla. I also wrote to the King pointing out the uselessness of a hospital of ten or fifteen beds in the event of epidemic disease and widespread

destitution, and pointing out that our desire was to assist him in medical matters while his country was still in an undeveloped state. I urged him to change his mind and give his consent.

His Majesty gave his consent to me personally, and I did not anticipate any difficulty this year. Without his consent it is useless to open the hospital, as we require the buildings, and we are also dependent on him for water supply, of which, this year, I anticipate great shortage.

If His Majesty continues to oppose, pressure must be brought to bear on him, as I fear again much destitution and a large influx of pilgrims from Mecca to Jeddah immediately after the Haj. Even now prices in Mecca are very high.

General.

1. Emir Ali, accompanied by Emir Zeid, arrived in Jeddah from Mecca on the 10th instant. On the 14th he left by the Khedivial steamer "Mansourah" for Yembo and Medina. Emir Zeid returned to Mecca.

A case of plague occurred among the crew—a fireman—of the Khedivial steamer "Mansourah." The malady was contracted in Suez, and he fell sick two days before the boat arrived at Jeddah, but he returned to work and fell sick again at Port S. where he was admitted to hospital and found to be suffering from

danger of plague being admitted to the Hedjaz, particularly to the northern ports of Wejh and Yembo, from Suez, is obvious, and I am instructing the Hedjaz quarantine authorities to take all possible precautions.

Government.—(a.) The canal hire to Mecca has been increased by Government order to P.T. 120. In addition a pilgrim pays P.T. 10 for a shukduf, and 15 for luggage without a shukduf. As a matter of fact pilgrims are paying much more. One case was recently brought to my notice in which an Indian pilgrim paid 42 rupees for a canal from Jeddah to Mecca.

As a rule a pilgrim pays 3 mejulisha (40 piastres) more than the

(b.) On the arrival of one pilgrim ship—the "Homayun"—the authorities disembarked while half of their luggage was left on board. The authorities closed the gates and the pilgrims were left overnight on the quay, without any food or proper comfort, until their baggage arrived the following morning. This is typical of the incompetency and thoughtlessness of some of the local officials.

(c.) It is reported that 60 per cent. of the foodstuffs has been appropriated by the Government. The merchants have to pay three or four times the amount of the appointed canal hire to take their foodstuffs to Mecca. The result is that prices in Mecca are high. It is said that postal employees in Jeddah are sending loaves by post to their colleagues in Mecca.

Current Rumours.

1. It is reported that Sheikh Faisal of Ahmed has established an independent tax on all who pass through his territory. He is said to have levied from pilgrims 1 to 2 gold pounds per camel.

2. That King Hussein, having failed in obtaining the favour of the Sunni Moslem world, is turning his attention to the Shias, amongst whom he is spreading propaganda in Mesopotamia and Persia. The King has warned the authorities in Mecca and Medina to respect, and take care of, the Shia pilgrims. There are a considerable number of Shia notables in Mecca at the present time. Previously Shias have always been badly treated in the Hedjaz, both by the Arabs and by the citizens of the Holy Places. Among the notables now in Mecca are Sheikh Abu Bataikh, Sheikh Mohamed Nur and Syed Zein from Mesopotamia, and Emir Abdul Rehman, son of Abdu Had Bahrein.

It is said that the King's present protection of the Shias is making a great impression on the Shia public, who will probably gladly accept King Hussein as Khalifa, as their Imam must be a son of the Prophet.

3. That King Hussein has wired to the brothers Hussein, Dr. Mohammed Hussein and Dr. Khalil Hussein, in Egypt, asking them to return to the Hedjaz.

4. It is reported that Sherief Shehnaat has returned to Medina after his attack on the rebels of Khairat, who were said to have been supported by followers of Ibn Rashid. Sherief Shehnaat was defeated, and about 100 of his men were killed.

Press "al Qibla."

No. 482 contains a telegram from Michael Lotfullah, head of the Syrian Union, and Rashid Rida, head of the Syrian Congress, protesting against an article in the "Morning Post" which said that the French would not think it wrong for Syria to be annexed to France.

His Majesty replied that this was pure intrigue, and the question must be decided by the will of the people of Syria. He commended them on having made the protest.

No. 484. In criticising an article by Shekeib Arselan the "Qibla" praises the Allies, and believes they are the only people who are going to fulfil their word, and further refers to speeches of the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

W. E. MARSHALL, Major,
British Agent and Consul

(enclosure 2 in No. 129.)

Shipping Intelligence to May 20, 1921

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and 20th May, 1921:—

Steamer	Flag	From	To	Arrived	Left	Pilgrims Disembarked	Cargo Discharged
Mansourah	British	Suez	Aden	11	12	9	
Homayun	"	Aden	Aden	14	17	47	2000
Nile	"	Aden	New York	14	15	107	
Aden	"	Aden	Aden	14	15	10	
Aden	"	Aden	Aden	14	15	10	
Aden	"	Aden	Aden	14	15	10	
Aden	"	Aden	Aden	14	15	10	
Aden	"	Aden	Aden	14	15	10	
Aden	"	Aden	Aden	14	15	10	
Aden	"	Aden	Aden	14	15	10	

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No 130

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 449.)

My Lord,

Cairo, May 28, 1921

I HAVE the honour to report that his Excellency General Gouraud, High Commissioner of the French Republic in Syria and Cilicia, Commander-in-chief of the army of the Levant, accompanied by Admiral Lebon, Naval Commander-in-chief, and a numerous staff, arrived at Port Said on the 17th May on board the battleship "Lorraine." A guard of honour of British troops was drawn up at the station, and his Excellency was met by the British consul. A special saloon was placed at the disposal of General Gouraud on the train for the journey to Cairo, where guards of honour of British and Egyptian troops lined the platform and the station square. His Excellency was met by Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Congreve, V.C., and by a representative of the Sirdar, and, after inspecting the guards of honour, drove to the Residency, where, with one aide-de-camp, his Excellency was my guest during the three days of his residence in Cairo. Later in the afternoon several official visits were paid. In the evening there was a dinner at the Residency.

The following morning General Gouraud visited His Highness the Sultan, accompanied by M. Gaillard, the French diplomatic agent, and by several members of his staff. There was a luncheon given subsequently in his honour by Lieutenant-General Sir W. Congreve. In the evening a number of the leading members of the British and French communities met his Excellency at an official dinner at the Residency.

On Thursday, the 19th May, General Gouraud visited the principal sights of Cairo,

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and in the evening was the guest of honour at a dinner at the French agency, at which Lady Allenby and myself were also present.

His Excellency left Cairo by special train on the morning of the 20th instant for Ismailia, when the same formalities were observed as on his arrival. He subsequently rejoined the warship "Lorraine" at Port Said, traveling down the Suez Canal on board one of the canal company's steamers.

During his stay at the Residency I had a conversation with General Gouraud on the subject of the situation in Syria, in the course of which His Excellency expressed himself as anxious as to the political situation and alarmed at what, in his opinion, were the aims of the policy at present pursued by the Emirs Feisal and Abdullah.

On his departure General Gouraud sent me a most cordial farewell message expressing the great pleasure he had derived from his visit, which he made by way of returning my visit to Beirut in the autumn of 1919.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,

11 rue de la Paix, Paris.

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No 131

Count de Salas to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 11)

(No. 17)

(Telegraphic)

YOUR despatch No. 18 of 27th January.

Vatican, June 9, 1921.

New French Ambassador, after presenting his letters of credence, has left for Paris. He is to return in time for Consistory in middle of the month.

The question of French protectorate in Palestine is understood to be under discussion and according to some private information which may well be correct Ambassador is taking a letter to His Majesty's Government does not bind them in this respect.

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No 132

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 1736.)

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Paris presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to say that he has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th inst. regarding the question of the British mandate in Syria and Palestine respectively allotted to them under the Anglo-French Convention of the 23rd December, 1920.

Paris, June 11, 1921

Enclosure in No. 132

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

PAR sa note du 21 mai, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu agréer qu'en attendant l'achèvement de la délimitation des zones de mandat, les territoires de la Syrie et de la Palestine seraient administrés séparément, sous l'administration actuelle des fractions territoriales sujettes à cette situation.

Le Gouvernement britannique demande si le Gouvernement français n'a pas d'objection à élever contre cette suggestion.

Le Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires étrangères s'empresse, en réponse

Grande-Bretagne que le Gouvernement français se rallie volontiers à cette proposition et donne des instructions dans ce sens au Haut-Commissaire de la République à Beyrouth en le priant de se mettre en relations directes avec son collègue britannique de Palestine pour la réalisation matérielle de ces instructions.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 11 juin 1921

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No. 133

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 14.)

Colonial Office, June 13, 1921

I AM directed by Mr Secretary Churchill to refer to the letter from the Agudat Chochvim of the United Kingdom of the 21st June, addressed to the Foreign Office, and to the status of the Agudat Israel Organisation, and to transmit to you, to be laid before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the accompanying copy of a further letter which has been received from the Central Bureau of this organisation.

Mr. Churchill proposes, subject to his Lordship's concurrence, to refer the Central Bureau to the Foreign Office letter of the 1st July giving them the assurance suggested by Sir Herbert Samuel in his despatch of the 16th July that their representations will receive consideration, and at the same time correcting the misapprehensions under which it appears, from paragraphs 2 and 3 of their letter of the 27th May, the Central Bureau are still labouring.

Mr. Churchill would be glad to learn in due course whether his Lordship concurs in the proposed reply.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURN

Enclosure in No. 133

Central Bureau of Agudat Israel to Colonial Office

Sir,

270, Whitechapel Road, London, May 27, 1921

I AM instructed by my committee to draw your attention to the following matter—

The Vienna office of the Agudat Israel World Organisation has been accorded the passport officer approved applications for visas to Palestine.

Owing to the increasing number of members of our Polish branches who are desirous of travelling to Palestine, the representative of the Warsaw branch of our emigration centre called on the local British passport officer for the purpose of procuring the same facilities as are accorded to our Vienna office. On the production of credentials from the Vienna British passport office, the British representative in Warsaw acceded to our request to also grant such visas as are recommended by our Warsaw centre.

We are given to understand that owing to the subsequent intervention of a representative of the Polish Zionist organisation, the British passport officer in Warsaw issued instructions for instructions.

I would respectfully draw your attention to the fact that the Polish branch of our organisation represents by far the majority of orthodox Jews residing in that country. The number of orthodox Jews in Poland is estimated at more than a quarter of a million, apart from these many thousands who, whilst adhering to our programme, are not yet enrolled.

Yours, Sir, will appreciate that there exists a keen desire amongst many of our Polish members to emigrate to Palestine, where they would certainly be a useful and constructive element, being for the most part composed of small traders, craftsmen and agricultural and technical labourers.

I am desired by my committee to express the hope that in view of the facts above

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glad to know that we had the co-operation of the Amir Abdullah. General Gouraud added that he hoped that the Amir would be wise enough to follow this advice. I append a copy of his speech and of the speech I made in reply.

8. I discussed several administrative questions during these conversations. A note of the conclusions reached was drawn up and communicated to M de Caix, and is subject to confirmation by him. The note is appended to this despatch, and I should be glad to know whether the arrangements suggested have your approval.

9. I mentioned to General Gouraud immediately on my arrival the situation with regard to the declaration of an amnesty in Mesopotamia, as stated in your telegram Nos. 97 and 98. He said that he had had no information that the declaration would be so soon as the 30th May. He had, in fact, let it be known that an amnesty would be proclaimed in Syria on the 8th June on the occasion of the Feast of Bairam. Although he regarded it as very desirable that the amnesties in Mesopotamia and Syria should be simultaneous, it would be very difficult to alter his arrangements now, and he thought it much better to make such an announcement on a definite occasion, such as

the Feast of Bairam.

10. I mentioned to General Gouraud the attitude of the Ankara Government, who had repudiated the agreement arrived at by their representative at the London Conference, and had put forward new demands of a remarkable character. These demands included not only a frontier further south than that which had been agreed but also the omission of the guarantees for the safety of the Christian population. He anticipated that there would be trouble in the quarter. He was convinced that the Kemalists were supported by the Bolsheviks, that the Germans were behind the Bolsheviks. He did not think that the Turks could take Smyrna, unless the Greek army collapsed altogether, but he was certain, on the other hand, that the Greeks could never settle the question by force of arms.

11. I took the opportunity while I was at Beirut to visit the fair which had been open there for a month and was about to close. It was an exhibition organised on an extensive scale. There were nearly 400 wooden booths and a few larger exhibition buildings. The exhibits appeared to be almost exclusively Syrian or French. It was fairly good commercial exhibition, not unsatisfactory as a first attempt. But it had cost the French Government no less than 2,000,000 fr., and it may be doubted whether the results were worth the expenditure. Owing to the commercial depression the business results are said to have been poor and few visitors attended from elsewhere than Beirut and the environs.

12. I mentioned to General Gouraud that the officers had no opportunity of showing kindness and attention to Admiral de Robeck and myself. I believe that the visit is likely to have a useful political result, which will be increased when General Gouraud comes to Jerusalem, as he intends to do at some future date.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner

Enclosure 1 in No. 135

Tout proposé par General Gouraud.

M le Haut-Commissaire,

"EUT été pour moi en tous temps un honneur et un plaisir de recevoir le représentant de Sa Majesté britannique dans cette maison de France."

J'éprouve aussi un plaisir particulier à saluer près de vous, M l'Amiral de Robeck, à côté de qui et des vaillants marins et soldats britanniques je m'honore d'avoir combattu aux Dardanelles.

Mais il me semble que votre visite comme celle que je rendais hier à M le Maréchal Foch prend dans les temps que nous traversons une signification particulière, en

car, amitié et confiance aussi nécessaires pour maintenir en Asie comme en Europe les résultats de la grande guerre qu'elles l'ont été entre nos soldats pour les obtenir.

Je sais, M le Haut-Commissaire, que telle est aussi votre pensée, et votre Excellence me permettra de la remercier des sages paroles qu'elle a adressées à Amman, il y a six semaines, à l'Amir Abdullah.

Puisse l'Emir écouter la voix de votre Excellence et comprendre que, comme vous avez dit si bien, le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité est nécessaire pour procurer le bien-être de tous et que vous ne permettrez pas que la Transjordanie devienne un centre d'hostilités soit à l'égard de la Palestine, soit à l'égard de la Syrie.

Vous savez que de mon côté je suis fermement décidé, demain comme hier, à interdire, sur le territoire de mandat français, toute agitation qui puisse porter atteinte à la grande Allée de la France, dans son pays de mandat.

Messieurs, je lève mon verre en l'honneur de Sa Majesté le Roi, de Sa Majesté la Reine, de leurs Altesses royales et des glorieuses armées et marines britanniques.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135

Sur H. Samuel's Reply to General Gouraud's Toast.

Le General Gouraud, Messieurs, Messieurs,

J'E vous remercie des aimables paroles que vous venez de prononcer.

J'ai longtemps désiré visiter mes voisins de la Syrie. La connaissance que j'ai eu le privilège de faire à Jérusalem avec M de Caix, l'Amiral de Bon, l'Amiral Morny et le General Gouraud, et de passer quelques jours dans ce pays si intéressant et si beau, m'a encouragé à le faire.

Et puis, il existe plusieurs questions d'ordre pratique et d'intérêt spécial aux deux pays, et il est bon que nous les discutions ensemble. C'est pourquoi je me suis adressé par la poste, surtout quand le courrier de Beyrouth à Jérusalem doit passer par Paris et Londres.

Je suis heureux aussi de venir à Beyrouth en compagnie de l'amiral commandant en chef la flotte britannique de la Méditerranée, et, par cette visite officielle, témoigner que la France et l'Angleterre, unies pendant la guerre, restent côte à côte en l'Orient après la paix.

Ceux qui ont combattu sur terre et sur mer contre le plus grand danger qui dans les temps modernes ait jamais menacé les libertés de l'Europe et du monde, n'oublieront sûrement pas cette camaraderie consacrée par tant d'actes héroïques.

En Palestine et en Syrie nous avons chacun nos propres problèmes et nos propres difficultés. C'était une sage remarque de Thiers: "Dans la politique il faut ne prendre que ce qui est utile et tout en sérieux."

Ces difficultés seront vaincues, ces problèmes seront résolus.

L'Administration de la Syrie et l'Administration de la Palestine sont chacune responsables de leur propre territoire. Elles ne doivent pas se gêner, mais il est bon qu'on sache que si l'une ou l'autre ne sera embarrassée par sa voisine soit directement soit indirectement, et que si des efforts seraient faits pour les éloigner l'une de l'autre ces efforts n'auraient pas le moindre succès.

Je désire aussi exprimer mon admiration profonde et respectueuse à l'armée française et à la marine française, qui pendant les dures épreuves de la guerre se sont conduites avec un courage merveilleux.

"Le Français," dit Chateaubriand, "aime le péril, parce qu'il y trouve la gloire."

De quel homme pourrait-on dire cela avec tant de vérité que de son Excellence le General Gouraud, Haut-Commissaire de la Syrie.

Personne n'a affronté plus grand péril; personne n'a trouvé plus grande gloire. En son honneur je lève mon verre.

Conclusions arrived at in Conversations at Beirut.

1. Boundary Commission

The first French representative of the western portion of the line. The second French representative may be absent at the outset.

2. Administration of Lake Huleh District

Immediately after the Commission has completed this preliminary inspection the British and French representatives will be invited to a meeting to be presided over by the Commission, without prejudice to any adjustments that may be necessary when the frontier is finally settled.

The Haut-Commissariat de la Syrie has prepared an agreement under which a train service can be begun at once. They will send a copy to Jerusalem. If necessary, Colonel Holmes will come to Beirut to discuss any points that may arise.

Article 8 of the convention of the 23rd December, 1920, provides that an expert examination of this question should take place within six months of the signature of that convention. It is agreed that this examination should be postponed without prejudice to the validity of the article.

It is desirable that the French and British Governments should decide in principle the lines of an agreement under which part of the profits on the paying portions of the railway in the French and British zones should be devoted to meeting the loss on the remainder of the railway. The details of such an agreement and the arrangements for running trains and for providing for the repairs of rolling-stock would be settled between the local Administrations. (This is subject to confirmation by General Gouraud.)

The French authorities accept in principle the provisional procedure suggested by the Palestine Government. A copy of the previous communication on this subject will be sent to Beirut.

ESTERDAY, while on a tour of inspection near Kunitra, General Gouraud was ambushed by four men disguised as gendarmes, and an officer with him was killed.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a communiqué which has been issued by the French agent and consul-general in Cairo, in connection with General Gouraud's recent visit to Egypt.

The communiqué is of interest as showing the considerable sums placed by the French Government at the disposal of their representatives for the purposes of propaganda in the Middle East.

Memorandum on General Gouraud's Gifts to Charity

THE French Diplomatic Agency has issued the following —

and the Lebanon, paid a visit, accompanied by the French Minister, to the Al Azhar University. The General was delighted with this visit. Memories of Morocco came back to him when he met the Maghribi students. He remembered with emotion that

3. a souvenir of his visit to Cairo, the General gave the following gifts. To M^r. [redacted] the charitable works of the Syrian Greek Catholic community; to M^r. [redacted] £ E 100 for the charitable works of the Syro-Armenian community; to M^r. [redacted] £ E 100 for the charitable works of the Maronite community; to M^r. [redacted] Vicaire patriarcal synagoge, £ E 50 for the charitable works of the Syrian [redacted] and to M. Habib Delhane, £ E 100 for the charitable works of the Syrian [redacted] Orthodox community.

The General also gave a sum of £ E. 100 for the Syrian Moslems. As no Syrian Moslem charitable society exists at Cairo, the £ E. 100 have been sent to the French consulate, which will distribute General Gouraud's gift to the Syrian Moslems of Cairo who have need of it.

No 135

See Herbert Samuel's Speech delivered at Jerusalem, June 3, 1921 (Communicated to Foreign Office via Colonial Office, June 28)

We are met together on the occasion of the birthday of His Majesty, King George V, to whom we would desire to offer our respectful congratulations and our good wishes for a long and prosperous reign over the vast dominions of the British Empire.

On the establishment of the civil administration in Palestine now nearly a year ago, I had the honour to convey to the people a gracious message from His Majesty. On that occasion I made a statement as to the lines of policy which the administration intended to pursue. On the 6th October last, at the inauguration of the Advisory Council, I made a second statement, reviewing the steps that had been taken during the interval. To-day, I would desire, first to give a brief survey of the measures that have since been adopted or that are now in contemplation, and next to address you upon the political situation in Palestine.

I rejoice to think that there is a keen desire among the people to enjoy the benefits of education. That is indeed the first condition of national progress. The Government has adopted a comprehensive scheme under which, in a period of four years, the whole country will be covered with schools. The people of the villages provide the building and furniture, and keep them in repair, and the Government provides the salary of the teaching staff, and the other costs of maintenance. During the last five months thirty-four new village schools have been opened providing education for 3,111 village children. State-funded schools have also been opened by the inhabitants of villages during the last two years have also been taken over by the Government. An additional thirty-five new schools will be opened during the present financial year.

Measures are at the same time being taken for the development of the two Training Colleges for men and women, and, by next September, there will be under training about eighty students in the former and over fifty students in the latter.

Teachers have also been appointed to live among the Bedouin tribes and teach the children. All this has been done from the general revenue of the country without the need of imposing any extra taxation.

Grants-in-aid are being allotted to a large number of schools maintained by religious or other organisations.

I have used my best efforts to promote, where necessary, a satisfactory settlement of the affairs of the religious communities.

At my invitation a conference composed of the leading Moslems of Palestine was held in November last to consider the administration of Awkaf and other matters. That conference appointed a committee to consult with the Government. A plan for the election of a standing committee for Moslem religious affairs was proposed by them, and accepted in principle. The details have been decided at a number of joint sittings. The duties of the committee for Moslem religious affairs will be to act on behalf of the Moslem population in matters relating to Awkaf, and to appointments to Moslem religious offices. The Government has decided to restore the revenues of the Khask Sultan Wakf, and certain other Wakfs of minor importance which were unjustly tak-

by the Turkish Government and amalgamated with the general revenue of the country. This will give to the Awkal council an additional income of about £ E. 18,000, and by means of this sum it is hoped that the Moslem authorities will establish a religious college in Palestine, which will revive the ancient traditions of the country as a centre of religious learning. I hope that the elections to the committee for religious affairs will be completed at a very early date. Meantime the funds referred to are being accumulated as from the 1st April, and will be held at their disposal.

An unfortunate dispute has taken place in the Orthodox Patriarchate, which has for some time paralysed the activities of that important body, and made its position difficult in the extreme. I appointed a learned commission to inquire into the matter, and it has recently issued its report.

The measures taken by the Government will restore the authority of the Patriarchate and will gradually enable the debts of the Patriarchate to be discharged and its finances to be re-established.

The Jewish community of Palestine possessed no satisfactory organisation for religious affairs. I invited the religious and lay leaders of the community to Jerusalem in February last. Two Joint Chief Rabbis and a Rabbiner, representing a lay element, were elected and have been accorded recognition by the Government as authorities of the Jews of Palestine.

I turn to questions of economic development. The first condition here is the improvement of communications. Without good roads, railways, ports, posts, telegraphs and telephones, no progress can be made in the construction and improvement of important main roads, so far as is possible, the funds at its disposal. The running of the railways shows considerable improvement, and there is continuous progress in the postal telegraph and telephone services. Expert investigations have been made, both at Haifa and at Jaffa, with a view to the consideration of the question of port construction.

The Government has prepared measures with a view to improving the breeds of horses, cattle and donkeys in Palestine. It would be of the greatest advantage to agriculturists for their stock to be raised to a higher standard. We proposed to purchase in Europe a number of stallions, bulls and donkeys of suitable breeds, the introduction of which will be certain to add greatly, in course of time, to the prosperity of the agriculture of Palestine.

On account of the very high cost of living in Palestine and the uncertainty as to the amount of foodstuffs available it was necessary last winter to prohibit the export from Palestine of the principal foodstuffs. A similar prohibition was enforced in Egypt, Syria and other countries upon exports of their produce. Prices having fallen and prospects of supply from Palestine, from Transjordan and from the West Bank satisfactory, these restrictions have been repealed, and, as has already been announced, in the event of no unforeseen circumstances occurring, the Government of Palestine has no intention now or in the future of interfering in any way with the freedom of export.

Owing to the financial stringency throughout the world it has not yet been found possible to found an agricultural or mortgage bank, although much time and money have been spent upon the subject. Steps are now being taken, however, which may have a better result. The funds belonging to the branches in Palestine of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank are being collected, all these sums will be devoted to the same purpose and will be made available for cultivators. Meantime the Government has advanced £ E. 370,000 in agricultural loans.

Last year's revenue was satisfactory. The revenue received by this Administration is much larger than that received by the Turkish Administration, but it must not be supposed from this that the rates of taxation paid by the people have been increased. They have not been increased, and, on the contrary, certain taxes, comparatively small in amount, have been abolished. The increase in revenue is partly due to the fact that the railway receipts and the receipts of the Ottoman Debt administration now come into the Treasury of the Government of Palestine. These two heads amount to over £ E. 1,000,000 a year, and against them there is to be charged expenditure upon the railways and upon the Ottoman Debt. The increase is partly due also to the growing prosperity of the country, which has led to an increase in the taxes levied. It is not to be expected that the Government will be able to spend for the benefit of the population, and are no longer diminished by wasteful or corrupt methods of collection.

I would mention that there is no charge upon the funds of Palestine for any expenditure in Transjordan.

The tobacco régime has been abolished in Palestine to the great relief of the people.

With respect to administration, the police force has not yet reached a satisfactory standard of efficiency, and steps are being taken for its improvement. It is intended to raise a new branch of the police force, to consist of about 500 men of a good standard drawn from all sections of the population. They will receive somewhat of the same training as the British police force, and will be supervised by British officials. This force will be employed partly in guarding the frontiers of Palestine against possible raids and partly as a reserve in the event of disturbances.

It is necessary to postpone for the time being the creation of the military defence force which was recently contemplated.

The heavy task of organising the various departments of an efficient administration is being undertaken. I hope to be able to effect this year and next reductions in the number of higher officials employed in the administration.

With respect to immigration, which arouses so much interest, in this connection I stated in my inaugural address on the 7th July of last year that its extent must be proportioned to the employment available in the country. It is indeed necessary that it should be strictly so proportioned and, further, that the employment should be new work and work of a permanent character. Immigration has been suspended pending a review of the situation.

Rules have now been laid down that persons belonging to the following classes may be admitted into Palestine:—

- (a.) Travellers, i.e., people who do not intend to settle in Palestine and whose stay will not exceed three months.
- (b.) Persons of independent means.
- (c.) Members of professions who intend to follow their calling in Palestine.
- (d.) Wives, children and other persons wholly dependent on residents of Palestine.
- (e.) Persons who have a definite prospect of employment with specified employers or enterprises.

The enforcement of these rules will be in the hands of British consuls and of the Immigration and Travel Department of the Government of Palestine. In addition, a number of persons who, at the moment that the suspension of immigration was announced, had left their homes, had disposed of their possessions, and had arrived, or had embarked at European ports in order to come to Palestine, will now be allowed to enter.

But it must be definitely recognised that the conditions of Palestine are such as not to permit anything in the nature of a mass immigration.

Among the new arrivals have been a number—comparatively, I am informed, a very small proportion of the whole—who are tainted with the pernicious doctrines of Bolshevian doctrines which carry with them the economic ruin of all classes in any country that they enter. The known members of this group have been arrested. All those among them who are aliens and who are not liable to be punished first for offences committed in connection with the disturbances at Jaffa will be expelled forthwith from the country. The closest care will be taken to prevent the infiltration into Palestine of other persons of that character.

I am anxious that the people of Palestine should be able to elect their representatives to the administration established under the Government of Palestine.

As has recently been announced, steps will at once be taken to re-establish the system of election in municipalities. We have not yet had time to consider those events and their causes before pronouncing an opinion. But it is certain that nothing can excuse flagrant crimes, such as the murders, the assaults, and the looting.

from enteric fever and living in insanitary surroundings, so I ordered his removal to the Indian hospital. I am waiting to see whether the Arab authorities will object.

In the meantime, the local Government are preparing their own hospital. Another medical officer, Dr. T. Fahmy, has arrived from Egypt by the latest boat.

Pilgrimage.

The number of pilgrims who have arrived by sea is now 37,000. They come from the Dutch East Indies and Singapore, 2,484 from India, 1,451 from the Soudan.

The steamship "Zayam" arrived from Karachi on the 31st May. All the pilgrims had single tickets, and I regret to say that about 100 were penniless and could not pay the boat hire of 12 piastres a head. They were searched and found to have no money and were allowed to go free. Of these penniless pilgrims, some had been provided with a free passage by the Nizam of Hyderabad and some by the merchants of Bombay.

There were among the pilgrims a considerable number of Bokhara, Afghans, and other frontier tribes and also twenty-four Russian subjects.

Of the 1,002 pilgrims on board, only twenty deposited money at the Bank of Egypt.

The pilgrims from the steamship "Jeddah" (which arrived from Bombay on the 4th June) were disembarked without any local quarantine, as there was only one death on board during the voyage. The majority of the pilgrims were Indians, but there were also a few from the Soudan, Persia, and Bokhara.

His Highness Mehtar of Chitral and Kazi Sulaiman (magistrate of Patiala State, and author) were among the pilgrims. The pilgrims had return tickets, but forty-eight were penniless and had not sufficient money to pay the boat hire ashore.

Arrangements are being made at Mecca for another caravan to proceed to Medina. It is expected that it will be raised to twenty before the caravan is completed. It is stated that Sheikh Faisal of the Hamada is still levying a tax on each camel and has men stationed at the entrance of the pass to collect the same.

The Jahlah tribe are reported to have looted a small caravan of Indian pilgrims on their way back from Medina. All money, foodstuffs, and baggage were taken, but the camels and shukhs were left. Three Javanese pilgrims arrived at Jeddah from Babagh in a destitute state. They fell behind their comrades and were looted by Bedouins and Arabs.

The "Jeddah" will sail on the evening of the 11th June to embark on the "Northbrook," which is due at noon on the 11th. It is not yet decided if King Hussein will accompany him to Jeddah.

Emir Ali has reached Medina in safety. He did not go direct from Yenbo to Medina, but went from Yenbo to Buwat and then to Medina via the railway line. He was accompanied by an escort of 300 people, including many sheikhs and notables.

It is reported that oil has been discovered in the Northern Hedjaz, between El Waj and El Ula, and also in the Farasan Islands, north of Kamaran.

Sheikh Mohammed Said Kadayam, a member of the new Kadayam sect, a new sect of some importance in the Punjab, has arrived in Jeddah and left for Mecca by the "Jeddah."

It is reported that Emir Faisal is arranging a conference of Arab leaders and important Moslems during the coming hajj, and has sent deputations to the various Arab rulers. An interview between Faisal and an Indian barrister, Mr. T. Kadir Bhai, is published in the Indian press. In this interview Faisal said he wished for a united Moslem world and that he would like a deputation from India to come to Mecca to discuss the matter. He is further stated to have said that his family had no intention to claim for the Khilafate, but that in their hearts they believe the Sultan of Turkey the lawful Khalifah of the Moslem world.

Apart from these current rumours, there is no confirmation of the congress referred to in your telegram No. 51 of the 21st May. I think that any congress which may be arranged will be of a private and not of an official nature.

Britain. It explains that it would be considered stupidity for the "Al Qibla" to be so and Great Britain wrong, but "the river might contain something which the sea does not." A sincere friend might sometimes be compelled to be rude or mad in his friend. When the Zionists came to Palestine they circulated Bolshevik proclamations, and this cost Great Britain much money and the sacrifice of many lives.

In a quotation from "Al Ahrar" newspaper No. 12424 on Transjordan, it states that matters are going satisfactorily there since the meeting of Mr. Churchill and Emir Abdullah. Military and civil officials have been appointed and the country has been divided into districts. The French Intelligence Department at Homs announced that Emir Abdullah had shot two spies. This is not true because, though condemned by a court-martial, Emir Abdullah had abrogated the sentence of death to one of the prisoners. The British Government had appointed an agent who had nothing to do with local Government just as in other independent countries. The British agent offered to obtain coal for the railways, but the Government refused for fear of foreign interference. The "Al Qibla" thanks Great Britain for complying with the desire of the inhabitants on the matter of independence, and the difficulty which formerly arose was that the British Government was waiting until everything is clearly settled.

"Al Qibla" No. 486 contains a Royal Proclamation, stating that the reason why the Powers, and why they had not yet carried out schemes required for the welfare and prosperity of the country, was because they were still waiting for a solution of the remainder of the terms included in their agreement with the Allies.

A leading article in the same number of the "Al Qibla" refers to the unfaithfulness of the European Powers, and states that the reformation of the Treaty of Sevres is due to some secret action committed by Italy and France without the knowledge of Great Britain, and says that this will never prove the unity of the civilised world.

"Al Qibla" No. 487 contains a notification from the Acting Prime Minister that the Arab Government announces to all the Moslem world that many people are propagating, throughout Islamic regions, false rumours that the Hedjaz is in lack of security, water, and means of comfort. This is done to discourage those who wish to visit the holy places. He announces that, though the Government is only recently established, the country is in good condition and all means of prosperity and comfort are provided.

There is another article criticising the French policy and accusing the French of being unfaithful to the British, while the latter were the only cause of saving the Hedjaz.

At the end of the 29th May, 1921—King Hussein sent me a copy of this paper on the 28th May, and drew my attention to an article referring to the visit of the French warship to Jeddah, and the address delivered by King Hussein to the French admiral.

The paper publishes the King's Speech, and after giving a short comment on it, asks the following questions:—

1. What would be the penalty to the man who disunited and attacked the Moslems from behind, thus exposing the coastline to danger, which was followed by blockade of the ports and occupation?
2. Has any advantage been gained by the Moslems from the federation with the British Government and acting in compliance with her instructions, or has it led to disunity and downfall?
3. What would be the penalty of the man who had been the cause of running the Hedjaz Railway, which was constructed out of the private money of the Moslems in general, and which was of great service to all who visited the sacred places; and, further, who is that man so that the Moslems may charge him?
4. Who has been the cause of losing Bagdad, all Mesopotamia and Palestine, and putting the whole lot in the hands of the British, who are the enemies of Islam, thus making Jerusalem as merchandise to be bought by the Jews?
5. Which of the two is better and useful to the Moslems? What has been done by that Sherref or what has been done by the hero of Asia Minor?
6. What is meant by "His Majesty the Deliverer?" In the speech there is a reference to the "Deliverer" who has saved our country. Is it possible that this can mean anything else except that it is Turkish?

W. E. MARSHALL, Major, R.A.M.C.,
British Agent and Consul

Shipping Intelligence to June 9, 1921

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Passengers Disembarked.	Cargo Discharged.
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No. 141

(No. 7)

Alapxe, March 22, 1921

I left Smyrna on the 21st February. The situation in the Greek zone was calm. The Greeks were keeping order in all parts of it, and, judging by the fact that no attempt had been made by Moslems living under Greek administration on Greek communications, the Moslems appear to have accepted their treatment for

The Greek army is confident of being able to deal with the Kemalist forces, the latter have made no serious attempt to attack the Greeks.

but both Venizelists and Royalists are united in desiring to continue operations against the Turks.

We called at Rhodes and Adalia. In both places Italians and Moslems are working hand in hand. At Adalia the control of shipping and passengers is carried out by Moslems and Italians. The latter have a garrison of about 200 men in the town and seemed somewhat afraid of the Turks and subservient to them. An Italian merchant was put on our ship (British steamship "Paltaun") during all our stay both at Adalia and Rhodes.

A Turkish notable and landowner of Alaya, named Tewfik, came on board at Adalia bound for Beirut and Egypt. He owns forests, and was travelling in connection with a large timber business. He was not a very intelligent man, but he was a very honest one. He was at Mersina and Tripoli.

I had several conversations with him, during which he told me that Mustafa Kemal had reorganised his forces and had forbidden independent irregular chiefs like Ethem Bey, of Salihli and Demirci Mehmed Efendi, of Nush and district, to operate unless incorporated in the regular army under his orders.

Tevfik further said that Komitat propaganda was being carried on in Adalia and district. After a speech by one Suikri, from Angora, over 1,000 men had volunteered in Adalia district, and 800 Manisra had been landed in. Even the women were ready to go and fight. Recently the Italians had supplied 2,000 uniforms to Adalia district and Turkish firms a suit. Anatolia would not be settled until Smyrna and Armonia were recognised as being Turkish. The Turks were indifferent about the fate of Constantinople, where effeminate Byzantine Turks spent their time in amusements and fought for empty ministerial honours. Smyrna had been Turkish for 600 years, and Turks would never allow a people like the Greeks, who had been under their rule, to

become powerful again. If the British had kept one corporal in each large town in Anatolia there would have been order and prosperity in the country. A petition to that effect was once got up in Adana, but the Italians stopped it. If the Smyrna and Armenian questions were settled to the satisfaction of the Anatolian Moslems, they would have no desire to follow the Angora Government in any other questions. As the French the Turks thought they were, as a race, decreasing in number and decadent. Their treatment of women had not been good, and this had raised the local people against them.

It appears that villagers living close to the Japanese brigades at night and snipe French forces.

As a scene of great activity. Great quantities of military stores were being imported. The railway was nearing completion. Road communication with Aleppo was for the time being safe, but people going into the country, even fairly close to the town, were armed.

Herout to Aleppo.—The only matter of note on the railway journey was at the station of Aboudouloun, where an Arab cavalry patrol was seen. I was told that they had been operating in the district of Idlib.

Aleppo.—I called on General de Lamothe, who is in command of the 2nd division and is representative of the French High Commissioner, and on M. Reclus, Chief Secretary and Adviser to the Government of Aleppo. Aleppo, Alexandretta and Edessa form an independent State under French control. The flag is white with the French colours in the corner and three golden stars on the fly. The Government is carried on by native officials under French control. The Moslem supremacy over native Christian elements is maintained.

I gathered from the French that the fall of Aintab had quietened things down and released a number of troops. Since the fall of that town trouble, which appears to be chronic, occurred and is still going on in the district of Idlib, south-west of Aleppo, where local Moslems, led, according to the French, by Turkish officers, have rebelled against French authority. A strong French column was despatched about the 9th March against these rebels. On the 13th March a fight took place near the village of Kennirji, where four French officers, including a major, were killed or mortally wounded. The public funeral of three of the officers took place at Aleppo on the 18th March. The body of the fourth officer remained in the hand of the rebels.

The officers who were killed belonged to the 19th and 32nd Algerian Tirailleurs.

Operations are still going on in Idlib region.

Apart from the Idlib district there is nothing of much importance to report. Peace has been made between the French and Hachem and Muchhem Beys, two Arab chiefs who control the Rakka-Edessa region, east of Aleppo, and there is hope that communications with Bagdad will benefit as a result. During the week a camel caravan reached Aleppo from Bagdad after three months' journey, but this has been the only caravan which has succeeded in getting through.

General.—The French opinion is for peace with the Kemalists at all cost. According to General de Lamothe, peace with Turkey was necessary to avoid local trouble and its repercussion on the Moslem world; Turkish resistance in 1921 was much better organised and more formidable than that of the spring of 1920, and operations round Aintab recalled trench warfare in France. The general holds also the view that Kemal's forces would easily dispose of the Greek army.

Both French and Italians seem to have been persuaded (perhaps because they wished to be persuaded) that the Greeks were seriously defeated in their operations near Eskişehir at the beginning of this year.

The French have very little good to say of the Armenians. They profess to think they are not worth fighting for.

The general spoke of a Turkish concentration near Urfa, but thought it might be destined for operations near Bagdad or Mosul.

Conclusion.—Comparison of the French zone here and the Greek zone in Smyrna is immensely in favour of the latter. The Greeks have shown much more competence in dealing with their troubles than the French. They keep order in their zone and their troops have inspired respect into the Turkish troops and are capable of, and willing to, continue operations against them. Moreover, they are of opinion that Mustafa Kemal is putting up a bluff.

The French troops seem bewildered with the resistance they encounter, and exaggerate the Turkish power of resistance and offence. This has led them to make an agreement which looks almost like a capitulation. The conclusion of the agreement is announced as follows in the local press:—

"La France, continuant sa politique traditionnelle de sympathie et de bonté à l'égard de la Turquie, a réussi, grâce à ses efforts et malgré les difficultés qu'elle a éprouvées à faire adopter ses conceptions par ses Alliés, à faire bénéficier la Turquie d'un traitement aussi logique que possible; c'est ainsi qu'elle a pu obtenir que les pays de langue turque reviennent au Gouvernement de Constantinople.

"La France, toujours soucieuse de remplir immédiatement ses obligations, a signé avec les représentants de Turquie à Londres un armistice en vertu duquel les pays de langue turque occupés actuellement par elle seront remis à la Turquie.

"Dans ces circonstances, la France, bien qu'ayant été toujours victorieuse et alors que la récente victoire d'Aintab venait une fois de plus de lui donner le droit de dicter sa volonté, a été uniquement guidée par le respect des droits des nationalités et par la répugnance qu'elle éprouve à infliger plus longtemps aux populations les horreurs de la guerre avec le malaise économique qui en est la conséquence.

"D'ailleurs, de sérieux avantages économiques lui ont été accordés en compensation de son geste de générosité."

This agreement only postpones trouble. It would certainly be better for Syria and Mesopotamia and for the Christians living in Turkey and are abandoned to the Turks if French and Italians withdrew their opposition to Greek action and co-operate with them; but French and Italians, feeling themselves unable to cope with the Turks, have to proclaim that Greeks cannot do so, and to oppose the continuance of their operations.

(Copies to Constantinople, Cairo and Beirut.)

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

P.S.—A piece of information, curious if true, by Tewfik, of Alaya, was that Ender Pasha was in Tashkend, and that when flying there, dressed as a German officer, he came down in Roumania and was taken prisoner. He was handed over to the British authorities, who were unaware of his identity and released him a month or two later.

J. M.

[C 12331/92/18]

No. 142

Karl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 1634.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 13, 1921.

THE French Ambassador, having asked to see me with a special message from his Government, called upon me at my private house yesterday, Sunday, morning.

His first point was with regard to the treatment of mandates at the forthcoming meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. His Government had, as I knew, in deference to the objections raised in Washington, proposed that the consideration of Mandates A should not be taken at the impending meeting of the Council. He now, however, desired to suggest that this reserve should not apply to Mandates B, which touched upon no particular American interest, and he hoped that the British Government would join with the French in representing to Washington that it was desirable to dispose of these mandates without delay.

His Excellency then commenced a discussion upon the Silesian question, reading to me a prolonged telegram from M. Briand, containing the latest French version of affairs, as reported from Silesia two days previously. The telegram contained the usual complaint against the attitude of the British, upon whom the French sought to place all responsibility for the delays and difficulties that had occurred. It referred with particular asperity to the recent firing upon and imprisonment of French soldiers by a portion of the German bands. It threw upon His Majesty's Government the sole responsibility for the delay in setting up a neutral zone. In general, it implied that the situation in Silesia—which, it may be remarked in passing, was largely due in the first place to the deliberate inertia, and has since been aggravated by the converted delays, of the French—was exclusively due to the maleficent activities of the British Government and the British representatives.

I said at once that I resented this tone of insistent complaint and reproach from the French Government; that there was in fact not a word of justification for it; that the boot was entirely upon the other leg; and that courtesy alone induced me to desist from repeating the demonstration which I had previously offered of the complicity of French soldiers and commanders in the rising, and of the procrastination of the French Government in dealing with the matter at this end. As to the incident of the French soldiers, I remarked that our information was that it had been due to a misunderstanding, and that it had been satisfactorily explained in Silesia. I informed him that a British soldier of the Black Watch had been shot, presumably by one of the Polish insurgents, in a fracas the day before; but I had not at once approached the French Government with a complaint about this. Such incidents were liable to occur in a situation of so much complexity and conflict.

The Ambassador seemed to think that the British were specially responsible for having allowed the French soldiers to be detained for twenty-four hours.

I declined, however, to discuss the matter further, saying that much larger issues were at stake.

As regards the neutral zone and the situation in general, his remarks were, I said, to a certain extent rendered obsolete by the events of the past two days. I read to him the greater part of a lengthy telegram from Sir Harold Stuart, dated only the day before in which was explained the plan for a progressive withdrawal

from the disputed area, by the insurgents on the one side and the Germans on the other: the inference being that the evacuated area would be occupied by the Allied Commission, using for the purpose the augmented Allied forces now at their disposal. The telegram reported that there was fair ground for believing that both sides would withdraw: the Germans to the left bank of the Oder, the insurgents to the eastern boundary of "Kreis." The whole object of the Allies should be to create this vacuum between the opposing forces, to get it effectively occupied by Allied troops, and to re-establish the authority of the Allied Commission.

It seemed to me, I added, that the appointment of Sir Harold Stuart had already exercised a most beneficial effect upon the situation. Personally, I had always held—and here the Ambassador indicated his assent—that it was a great mistake to place the commission entirely in the hands of military men. If the French had followed, or were now able to follow, our example in sending a prominent civilian, I was certain that much better results would be obtained. I thought that the French attitude in supporting General Le Rond had been one of the main contributory causes of the trouble. Now, however, that the commission were functioning better, it seemed to me superfluous and unwise to complicate the matter by sending a fresh body of experts to over-ride them. We had accepted this proposal merely in order to make things easier for M. Briand, but we now thought that it was more than doubtful whether it possessed any merit. Much the best thing would surely be to get the commission, after establishing their position, to make another report to the Allies. The matter could then be brought before a meeting of the Supreme Council—and here I pointed out that the delay in summoning the latter, which we were ready to attend at any moment, was due exclusively to M. Briand—and, if the Supreme Council wanted expert assistance, either in examining the report of the commission or in arriving at a decision themselves, they could doubtless procure it.

Inasmuch as I was about to send to Paris the important despatch inviting French discussion and co-operation in the settlement of the troublesome affairs of Turkey and Greece, I thought it only right to acquaint the French Ambassador with the decisions of His Majesty's Government and the step I was on the eve of taking. Accordingly, I explained to him the exact sequence of events—not failing to point out the disastrous failure that had attended the attempt of the French Government to come to terms with Mustapha Kemal behind our backs. I indicated the dangers of the present position. I explained the policy which we had decided to recommend, namely: a mutual desistance from hostilities (unless the Greeks and Turks had already come to blows) with a view to negotiations to be undertaken by the Powers, these negotiations to involve certain very considerable concessions to the Turks, including a substantial modification as regards the future position of Smyrna; while, as regards the Greeks, an enquiry would be made into the conditions under which, if the negotiations were either refused by the Turks or broke down, the existing embargo upon the Greek purchase of arms, ammunition, aeroplanes, &c., could be removed, and a blockade instituted in the Black Sea in order to prevent the Kemalists from obtaining Bolshevik supplies. I told the Ambassador that the despatch concluded with an offer on my part to go to Paris any day, in order to discuss matters with M. Briand.

His Excellency, accepting my general account of the situation, expressed unofficially warm sympathy with the object that I had in view, and did not think that it would meet with anything but assent from the French Government.

Incidentally, he was very curious to know why it was that M. Venizelos had been in this country, and what was the nature of the consultations that had taken place with him. Obviously the Ambassador suspected that there had been some sort of plot between His Majesty's Government and that statesman.

I told him frankly that the very reverse was the case. I had seen M. Venizelos only with a view of ascertaining from him whether he thought it likely, in the present circumstances, that the Greek Government would accept such a suggestion as I had outlined, and whether, had he himself been in power, he would have given it a warm or a cold welcome. I had been relieved to hear from M. Venizelos that, while he expressed no opinion upon the present position of the Greek forces in Asia Minor, or on the policy of King Constantine, he nevertheless agreed that an attempt should be made to compose matters at the present juncture, upon lines in general accord with those that I had mentioned.

The Comte de Saint-Aulaire evidently regarded this information as of great value, and thought that it would make a material difference to the attitude of King

Constantine and his advisers in pursuing a reasonable policy if they had any idea that, in doing so, they were not liable to be assailed by M. Venizelos and his party for lack of patriotism or an abandonment of their country's interests.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

C 12330/704/22

No. 143.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 501.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 13, 1921.

I SAW the Italian Ambassador by appointment yesterday, Sunday. He had just returned from Rome, and he desired to bring me the latest expression of the policy of Count Sforza. The latter, without being definitely wedded to the scheme which he had put forward for the territorial solution of the Silesian frontier question, nevertheless hoped that it would provide a suitable basis for discussion, and that it would be supported by the British representatives. However that might be, Count Sforza had instructed the Ambassador to tell me that, whenever the Supreme Council assembled, he would be found in general support of the British attitude and policy; that the main object of the Italian Government was to give a good chance to the new Government of Dr. Wirth; and that Italian policy was directed now, as it had been throughout, to the early re-establishment of peace in Europe.

I said that I was very glad to receive these assurances; but I could not help remembering that they preceded with almost mathematical regularity every Allied Conference which I had so far attended. I entirely believed that Count Sforza's general policy was on the same lines as our own; but I had usually found that, when a conference met, Count Sforza's sympathy either evaporated or at any rate was expressed only in formulas of a very general description; and that on many occasions, when we had expected his earnest and powerful support, this support had either been given in a very half-hearted way or had been altogether withheld. I thought, if I might venture to say so, that the best service Count Sforza could render to the Allied cause would be by taking a more definite attitude at the meetings of the Supreme Council on the points concerning which he was never tired of assuring us that his sympathies were entirely in accord with our own.

I then took advantage of the occasion to make a statement to the Ambassador, the need for which had long been in my mind, regarding the general policy pursued by the Italian Government in the Near and Middle East. We all of us knew, I said, that Italy was animated by a special feeling of regard for the Turks, and that she had throughout sought to build for herself a position of peculiar influence in Asia Minor. This had been particularly true of the Italian relations with Mustapha Kemal, whose delegation had been brought by Italians through Adalia to Europe, with whom they had kept up close relations, both in Rome and in Angora, and whom they were, rightly or wrongly, believed to have assisted in even more material ways. This did not, however, prevent me from regarding with considerable astonishment the secret treaty which Count Sforza had concluded with Bekir Sami Bey in London—an agreement concluded without our knowledge and behind our backs, and the contents of which we learnt only at a later date.

Here Signor de Martino interposed to state his impression that Count Sforza, while in London, had informed me of what he was doing.

I replied that I had no recollection of Count Sforza's having mentioned the matter to me at all, even in the most indirect or general way. Whether he had or not, he had most certainly not given me any idea of what the contents of the agreement turned out to be. It transpired that, although the Italians had no such excuse for hasty agreement as had the French, who were bent upon recovering their prisoners and extricating their stricken forces from a dangerous position in Cilicia, the Italians had sought to conclude an agreement with Angora which not only provided for their commercial position under the Tripartite Agreement, but also went so far as to promise future support to the Kemalists in pressing for the abandonment of the main clauses in the Treaty of Sevres, as regards Smyrna and otherwise, which they themselves—that is, the Italians—had signed. This, I thought, was a most extraordinary position. I did not understand what defence could possibly be offered for it. That a party to a treaty which it had signed, and

the ratification of which it had urged, should, behind the backs of its Allies, agree to support the enemy in abrogating the main provisions of that treaty was to me quite inexplicable. Nor could I, I said, accept the defence of the Ambassador, which was somewhat diffidently offered, that there had been no concealment about the sympathies of the Italian Government throughout, since they had never been in favour of those parts of the treaty to which I had referred. This contention enabled me to ask at once why, then, had they signed the treaty as it stood; why had they not taken the opportunity, repeatedly presented to them, of effecting amendments; why, above all, had they attempted to compass their ends in this clandestine and tortuous way?

I went on to give another illustration, if the reports that I had received were correct, of a similar attitude on the part of the Italian Foreign Minister. The British Government, who had for eighty years had close relations with the State of Afghanistan, contiguous as it was to the frontiers of India, and who had throughout the greater part of that time subsidised and exercised complete control over the foreign policy of the Afghan rulers, had for some time been engaged in negotiating a new arrangement with the Afghan Government, which was on the verge of conclusion. Any day the British Government might hear that it was signed. Under it, the Ameer would once more receive a large subsidy from the British Government, and would thereby admit the superior and predominant political influence of Great Britain in his country. It was true that he was at the same time being assailed in Kabul by political missions and requests for treaties of alliance with the Soviet Government and with Turkey. Moreover, he had sent an Afghan mission of a somewhat suspicious character to Europe, and this mission was now travelling about from place to place. Great was my surprise when I heard that this mission had been in Rome, and that, without a word of reference to us, it had concluded, or was alleged to have concluded, an agreement with the Italian Government, who were forthwith to despatch a representative and mission to Kabul.

Whatever might be said for or against the policy of such an agreement, that the Italian Government should have concluded it, if they had, without any reference to us, was a proceeding against which I felt that I had the right to utter a vehement protest. What would the Italian Government have thought if, in some region contiguous to their possessions in Africa or elsewhere, the British Government had, behind their backs and without any attempt to consult them or keep them informed, concluded a secret agreement with the powerful ruler of such a region? If this report was true—and, in view of what had been done with Angora, it seemed to me not incredible—I desired seriously to ask the Ambassador in what direction his Government intended to go? Did they hold themselves at liberty, while professing a warm and close alliance with ourselves, to conclude behind our backs these secret agreements, which might very well be in direct conflict with our interests?

If that was the view of Italian policy, it seemed to me that Count Sforza was moving deliberately in the direction of a rupture of that concord upon which the peace of the world depended, and that I was justified in asking for some clear intimation from him as to what was his intention.

Signor de Martino declared that it was new to him that any such agreement had been concluded; but he remembered having either seen or heard in Rome of a delegation of Afghans, whom I think he said he had seen in picturesque costume on some official occasion. He was under the impression that your Excellency was aware both of their presence and of their object. He even believed that you must be acquainted with the agreement, if it had been concluded; and he was surprised that no communication on the subject had been received from you by the Foreign Office. He would at once enquire of his Government, as I undertook to do from your Excellency, what had happened in the matter.

His Excellency, who seemed to be very ill-acquainted with the history and position of Afghanistan, then went on to cross-examine me closely upon the degree of political independence enjoyed by that country.

I gave him a history of our relations with successive Afghan Ameer, and acknowledged that we no longer claimed to exercise that complete control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan which we had been in a position to do before the war. Had we still been in that position, an Afghan mission would not be wandering about Europe at the present time. But this fact did not alter the broad fact that Afghanistan, by virtue of its position and history, lay within the sphere of British political influence, and that, whether foreign Powers were or were not at liberty

to conclude separate agreements with its Government, it was almost inconceivable that an Allied Government, fully acquainted with the situation, as it must be, and affecting to march at our side in close co-operation for the settlement of the East, should conclude such an arrangement without any reference to ourselves. I had been a warm supporter of the Italian Alliance throughout; British armies had fought in the war on Italian soil for the defence of Italian interests and Italian territory; our policy with regard to Germany had been substantially the same. It was, therefore, a matter of much surprise and distress to me that Italy should conceive herself at liberty—without any interests at all, or with only insignificant interests, in the parts of the world to which I had referred—to strike out a policy of her own, sometimes in divergence from us, anyhow without our knowledge. I thought that the Ambassador could render a real service to his country, about the continued friendship of which with ourselves he had often spoken to me, by reporting frankly to his official superiors the doubts and apprehensions that were growing in my mind.

The Ambassador, who was a good deal concerned at what I had said, but who did not at any stage express dissent, undertook to do as I had asked.

I may add that, as regards the pro-Kemalist policy of his Government, I was able to point out with a certain amount of sardonic satisfaction that it had so far been a disastrous failure, inasmuch as, while Count Sforza's London Agreement had been repudiated in Angora, the Italians had found themselves in so perilous a position at Adalia that they had had to withdraw from that port. This failure would, I thought, render it easier for the Italian Government to adopt a different and more candid policy in the future.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 7279/143/44]

No. 144.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 533.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 24, 1921.

THE Italian Ambassador, having asked to see me to present a message from Count Sforza, commenced by reading out a telegram from the latter, in which the Italian Foreign Minister deplored the lack of union which had recently characterised the policy of the Allied Powers in the East; suggested that, before resuming the discussion of this question at the next meeting of the Supreme Council, there should be a confidential exchange of views between them; trusted that from this examination there might emerge a new and harmonious Allied policy for those parts of the world; and ended by reviving the suggestion, which Signor de Martino had at an earlier date placed before me, namely, that there might be a resumption of the discussions, which had been initiated with Lord Grey just before the commencement of the war, concerning a Mediterranean agreement between Italy and Great Britain.

I said at once that no one was more disposed than myself to maintain the close harmony between the Allies, which had been the accepted basis of our action during the past few years, and to which, for my own part, I had been wholly loyal; but I felt bound to tell his Excellency that, in view of the recent policy and actions of Count Sforza himself, a more unfavourable moment for opening discussions as to a closer alliance or understanding could not, in my opinion, have been found, and that before I even entered into a discussion on the matter I should have to be convinced that there was a radical change in the attitude and policy of Count Sforza himself. While Signor Nitti's Government was in power there had been, as testified at numerous conferences, a close unity of spirit and action between our two Governments. We had almost always, at any rate in European politics, been found to take the same view, and we had jointly exercised our influence in the pacification of Europe. Since Count Sforza, however, had become Foreign Minister, he had preferred to pursue an Asiatic policy of his own, which was not only independent of ours, but in many respects quite inconsistent with it, and the recent symptoms of which had caused me the gravest surprise and alarm.

I then referred to the conversation which Sir Eyre Crowe, acting upon my instructions, had recently held with his Excellency, and I said that it was probably not necessary for me to do more than to recapitulate the main points, although I had something further to add to them. It was somewhat astonishing to hear a

complaint from Count Sforza of lack of unity between the Allies when he himself was mainly responsible for it. What was the good of talking about an alliance, when one of the Allies thought it open to him, while actually engaged in a conference with the others, to conclude an agreement behind their backs, or at any rate behind the back of one—namely, England—in which he openly pledged himself to support an enemy Power, in this case the Angora Government, against the Allied body of which he himself was a member, and against a treaty upon which his own signature was still wet? I had as yet heard no explanation or defence of this procedure, and I remained lost in astonishment at it.

The second point in which Count Sforza had claimed a liberty, inconsistent with any conception of an alliance, as I understood it, was that of the recent agreement which he had concluded at Rome with a mission from Afghanistan. Here again I was at a loss to understand how the Italian Government could reconcile such procedure with the sentiments which they now professed. If the defence were offered that Afghanistan was an independent State, the answer was at once clear, that no one knew better than the Italians, with their ramification of agents throughout the East, what were the real relations between Afghanistan and Great Britain, and how predominant had been for the last eighty years, and must continue for geographical reasons to be, the political influence of Great Britain at Kabul. If Count Sforza's proceedings were so innocent, why had he omitted to tell us what he was doing? I understood his defence now to be that Italy had commercial relations with Afghanistan which he was desirous of maintaining. I had yet to find anyone who could define to me their nature, and I doubted very much whether Count Sforza himself would find it easy to demonstrate their existence.

I had, however, received information within the last twenty-four hours which showed me very clearly what was the view taken of these innocent commercial relations at Kabul. I had seen a telegram from Afghanistan which categorically stated that the Government of Italy were prepared to sell arms and implements of every kind to the Afghan Government. If this were true, as I could hardly believe it to be, was it the kind of arrangement that Count Sforza, in his desire for a closer alliance with ourselves, thought himself at liberty to make? Hearing that the same Afghan mission had gone from Rome to Paris, I had taken the trouble to enquire what view the French Government took of it, and whether any similar action was contemplated there. I had only this afternoon received the reply that M. Briand would not dream of doing anything of the sort. It was obvious, therefore, that the views of Paris coincided very closely with those which I had ventured to express.

But I went on to say that my case was not confined to that of Angora and Afghanistan alone. Every Foreign Office in the world, the Italian, no doubt, not less than our own, had the means of securing information as to what was going on in most parts of the world. It could not be by a mere coincidence, nor could it be due to some great mistake, that from a dozen different quarters, not merely in the East, but in Europe, information reached me that Count Sforza was pursuing a policy quite independent of British interests, and sometimes sharply opposed to them. It was not possible or desirable for me to specify cases, but when I was aware of the fact that the Italian Foreign Minister would sometimes give simultaneous assurances of his support to ourselves on the one hand, and to other parties, with whom we were in disagreement, on the other, I could not feel very confident that a single or uniform policy was being pursued. I had not met with a similar experience in any other quarter, and the impression left upon my mind had deepened and strengthened with every month that passed. I felt sure that, until there was an open and permanent departure from this line of action, it was useless to pursue the larger line of discussion which the Ambassador had recommended.

Signor de Martino, who had listened to my statement without protest, and, I think, also without much surprise, cordially agreed that it was impossible even to contemplate the discussion which his chief desired unless the ground was cleared by the removal of all the obstacles which the independent attitude of his Government had created. The remarkable thing was that at no point did he attempt any defence. This may perhaps be explained by the somewhat delicate relations that are believed to subsist between Count Sforza and himself, and which would perhaps render it not altogether disagreeable to one to see the other put into an unpleasant corner.

Indeed, the Ambassador went on to explain that he thought the case which I had presented had better be made to Count Sforza by yourself rather than by him.

This, I suggested, was a somewhat unusual form of procedure, and I had every confidence that he would adopt the more normal method of reporting to his Government the case which I had thought it my duty to make. If he was at all afraid that his presentation of the case would be open to suspicion, I would consider the propriety of giving instructions to you to support his representations.

Signor de Martino, changing the subject, then sought information from me as to what was in contemplation as regards the possible modification or cancellation of the Tripartite Agreement with Turkey. His Government were very much alarmed at the suggestion that this might be proposed. It represented their sole spoils of war, and public opinion in Italy would never allow of this modification.

I felt bound, not for the first time, to contest his Excellency's reading of history. In Europe, I pointed out that none of the victorious Allies had gained more out of the victory than Italy; while in Asia, where they had not, so far as I could remember, made any sacrifices, or even lost a man, and where their case for compensation arose solely out of a somewhat vague phrase in the Treaty of London, they appeared to claim as a right compensation, for which it was very difficult to find justification.

I told the Ambassador exactly what had happened at Paris. When I was discussing with M. Briand the concessions that it might be necessary to make to the Kemalist Party, in the event of negotiations being reopened with them, M. Briand had himself taken the initiative in remarking that, in his judgment, the Turks would be found to be just as sensitive about the infringement of their sovereignty involved in the Tripartite Agreement as they were about Smyrna or Thrace, and, accordingly, that a modification of that agreement would probably turn out to be one of the conditions of success. I had expressed my entire agreement with this line of reasoning, and while willing to adhere to any engagement which the British Government had made in what was, so far as we were concerned, only a self-denying ordinance, I yet felt that the French and Italian Governments would find it very difficult to get any Turkish Government to accept the agreement in anything like its present form, and that they had better put their heads together in order to find some way out of the difficulty.

M. Briand had taken the line, in the presence of the Italian Ambassador at Paris, that the advantages which France and Italy desired might be obtained in another way with the free consent of the Turkish Government; and I had said that I had no objection to any such an arrangement. It was, however, a matter for the French and Italians to arrange between themselves. All this was said in the presence of Count Bonin, who had, naturally enough, declined in any way to compromise his Government, and had expressed with candour the kind of reception which he thought any such modification would meet with in Italy.

There, I said, the matter must for the moment rest. I warned the Ambassador that, should we come to the point of resuming negotiations with Turkey, the subject could not in all probability be escaped.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.